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This thesis explores the construction, implementation and experience of transitional 
justice at both the state-level in Uganda, and within the Acholi sub-region, the epicenter 
of the twenty-year war between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army.  It takes 2006 as its starting point, when peace talks began between both sides in 
Juba, southern Sudan.  Conducted against the background of the ICC’s first ever arrest 
warrants for leading members of the LRA, these talks provided the empirical context for 
the major theoretical debates that dominated the nascent field of transitional justice.  
These included normative disagreements about the relationship between peace and 
justice and the relative merits of international versus indigenous approaches to justice.  
At Juba, an Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation was signed and purported 
to address and resolve these dilemmas.  To date however, we know remarkably little 
about the political and socio-legal dynamics and trajectory of transitional justice in 
Uganda since Juba.  This thesis aims to bridge that gap, providing an in-depth, empirical 
study based on extensive fieldwork involving 106 semi-structured interviews, 25 focus 
group discussions and participant observation.   
 
Two major dissonances are identified in the promotion, practice and experience of 
transitional justice in Uganda since 2006.  The first highlights the dilemmas surrounding 
contemporary donor approaches to transitional justice in the absence of a substantive 
domestic political transition.  The interaction of a technocratic and apolitical donor 
approach with a reactive, procrastinatory and occasionally opportunistic GoU approach, 
created a stasis which prevented the emergence of a transitional justice policy for 
Uganda.   The second area of dissonance identified was between the ‘local’ as imagined 
in transitional justice narratives and the local as lived experience in post-conflict 
Acholiland.   Rhetoric around particular ‘Acholi’ approaches to transitional justice, 
focusing on values of forgiveness and reconciliation, has obscured both the complexity 
of post-conflict local justice practices and the extent to which these processes and their 
outcomes were highly contingent on the wider, post-conflict socio-economic context, 
including poverty, physical and spiritual insecurity, and other quotidian strains.  Finally, 
in its treatment of the northern Ugandan case, this thesis contributes to broader 
theoretical debates about how transitional justice is constructed and practiced, 
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In late 2003, the Government of Uganda (GoU) issued an innocuous sounding ‘Referral 
of the Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’ to the newly formed 
International Criminal Court (ICC).  Early the following year, at a public press 
conference in London, the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, and the 
President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, made public a legal process which placed the 
ongoing conflict in northern Uganda at the heart of debates about the relationship 
between peace and justice.  In October 2005, the ICC unsealed its first ever arrest 
warrants, charging five Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commanders with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.1  The Ugandan situation, said one observer, was ‘a litmus test 
for the much celebrated promise of global justice’.2  Payam Akhavan, a former legal 
adviser to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), went so far as to 
suggest that because of the ICC intervention, ‘the prospect of sustained national peace 
may finally be within Uganda’s reach for the first time since its independence in 1962’.3  
A year later, in 2006, peace talks between the LRA and the GoU began in Juba, the 
capital of the then semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS).4  For some, 
Akhavan’s position remained credible, for others precisely the opposite was now the 
case: the ICC arrest warrants were a direct impediment to the successful completion of 
the most promising peace process in twenty years. 
 
From the outset, the ICC faced significant controversy in Uganda.  This centered on two 
particularly delicate issues.   First, commentators questioned the wisdom of attempting to 
render justice prior to the settlement of the conflict; and second they questioned the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For details of the arrest warrants see the ICC website: http://icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/ (accessed January 2014).  
Arrest warrants were issued for alleged Commander in Chief of the LRA, Joseph Kony; alleged Second-in-
Command of the LRA, Vincent Otti (now deceased); alleged deputy Army Commander of the LRA, Okot 
Odhiambo; Alleged Brigade Commander, Dominic Ongwen and alleged Deputy Army Commander, Raska 
Lukwiya (now deceased).  
2 Quoted in Mark Kersten, ‘Why Uganda is our best chance to get the bottom of the peace and justice 
debate’, Justice in Conflict (15 June 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/06/15/why-uganda-is-our-best-
chance-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-the-peace-justice-debate/ (accessed November 2011) 
3 Payam Akhavan, ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to 
the International Criminal Court,’ American Journal of International Law, 99:2 (2005), pp.403-421, 421. 
4 South Sudan was declared an independent state in July 2011, following a popular referendum. 
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appropriateness of an international body intervening in a local space.5  Many Ugandans, 
particularly the Acholi in the north, who had suffered at the hands of both the LRA and 
the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), could not understand why only one side 
was being held to account.  Then, as it became clear that the ICC would under no 
circumstances withdraw its warrants, the court came to be seen by many as the ultimate 
peace spoiler, an institution whose inflexibility would prolong a devastating conflict and 
thus determine the fate of millions of northern Ugandans. 6   A ‘victim’ discourse 
developed, amplified through Uganda-based NGOs, Acholi religious, traditional and 
political leaders, and sympathetic scholars.  The narrative was damning: the very people 
in whose interests the ICC should have been acting – the victims of mass atrocities – 
viewed the court as biased, counterproductive, and recklessly irresponsible.7  These 
charges were compounded by another: not only was the ICC dangerous, it was a sinister 
product of Western judicial neo-imperialism that sought to privilege foreign concepts of 
retributive justice over traditional ‘Acholi values’ of reconciliation and forgiveness.8  
These contentions created a highly charged atmosphere at the Juba peace talks (JPT), and 
sparked a vociferous debate among researchers, international donors, civil society and 
local leaders, about what the Acholi truly want in terms of justice and how that might be 
achieved in the context of ongoing negotiations.9   
 
At the time of the Juba talks, Uganda was the transitional justice case study.  This was the 
first time anywhere that peace talks had begun against the backdrop of charges brought 
by the ICC against key members of one of the negotiating sides.10  The talks provided !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Critiques of the ICC’s intervention in Uganda at this time include: Refugee Law Project, ‘On the 
Announcement of Formal Investigations of the Lord’s Resistance Army by the Chief Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court and Its implications fon the Search for Peaceful Solutions to the War in 
Northern Uganda’ (28 July 2004); Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, ‘Whose Justice? Perceptions of 
Ugandaʼs Amnesty Act 2000’, Refugee Law Project Working Paper, 15 (February, 2005); Lucy Hovil and 
Joanna Quinn, ‘Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’, Refugee Law Project 
Working Paper, 17 (July, 2005); Adam Branch, ‘International Justice, Local Injustice’ Dissent Magazine, 
(Summer, 2004); Phillip Kasaija Apuuli, ‘The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) Insurgency in Northern Uganda’, Criminal Law Forum, 15:4 (2004), pp.391-409.!
6 Ibid.  There is an international relations literature which examines the notion of peace process ‘spoilers’, 
see, for example, Stephen John Steadman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, 22:2 
(1997), pp.5-53 and Marie-Joelle Zahar, ‘Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes’ in John Darby 
and Roger MacGinty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).  
7 ibid 
8 ibid!
9 Ibid; Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p.208 
10 Although, it should be noted, not the first time that charges were brought against persons thought to be 
critical to a peace process.  In 1995 the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders Radovan Karadzic and 
Ratko Mladic were indicted by the ICTY, in the midst of conflict, ensuring their exclusion from 
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empirical context for the major theoretical debates that had dominated the nascent field 
of transitional justice since its emergence in the late-1980s.11  Was peace more important 
than justice?  Should truth and reconciliation have been foregrounded over prosecution?  
Were local justice methods more appropriate than national and international ones?  One 
scholar, present in Juba at the time, likened these ‘either/or’ polemics to competitive 
sports rivalry: a football match in which one felt they had to choose ‘sides’.12  But while 
the academic and NGO discussion was hyperactive during Juba it quite quickly petered 
out around the time that the talks failed, in December 2008.  This is surprising because 
the Juba process left an important legacy – an Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation (AAR), signed by the GoU and the LRA/M in June 2007 and an 
implementing protocol signed in February 2008 (from here on the ‘AAR agreements’).13  
The agreements proposed a national procedure for dealing with LRA and UPDF crimes: 
domestic trials, in combination with other mechanisms, including traditional justice; a 
‘body’ to ‘inquire into the past’; and reparations for victims.  The GoU committed itself 
to implementing the AAR framework regardless of the failure of the talks.  To date, 
however, we know remarkably little about the trajectory of transitional justice debate, 
policy and practice in Uganda since the signing of that agreement. That story, in all its 





subsequent peace talks, and in May 1999 the sitting president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Slobodan Milosevic, was indicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Kosovo. 
11 For a conceptual history of transitional justice, see Paige Arthur, ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human 
Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’, Human Rights Quarterly, 31 (2009), pp.321-367; for 
overview of the key debates in the scholarly field, see Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, ‘Advocacy and 
Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice’, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 7 (2004), pp.345-362; Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations 
of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 26 (2014), pp.149-178. 
 
12 Comments made by Dr Phil Clark, ‘Taking Stock of Transitional Justice’, Conference of the Oxford 
Transitional Justice Network, Oxford, June 2009, http://media.podcasts.ox.ac.uk/socleg/otjr/clark-
12 Comments made by Dr Phil Clark, ‘Taking Stock of Transitional Justice’, Conference of the Oxford 
Transitional Justice Network, Oxford, June 2009, http://media.podcasts.ox.ac.uk/socleg/otjr/clark-
medium-audio.mp3?CAMEFROM=podcastsGET (accessed February 2011) 13!Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
and the Lords Resistance Army/Movement, 29 June 2007, available online at 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace_agreements.php (accessed September 2010); Annexure to the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 19 February 2008, available online at  
http://www.beyondjuba.org/peace_agreements.php (accessed September 2010). 
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This thesis empirically examines the political and socio-legal dynamics and trajectory of 
transitional justice in Uganda since 2006, when the Juba peace talks began. It is, in 
essence, a case study, which uses detailed, in-depth contextual analysis to develop a 
better understanding of a contemporary phenomenon, ‘transitional justice’, in its ‘real life 
context’.14  Putting aside idealized notions of what transitional justice ‘ought’ to achieve, it 
interrogates the reality of transitional justice in Uganda.15   
 
The research addresses two central themes.  The first is how transitional justice has been 
perceived, conceptualised, transacted and produced in various ‘localities’ across the 
Ugandan political spectrum.16  This ranges from Ministers sitting in Cabinet meetings, to 
staff sitting in donor offices, to ‘traditional’ chiefs in rural Acholiland. This involves 
analysis of how different transitional justice conceptions, underpinned by alternate logics 
and objectives, interacted, collided and sometimes reinforced one another.   The second 
area of inquiry moves beyond transitional justice per se, to address how relevant this 
project, in all its multiple conceptions, has been to people on the ground in Acholiland 
who negotiate post-conflict realities on a daily basis.   
 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that while other sub-regions in northern Uganda 
were affected by LRA violence, most notably Lango, Teso and West Nile, Acholiland 
was the epicenter of violence and displacement throughout the war.17  Acholiland was 
also distinct from other war-affected regions in northern Uganda in that its people 
confronted, in extremis, two dilemmas associated with the complexity of post-Cold War 
conflicts.  The first was that mass violence was perpetrated and suffered by civilians who 
knew one another – neighbours and relatives – who, in the war’s aftermath have had to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (Newbury Park: Sage, 1984).  
15 It has become almost a truism that much of the theoretical transitional justice literature is highly 
normative and often assumes links between process and outcome that the empirical evidence does not 
support.  For studies examining these claims, see Oskar Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, ‘State-Level 
Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 4:3(2010), pp. 
329-354 and Anna Macdonald, Local Understandings and Experiences of Transitional Justice: a review of the evidence, 
Justice and Security Research Programme, Working Paper 6 (2013). 
16 See Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, ‘Introduction’, in Lars Waldorf and Rosalind Shaw (eds.), Localizing 
Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 
pp.6-9, for a discussion about framing the ‘local’ in transitional justice research.!
17 Today, the Acholi sub-region, also sometimes called Acholiland, is made up of seven districts: Gulu, 
Kitgum, Pader, Agago, Nwoya, Amuru and Lamwo.  There is also a small Acholi population in Southern 
Sudan.  The 2002 census put the population of Acholiland at 1.17 million.  Fieldwork was also conducted 
in West Nile, but not as intensively.  The most comprehensive study of ‘victim perceptions’ across the 
entire northern Uganda region is Making Peace Our Own, Victims Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and 
Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights 
(2007).   
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co-exist again as ‘intimate enemies’.18  The second dilemma was that those who carried 
out violent acts as members of the LRA, and those who suffered at their hands, were a 
diverse group, and often did not fit neatly into either ‘victim’ or ‘perpetrator’ categories.   
The majority, as Erin Baines argues:  
‘were neither high-level organizers, nor passive victims.  They include bystanders, 
collaborators, informants, forced perpetrators, victims-turned-perpetrators and 
perpetrators-turned-victims’.19 
 
It was into this highly complex social and moral situation that different transitional 
justice conceptions emerged and intervened.  This thesis is concerned both with the 
motivations and political objectives informing these conceptions, but also with the way 
in which they fit with what Juan Diego Prieto labelled, in the context of Columbia, ‘local 
co-existence situations’.20  It is both important and necessary to make a distinction 
between ‘transitional justice’ as an articulated set of prescriptions about how society 
ought to respond to mass atrocity, and what might be termed ‘justice in transition’. 
‘Justice in transition’ here refers to the ways in which communities across Acholiland, 
affected by violence, construct and experience social coexistence, justice, and repair, in 
the context of their everyday lives. 21  As will be shown, sometimes these processes over-
lapped with macro-transitional justice narratives; in other cases a relationship was much 
harder to discern.   
 
The approach to this research takes as a starting point the assertion of Bruce Baker and 
Eric Scheye that conventional paradigms in international policy need to be challenged by 
an assessment of ‘the reality on the ground… unshackled by normative considerations’.22   
Similarly, Alex De Waal makes reference to the ‘original sin’ of much international policy, 
namely that it prescribes and justifies while overlooking the essential analysis of how 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Kimberly Theidon, ‘Justice in Transition: the micro-politics of reconciliation in postwar Peru’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 50:3 (2006), pp.433-457.  This dynamic is in many post-Cold War conflict contexts, see 
for example, Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) and Waldorf and Shaw, ‘Localizing’. !
19 Erin Baines, ‘Spirits and Social Reconstruction After Mass Violence: Re-thinking Transitional Justice’, 
African Affairs, 109:436 (2010), pp.409-430; Erin Baines, ‘Complex Political Perpetrators: Reflections on 
Dominic Ongwen, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47:2 (2009), pp.163-191. 
20 Juan Diego Prieto, ‘Together after War While the War Goes On: Victims, Ex-Combatants and 
Communities in Three Colombian Cities’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6 (2012), p.525-546 
21 Pierre Hazan, ‘Transitional Justice After September 11’, in Shaw et. al, ‘Localizing’, pp.49-65; Pilar Riano 
Alcala and Erin Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6 (2012), pp.385-393, 385; 
Prieto ‘Together’, p.525-546. 
22 Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, ‘Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile 
states’, Conflict, Security and Development, 7:4 (2007), pp.503-528, p.514 
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states and societies actually function.23  Indeed, a widespread critique of transitional justice 
scholarship and policy is that it has been too heavily rooted in normative notions of what 
is inherently believed to be right, rather than evidence about what has been occurring on 
the ground.  David Backer has highlighted the disproportionate emphasis in transitional 
justice scholarship on the ‘moral-philosophical and jurisprudential aspects’ of transitional 
justice processes and a preoccupation with ‘institutional design and implementation’, 
while Oskar Thoms et al have argued that transitional justice debates are ‘faith based’ 
rather than ‘fact based’.24   Indeed, despite the growth of the field and the proliferation of 
transitional justice practices, we still have a very rudimentary understanding of how these 
interventions are actually shaped and experienced domestically.   
 
This is recognised by both scholars and practitioners as a serious shortcoming.  Harvey 
Weinstein’s lamentation that ‘as a field, we have not been successful at promoting a 
research agenda that values the study of effectiveness’ is widely shared.25  One response 
has been a series of quantitative, large-n comparative studies, which employ datasets in 
order to try and establish causal links between transitional justice and broader, systemic 
statebuilding objectives such as peace, democratisation and human rights adherence.26  
These studies draw upon the ‘justice cascade’ theory, conceptualized by Ellen Lutz and 
Kathryn Sikkink in 2001 as a ‘dramatic shift in the legitimacy of the norms of individual 
criminal accountability for human rights violations and an increase in actions (like 
prosecutions) on behalf of those norms’.27  The argument follows that since the 1970s, 
there has been a proliferation of national, transnational and international criminal 
accountability for human rights crimes, and that this represents a ‘tipping point’, a 
moment where ‘a critical mass of actors has adopted a norm of practice, creating a strong 
momentum for change’.28  To date, critics have pointed to several methodological and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Alex De Waal, ‘Dollarised’, London Review of Books, 32:12 (2010), pp.31-41. 
24 David Backer, ‘Cross-National Comparative Analysis’ in Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter and 
Audrey R. Chapman (eds.), Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research 
(Washington D.C: USIP Press, 2009), 23-91; p.60 and Thoms et. al, ‘State-Level’, p.5. 
25 Harvey Weinstein, ‘Editorial Note: The Myth of Closure, the illusion of Reconciliation: Final Thoughts 
on Five Years as Co-Editor-In-Chief’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5:1 (2011), pp.1-10, p.3. 
26 See for example, Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne and Andrew Reiter, Transitional Justice in the Balance: Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington D.C: USIP Press, 2010) and Hun Joon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, 
‘How do Human Rights Prosecutions Improve Human Rights After Transition?’, Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Human Rights Law, 7:1 (2010), pp.69-90. 
27 Quoted in Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing the World 
(W.W.Norton: New York, 2011), p.6. 
28 Ibid, p.7. 
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data problems plaguing large-n macro-level TJ impact studies.29  Furthermore, these 
studies claims to tell us broadly whether accountability mechanisms decrease human 
rights abuses and ‘improve democracy’ but cannot tell us why, how or when.  This can 
only be understood through deep, contextual engagement with the underlying social, 
political and economic dynamics in any given place.   
 
The fact that a transitional or post-conflict regime has a new human rights framework or 
transitional justice policy tells us very little about whether society as a whole is on a new 
trajectory and in particular how communities and individuals understand and perceive 
these changes and whether this is reflected in everyday activity and behavior.   Indeed the 
first scholars to really engage with the ‘local’ in transitional justice asked whether 
‘universalistic assumptions about the benefits of justice accord with what people think on 
the ground?’ and whether ‘adequate account is taken of non-western cultures and beliefs 
and local practices of justice?’.30  This is an area of inquiry that tends to be ethnographic 
and interpretive and recently, edited volumes and journal collections have been published 
which engage closely with how transitional justice is viewed from the bottom up, across 
cases.31  This thesis takes this methodological and epistemological approach as its starting 
point and posits that such an approach is likely to ‘destablise’ many of the norms and 
assumptions upon which the positivist, large-n quantitative studies rest.   
 
Transitional justice in Uganda ‘since Juba’ is not easy terrain to navigate or conceptualise, 
marked as it has been by a plurality of claims, objectives and processes.  What this thesis 
shows is that transitional justice was constructed, implemented and experienced in 
messy, liminal, and multiple ways.  The contribution this research makes is three-fold.  
Firstly, through deep contextual analysis, it presents the first empirical account of the 
trajectory that transitional justice, in all of its multiple conceptions, has taken at both the 
state level in Kampala, and the local level in Acholiland, since the Juba peace talks began 
in 2006.  Secondly, two major dissonances are identified in the promotion, practice and 
experience of transitional justice in Uganda since 2006.  The first is between 
contemporary technocratic donor approaches to transitional justice in Uganda and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 For an overview of these critiques, see Thoms et. al, ‘State-Level’.!!
30 Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein, My Neighbour, My Enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass 
atrocity, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.2.  
31 See, for example, Shaw et al ‘Localising’; Alexander Hinton (ed.) Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and 
Local Realities after Mass Violence (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 2011); International Journal of 
Transitional Justice ‘Special Issue’ on ‘Transitional Justice and the Everyday’ (November 2012).!
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reactive, procrastinatory and occasionally opportunistic GoU approach.   The interaction 
between these approaches created a stasis which has prevented the emergence of a 
transitional justice policy for Uganda.  The second dissonance identified was between the 
local as imagined in transitional justice narratives and the local as lived experience in 
post-conflict Acholiland.  Rhetoric around particular ‘Acholi’ approaches to transitional 
justice, focusing on values of forgiveness and reconciliation, have not taken sufficient 
account of the highly flexible nature of local justice practices and the extent to which 
justice and reconciliation decisions are contingent on a wide range of post-conflict 
factors, including poverty and physical and spiritual insecurity.  Thirdly this thesis 
provokes broader, theoretical questions about the wisdom of promoting transitional 
justice in the absence of a substantive political transition; the prudence of current donor 
approaches to transitional justice; the relationship between over-simplified narratives 
about the ‘local’ and local realities; and crucially, how all of this relates to the individuals 
and communities who have been affected by violence, as they try to come to terms with 
what has happened to them and keep going.      
 
Background: War and transitional justice in northern Uganda 
 
The LRA was formed in 1987 by Joseph Kony, an Acholi who saw himself as a spirit 
medium and ‘spokesperson of God’.32  The LRA immediately began an armed rebellion 
against President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, which 
had installed itself in Kampala the preceding year.  The war between the Ugandan 
government and the LRA lasted roughly twenty years.  It was characterized by the brutal 
suffering of northern Ugandan civilians who bore the brunt of both LRA and NRA/M 
violence.   The LRA was notorious for the vicious injuries it inflicted upon those who 
were regarded as unsupportive of the rebel cause.  Incidents included the severing of lips, 
noses and ears and the dismembering and cooking of bodies.33  The LRA was also 
notable for its strategy of abducting and forcibly recruiting members, often children. 
Chris Blattman and Jeanie Annan, who conducted some of the most rigorous statistical 
analyses of abduction trends and patterns as part of the Survey of War Affected Youth 
(SWAY), estimated that around 66,000 people were abducted by the LRA during the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Introduction’, in Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (eds.), The Lords 
Resistance Army, Myth and Reality (London: Zed Books, 2010), pp.1-25, p.9-10. 
33 For accounts, see for example, ‘When the sun sets, we start to worry…’, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and IRIN (2004). 
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period that it was operational in northern Uganda, and roughly four fifths were under the 
age of eighteen.34  The SWAY data challenged ‘popular wisdom’ that 80 per cent of the 
LRA was made up of abductees but, as the authors note, ‘the 80 per cent figure is only a 
mild overstatement’.35  
 
Throughout the war Acholi political, religious, and traditional leaders made efforts to try 
to secure a peaceful solution to the conflict.  Their most notable success was a campaign 
for a blanket amnesty to cover all Ugandans ‘formerly or currently’ engaged in rebellion 
against the NRM government since 1986.36  Overcoming opposition from President 
Museveni, an Amnesty Act was passed by Parliament in January 2000, and although it 
was originally valid for only six months, it has been renewed several times since.37   As of 
May 2012, 26,288 people had benefitted from the amnesty, 49% of whom were members 
of the LRA.38  The Amnesty Act also established an Amnesty Commission, whose duties 
included ‘re-settling’ and ‘reintegrating’ reporters back into their communities, and 
providing them with modest ‘reinsertion packages’ containing basics including a mattress, 
plastic cups, and maize and bean seeds.39  Since relative peace returned to northern 
Uganda in 2006, the number of reporters has gradually dwindled, and international and 
government support for the Amnesty Act and Commission also ebbed away.40  In its 
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34 Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, ‘On the nature and causes of LRA abduction: what the 
abductees say’, in Allen and Vlassenroot, ‘Lords’, pp. 132-156, p.135; The authors acknowledge that any 
attempt to estimate abduction numbers is at best an ‘educated guess’.  They account for example, for 
falsely reported abductions but conclude that this may account for ‘at most a 5 or 10 percent 
overstatement’, see Blattman and Annan, ‘Nature’, p.134-5. 
35 Jeannie Annan, Christopher Blattman, Roger Horton, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern 
Uganda, Findings from the Survery for War Affected Youth, UNICEF (2006). 
36 For good analyses of the campaign for a blanket amnesty, see, Okello Lucima (ed.), Protracted conflict, 
elusive peace: Initiatives to end violence in northern Uganda, (London: Accord, 2002); Claudia Giampietri, Rendering 
Justice, Pursuing Peace, (Gulu: Human Rights Focus, 2010); Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal 
Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006). 
37 For a thorough analysis of the legal implications of the Act, see Sarah Nouwen, Complementarity in the line 
of fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 206-228; In May 2012, Part II of the Amnesty Act, the part of the Act that 
allows for the granting of an Amnesty Certificate was lapsed.  It was re-instated in May 2013.  This is 
explored in Chapter 6.  
38 Author interview, Justice Onega, Chair, Amnesty Commission, Kampala, 13.06.2012 
39 There is no unitary Demoblization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme for northern 
Uganda.  Because of the nature of abduction and return (which usually involved ‘escaping’ or being 
‘rescued’), most non-government and government initiatives focus on ‘Reintegration’ rather than on the 
two ‘Ds’.  Disarmament and demobilisation has been managed by the UPDF, and consists of short term 
detention in the UPDF Child Protection Unit, normally for around 48 hours, followed by transfer to a 
reception centre.   
40 In 2011, for example, there were only 29 reporters; this was down from 2906 in 2009 (email exchange 
between Amnesty Commission and Author, September 2012).  The two remaining reception centres in 
Gulu, Save the Children Organisation (GUSCO) and the World Vision, each had only two reporters in 
residence in August 2012.  By July 2013, both centres were preparing to close.!!The trajectory that the 
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more active period in the early and mid-2000s, the Commission carried out its re-
settlement and re-integration duties in co-ordination with the numerous NGO-
administered reception centres that were set up across Acholiland in the early 2000s. 41  
Since then, due to the lack of reporters, most have closed or are in the process of closing.   
There exists no precise data on the proportion of LRA returnees who actually took up 
the reception and amnesty process.  The best estimates indicate that over a half did not 
pass through a reception centre or receive any assistance from NGOs or from the 
government on their return.42  
 
Since 1988, the Ugandan government’s response to the LRA shifted between negotiation 
and military offensives.  From the mid-1990s onwards the government began moving 
civilians, often forcibly, from rural areas, into camps where the UPDF could ‘protect’ 
them.  It was estimated that by the late 1990s most of the people living in the Acholi 
sub-region were being kept in wretched conditions in ‘rural prisons,’ subjected to what 
would later be termed ‘social torture’.43  Indeed, by the early 2000s, the horrendous 
reality of life in the camps, and the perceived inadequacy of the GoU response to the 
situation in the north, led to increasing international pressure for a resolution to the 
conflict.44  A seemingly incoherent set of responses ensued.  The GoU flip-flopped 
between support for peace negotiations and support for military strikes, and in 2004 
President Museveni publicly announced the ICC referral while also declaring a ceasefire 
in the hope that Joseph Kony and his senior commanders would accept amnesty.45  
Then, in late 2005 Riek Machar, who was then vice president of GoSS, offered to 
mediate peace talks between the GoU and the LRA.  For reasons that will be explored in 
detail in Chapter 4, both sides agreed.  The peace talks began in Juba in July 2006, and 
resulted in a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA), signed between the LRA and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Amnesty Act has taken, and donor support for the Act, is a complex story that is told in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
41 The most comprehensive study on the Reception Centres is Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, A Hard 
Homecoming, Lessons learned from the reception center process in northern Uganda, (USAID and UNICEF: August 
2006).  
42 Annan et. Al, ‘SWAY’, p.63; Schomerus and Allen, ‘Hard’, p.viii.  Many of those who did take up the 
Amnesty Certificate later complained that they never received the re-insertion package.  In 2012, the 
Amnesty Commission claimed that of the 26,232 reporters that had been granted Amnesty, to date, 20,263 
had been issued with reinsertion kits.   
43 Allen and Vlassenroot, ‘Introduction’, p.14-15; Chris Dolan, Social Torture, The Case of Northern Uganda, 
1986-2006 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011).  
44 Allen and Vlassenroot, ‘Myth’, provides a series of contributions which analyse the national and 
international dynamics that led to the peace talks.  This will be explored more in Chapter 4.  
45 ‘Amnesty bitter on Kony pardon’, New Vision, 17 November 2004, 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/E/8/13/400686 (accessed January 2012) 
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GoU in August 2006.  Since then, relative peace returned to northern Uganda.46  It was 
estimated in 2010 that the vast majority of the 1.8 million people who lived in IDP 
camps at the peak of the crisis had returned to their areas of origin, or resettled 
elsewhere.47  
 
Over six years since the signing of the AAR agreements at Juba in 2007/8, there exists a 
mixture of international, governmental, NGO, private and hybrid initiatives aimed at 
transitional justice and broader social repair in northern Uganda, but these do not fall 
within a single policy framework or set of guiding principles.   At the state level, 
transitional justice discussions, research, policy development and programming has been 
based on implementation of the AAR agreements.  This has been co-ordinated by the 
Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) secretariat, which oversees the work of seventeen 
government departments, and is funded mostly by European donors. 48  Linked to 
transitional justice objectives but not explicitly framed as such, was the Government’s 
Peace, Recovery and Development Programme for Northern Uganda (PRDP), launched 
in September 2007.  This programme has been administered by the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM), and contains four strategic objectives, one of which was ‘peace-building 
and reconciliation.’  This objective is predominantly donor-funded.    
 
In mid-2013, JLOS circulated a draft Transitional Justice Policy amongst ‘key 
stakeholders’ for comment, but it was widely criticised as ‘incoherent’ and incomplete, 
and, as of the time of writing, in July 2014, its future remained uncertain.49  Of all the 
accountability and reconciliation ‘modalities’ agreed upon in the AAR, only the 
establishment of a special division of the High Court of Uganda – later named the 
International Crimes Division (ICD) – was implemented.   The court has heard only one 
ill-fated war crimes case, that of former LRA member Thomas Kwoyelo (which is the 
focus of Chapter 6).  The GoU also passed an International Criminal Court Act (ICC 
Act), in 2010, which provided for domestic jurisdiction over ICC Statute crimes.50  There 
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46 While the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) ended LRA attacks inside Uganda it did not lead, as 
anticipated, to a conclusive peace agreement.  The LRA has now shifted operations to South Sudan, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.   
47 UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Uganda, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html. 
(accessed January 2014).  
48 Donor support for JLOS is explored in Chapter 5. 
49 National Transitional Justice Policy (3rd Draft, May 2013) (on file with author); A Renewed Promise for Peace 
and Justice: The Reinstatement of Uganda’s Amnesty Act, Refugee Law Project Press Release (29 May 2013).  
50 International Criminal Court (ICC) Act, Uganda, March 2010 
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has been no significant progress on initiatives aimed at reparations or truth seeking.51  
‘Traditional’ justice processes, meanwhile, still remain the subject of policy discussion.52  
The much-touted ‘mato oput’ ceremonies, promoted by advocates as Acholi accountability 
and reconciliation rituals, have not taken place in large numbers.  Varying accounts 
placed the number of mato oput rituals that have been conducted between perpetrator and 
victim clans, in response to crimes committed during the conflict, at six at the most.53  
The Prime Minister of Ker Kwaro Acholi, the cultural body of the Acholi, said there had 
only been five.54 
 
Outside of the central government framework there have been numerous interventions 
in Acholiland which explicitly use the term ‘transitional justice’.  There exists, for 
example, a plethora of donor-funded initiatives aimed at encouraging dialogue around 
reconciliation and forgiveness for wrongs committed during the conflict.  Best-known 
among the organisations undertaking these activities are the Acholi Religious Leaders 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and the Acholi cultural institution the Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), 
as well as prominent NGOs, including the Refugee Law Project (RLP) and the Justice 
and Reconciliation Project (JRP).  These organisations regularly interact at local 
government level with the District Reconciliation and Peace Teams (DRPT), which are 
present in each of Acholiland’s seven districts, and are responsible for dealing with 
conflicts relating to the 20-year war.    !
Current state of the literature on transitional justice in Uganda !
Transitional justice emerged as a fully-fledged subject of academic inquiry and as a policy 
tool during the 1990s, although debates on transitional justice themes were evident 
throughout the twentieth century and long before that.55   The United Nations Secretary 
General (UNSG), Kofi Annan, outlined the UN’s normative commitment to transitional 
justice in his landmark report in 2004.  He defined transitional justice as:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 This is discussed in detail in Chapter five. 
52 In 2012, JLOS released a long awaited study report, Justice Law and Order Sector, Traditional Justice and 
Truth Telling and National Reconciliation, Study Report (July 2012) but with the delay on the National 
Transitional Policy, nothing has been implemented.  
53 The Prime Minister of Ker Kwaro Acholi put the number at four in August 2013, (author interview).  
The author was also informed about another Mato Oput ceremony that had taken place near Purrong sub-
county between two clans in 2012.  This is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. 
54 ibid 
55 See for example, Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.56  
 
Since then diplomats, lawyers, politicians, and scholars, have echoed the refrain that 
transitional justice must be implemented not only to ensure accountability for odious 
crimes, but also to promote democracy, reconciliation, truth, and even peace.57  Foreign 
aid and development agencies regularly engage with transitional justice issues, and 
mediators can no longer escape the call for accountability to be included in peace 
negotiations.58  In 2011 the World Bank’s World Development Report made explicit 
links between transitional justice, security, and development, and highlighted transitional 
justice as a ‘core program tool’ for breaking cycles of violence.59  The same year, the UN 
Human Rights Council established a mandate for a special rapporteur on the promotion 
of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence.  Access to justice, 
including transitional justice, is now widely regarded as a crucial component of the post-
2015, post-Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agenda.60  A recent editorial note in 
the International Journal for Transitional Justice stated that since the early 1990s ‘well 
over a billion dollars has been spent on transitional justice mechanisms’.61  Despite this, 
there remain key definitional, theoretical, and conceptual questions about what 
transitional justice is, and what it hopes to achieve, explored in Chapter 2.  
 
Current literature on transitional justice in Uganda falls into three overlapping categories.  
In no particular order, the first explores the power politics of international justice; the 
second considers the relationship between peace and justice; and the third is concerned 
with the study of local perceptions and experiences of war and justice in northern 
Uganda.  This last category takes the form of both large-scale survey-based analysis and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56The Rule of Law and Transitional justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary General, 
(S/2004/616) (23 August 2004), paragraph 8; Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and 
the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3 (2009), 5-27, p.9. 
57 For accounts, see Maria Avello, ‘European Efforts in Transitional Justice’, FRIDE Working Paper 58 
(June, 2008); Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice During 
Conflict’, Ethics and International Affairs, 24:2 (2010), pp.191-2011. 
58 Vinjamuri, ‘Deterrence’.  
59 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2011), p,17. 
60 ‘Link Between Rule of Law, Development Essential to Post-2015 Development Framework, Deputy 
Secretary General Tells Event on Transitional Justice’, UN Department of Public Information Press 
Release, 1 November 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/dsgsm721.doc.htm (accessed 
January 2014) 
61 Harvey Weinstein, ‘Editorial Note: The myth of closure, the illusion of reconciliation’, International Journal 
of Transitional Justice, 5:1 (2011), p.1-10, p.1 
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ethnographic and field-based research.  A preliminary observation is that much of the 
existing literature on transitional justice in Uganda appears slightly dated, as it was 
produced before, during, or shortly after the Juba peace talks.  There is very little analysis 
of the trajectory that transitional justice has taken in Uganda post-Juba.62   
Power pol i t i c s  and internat ional just i c e  
The ICC’s involvement in northern Uganda produced a body of literature examining the 
power politics of international criminal justice in that context.  Most vociferously, Adam 
Branch argued that the ICC represented a dangerous form of western intervention in 
Uganda, because it colluded with a ‘militarized security state’ in ‘the name of human 
rights’.63  Branch argued that the war on terror demonized the LRA as terrorists, while a 
human rights discourse provided the Ugandan government with a tool, ICC arrest 
warrants, to further legitimise and entrench its war against the north.  Other 
interpretations provided a more forensic account of the relationship between the 
Museveni regime and the ICC.  Phil Clark, for example, argued that the Ugandan 
Government amply demonstrated the finesse with which political elites in Africa are able 
to ‘ensure that interventions by international institutions ultimately play to their 
advantage’.64  
 
A related argument questioned the normative power of international criminal justice. In 
Uganda, the negotiations that led to the Juba peace talks in early 2006 saw President 
Museveni essentially rebuff the ICC by promising to ‘guarantee’ Joseph Kony’s safety.65  
Indeed the Ugandan government’s attitude toward the ICC has vacillated between 
support and refrain, raising important questions about the political dynamics of norm 
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62 Two important exceptions are firstly, Sarah Nouwen, ‘Complementarity’, but the focus of the book is on 
one element of transitional justice, criminal justice and secondly Joanna Quinn’s chapter on transitional 
justice and peacebuilding in Uganda, see, Joanna Quinn, ‘‘The Supposed Accountability/Peacebuilding 
Dilemma: The Case of Uganda’, in Chandra Lekha Sriram, Jemima Garcia-Godos, Johanna Herman and 
Olga Martin-Otega (eds.), Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and ex-Combatants, 
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63 Adam Branch, ‘Darfur and Northern Uganda: Two Models of Intervention’, essay posted on ‘Making 
Sense of Sudan Blog’, April 25th 2009, http://africanarguments.org/2009/04/25/darfur-and-northern-
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64 Phil Clark and Nicholas Waddell ‘Introduction’ in Phil Clark and Nicholas Waddell (eds.) Courting in 
Conflict: Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, (London: Royal African Society, 2008); Phil Clark, ‘Chasing 
Cases: The ICC and the Politics of State Referral in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda’, in 
The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). See also, Mahnoush Arsanjani and Michael Reisman, ‘The Law-In-Action of the International 
Criminal Court’, American Journal of International Criminal Law, 99 (2005), pp.385-403. 
65 This is explored fully in Chapter four. 
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compliance and enforcement.66  Linked to this were important questions about the 
internal dynamics and priorities of the ICC itself.  Clark showed that the Uganda case 
selection and prosecutorial strategy was symptomatic of a new and insecure institution 
trying to establish itself as a global player in the fight against impunity.  Its investigations 
into LRA, but not UPDF crimes, created a perception of the ICC as fundamentally 
motivated by a desire to ‘get legal runs on the board in order to build support among its 
States Parties’.67  The motivations of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) itself have 
therefore been just as contested as the motivations of the GoU in the Ugandan context.    
Peace and just i c e  in northern Uganda: Juba and beyond  
With the exception of Mareike Schomerus’s unique ethnographic study of the Juba peace 
talks from the perspective of the LRA, the available literature on the talks is largely NGO 
material that, in keeping with contemporary debates, framed the Juba talks in terms of 
the peace versus justice dichotomy.68  At the time, this was a polarized and largely 
theoretical debate, and the claims of each side were almost impossible to substantiate.  
Graeme Simpson questioned the rigidity of normative positions, arguing that coverage of 
the Ugandan situation betrayed a ‘reductionist’ approach to peace and justice.  He called 
for an alternative approach, one in which ‘diverse accountability mechanisms can 
contribute to peace-building efforts, rather than compromise them’.69  The call for a 
‘holistic approach’ is now widespread in the NGO and academic literature on transitional 
justice in Uganda, but this prescription tends to assess the relationship between different 
transitional justice processes in apolitical and unproblematic terms.70  
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Other literature exploring what happened at Juba, and the implications for transitional 
justice in Uganda has been legal and technical in nature.  For international lawyers and 
legal scholars, discussions at the Juba talks around domestic prosecutions for war crimes, 
sparked a great deal of debate about the possible applicability of the Rome Statute’s 
‘complementarity’ provision. 71   There have also been a number of reports by 
international human rights organisations that examine, from a narrow legalistic point of 
view, the agreements that were produced at Juba and the institutions that were 
proposed.72  
 
Field based research explor ing ‘ local ’  just i c e  and reconc i l iat ion in northern Uganda 
Since the ICC referral was made public in 2004, a great deal of literature has been 
produced which aims either to measure and/or interpret Acholi perspectives on conflict-
related justice processes.  The Berkeley-Tulane Center for Human Rights has produced 
three cross-regional public attitude surveys aimed at recording views on the relationship 
between peace and justice in northern Uganda.73  These have some value in that they 
examine responses across large geographical areas and investigate the relative significance 
of key variables, such as ethnicity and exposure to violence as factors in shaping 
attitudes.74  Answers to standardised questions, however, do not reveal very much about 
the ‘intersubjectively constructed concepts’ that inform people’s beliefs, opinions and 
evaluations about conflict and justice.75  According to Gauri et. al an understanding of 
these ‘sources of meaning’ requires ethnographic, historical and interpretative work.76  In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Reconciliation Raise Questions’, International Refugee Rights Initiative, 4:3, (2008); Michael Otim and Marieke 
Wierda, ‘Uganda: Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court’, International Center for 
Transitional Justice (2010); Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice for Serious Crimes Before National Courts: 
Uganda’s International Crimes Division’ (2012).!
73 These have been carried out in partnership with other organisations.  Pham et. Al, Forgotten Voices: A 
Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda’, Human Rights Center, University 
of California, Berkeley and International Center for Transitional Justice (2005); Pham et. al, When the War 
Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes About Peace, Justice, and Social Reconstruction in Northern Uganda, 
Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, Payson Center for International Development, 
Tulane University and International Center for Transitional Justice (2007); Pham et. al. ‘Tramsitioning to 
Peace:  A Population-Based Survey on attitudes about social reconstruction and justice in Northern Uganda, Human 
Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley (2010).  
74 For a discussion of the numerous surverys, see, Harvey Weinstein, Laurel Fletcher, Patrik Vinck, and 
Phuong Pham, ‘Stay the Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities Take Priority? in Shaw et al., ‘Localizing’, pp.49-
69. 
75 Varun Gauri, Micheal Woolcock and Deval Desai, ‘Intersubjective Meaning and Collective Action in 




this vein, a qualitative study was conducted on behalf of the UN Office for the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 2007, and it gathered information about public 
perceptions of peace and accountability. It employed a ‘narrative method’ and revealed a 
much more nuanced set of findings.77  In general, however, it is the large-scale attitudinal 
surveys that have attracted the most attention in the wider literature.  Worryingly, cursory 
reference to these survey findings often appear as a ‘nod’ to including the ‘local’ in 
research, and despite shifting contexts and attitudes, findings are presented as ‘evidence’ 
of timeless public perceptions and priorities, and as a barometer for the success of 
initiatives.78 
 
There exists an important body of interview-based and ethnographic work focused on 
the value of post-conflict ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ justice in northern Uganda.  The 
debate on the relative merits of this approach to transitional justice has, again, been 
intense, and tends to be framed in an unhelpful ‘retributive versus restorative’ justice 
dichotomy.79  In 2005, after the ICC arrest warrants were announced, both the Refugee 
Law Project and the Liu Institute for Global Affairs, working in collaboration with the 
Gulu NGO Forum, published reports which challenged the appropriateness of 
international justice in the Acholi context.  Both reports acknowledged that many of the 
values and processes underpinning traditional mechanisms were disrupted and displaced 
by the conflict, but emphasised that the ‘general’ view in northern Uganda was that 
traditional or localised justice practices, particularly the ritual of mato oput, should play a 
‘significant’ role in any post-conflict phase.80  In his book Trial Justice, Tim Allen, reached 
very different conclusions about the status of local rituals such as mato oput, and local 
perceptions of the ICC.  He found that people did want legal accountability in 
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77 UNOHCR, ‘Making’. 
78 Macdonald, ‘Local’, p.60; examples include, Renee Jeffery, ‘Forgiveness, amnesty and justice: The case of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda’, Cooperation and Conflict, 46:78 (2011) and Cecily Rose, 
‘Looking beyond amnesty and traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms in Northern Uganda: a 
proposal for truth telling and reparations’, Boston College Third World Law Journal 28:2, (2008), p.345-67 
79 See for example, Joanna Quinn, ‘Social Reconstruction in Uganda: The Role of Informal Mechanisms in 
Transitional Justice’, Human Rights Review, 8:4 (2007), pp.389-407; James Latigo, ‘Nothern Uganda: 
tradition-based practices in the Acholi region’, in Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, Learning from African Experiences (Stockholm: IDEA), pp.85-123 
80 Hovil and Quinn, ‘Peace’, p.3;  For similar arguments see: James Latigo, ‘Northern’; Erin Baines, Roco 
Wat I Acoli: Restoring Relationships in Acholiland: Traditional Approaches to Justice and Reintegration, Justice and 
Reconciliation Project, (September, 2005); Erin Baines, ‘The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to 
Justice and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007), pp.91-114.  
See also, Thomas Harlacher et. Al, Traditional Ways of Coping in Acholi, (Caritas: 2006), which documents 
numerous Acholi rituals.   
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Acholiland and that attitudes towards the ICC were often positive.81  Allen questioned 
the ‘romantic enthusiasm’ for traditional justice, arguing that rituals of healing were 
common in northern Uganda, but that attempts externally to fund and codify ritual 
processes were both dangerous and distorting. 82   Meanwhile, Sverker Finnström’s 
ethnographic analysis brought some clarity to seemingly confusing and contradictory 
findings. Finnström described a ‘pragmatic pluralism’ in which people selected ‘in 
different contexts and at different historical moments, which of several strategies will 
best allow them to survive and reconstruct their lives’.83  Finnström argued that the 
tendency to dichotomize ritual action against international justice systems was 
misdirected, because ‘Ugandans are, and always have been, realists and pragmatic 
pluralists’.84  
 
Erin Baines has similarly attempted to break down the conceptual barrier between 
restorative and retributive justice processes.85  Baines has called for scholars to pay closer 
attention to Acholi moral and spirit worlds, and in particular, the way in which these 
shape the process of social healing.86  Other attempts to address this question have 
continued to document Acholi rituals and call both implicitly and explicitly for these to 
be supported with external funds or assistance as part of the peace process.87   
 
Gaps that this  research addresses 
A reading of the extant literature on transitional justice in Uganda reveals four gaps 
which this research addresses.  In doing so, it makes a significant empirical contribution 
to the literature.  First, there has been very little reflective scholarly analysis examining 
the role that ‘justice’ issues actually played during the Juba peace talks.  What is missing 
from the literature is a discussion which contextualizes and historicizes ‘justice’ at Juba, 
rather than abstracting it in the service of normative, theoretical arguments about the 
more general relationship between peace and justice.  There remains a lack of focused 
analysis on the process leading up to the drafting of the AAR agreements, and the 
politics and objectives informing the positions of both the LRA and the GoU.  Given !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Tim Allen, ‘Trial’, p.96-127. 
82 Tim Allen ,‘Trial’, p.167; For a further critique of the traditional justice agenda, see Adam Branch, ‘The 
Violence of Peace: Ethnojustice in northern Uganda, 45:3 (2014), pp.608-630. 
83 Sverker Finnström, ‘Reconciliation grown bitter? War, retribution and ritual action in northern Uganda’, 
in Shaw et. Al, ‘Localising’, pp.135-157, p.22 
84 ibid, p.153 
85 Baines was main author of the controversial ‘Roco Wat’ report. 
86 Erin Baines, ‘Spirits’. 
87 See for example, Baines, ‘Haunting’, Harlacher et. al, ‘Coping’.  
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that the AAR agreements have shaped the direction of Uganda’s transitional justice 
debate and programming subsequently, this is a gap which this research addresses.  
 
Second, there has been very little examination of donor motivations and domestic 
political dynamics around implementation of the AAR agreements since Juba.  Sarah 
Nouwen’s recent book Complementarity in the Line of Fire, interrogates the path that 
domestic criminal justice has taken, through the lens of the ICC ‘complementarity’ 
principle, but otherwise very little is known about the political trajectory that transitional 
justice as a ‘package’ of measures has taken.  The ICC became more of a dormant 
presence from 2008 onwards in Uganda.  This thesis reflects this and focuses – at the 
state level - on a different set of actors that came to shape transitional justice in Uganda: 
most notably donors, JLOS staff, and those political and legal actors involved in the new 
domestic War Crimes Court.    
 
Third, whilst much has been written about forgiveness and reconciliation in the Acholi 
context, it is the mediated and ideal-type formulations of ‘local approaches’ which are 
foregrounded.  This is the case both for supporters and for detractors of this form of 
transitional justice.  What has received scarce attention are the less externally-mediated 
ways in which people and communities across Acholiland have been reconstructing the 
‘basic fabrics’ of meaningful social, political, and economic life, against the backdrop of 
their lived war experiences.88  This might involve activities that are, to some degree, 
structured, such as ritual, the organization of saving and loan associations or the role of 
local courts in dispute resolution.  It might also involve less articulated processes, such as 
supportive discussions with neighbours during prayer groups, or social interaction during 
joint gardening work.  It is important here to avoid what Kimberley Theidon calls a 
‘facile embrace of the local’.89  It is patently evident that processes of social repair in 
post-conflict Acholiland can be violent and discriminatory.  For example, a widespread 
claim amongst returnees is that they are socially and economically excluded from and 
rejected by their families and communities.90   It must also be emphasized that the 
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88 Alcala and Baines, ‘Editorial’, p.386.  Baines’s study ‘Reconstructing’, is an important exception, but the 
focus here is purely on ‘sprit worlds’ and their role in reconstruction.   
89 Kimberley Thiedon, ‘Editorial Note’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3:3 (2009), pp.295-300, 
p.296 
90 This is explored in Chapter 8. 
! 28 
‘everyday’ in local spaces is neither mundane, nor stable, nor uneventful.91  In northern 
Uganda, stark social deprivations and continuing structural violence interfere regularly in 
daily life, and in unpredictable ways.  However, a comprehensive account of transitional 
justice in northern Uganda is not possible if we ignore the myriad ways in which people 
and communities actually experience co-existence and actually go about reconstructing 
their worlds against the backdrop of the enormous injustice of a twenty-year war.   
 
Holly Porter’s research on responses to sexual violence in Acholiland is the most 
comprehensive effort to date to situate responses to wrongdoing in the broader social, 
cosmological, and political context.92   This research hopes to follow Porter’s broad 
approach, but also that of Elizabeth Drexler, who, in the context of East Timor, warned 
against ‘excessive localisation’ because it risks neglecting the structural conditions that led 
to the violence in the first place and shapes and constrains possible options for 
accountability and reconciliation.93   This links to the fourth and final gap in the existing 
literature, which is that scholars of transitional justice in Uganda have tended to direct 
their attention to the level of social or institutional structure that they are interested in, or 
would like to see transitional justice efforts address.94  Instead, this research explores how 
different transitional justice conceptions and practices converge, diverge or bear any 
relationship at all to one another, whilst also examining how this fits with the local ‘co-
existence’ situations described above. 
 
Research design and methodology 
 
The research design was based on a ‘within-case’ study approach.  This allowed for the 
development of an intimate familiarity with the Ugandan context in order to discern how 
various political, cultural and socio-legal patterns refuted, expanded and complicated the 
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91 The concept of the ‘everyday’ is still relatively under-conceptualised, see Ben Highmore (ed.), The 
Everyday Life Reader, (New York: Routledge, 2002).  The November 2012 special edition of the 
International Journal of Transitional Justice was entitled ‘Transitional Justice and the Everyday’.   
92 Holly E. Porter, After Rape: Justice and Social Harmony in Northern Uganda, PhD Thesis, London School of 
Economics and Political Science (2013).  
93 Elizabeth Drexler, ‘Addressing the legacies of mass violence and genocide in Indonesia and East Timor’, 
in Alexander Hinton and Kevin O’Neill (eds.), Genocide: truth, memory and representation (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009), pp. 219-247, p.230. 
94 See, Geoff Dancy, ‘Impact Assessment, Not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role for Positivism in the 
Study of Transitional Justice’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 4:3 (2010), pp.355-376, p.361.  
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particular phenomenon under study: transitional justice. 95   The within-case study 
approach also has particular value in addressing contemporary events. As Yin argues, it 
deploys the same techniques as history but adds, ‘two sources of evidence not usually 
included in the historian’s repertoire: direct observation and systematic interviewing’.96  
The research was conducted using a range of qualitative research methods in order to 
ensure a comprehensive and ‘thick’ examination of transitional justice in Uganda through 
multiple sources of evidence.97  Data was collected using three main techniques: semi-
structured interviews; focus group discussions and participant observation.  In total, 
eight months were spent in Uganda from April 2012 to October 2012 and from July 
2013 to September 2013.  Two and a half months were spent in Kampala, the capital city 
of Uganda, and five and a half months in Acholiland, northern Uganda.  During this 
period, 106 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with people across the 
Ugandan political spectrum, from donors to cabinet ministers to JLOS bureaucrats to 
religious and traditional leaders in Acholiland.  In addition, 25 focus group discussions 
were conducted exploring the connections between macro-level transitional justice 
narratives and practices and local realities.  It should be noted that ‘local’ is understood 
broadly as comprising the sub-state, the community and the individual. It is also used 
interchangeably with ‘micro-level’. The approach here borrows from Shaw et. al’s 
description of the local as a ‘standpoint based in a particular locality but not bounded by 
it’. 98   Such an approach guards against the mischaracterisation of local spaces as 
somehow remote, marginal and circumscribed.99    
 
The first stage of the research involved analysis of the existing secondary literature on the 
history, politics, and culture of Uganda since pre-colonial times.  It also involved a 
rigorous review of the transitional justice, legal anthropology and peace-building 
literatures.100   This included academic books and journal articles, reviews of press 
clippings, and a close interrogation of publicly available government, inter-governmental, 
and donor policy reports, NGO reports, and evaluation reports.  The research findings !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Barbara L. Paterson, ‘Within-Case Analysis’, in Mills et. al (ed), Encyclopedia of Case Study Research 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 2010), pp.304-324. 
96 R. Yin, Case Study Research: Designs and Methods (Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage Publications, 1994), p.8.!
97 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
p.17. 
98 Shaw et. al, ‘Localizing’, p.6 
99 Ibid. 
100 Research on the existing transitional justice literature was aided by a grant from the Justice and Security 
Research Programme at the London School of Economics, which allowed me to carry out a systematic 
evidence review of local experiences of transitional justice processes.  
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also rely on examination of a selection of primary data.  Access to this data was granted 
in a discretionary manner and none of it is in public archives.  The material included a 
selection of restricted documents from an archive of the Juba peace talks; a selection of 
restricted documents from the first trial of the War Crimes Division of the High Court 
of Uganda; data from the Office of the Prime Minister, on Peace, Recovery and 
Development Programme (PRPD) for northern Uganda; unpublished evaluation reports; 
a selection of archives from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) ‘external 
security’ department; and, finally, two unpublished manuscripts on Acholi history and 
culture.  !
The second stage of the research involved semi-structured interviews and focus groups.  
The purpose of semi-structured interviews was three-fold.  Firstly to try and establish the 
attitudes, values, and motivations of ‘public authority figures’ involved in transitional 
justice process in Uganda.  Public authority is understood here as the existing structures 
that perform governing functions, as well as possibly delivering other services or 
maintaining ideas about social duty and morality.  The term can therefore refer to 
everything from administrative systems associated with formal state government to the 
influence of clan elders.101  Secondly the aim was to reconstruct events that have taken 
place since 2006, when the Juba talks began; and thirdly, to corroborate information 
from other sources.  In total, 106 interviews were conducted with a broad range of 
individuals directly or indirectly involved in transitional justice debates and policy 
development or implementation.  Purposive, non-probability, and snowball sampling was 
used to reduce randomness and to identify the most relevant interview subjects. 
Interviews were conducted with a wide range of authority figures including:  
• Key Ugandan decision makers, including government ministers, MPs, 
government officials, as well as cultural and religious leaders.   
• ICC staff, and UN and bi-lateral donor, and international NGO staff involved in 
transitional justice, justice sector reform, peace-building and governance policy in 
northern Uganda.  
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101 For studies on the concept of public authority, see: Christian Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: Public 
Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, Development and Change, 37:4 (2006), pp.685-705,p.686; Kate 
Meagher, Tom De Herdt and Kristof Titeca, ‘Unravelling  Public Authority: paths of hybrid governance in 
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• Local leaders in Acholiland who make up the justice and security network at 
village, parish, and sub-county level.  This included local councillors; elders; 
religious and traditional figures; witch doctors and NGO mediation workers.  
 
The main problem encountered with the interview approach was how far it was possible 
to judge the extent to which interviewees were misrepresenting their own positions and 
versions of events.  Politicians and community leaders were prone to shaping their 
accounts in such a way as to either ‘inflate or minimise their role in a process’.102  This 
was probably to preserve or enhance reputational capital, but a tendency towards 
exaggeration or circumvention, depending on the issue, is also a rather human way of 
interacting.103  Another challenge was that in some cases the interview process involved 
documenting ‘instant histories’.104  Interviews with policy makers sometimes took place 
in the immediate aftermath of a particular event, (the lapsing of the Amnesty Act, or the 
trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, for example), where the effect on public relations was very 
much at the forefront of the minds of respondents.  This was more the case with donor 
staff than with government officials, who tended to be very candid.  In other cases 
respondents were asked about things that had happened further back in history, and they 
were simply unable to recall enough to respond to questions in depth.  
 
These issues highlight the importance of triangulation, which was used not only to judge 
the validity and credibility of the information that was gathered from interviews, but also 
to bring to light the plurality of different narratives that might exist on the same set of 
events and/or policies.  Indeed, while data collected during interviews should always be 
treated with circumspection, and should always be interpreted in light of the 
respondent’s own background, potential biases and possible political agendas, the very 
fact that answers may appear skewed or questionable provides a rich source of material 
which can tell us important things about how and why history and memory are 
constructed.  !
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In addition to the interviews, the fieldwork involved a series of twenty-five focus group 
discussions in five research sites across Acholiland: four rural and one urban.  The sites 
were selected on the basis of variations in the following criteria: (i) distance from Gulu 
town, the main provincial town and NGO hub of the Acholi sub-region; (ii) sites of 
alleged massacres during the LRA conflict (both alleged LRA and UPDF massacres); (iii) 
sites where ‘victims’ and ‘survivor’ associations were active; (iv) sites with notable on-
going land disputes; (v) sites with dedicated NGO programmes related to transitional 
justice and reconciliation. The various research sites had different combinations of these 
characteristics.  The idea was to select areas with varying dynamics to try to build a more 
nuanced picture of post-conflict life in Acholiland. 85 per cent of people in the Acholi 
sub-region are rural dwellers, and to reflect this, four of the five research sites were in 
rural areas.105  For confidentiality reasons, the precise locations of the five research sites 
are not revealed.  In the text each site is referenced according to the administrative 
district it lies in.   
 
In each research site group discussions were divided along the following lines: (i) women 
(mixed ages) (ii) men (‘older’)106 (iii) youth (mixed gender) (iv) male LRA returnees 
(mixed ages) (v) female LRA returnees (mixed ages).107  A total of 25 group discussions 
were carried out, with an average of six participants per group.  The kinds of responses 
elicited varied considerably depending on age, sex, and experiences during the war, 
although common themes and sentiments also emerged. These differences and 
similarities were important to capture. The style of the groups was informal and 
conversational.  Participants were not asked to fill out surveys, and were not required to 
provide categorical answers to specific questions.  At the beginning of the sessions the 
groups were asked broad questions about life since the end of the conflict; whether they 
felt they had experienced wrongdoing during the conflict; current disputes and avenues 
for redress, and how people are moving on with their lives.  Towards the end of the 
sessions they were asked to comment on issues related to transitional justice if these had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Ron Atkinson and Julian Hopwood, Land Conflict and Monitoring Mapping Took for the Acholi Sub-region, 
United Nations Peacebuilding Programme and Human Rights Focus, (2013), p.24. 
106 The UN defines youth as those aged between 15-24 but in Uganda it is also a socially constructed 
concept.  As Blattman and Annan note, ‘many in northern Uganda use the approximate ages of 14-30 to 
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107 In initial trials, groups were not divided according to age of gender but it soon became clear that women 
and younger men were remaining quiet while senior males dominated the discussion.  Groups were divided 
up in the manner highlighted above after discussions with local researchers, taking into account both time 
and resource constraints.  
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not already come up spontaneously.  All focus group discussions were carried out in 
Acholi, and simultaneously translated into English with the assistance of a research 
assistant. 
 
The focus group participants were selected with the help of a local leader.  In all but one 
research site this was the head of the of the village council (Local Councillor I); in the 
remaining site it was the head of the parish council, (Local Councillor II).  Local leaders 
were asked to gather an equal number of men, women, and ‘youth,’ for a discussion 
about village life since the end of the conflict and the disbandment of the camps.  It was 
stated explicitly that these individuals need not have an ‘identity’ as a survivor/victim or 
perpetrator; this was in order to avoid extreme or deviant case sampling.  Group 
discussions with returnees were undertaken at the District level, with the assistance of 
the District Peace and Reconciliation Team.  This was in order to ensure a more 
anonymous and sensitive process.  In each site, group discussions were followed by key 
informant interviews with local leaders, as well as with traditional and religious leaders in 
the area.  These interviews were carried out in order to get a clearer picture of local 
dynamics from the local public authority perspective.   
 
There are limitations to the focus group approach.  Two were particularly apparent 
during this research.  Firstly, using purposive and snowball sampling for focus group 
discussions means that the researcher is indirectly involved in ‘developing and managing 
the initiation and progress of the sample’.108  One of the dangers with this type of 
sampling, and using local leaders to help with identification of participants, is that the 
researcher is recommended people with similar characteristics or experiences; or people 
who are felt to be more ‘interesting’.109  It is therefore ‘incumbent on the researcher to 
ensure that the initial set of respondents is sufficiently diverse for the sample not to be 
skewed excessively in one particular direction’. 110   This was done by building a 
relationship with the person who helped select the participants, sitting down with 
(usually) him informally, and talking, often for a long time, about village life and the 
broad parameters of the research project.   
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108 Lynne Millward, ‘Focused Interviews’, in Michael Lewis Beck, et. al, The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science 
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109 Tansey, ‘Process’, p.19. 
110 Ibid.!!
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In the focus group discussions, the questions being asked were likely to involve private 
reactions and deep detailed responses.  The risk for the researcher is being drawn 
towards the stories or versions of events that are the most dramatic or striking.  A 
conscious effort was therefore made to give equal time and attention to those whose 
responses may appear more mundane.  For example, while some people were strongly of 
the opinion that northern Uganda was ‘still at war’, particularly in relation to tensions 
over land, or ‘time-bombs’ relating to unresolved crimes committed during the conflict, 
others were of the opinion that life was now on the right track, that things were much 
better, and that what happened during the twenty year conflict should simply be 
forgotten so that people can move on.  It is important to follow up both kinds of 
responses; although the former may appear more striking, the latter is equally revealing 
of transitional dynamics and coping techniques in the aftermath of violence and war.    
 
Semi-structured interviews were either recorded, with a tape recorder, or in note form, 
depending on the wishes of the interviewee.  All focus group discussions were tape 
recorded.  All focus group participants were granted anonymity.  Interviewees were given 
the option of anonymity.  All respondents were asked to sign an informed consent form, 
approved by the King’s College ethics committee, which outlined the purpose of the 
research, anonymity protocols and data storage methods.   !
The third strand of research involved participant observation.  A research associate 
affiliation with the Refugee Law Project at Makerere University (RLP), during the 
fieldwork period in Uganda provided an insight into the workings of an NGO/advocacy 
group, funded in part by international donors, which has been closely involved in 
transitional justice issues since the outset in Uganda.  It also allowed access to relevant 
meetings, workshops, training, and community outreach in Kampala, Gulu, and across 
rural Acholiland.  The opportunity to observe meetings attended by civil society, 
bureaucrats, donors and occasionally politicians and local councillors, discussing 
transitional justice issues, provided important insight into the political space where 
transitional justice policy and programming was being discussed and shaped.  It also 
provided an opportunity to witness first hand the ways in which transitional justice 
promoters and practitioners engaged with affected communities; to observe how this 
interaction actually took place and what seemingly inscrutable terms such as ‘capacity 
building’, ‘local partnerships’ and ‘sensitisation trainings’ looked like in practice.    Using 
this method had its limitations, however.  Attendance at particular ‘events’, such as 
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meetings and workshops did not allow for a far-reaching understanding of the 
participants involved and was more of a reflection of their actions and behaviour in 
particular settings and particular roles.  Triangulation of methods enabled the 
comparison of participant observation during these meetings with interview and focus 
group data.   
 
While this was not an orthodox ethnographic study, the research approach was informed 
by ethnographic methods and techniques.111   Ethnographic methods were deemed 
useful because they allow the researcher to explore the subjects’ frames of reference 
whilst remaining as open as possible to different understandings and interpretations of 
the world.112  Meaning was therefore probed for through ‘thick descriptions’ of people’s 
views and actions, and the context that they inhabit.113  An ethnographic approach, and 
interview-based, focus group and participant observation methods were used because it 
was felt that this was the most effective way to generate data that could provide some 
insight into the ‘inherently relational’ and ‘inherently contested’ nature of the socio-legal 
dynamics being explored.114  The methods used in this research were designed to offer an 
interpretivist approach to understanding how transitional justice is constructed and 
experienced in context: what McGovern called the ‘extensive and intensive qualitative 
research required to obtain context-specific knowledge’.115  It was felt that if such 
knowledge could be generated, it would allow for a more robust and textured assessment 
of the reality of transitional justice on the ground than that offered by the purely 
theoretical literature or that based on positivist, large-n comparative research using 
datasets.116   
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Primary data was analysed using a ‘general inductive approach,’ which allowed research 
findings to emerge from the identification of frequent and dominant themes. 117  
Transcripts were read several times to identify themes and categories, and both ‘emic’ 
and ‘etic’ approaches were used to interpret the material gathered. In social science, the 
‘emic’ approach aims to describe a particular culture or political system, ‘in its own terms’, 
while the ‘etic’ approach provides a more explicitly ‘outside’ perspective which links 
cultural and political practices to external phenomena that ‘may not be salient to 
insiders’.118  An initial manual emic coding frame was developed in an attempt to 
understand ‘participants’ indigenous meanings of real world events’ and to examine 
things ‘through the eyes of members of the culture being studied’.119  Thus tentative 
labels were created for chunks of data that appeared to signify common patterns. Labels 
such as ‘courts’, ‘friendship’, ‘mercy’ and ‘social loss’ were understood as the ‘nouns and 
verbs of a conceptual world’ and part of the analytic process was to link these categories 
to the social phenomena that they described, such as institutions, social relations or social 
outcomes.120   A second, ‘etic’ coding frame was then developed from the scholarly 
literature and prior research.  The etic coding was based on the conceptual framework of 
transitional justice in an attempt to analyse the relevance and experience of TJ to the 
Ugandan setting.  Thus research findings were to some degree influenced by research 
objectives, however, they did arise directly from analysis of the raw data, rather than 
from existing models or theory.  In the text, where quotes are given it is because they are 
representative of broader opinion and dominant themes and where this is not the case, it 
is explicitly stated.   
 
A particularly challenging issue that arose in interviews and focus groups, was around 
identifying salient understandings of essentially contested concepts such as ‘justice’.  
There exists some debate in the literature about the need for sounder conceptual 
architecture to help us understand and even ‘operationalise’ notions such as transitional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 The analytic approach was ‘generic’ rather than being located in specific approaches associated with 
analyzing qualitiative data, such as grounded theory or content analysis, even though the inductive 
approach is also evident in these forms of data analyses. See, David R. Thomas, ‘A general inductive 
approach for analyzing qualitative data’, American Journal of Evaluation, 27:2 (2006), pp.237-246. 
118 Michael Morris, Kwok Leung, Daniel Ames, and Brian Lickel, ‘Views from Inside and Outside: 
Integrating Emic and Etic Insights About Culture and Justice Judgement’, Academy of Management Review, 
24:4, (1999), pp.781-796, 781; Thomas Headland, Kenneth Pike and Marvin Harris, Emics and Etics: The 
Insider/Outsider Debate (London: Sage, 1990). 
119 Both quotes are taken from James Olive, ‘Reflecting on the Tensions between Emic and Etic 
Perspectives in Life History Research: Lessons Learned’, Socialforschung 15:2, (2014), p.9. 
120 Steve Borgatti, Introduction to grounded theory (1996) available at: 
http://www.analytictech.com/mb870/introtogt.htm  
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justice.121  Indeed two successive UN Secretary Generals, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki Moon 
have referred to the need to ‘articulate a common language of justice’ in their reports on 
transitional justice and the rule of law.122  The supposition that informed the design of 
this research, however, is that justice exists as a ‘notion’ rather than a discrete goal, and 
will probably never have universal meaning.  There will always be multiple ‘conceptions’ 
of what justice is.123  In many places where transitional justice is operational in some 
form, the very word ‘justice’ has no direct translation, and even where it does, individual 
and group ideas about what justice actually means can range from access to health care to 
the ability to pay school fees or for a decent burial.124   
 
The ‘translateability’, universality, and relativity of transitional justice conceptions and 
practices was a pressing and uncomfortable question.  In Acholiland there is no word for 
‘justice’.   The translation most commonly used is ‘Ngol matir,’ which literally means to 
‘cut straight,’ and is used to describe the process by which a fair judgment has been 
made.125   People are rarely familiar with the term transitional justice.  This did not mean 
that associated concepts of accountability, truth, and reconciliation were not present, but 
they did not exist under this linguistic or conceptual banner.  This was a particularly 
important consideration for fieldwork conducted away from government institutions, 
NGOs, and donor offices.  The starting point during fieldwork with communities in 
Acholiland was therefore to examine people’s understandings of injustice, and start from 
there.  Thus, during focus group discussions people were asked to reflect on instances 
during and since the war when they or people they knew, were tero I yoo matir which is a 
locally recognised way of saying, ‘not being treated in the right way’.   It was felt that this 
kind of approach would allow for a much richer discussion to develop than one 





121 See, for example, Thoms et. al ‘State-Level’.  
122 See UNSG, ‘Transitional’ (2004); UNSG, The Rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies: Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council (S/2011/634) (2011). 
123 Dancy, ‘Impact’, p.368. 
124 Macdonald, ‘Local’, p.8 
125 Holly Porter’s anthropological work on understandings of the concept of ‘justice’ in Acholiland inform 
the approach taken in research design.  See, Porter, ‘After Rape’, especially pp. 98-106 for a discussion of 
the ‘meaning of justice’.   
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This thesis empirically examines the political and socio-legal dynamics and trajectory of 
transitional justice in Uganda since 2006.  It explores the full range of processes put 
forward in the AAR: domestic prosecutions for war crimes, truth-telling, reparations and 
support for traditional justice.  Each is explored through the different socio-political 
perspective of key actors involved in transitional justice construction and implementation 
as well as through the lens of the war affected communities for whom these processes 
were ostensibly designed to benefit.  The first two chapters establish the conceptual and 
analytical framework.  Chapter 2 examines the genesis of the dominant liberal transitional 
justice paradigm and its normalization as a form of conflict and post conflict 
intervention.  It explores the ‘migration’ of transitional justice from post-authoritarian to 
conflict and post-conflict settings and its incorporation into the peace-building and 
development programmes of international aid agencies and donors.  It goes on to 
propose an analytical approach towards exploring the dissonance between the normative 
oughts of the orthodox transitional justice paradigm and the messy complex realities of 
transitional justice as it is debated and as it happens.   
 
Chapter 3 provides the context against which we can historicise and ‘re-politicise’ 
Acholiland as a local space in which transitional justice – in its varying forms - has both 
emerged and intervened.  It charts the history of legal pluralism, social order, state power 
and conflict in Acholiland and lays the groundwork for subsequent chapters by 
highlighting important historical and contemporary themes around local justice 
conceptions and provision that complicate existing transitional justice narratives and 
practices in the sub-region.   
 
The emergence of a transitional justice framework for Uganda is explored in Chapter 4 
through an in-depth examination of the justice debate between the GoU and the 
LRA/M during the Juba peace talks.  The chapter explores the motivations of both GoU 
and LRA/M actors at Juba. It argues that while the AAR agreements may have 
represented progress on paper, they were based on hard-boiled, expedient political 
calculations about the best way to both avert and instrumentalise justice issues during 
difficult negotiations around a broader political settlement that neither side was entirely 
committed to.   
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Chapters 5, 6, and 7 chart the trajectory of transitional justice debate and practice since 
Juba.  Chapter five explores the way in which transitional justice at the state-level became 
a donor driven affair after the Juba talks.  In particular it examines – in context - the 
technical and ‘post-political’ approach that donors adopted, focused mainly on 
institutional strengthening and justice sector capacity building.  It posits that the donor 
approach was easily out-maneuvered and instrumentalised by Ugandan political elites and 
explores this dynamic in relation to the neglected elements of the AAR: truth, reparations 
and traditional justice.  Chapter six explores an area where there has been some tangible 
activity: the International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda.  This chapter 
analyses the court’s first and only war crimes trial to date, that of former LRA member 
Thomas Kwoyelo.  It shows how the trial highlighted the complex legal, political and 
institutional conflicts between prosecution and amnesty for war crimes and analyses why 
the political leadership of the state refrained from expressing a coherent position on this 
issue.  In order to provide the fullest possible picture of the Kwoyelo trial, this chapter 
also interweaves an analysis of how the trial was interpreted ‘on the ground’ in 
Acholiland, both by affected communities and by the local leadership.   
 
Chapter seven interrogates the role of the powerful ‘forgiveness’ and ‘reconciliation’ 
agendas that are often misleadingly described as comprising the ‘Acholi’ approach to 
transitional justice.  The chapter examines the way in which forgiveness and 
reconciliation agendas - mediated by religious leaders and ‘traditional’ leaders, often with 
support from donors - have been experienced, re-shaped and contested in Acholiland.  
Chapter Eight provides an analysis of every day ‘justice in transition’ in northern Uganda, 
and how this relates to the meta-narratives and programmes of transitional justice.  In 
particular, it explores the most significant means by which social relations are being 
constructed and re-constructed in the aftermath of such a devastating conflict and how 
these transitional realities challenge the prevailing assumptions that inform existing 








This thesis is an attempt to understand, empirically, how transitional justice has been 
constructed, implemented, and experienced in the Ugandan context since 2006.  This 
chapter explores the emergence and evolution of the dominant liberal conception of 
transitional justice, which has played an important role in post-conflict discourse in 
Uganda.  Espoused by UN agencies and western aid donors, this orthodox position 
promotes the adoption of justice and accountability instruments that will orient society 
towards a ‘liberal peace’.   This chapter lays the groundwork for a clearer conceptual 
understanding of this dominant form of transitional justice thinking in contemporary 
international policy.  It charts the emergence of transitional justice as a specific political 
and academic project in the late 1980s and early 1990s against a background of tectonic 
shifts in the global political landscape, and goes on to explore its trajectory over the last 
two and a half decades.  There is a particular focus on two important developments: the 
first was the migration of transitional justice from ‘post-authoritarian’ to ‘post-conflict’ 
settings and the second was its incorporation, by the mid-2000s, into the international 
peace-building and development architectures.    
 
Transitional justice, as will be explored, has developed as a field with certain core 
normative assumptions and practices which inform its application.  As a vague but 
discernable notion that past wrongs should be addressed in the service of a better future, 
proponents have essentially viewed transitional justice and its attendant processes as 
elastic and ‘post-political’.  The dominant liberal conception of transitional justice that 
has emerged, particularly in the last decade, is a socially constructed way of identifying, 
interpreting and resolving global problems and this has resulted in the confident and 
standardized application of transitional justice to a wide range of contexts. As this 
chapter goes on to argue, while the ‘toolbox’ approach towards transitional justice, in 
both conflict and post-conflict settings is often advanced by international donors and aid 
agencies as an apolitical ‘technology,’1 it remains a deeply normative and political project.  
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im convincingly sums up its logic:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Sharp, ‘Interrogating’, p.158 
! 41 
‘Let us promote an intermediate level or degree of ‘justice’, as we know or accept 
it to be, until the situation is ready for the next phase toward the ultimate 
fulfillment of our vision of justice as it should be practiced everywhere in the 
world’.2  
 
Finally, this chapter explores the ways in which the normative and intellectual 
superstructure of liberal notions of transitional justice have – on application - been 
appropriated and re-imagined by a range of different people and groups, from politicians 
to local leaders to NGOs, to communities affected by forms of violence.  This lays the 
groundwork for some of the dissonances that characterise the Ugandan case, explored in 
more detail as the thesis progresses.  The chapter ends with an appeal to distinguish, 
conceptually, between ‘transitional justice’, as a normative project infused with a 
teleological impulse to pull post-conflict states in the direction of liberal governance 
reforms and ‘justice in transition’ which comprises the plurality of ways in which people, 
in local spaces, seek to restore and reconstruct relationships, and social fabrics, in the 
lingering aftermath of atrocity.  
 
The emergence of transitional justice 
 
The literature on transitional justice provides a vast choice of historical starting points, 
ranging from ancient Greece to the democratic transitions of the late 1980s. 3  This is 
symptomatic of what has been referred to as the ‘severe theoretical poverty’ that afflicts 
the field.4  The approach in this chapter is to depart from the notion of transitional 
justice as a ‘perennial problem’ and a ‘metaphysical enterprise’, while at the same time 
taking account of the important historical, political, and social residues that provide the 
context for its emergence.5  Transitional justice, it will be argued, emerged as a term and 
a distinct political project against the backdrop of a wave of political transitions that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, ‘Editorial Note: From the Neocolonial ‘Transitional’ to Indigenous 
Formations of Justice’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 7:2 (2013), pp.197-204, p.197.!
3 See Jon Elster, ‘Closing’, p.7; Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
4 Phil Clark, 'Tensions in Transitional Justice' in Phil Clark and Zachary Kaufman (eds.), After Genocide: 
Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, (London: Columbia 
University Press, 2009). 
5 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), pp.69-95 at p.89; 
Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.328. 
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began in the mid-1970s.6  At the same time, it derives its authority and much of its 
conceptual basis from the international legalist paradigm that emerged after WWII.7   
 
Modern transitional justice has its roots in the Nuremberg trials, but from the end of the 
1940s to the mid-1980s amnesty and silence were considered the ‘catalyst for 
reconciliation par excellence’.8  State-sanctioned silence was the outcome of negotiated 
compromises between the successor elites in post-Franco Spain and post-Khmer Rouge 
Cambodia.  In Pinochet’s Chile, impunity was established through formal amnesty 
legislation in the late 1970s.  During this period the international criminal, humanitarian, 
and human rights legal apparatuses which exist today, were being debated, established, 
and codified, but the Cold War political equilibrium created a hiatus in enforcement.9 
Indeed, human rights practices, at home and abroad, would often be a matter of 
considerable embarrassment should they be subjected to full international scrutiny.  As 
far as powerful Cold War states were concerned, international criminal, human rights, 
and humanitarian law, comprised a ‘low-cost’ declaratory commitment, one that they did 
not intend to activate.10 
Transitional justice, when it emerged, was the product of a particular historical and 
political moment.  Military regimes in Latin America and communist regimes in Central 
and Eastern Europe were collapsing.  These countries had different histories, but they 
shared a key challenge: what to do about the ‘former torturers persisting in their midst’.11  
It was not a straightforward question, because, as Lawrence Weschler, who was 
instrumental in the creation of the concept predicted, ‘good people will disagree on how !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This is a reference to what Samuel Huntingdon called democracy’s ‘third wave’.  According to this theory, 
the third wave began in southern Europe in the mid 1970s (Portugal, Spain, Greece) and also included the 
end of military rule in Latin America in the 1980s; liberalization in Asia Pacific countries (Phillipines, South 
Korea) from the mid 1980s, and the fall of communist regimes in East Europe after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. See Huntingon, ‘Third’. 
7 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional’, p.70; Pierre Hazan, ‘Judging War, Judging History’: Behind Truth and 
Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).   
8 Hazan, ‘Judging’, p.38.  Trials of the Junta leaders in Greece in 1974 were an important exception. 
9 Rachel Kerr and Erin Mobekk, Peace and Justice: Seeking Accountability after War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2007).  The following regimes and laws enacted during this period: The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), the Geneva Conventions (1949); Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977); 
Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (1949); International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966); Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984).  For the full list of the core international human rights instruments, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (accessed 02.03.13). 
10 Jack Donnelly, ‘International human rights: a regime analysis’, International Organization, 40:3 (1986), pp. 
599-639  
11 Quoted in Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.22 
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that holding to account ought to proceed in the context of real life, often exceptionally 
precarious political situations’. 12  Transitional justice was not just about the ‘moral 
obligation’ and ‘legal duty’ to prosecute.13  The emphasis was also on ‘prudence’.14  It was 
about striking the right balance between legitimate claims for legal accountability for 
human rights abuses, and the aspiration for a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy. 
Paige Arthur, in her impressive conceptual history of transitional justice, argues that in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s transitional justice emerged at the international level as a 
result of a set of interactions that took place between human rights activists, lawyers, 
legal scholars, policy makers, journalists, donors, and comparative politics experts, all of 
whom were ‘concerned with human rights and the dynamics of transitions to 
democracy.’15  During a series of conferences, the first of which was held by the Aspen 
Institute in 1988 and funded by the Ford Foundation, participants from different 
continents began to discuss the question of violence committed by agents of the state in 
former totalitarian regimes. 16   A broad consensus was reached on the various measures 
that might be employed to address these transitional problems: Commissions of Inquiry, 
prosecutions, truth-telling, lustration, vetting and compensation for harms were all 
discussed.  Each measure was articulated as having a dual function.  Firstly, it must 
ensure an acceptable measure of justice for victims, and secondly it must facilitate a 
transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy as smoothly as possible.  So, for 
example, as the Aspen Conference report noted, prosecutions were intended to fulfill a 
‘duty owed to victims,’ but also to ‘provide a unique means by which to assert 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 ibid 
13 An ‘anti-impunity’ movement sprung up in the late 1970s that was more focused on the obligation and 
legal duty to prosecution.  It was particularly focused on crimes committed during the ‘dirty war’ periods of 
the 1970s and 80s in Central America and resulted in proliferation of transnational litigation. This 
movement, argues Paige Arthur, had a different ‘history and conceptual background’, see Arthur, 
‘Transitions’, p363.  The anti-impunity movement and its debates about its impact are explored in, Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transitional Justice in the Age of Human Rights (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
Studies in Human Rights, 1996); Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and 
Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 2:1 (2001); 
Cath Collins, ‘Grounding Global Justice: International Networks and Domestic Human Rights 
Accountability in Chile and El Salvador’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 38 (2006). 
14 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.323; Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Deterrence’.  
15 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.324 
16 Other significant Conferences on this theme were the Charter 77 Foundation Conference, ‘Justice in 
Times of Transition’ in  Salzberg in 1992 and Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA); 
conference, ‘Dealing with the Past’, in 1994.  Paige Arthur, in ‘Transitions’, includes an appendix which 
lists the participants at each conference; Hazan, ‘Judging’, p.31 
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democratic values’.17  Similarly, truth-telling efforts must ‘respond to the demand of 
justice for victims’ while also ensuring that new governments ‘do not absorb an 
institutional tradition which has not expunged its most objectionable aspects…’.18  This 
dual moral-utilitarian logic became the loose formula of transitional justice: a specific 
politico-legal project developed by an epistemic community concerned with both 
individual human rights and transitions to democracy.19   
By 1995, when Neil Kritz’s four-volume compendium, Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, was published, the idea of transitional justice and 
its practices was already relatively well understood. It was, argues Paige Arthur:  
‘presented as deeply enmeshed with political problems that were legal-
institutional and, relatively short term in nature.  So short term in fact, that they 
could be dealt with specifically during a “transitional” period.’20   
This is a significant point that requires explanation.  At the outset, the developing 
transitional justice field was informed by the ‘transition’ paradigm, an intellectual 
framework that was developed by an influential group of political scientists in the US 
during the 1980s.  At the time when President Ronald Reagan was talking about a 
‘democratic revolution on a global scale’, the ‘transitologists,’ as they became known, 
sought to explain and make sense of the multiple and heterogeneous processes by which 
states as different as Mauritania, Mongolia and El Salvador were undergoing political 
liberalisation.21  The ‘Transitions Project’ was overseen by comparative political scientists 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, who also contributed to Kritz’s 
compendium on transitional justice.  Focusing on cases in Latin America and Southern 
Europe, they published a seminal work in 1986, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.22  This 
rejected the structural thinking of the modernization theorists, who argued in the 1960s 
that ‘political development’ would be the gradual product of long-term, socio-economic 
stages.23  The Transitions Project developed a new theory: liberal democracy could be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 State Crimes: Punishment and Pardon: Papers and Report of the Conference, November, 4-6, 1988, Wye Town, 
Maryland, (Maryland: The Aspen Institute, 1989), p.3. 
18 Zalaquett, ‘Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles 
Applicable and Political Constraints’ in ‘State Crimes’ p.31.  
19 Annie Bird, US foreign policy on transitional justice, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics (2012), also 
uses the idea of ‘epistemic communities’.  
20 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.333 
21 Hazan, ‘Judging’, p.31 
22 O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions’. 
23 In the 1960s policy makers and political scientists, for example W.W Rostow did not talk of ‘transitions 
to democracy’ but rather of socioeconomic modernization as a precondition of an evolutionary process of 
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established in almost any country through ‘a shortened sequence of elite bargaining’ and 
‘legal-institutional reforms.’24   In their tentative conclusions, Schmitter and O’Donnell 
argued that central to a successful transition was the moral and practical need to ‘settle a 
past account’ but ‘without upsetting a present transition’.25  Confronting past abuse in a 
way that was acceptable to the interests of the elites negotiating the transition would, it 
was argued, go some way to combating impunity while also averting potential coups and 
maintaining peaceful order.26  Borrowing these ideas and building upon them, transitional 
justice developed as a powerful normative discourse. It was assumed that transitional 
justice processes would develop narratives about past violence, settle accounts and 
demonstrate the truth.  This in turn would play a powerful role in fostering social repair 
and consolidating the rule of law.27 
Legal-institutional reforms were a response both to the types of individual abuse that 
human rights activists were focused on, and to the sort of transition that comparative 
political scientists envisaged.28  Thus transitional justice emerged as a self-validating 
paradigm, it was ‘a response to a new set of problems, and the means of legitimating 
practices used to respond to those problems’.29  In Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe these practices were quickly taken up and locally driven support for 
them was widespread, particularly amongst burgeoning domestic anti-impunity 
movements.30  Indeed, as one Chilean lawyer with long experience in a local NGO noted, 
‘during the 70s and 80s, we’d be on the phone to Amnesty International every other day, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
political development; See Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.337; see also W.W Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
24 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.338 
25 O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions’, p.28; Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.347 
26 O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘Transitions’, pp.28-31. 
27 For a good summary of some of the key arguments that emerged in the scholarly literature, see 
Vinjamuri and Snyder, ‘Advocacy’.  The legalist argument, which remains committed to the ‘moral 
absolutism’ of universal human rights standards, maintains a weary skepticism of ‘softer’ approaches to 
justice, lamenting the decision to forgo prosecutions in favour of truth-seeking methods as understandable 
but inadequate.  Ruti Teitel, has argued that Cold War justice – linked as it was to nation-building, did not 
reflect the ‘ideal rule of law’ and that transitional jurisprudence reflected a ‘conception of justice that was 
imperfect and partial’, see Teitel, ‘Transitional’, p.76.  
28 Teitel has argued that transitional justice is distinctive in that it is both backward-looking and forward-
looking: see, for example, Ruti Teitel, ‘Rethinking Jus Post Bellum in an Age of Global Transitional 
Justice’, The European Journal of International Law 24:1 (2013), pp.335-342. 
29 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p. 238. 
30 For an interesting account of domestic anti-impunity movements in both Chile and El Salvador, see 
Cath Collins, Post-transitional Justice: Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador (Philadelphia: Penn State 
University Press, 2010).  
! 46 
sending them papers, smuggling documents out to them whenever we could’.31  The 
most common approach to transitional justice in Latin America was to combine limited 
prosecutions with a truth commission, or to prohibit prosecutions altogether.32   In 
Central and Eastern Europe truth commissions were less appealing, because the use of 
history by various predecessor governments was itself seen as a ‘destructive dimension of 
Communist repression’.33  In many of these countries the main response of the successor 
regime was to pass lustration laws as part of the wider ‘de-communization’ campaigns, 
whilst also enacting legislation that guaranteed victims access to the historical record.34  
What was clearly neglected in the emerging process was any discussion about the broader 
structural causes of human rights violations, and the possibilities for reform at the socio-
economic level.  Given the ‘end of history’ mentality that defined the political moment, 
the de-radicalisation of the Left in the 1970s, and the post-Cold War faith in the 
liberalizing qualities of market democracies, this is probably not surprising.35  It is, 
however, notable for two reasons.  Firstly, because it supports the argument that 
transitional justice is largely a product of post Cold War political liberalism,36  and 
secondly because African intellectuals continued to identify the colonial legacy and the 
Cold War predicament of one-party regimes squarely with the logic of socio-economic 
crimes.  The Ugandan scholar (then Minister of State), Mahmood Mamdani, who himself 
had attended the 1988 Aspen Conference, later argued that it was ‘social suffering’ rather 
than ‘individual human rights violations’ that characterized the great colonial crimes of 
economic expropriation, exploitation, and inequality, and which continued to shape the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31!Interview conducted by Cath Collins, cited in Cath Collins, ‘Grounding Global Justice: International 
Networks and Domestic Human Rights Accountability in Chile and El Salvador’, Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 38:4 (2006), 711-738, p.715.!
32 Vesselin Popovski and Monica Serrano, After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe (New York: United Nations University Press, 2012).  Attempts to address past human rights abuses 
in Latin America continue, but scholars have referred to these efforts as ‘post-transitional justice,’ because 
transitions to democracy are generally believed to have taken place.  See, for example, Cath Collins, ‘Post-
Transitional Justice: Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador (Pennsylvania: Penn State University 
Press, 2010); For different interpretations on the efficacy of transitional and ‘post-transitional’ justice in 
Latin America, see Sikkink and Walling, ‘Cascades’; and the different in interpretations of the Argentinian 
transitional justice process in Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1998) and Jaime Malamud-Goti, Game without End: State Terror and the Politics of Justice, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1996).  
33 Teitel, ‘Transitions’, p.79. 
34 Lavinia Stan (ed.), Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2009) 
35 Ruti Teitel offers an interesting insight into the development of transitional justice and the ‘end of 
history’ mentality, in Teitel, ‘Transitional’, p.85-68.  Both Paige Arthur and David Rieff write about the ‘de-
radicalisation’ of social movements and particularly the global decline of the Left during the 1970s.  They 
argue that a generation of humanitarians and human rights advocates emerged from the ‘husk of the scared 
Left’, see David Rieff, A bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
p.199; Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.339. 
36 Hakan, ‘Judging’, p.41. 
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colonial legacy. 37   Despite this, the role that socio-economic justice might play in 
transitions was not included in the original discussions about transitional justice in any 
substantive way.  Even if it emerged as a field that recognised the dilemmas involved in 
balancing justice with the other complex and diverse requirements of nation-building, 
first generation human rights were the central legal and ethical framework within which it 
would operate, justify, and measure itself. 
The expansion of transitional justice 
The initial conceptual foundations that underpinned the new field of transitional justice 
were soon stretched by the rapidly shifting politics of the post-Cold War world.  Before 
it had been adequately theorized, transitional justice underwent what Pablo De Grieff has 
called ‘excessive expansion’.38  During the 1990s, transitional justice policies were being 
formed in the context of seemingly antithetical post-Cold War political developments. As 
Pierre Hazan points out,  
‘there was a cautious optimism linked to accelerated democratic transitions after 
1989, but the post-Cold War period also witnessed the multiplication of internal 
conflicts and policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide, marked by Rwanda and 
Srebrenica’.39   
 
In line with emerging ideas about transitional justice, the ‘cautious optimism’ approach 
raised questions about the wisdom of systematic prosecutions in  situations where regime 
change was a fragile operation, so, as has been noted above, alternative and 
complementary mechanisms were promoted to mitigate the risks associated with an 
overly punitive or lenient prosecutorial strategy.  Although not the first, the South 
African TRC has been central in shaping modern attitudes towards truth commissions.  
The experience in South Africa broadened the moral and political justifications for a 
‘restorative’ approach to human rights violations in the greater service of nation building. 
As one activist later remarked after South Africa, ‘the world has become besotted with 
truth commissions’.40  But transitional justice in this period also became associated with a 
post-Cold War ‘globalising politics’, which raised profound questions at the ‘intersection 
of jurisdiction and sovereignty’ and led to radical changes in international criminal law !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.341-3; Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: 
Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43:4 (2001), 
pp.651-664; Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle, ‘Neo-Patrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa’, World Politics, 46:4 (1994), pp.453-489. 
38 De Greiff, ‘Thoughts’, p.11 
39 Hazan, ‘Judging’, p.55 
40 cf. Hazan, ‘Judging’, p.33 
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and practice.41  The international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
set up in 1993 and 1994 respectively, under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, making an explicit link between the courts and international peace and security.42 
Originally ad hoc responses to serious crimes, this gradual process generated its own 
internal dynamic by creating a bureaucracy, new norms, and jurisprudence, which in turn 
underpinned the legitimacy of judicial intervention in international relations.43  Whilst on 
the one hand existing as an expression of South African particularism, transitional justice 
also became associated with a new set of ‘major legal edifices’, such as the ICTY, ICTR, 
ICC and other local and hybrid tribunals and criminal courts.44  
International jurisprudence became ‘normalized’ quite rapidly during the 1990s.  The 
most ‘recognised symbol’ of this was the ICC, established in 200245 as a permanent 
international tribunal to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as 
a ‘routine matter under international law’.46  The Rome Statute of the court allowed for 
justice to be pursued in conditions of persistent and unresolved conflict.47  It also 
emerged against the backdrop of a now established transitional justice paradigm, and in 
line with that thinking it emphasised the instrumental purposes of international justice in 
facilitating peace and state-building.  The International Criminal Court’s August 2005 
Report to the UN General Assembly confidently outlined the existing network of 
international justice bodies and the role they play as enforcers and custodians of 
collective security:  
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‘The Court is the centre-piece of an emerging system of international criminal 
justice which includes national courts, international courts, and hybrid tribunals, 
with both national and international components.  These institutions of criminal 
justice are also closely linked to efforts to establish and maintain international 
peace and security’.48  
In so far as Rome Statute crimes may involve abuse of power by political leaders, no one, 
not even acting Heads of State, were (or are) immune from judgment.49  International 
courts and tribunals have indicted national leaders and rebels who might be pivotal to 
on-going peace talks, such as Slobodan Miloševic, Joseph Kony, Charles Taylor, Omar 
al-Bashir and most recently Muammar al-Gaddafi, before his death.  This has turned 
what were once hypothetical debates about the relationship between peace and justice 
into urgent policy dilemmas.50  Since the turn of the century, and especially with the 
advent of the ICC’s prosecutorial strategy, the Court has become a site of serious 
contention in international politics.  Recent years, for example, have witnessed the ‘bloc 
opposition’ of the African Union, the most important regional organisation in the 
continent where the ICC has focused almost all of its efforts.51  President Museveni’s 
attitude towards the court is instructive here.  In September 2013, almost exactly ten 
years after he oversaw the first State referral to the ICC, he addressed the UN General 
Assembly and condemned the ‘shallow and biased’ way that the court has ‘continued to 
mishandle complex African issues’ and counseled that the ICC stop meddling in ‘past 
mistakes’.52  Not long before, he had attended the AU Summit in Addis, and called on 
the ICC to ‘stop hunting Africans’.53  Norbert Mao, the former District chief of Gulu, 
has argued that Museveni is ‘on the wrong side of history’ on the ICC but it is not so 
clear that he is.  The poisonous relationship between the Court and the AU has been a 
source of political and electoral capital for African leaders, who successfully campaign 
against the neo-imperialist tendencies of the West and Western institutions, which is how 
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the ICC is framed by its detractors, even if the balance of Rome Statute signatories might 
indicate otherwise.   
Shaw et. al argue that contemporary transitional justice practice is at once marked by a 
‘return to Nuremberg’s international norms against impunity’ and a ‘fascination with 
locality’.54  Indeed in contexts where mass atrocities were committed during the 1990s 
and early 2000s, including Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia, trials55 and 
even truth commissions have been accused of being insufficiently attentive to local 
cultures, social integration and reconstruction.  The first scholars to engage with the 
‘local’ in transitional justice asked whether ‘universalistic assumptions about the benefits 
of justice accord with what people think on the ground’ and whether ‘adequate account 
is taken of non-western cultures, beliefs and local practices of justice’.56  Part of the 
problem was the nature of these ‘new wars’ and the complicated reality of their aftermath, 
in which those who killed and harmed had to live side by side with those upon whom 
they inflicted suffering and humiliation.57  This led to a growing interest in the role that 
‘local’ or ‘traditional’ practices of dispute settlement and reconciliation might play in 
transitional justice. 58   Scholars and practitioners alike argued that ‘traditional’ and 
‘informal’ justice systems should be adopted or adapted as part of a broader response to 
mass violence, and the 2004 UNSG report acknowledged that ‘due regard must be given 
to indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice’.59  What Shaw et. al term 
the ‘shift towards the local’ in transitional justice has also resulted in a clearer 
international commitment to victims’ rights and needs in transitional justice 
programming.60  Guidelines and templates on how to manage the victims of human 
rights violations are now fairly well established.  The ICC Statute, for example, 
established a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), and also contains guidelines on the 
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participation of victims in court hearings.61  The UN’s 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, meanwhile, establish a right-based interpretation of 
access to justice, reparation and truth.62  In practice, though, scholars have levelled sharp 
critiques at the ‘nod’ to the local, arguing that neither support for local practices or 
victim-centeredness really modifies the ‘foundational assumptions’ of transitional 
justice.63  These ‘foundational assumptions’ and their logics in current practice are 
explored in more detail below.   
 
Transitional justice, liberal peace-building and the rule of law: the ‘normalisation 
of transitional justice’ 
 
There is a fundamental aspect of the short history of transitional justice that requires 
more explanation and is particularly pertinent to the Ugandan case.  Nearly three decades 
after the wave of democratic transitions brought the field to life, transitional justice faces 
an under-conceptualised challenge, namely that it operates in radically different contexts 
from those for which it was first designed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.64  At the 
outset, transitional justice policies were designed to resolve specific policy challenges, 
most notably in the Latin American countries of the Southern Cone.  Firstly, measures 
were designed and implemented in countries with ‘relatively high degrees of both 
horizontal and vertical institutionalization’.65  Today, we see transitional justice being 
proposed and implemented in hybrid legal and political spaces such as northern Uganda, 
where the institutions of the state are largely absent.  Secondly, transitional justice came 
to life in places that were transitioning from authoritarianism to, hopefully democracy.  
Today, it operates in post-conflict peace-building contexts, sometimes in ‘illiberal states 
with little pretension to democratic transition’.66  Thirdly, in its original formulations, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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transitional justice was designed to meet the challenge of ‘abusive exercise of state 
power’67, and although this was a major feature of the war in northern Uganda, the extent 
of the fratricidal violence perpetrated by the LRA against its fellow Acholis and northern 
Ugandans provides an additional and perhaps not sufficiently understood problem for 
transitional justice.68   
 
Part of the reason for the expansion of transitional justice was the advent of judicial 
interventionism, shaped as it was by collective security agendas and normative shifts of 
the 1990s.  But something else important happened too.  As ethnic wars raged in the 
1990s, the transitional justice formula became subsumed into the broader liberal 
international peace-building apparatus.69  Along with other initiatives such as security 
sector reform (SSR), rule of law strengthening and disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR), transitional justice became a core component of what Mac Ginty 
termed ‘routine peace-building,’ and another element of the ‘common swirl of politically 
related “good things”’ that development and aid agencies saw as central in the promotion 
of liberal market democracies in post-conflict states. 70   Critics complained about 
conceptual ‘expansion’ and ‘stretching,’ yet it was not evident that much conceptualising 
was happening at all.71  Rather, transitional justice was undergoing application expansion – 
the same tools and frameworks were being used in radically different contexts, without 
adequate consideration.  It also gradually became professionalized and bureaucratized.  
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was set up in 2000 by the former 
vice-President of the South African TRC, Alex Borraine, and soon co-opted other 
prestigious former commission members and human rights experts to its board and 
staff.72  Transitional justice ‘consultants’ employed by the UN and other agencies were, 
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and still are, flown around the world to advise on transitional justice in contexts they 
were not necessarily all that familiar with.73  
 
Transitional justice and liberal peace-building share a compatible logic.  As Chandra 
Sriram has argued, both share a ‘faith’ that ‘key goods’ such as democracy and justice can 
‘essentially stand in for and necessarily create peace’.74  But as critics of the liberal peace 
agenda argue, the ‘peace’ which it aims to create is a specific one, involving the 
promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms, secular authority, centralized 
governance and institutions of justice.75  The incorporation of transitional justice into the 
broader liberal peace-building agenda was officially realised with the launch of the 
UNSG’s 2004 report, which made an explicit link between transitional justice, peace-
building, and the rule of law, and encouraged people to think of ‘justice, peace, and 
democracy,’ as ‘mutually reinforcing imperatives’ that must be advanced in ‘fragile, post-
conflict settings’.76  Indeed the ‘rule of law’ itself is a notoriously difficult concept to pin 
down.  It has as Nick Cheesman argues, become ‘an all encompassing global good, an 
international hurrah term (and) has eclipsed other political ideals’.77   Querying the 
precise meaning of the term has almost become a scholarly sub-discipline in itself but 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s summation that it is ‘increasingly seen as the panacea for all the 
problems that afflict many non-Western countries, particularly in post conflict settings’, 
is apt.78  He continues: 
‘Development expert’s prescribe it as the surest shortcut to market-led growth; 
human rights groups advocate the rule-of-law as the best defense against human 
rights abuses; and in the area of peace and security, the rule of law is considered 
the surest guarantee against the re-emergence of conflict’.79   
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Pablo De Grieff has argued that ‘scholars largely agree about usefulness of transitional 
justice measures to re-establish the rule of law’.80  But this is not so clear.  Scholars have 
critiqued the relationship from two perspectives: the first holds that the conflation of 
transitional justice and rule of law has led to the ‘marginalization of bread and butter rule 
of law issues’, through the promotion and privileging of transitional justice initiatives, 
such as war crimes courts and truth commissions.81  The second major critique is that 
transitional justice legitimates rule of law promotion, which, in essence is concerned with 
modeling states according to the free market and thus entrenches systematic inequalities 
and actually constrains democracy.82  !
 
The programmatic linkages between rule of law and transitional justice were not 
explicitly defined in the 2004 UN Report, and remain vague even today.  Despite this, 
there is a strong normative assumption that transitional justice will strengthen the rule of 
law.  The ‘Rule-of-Law Tools for Post Conflict States’ series published by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), for example, provided for policy makers a 
manual on each of the major transitional justice processes, and how they might ‘enhance’ 
UN efforts to ‘work quickly and effectively to re-establish the rule of law and the 
administration of justice in post-conflict missions’.83  As liberal peace-building policy and 
practice has evolved, transitional justice practice has evolved with it.  From the mid-
2000s, the UN was articulating a need for better ‘state-building’ and a belief that more 
attention needed to be paid towards strengthening government institutions in order to 
‘lock in’ liberal political and economic reforms.84   This was influenced by the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq which reinforced calls for the ‘creation and nurturing of robust rule 
of law institutions in fragile states’.85  In a 2011 follow-up to the original 2004 report, the 
new UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, again explicitly linked transitional justice to 
broader rule of law reforms but also to ambitious institution-building and economic 
development objectives:  
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‘transitional justice initiatives promote accountability, reinforce respect for 
human rights and are critical to fostering the strong levels of civic trust required 
to bolster rule of law reform, economic development and democratic 
governance.’  
 
Transitional justice initiatives have become, the UNSG continued, ‘indispensible 
elements of post conflict strategic planning’.86   The World Bank’s World Development 
Report noted that same year that transitional justice initiatives in post conflict societies, 
‘send powerful signals about the commitment of the new government to the rule of 
law.’87  Thus in the last decade, from Iraq88 to Uganda, transitional justice has become 
embedded in general international top-down efforts to rebuild or consolidate the 
structures of governance in post-conflict states, and linked to programmatic rule of law 
reforms that include ‘technical assistance’ in: 
‘drafting laws, direct support for courts and judiciaries to strengthen 
‘independence’, training for security services, support for civil society and private 
associations to advocate in favour of human rights and against corruption’.89 
 
Today, the rhetoric around transitional justice is politically neutralized, using the language 
of ‘good governance’ and ‘rule of law,’ which are presented as intuitive, or ‘post-
political’. 90   Thus it paradoxically intimates a rather inchoate, abstract ambition to 
universalize the standards of humanity in the service of peace and democracy, while at 
the same time being rooted in a technocratic logic about how change happens.  This 
represents an interesting departure from the original conception of transitional justice, 
rooted as it was in the explicit need to negotiate political bargains and compromises in 
order to ensure meaningful political change. It also represents a form of what James 
Ferguson famously called ‘anti-politics’, a form of development intervention that may 
not achieve stated objectives because its logic is based on the construction countries that 
bears ‘little relation to prevailing realities.’91  Transitional justice has been critiqued on 
these grounds in places as widespread as Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Nepal.92  It !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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would be misleading to claim that this has not been recognized as an issue amongst 
development and transitional justice practitioners.  Prescriptions for ‘greater sensitivity’ 
of context in programming, however, reproduces a specialist, technical language that is 
inscrutable to outsiders, or engages in obfuscation with the deployment of new 
paradigms such as ‘beneficiary participation’, which are largely tokenistic addendums to 
the status quo.93 
 
The question arises as to whether the dominant liberal transitional justice paradigm is 
shaped by the ethics of cosmopolitanism or is more adequately described as a form of 
neo-colonialism.  On the one hand, attempts to re-order societies are part of a western 
tradition that dates back to the 17th century.94  Roland Paris argues that both European 
colonialism and today’s post-conflict agendas:  
‘have involved powerful external actors seeking to re-fashion the domestic 
structures of weaker societies in accordance with prevailing notions of good or 
‘civilised’ governance… now translated into contemporary parlance of ‘capacity 
building’ and ‘good governance’.95 
 
The ‘normalisation’ of transitional justice in international policy is also welcomed, 
however, as a sign of the cosmopolitanism of a global civil society, which has been 
described as the ‘ethically attractive part of the globalization package’.96  The idea that all 
human beings live in the same universal moral community, and thus are equally 
deserving of human rights and justice guarantees, has a strong deontological appeal.  And 
yet, what both cosmopolitan approaches, expressed through INGOs and human rights 
movements, and development approaches, focused on state-building and good 
governance share, is what Craig Calhoun calls:   
‘a distanced view of the global system, a view from nowhere or from an 
impossible everywhere that encourages misrecognition of the actual social 
locations from which distant troubles appear as emergencies.97 
 
The dominant transitional justice conception which, today, finds expression in broader 
international post-conflict policy is not badly intentioned or malicious.  The point is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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more that it derives from a particular way of seeing the world, and thus represents a 
limited perspective, even if its advocates and policy makers regard it in universalizing 
terms.  The technocratic direction reinforces this limitation because it encourages a 
closed feedback loop.  The terms of debate are conventionally set using categories that 
simultaneously describe and interpret social phenomena.  Roger Mac Ginty calls this 
‘epistemic closure’, the practice whereby problems are conceived as autonomous and 
freestanding and thus exist within in a delimited framework of possible solutions.  The 
assertion of a senior official at the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 
sums this up: ‘what does a state need to get over a legacy of violence?’ she asked 
rhetorically, ‘The answer is transitional justice’.98  
 
Transitional justice: Law, Politics and Practice 
 
The previous section argued that transitional justice as promoted by development and aid 
agencies – whether bilateral or multilateral, is today a normative political project (despite 
presenting itself as political neutral and value free), which views transitional justice 
processes as part of the global movement towards political liberalization.99   Here though, 
we encounter a conceptual problem.  According to the scholarly literature, transitional 
justice exists both at the ‘high altitude, immobilized and abstracted’ and at the ‘everyday’ 
politics of places.100  But how can transitional justice be both an international political 
project linked to liberal peace-building and claims of the universality of human rights and 
justice and at the same time a discrete set of ideas and practices linked to culturally relative 
notions?   And what holds these facets of transitional justice together?   
There is no agreement in the literature about the ‘type of transition that legitimately 
triggers transitional justice’101.  What is clearer is that the term transition tends to be 
‘positively signified’.102  The word itself is not simply descriptive of a process of change, 
as Siphiwe Dube argues, it carries the notion of teleological progress, which tends to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Author interview with UNDP official, London, 07.11.2012 
99 See for example, Franzski and Olarte, ‘Political’; Sharp, ‘Fourth-Generation’ and Rosemary Nagy, 
‘Transitional Justice as  Global Project: Critical Reflections’, Third World Quarterly, 29:2 (2008), pp.275-289.  
100 See for example, International Journal of Transitional Justice Special Issue: Transitional Justice and the 
Everyday, 6:3 (2012); Alcala and Baines, ‘Editorial’, p.387 
101 Christine Bell, ‘Transitional’, p.24 
102 Siphiwe Dube, ‘Transitional Justice Beyond the Normative: Towards a Literary Theory of Political 
Transitions’, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5:2 (2011), pp.177-197,  p.178 
! 58 
obscure the turbulent, deviating and contingent aspects of any transitional phase.103  
Indeed the reality is that each individual transitional process modifies latudinous 
international legal rules and frameworks, whilst introducing other historically specific and 
contingent elements. This process of modification reveals a variety of different 
conceptions about what transitional justice is and what it ought to achieve.104  Jack 
Donnelly describes this process, in the context of international human rights more 
generally, as ‘substantial second order variation’. 105  Below, three conceptions of 
transitional justice particularly pertinent to the Ugandan case are laid out and each 
implies a difficult relationship between the liberal conception espoused by the UN and 
other aid agencies, and the realities of political context.  
 
Firstly, different conceptions of transitional justice may be part of the deliberate strategy 
of powerful elites in whose interests it is to halt, subvert, or circumvent its progression. 
In Uganda, as we shall see, the government’s conception of transitional justice, has, to 
date, focused exclusively on LRA perpetrators, and excludes UPDF soldiers who, the 
government argues, should be dealt with through the court martial system.  In Kenya, the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission which was set up in the aftermath of the 
post-2007 election violence to establish a record of abuses dating back to independence 
in 1963, has been described as an ‘attempt to protect, rather than expose, those 
responsible for past crimes’.106  Finally, in Colombia, Michael Taussig has described the 
‘inverse relationship between Colombia’s layers of laws upon laws, including ratification 
of human rights standards, and the lived reality of violence, corruption, and impunity 
experienced by so many ordinary Colombians’.107   This raises an important point, which 
is that the normative structures that exist in global politics are not self-evidently true.108  
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Questions about why and how states adhere to them reveal what Schmitt famously called 
the ‘political quality of the law’.109  President Museveni’s quip to the audience at the 2010 
ICC Review Conference in Kampala about ‘you people’ and ‘your love for human 
rights!’, was disconcerting for observers and it is tempting to caricature his remarks as 
playful deviance or pure politicking.110  This would be misguided.  As Nick Cheesman 
has argued, too often, scholars and practitioners have misconstrued the gap between 
compliance and commitment as a gap between ‘principle and practice, between 
aspiration and reality’, when the issue is actually that governments in question are being 
held up to an ‘ideal to which they do not in fact subscribe’.111  Thus the difference in 
political arrangements is not just one of ‘degree’ but one of ‘kind’, a realization that 
should ‘encourage a little less hubris’ and more sober attention to the possibility that 
states and leaders who do not subscribe to rule of law are not simply ‘occupants of low 
rungs on a ladder to the rule of law; they are climbing a different ladder altogether’.112  In 
Uganda, for example, donor support for transitional justice is linked to the normative 
framework of the rule of law and, as will be argued in Chapters 5 and 6, powerful state 
actors, politicians and security officials commonly reject its entire rationale. 
Secondly, different transitional justice conceptions can emerge from the way in which the 
process is framed both ethically and morally.  The spiritual language that is invoked by 
proponents of ‘restorative’ approaches is stratified and linked to what has been called ‘a 
jurisprudence of forgiveness and reconciliation’ that borrows from the non-legal 
‘domains of medicine and theology’.113  Thus Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the President 
of the South African TRC, linked Christian forgiveness and African mysticism to the 
goal of reconciliation. 114  In his rhetoric surrounding the launch of the South TRC, 
Tutu’s invocation of Ubuntu, a romantic expression of the social regulation of the ‘rural 
African community’, was also part of a spiritual and moral case for an alternative 
transitional justice conception.  He argued that:  
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‘Ubuntu says I am human only because you are human…you must do what you 
can to maintain this great harmony which is perpetually undermined by 
resentment, anger, desire for vengeance.  That is why African jurisprudence is 
restorative rather than retributive’.115   
In northern Uganda, amnesty and forgiveness have been promoted as a form of 
restorative transitional justice by the political, religious and traditional leadership. 
Religious leaders, for example, have argued that ‘forgiveness’ is a core transitional justice 
principle in the Ugandan context and that the Amnesty Act, which it lobbied for is an 
expression of Acholi cultural values of mercy.116  The Amnesty Act itself defines amnesty 
as ‘a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other 
form of punishment by the State’.117  Chapter 6 shows that although initially favourable 
to such approaches, justice sector donors funding transitional justice in Uganda have 
become increasingly intolerant towards the blanket Amnesty and have been engaged – 
largely unsuccessfully - in an effort to re-calibrate this particular conception of 
transitional justice by pointing to Uganda’s obligations to prosecute under international 
law.   
Another challenge to the dominant liberal conception of transitional justice – again, 
relevant to the Ugandan context – has been the foregrounding of ‘traditional’ approaches 
linked to concepts of intra and inter-communal reconciliation.  This has necessitated 
donor engagement with practices such as witchcraft, spirit possession, and spiritual 
healing, all of which represent ‘difficult territory’ for international policy makers.118  
While some scholars see ‘traditional’ processes as a more relevant and meaningful 
approach to accountability in contexts where the perpetrator/victim divide is blurred and 
state institutions are nominally absent, policy makers exhibit clear discomfort with ideas 
and practices that they regard as largely unreconstructed.119  Premised on systems of 
mutual support and obligation rather than the individual, and transacted in a non-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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codified way, they represent deviance rather than diversity, and are regarded as too 
amenable to state capture.120  As described above, the UN and other agencies now agree 
that while such practices must be part of the transitional justice toolkit, because they are 
locally ‘embedded’, the ‘transcendent values’ that underpin international legal frameworks 
cannot be compromised.121  
Thirdly, different conceptions of transitional justice challenge the dominant 
preoccupation with legal forms of redress for violations of civil or political rights during 
periods of conflict and oppression.  In northern Uganda, it is unequivocally the case that 
the majority of people prioritise compensation and socio-economic redress over other 
forms of transitional justice.122  In other contexts this has become a more defined agenda. 
In Peru, South Africa and Chile, for example, where truth commissions have failed to 
have any impact on the direction of economic policy, advocates have argued that justice 
for the crimes experienced during the conflict can only be properly addressed through 
redistributive policies that address the legacies of socio-economic inequality. 123  The 
recent Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia witnessed a transitional 
justice conception derived from calls for greater ‘social justice’ in response to youth 
unemployment, corruption, income inequality and nepotism.124  Such arguments are 
phrased in the language of economic, social and cultural rights (ESC) in an attempt to 
make social justice a legitimate priority within the transitional justice paradigm.  This 
conception of transitional justice, just like the dominant conception which privileges civil 
and political rights, is still firmly rooted in international human rights law.  It just 
represents a different set of priorities embedded in a particular cultural, historical and 
political logic, and a challenge to mainstream approaches.125  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Transi t ional  just i ce  pract i ces  and the problem with ‘hol i sm’  
In the scholarly literature, a consensus has emerged which takes into account the 
multiple conceptions of transitional justice and argues that as a form of practice, 
transitional justice must incorporate a whole range of theoretical and operational 
responses to mass conflict.  In this broad view, accountability is just one of many goals, 
jostling for space alongside other reconstructive objectives such as reconciliation and 
forgiveness.  Rama Mani offers one of the broadest interpretations.  Her argument - 
which draws upon John Galtung’s complementary objectives of negative peace (end of 
conflict) and positive peace (removal of structural and cultural violence) - is that a 
holistic approach is required.  This involves ‘reparative justice’: restoring the rule of law 
through domestic criminal justice reforms; retributive justice; truth commissions, 
reparation, and traditional mechanisms; and finally redressing the inequalities that 
underlie conflict.126  There is an appreciation that the broader aims of transitional justice 
will only be met by what Naomi Roht-Arriaza refers to as the ‘interweaving, sequencing, 
and accommodating (of) multiple pathways to justice.127   It has also been suggested that 
there are very practical reasons for why the transitional justice ‘industry’ is keen for the 
concept to have a more ‘holistic’ approach which encompasses broader developmental 
objectives: because developmental and peace-building programmes tend to be better 
funded.128  
 
A concern is that scholars and practitioners have attempted to ameliorate the ontological 
and epistemological complexity of transitional justice through a call for greater 
procedural pluralism.  ‘Holism’ is fashionable in post-conflict policy, and is a key plank 
of transitional justice programming in Uganda.129  Two observations can be made here.  
The first is that while it is possible to list a wide range of processes - international 
prosecutions; domestic prosecutions; vetting; lustration; truth commissions; community-
based justice; truth-telling; memorials; reparations – it is far more difficult to 
conceptualise the linkages between them and the politics that might intervene when one 
or more mechanisms, shaped by alternate transitional justice conceptions, operate in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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same socio-political space.  The evidence from Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, 
for example, shows that the relationship between different processes may be difficult, 
and can result in competition, tension, mistrust and confusion amongst local 
populations.130  The second observation is that ‘holism’ implies a degree of permissive 
pluralism that the dominant liberal conceptions of transitional justice do not allow in 
practice.  Thus, as has been alluded to above, for example, while ‘traditional processes’ 
are now foregrounded in transitional justice, they are still subject to universal claims and 
efforts towards ‘improvement’ which, if not introduced carefully, can ‘intellectually 
obscure’ and ‘politically repress’ difference.131  
 
Justice in transition: Social repair and the ‘every-day’ 
 
It is important to make a conceptual distinction between ‘transitional justice’ and what 
might termed ‘justice in transition’.  In recent years, there has been a ‘shift to the local’ in 
transitional justice research. 132  Scholars are increasingly examining national and 
international transitional justice interventions through the local perspective, highlighting 
the discordance between ‘ideal’ policy prescriptions and on-the-ground realities.  A 
particular strand of this literature is interested in what has been described as:  
‘the many individual and collective ways in which people pursue mundane 
activities and practices to restore the basic fabrics of meaningful social relations, 
negotiation or recreative protective mechanisms and provide some sense of 
continuity in their lives and sense of self in relation to others’ in the aftermath of 
violence and conflict.133   
 
This literature is influenced by Veena Das’s examination of survivors of mass violence 
during the partition of India, in which she concludes that ‘life was not recovered through 
some grand gestures in the realm of the transcendent but through a descent into the 
ordinary’.134  This kind of activity is often referred to in the literature as ‘social repair,’ but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 See for example, Nicola Palmer, ‘Transfer or Transformation?  A Review of the Rule 11 bis Decisions 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The International Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 20:1 (2012), pp.1-21; Drexler, ‘Addressing’; Jessica Lincoln, Transitional Justice, Peace, Accountability: 
Outreach and the Role of International Courts after Conflict (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).  
131 Donnelly, ‘Universality’, p.298 
132 Shaw et. al ‘Localizing’; Alexander Hinton (ed.) Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities 
after Mass Violence (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 2011); International Journal of Transitional Justice 
‘Special Issue’ on ‘Transitional Justice and the Everyday’ (November 2012). 
133 Alcala and Baines, ‘Editorial’, p.386 
134 Veena Das, Life and Worlds: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary (Berkeley: University of Berkeley 
Press, 2007).!
! 64 
there is no theoretical foundation which underlies such a concept.  A starting point 
towards better definitional clarity is to analyse what is meant by ‘social breakdown’.  If 
we adopt Weinstein and Fletcher’s description of social breakdown as being determined 
by a ‘multiplicity of influences’ and characterized by: a destruction of infrastructure, 
displacement, economic chaos, social and health chaos, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and civilian deaths – then it seems reasonable to suggest that social repair 
describes the way which people engage (or not) with processes and practices of recovery, 
coexistence and reconstruction as are of value in their everyday lives.135   
 
This is an area of inquiry that very important in northern Uganda, as well as in other 
contexts such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone.  These were conflicts defined, in part, by 
fratricidal violence.  It is the sort of violence that disrupts networks of familial and 
habituated relationships and creates what have been termed ‘intimate enemies’.136   In a 
special edition of the International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ), the editors 
discuss the possibilities for ‘re-conceptualizing transitional justice to consider the 
practices and processes with which people live through violence and seek to make sense 
of and resist violence’.137  It is not clear whether the authors mean that transitional justice 
should be equated with everyday practices and processes of social repair, or whether it 
should simply take them into account.  If the former, a word of caution is necessary.  We 
lack information about how communities recover after mass violence, and in particular, 
we lack information about the contribution that transitional justice plays in this process.   
Transitional justice is a loaded term: a political project with specific meanings attached to 
it.  Anachronistically subsuming all reconstructive practices under the nomenclature of 
‘transitional justice’ may distort their meaning and misrepresent the ‘foundations and 
functioning of the societies’ in question.  This is not to undermine the importance of 
‘everyday’ modes of social repair; on the contrary, understanding these processes is 
essential – but they do not need the transitional justice label blindly attached to them in 
order to provide validity or legitimacy.  Often links may exist between these processes 
and local conceptions of transitional justice; but sometimes such links will be harder to 
substantiate.   
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Perfect or relative justice? 
 
Given all of this, how should we conceptualise transitional justice in the Ugandan 
context?  There are, argues Amartya Sen, two basic and divergent approaches to thinking 
about justice.  Both took shape in the enlightenment period, and continue to influence 
our reasoning today.  The first is what he calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’.138  This is 
the approach taken by philosophers as diverse as Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, who were preoccupied with setting out institutional 
arrangements that would create the most just society.  The focus of this tradition was on 
‘perfect justice,’ and on ‘getting the institutions right,’ and while much thought was given 
to the ‘requirements of behavioral norms’ to ensure compliance, this line of inquiry 
focused on desirable rather than actual behaviors and social interactions.’ 139   Sen 
distinguishes between ‘transcendental institutionalism’ and what he terms ‘realization 
based comparison’. 140  The latter, he argues, was the approach taken by thinkers with 
substantive theories as diverse as Adam Smith, John Stewart Mill, and Karl Marx.  
Instead of focusing on the attainment of a transcendental and perfectly just society, they 
were interested in ‘societies that already existed or could feasibly emerge’. 141 Despite the 
apparent relevance of such an approach to the legally pluralistic societies in which 
transitional justice operates today, it is the first approach, ‘transcendental 
institutionalism’, characterized as it is by a strongly positivistic trend, which shapes much 
of the scholarship and practice of contemporary transitional justice.142   
 
As the discussion above illustrates, even though there are over-arching legal and 
normative transitional justice concepts, this does not translate into ‘reasoned agreement 
on the nature of the just society,’ and, moreover, the search for such agreement is 
probably elusive, or as Sen would argue, redundant.  Thus alternate conceptions that 
might emerge from the ‘transcendental’ solutions promoted by the universalist human 
rights ethical and legal architecture should not be understood as perversions of justice 
simply because they do not meet an ‘unavailable perfect situation’, nor should they be 
ranked ‘in terms of their respective closeness to the perfect choice’.143  Geoff Dancy has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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written about the tendency of scholars, even those working from an interpretative 
perspective, to ‘self-reflexively’ base judgments about transitional justice in any given 
context on a ‘maximalist position’, which dictates that justice ‘must be universal, equal 
and color blind’.144  Departing from such an approach does not amount to a call for 
methodological cultural relativism. It is an argument for a practical approach, which takes 
into account imperfect realities, and seeks to acknowledge and interpret and reflect on 
the plurality of different justice-related claims and principles that have emerged in 
Uganda since the Juba peace talks began and how, and why, some arrangements are 




We have seen how transitional justice emerged as a distinct political and legal project in 
the late 1980s.  It was envisaged and shaped by an epistemic community concerned with 
both human rights and transitions to democracy.  This was against the backdrop of 
political shifts taking place in Southern Europe, Latin America, Central and Eastern 
Europe; and South Africa.146  It was at these profound political and existential turning 
points that scholars, activists and politicians came together to engineer a relationship 
between two formless notions: justice, and transition, in the service of a third: 
democracy.   Since that time, the moral and utilitarian elements that were evident in the 
original transitional justice formulation have been distilled and refracted.  As it has 
migrated across contexts, it has also become professionalized and normalized in a 
broader post-Cold War political project: that of international liberal peace-building.   A 
key characteristic of this latest phase of transitional justice – as we shall see in Chapter’s 5 
and 6 – is the idea that it can be established via a ‘repertoire’ of ‘post-political’, 
ideologically neutral techniques and projects, even in states that are not undergoing a 
political transition.147 
 
The dominant liberal transitional justice paradigm frames the path post-conflict states 
ought to follow, but reality intervenes.  On application, and in context, multiple 
transitional justice conceptions exist and often they challenge, appropriate and subvert !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the dominant paradigm.  Different transitional justice conceptions can emerge from 
alternative ideas about the substantive and ontological basis of transitional justice, but 
they can also be framed as a deliberate attempt to obfuscate responsibility for 
wrongdoing.  International policy makers and donors may try to contain these 
differences and diversions, but often a lack of knowledge or genuine interest in context 
impedes this.  Meanwhile, the ways in which people and communities are actually moving 
on with their lives in conflict and post-conflict places remains out of focus.  In the rest 
of this thesis we go on to explore these dynamics more closely in the Ugandan context.  
In order to understand that context it is imperative to provide a historical overview of 





3. Law, power and public authorities in Acholiland from pre-colonial 





As a policy intervention, transitional justice falls within the existing legal realm and 
broader notions of social order. However battered by war, conflict or poverty these 
concepts may be and however much they are subject to continuous re-negotiation and 
mutation, they have in some form existed in the past, have continued into the present, 
and will shape the future.  There is a value, therefore, in trying to understand, through 
close examination of the available sources, what came before in Acholiland, and what the 
implications might be for the application of transitional justice.  What follows is an 
historical analysis, which examines continuity and change since pre-colonial times, with 
particular attention to the administration of justice and order, and the formation of 
Acholi ‘identities’.  This is not strictly chronological; instead, important themes are 
addressed under the headings of ‘justice traditions’, ‘conflict and disorder’ and ‘narratives 
of social repair’.  This chapter answers Adam Branch’s call for an analysis that 
historicises rather than essentialises the Acholi within ‘pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial political and social processes’.1   This is important because the debate about 
transitional justice in Uganda has been based on the construction of narratives that 
justify a particular form of intervention.  This involved some ‘terrible simplifiers’ about 
the particular ‘ways’, ‘traditions’ and ‘needs’ of ‘the Acholi’, which were often 
prescriptive, reductionist and abstracted.2    
 
The first part of this chapter explores the multiple traditions3 of justice in pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial Acholiland, examining three foundational themes.  The first is 
the abiding presence of what will be described as a form of ‘legalism’: sets of precedents 
and ideal normative principles that circumscribe a moral order but have never been 
written down or ‘institutionalised’ in the sense of formal organisation.  The second is the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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administrative division between ‘civil’ and ‘customary’ law first imposed by the colonial 
authorities.  The third is way in which people in Acholiland have adapted and re-
imagined systems of social regulation ‘at the margins’4, against the backdrop of major 
systemic and rhetorical political shifts at the state level since the colonial period.  This 
section also introduces the role of spirituality and cosmology as a ‘realm of internal 
contradiction and struggle’ in the ordering of social and moral worlds.5  The remainder 
of this chapter explores the historical relationship between Acholiland and the central 
state and the experience of conflict and disorder in modern Acholi history. It charts the 
coming of the LRA, the devastating consequences of the twenty year war and the impact 
it had on Acholi moral, political and social worlds.  It finishes with a preliminary 
discussion – developed as the thesis progresses - about the way in which a particular 
response to that devastation: transitional justice, fits with the broad canvas of custom, 
culture, moral norms, institutional attachments, administrative arrangements and 
religious and family ties upon which it is grafted.  
 
The multiple ‘traditions’ of justice in Acholiland 
 
Legal ism in Achol i land 
In the early twentieth century the colonialists expanded the Uganda protectorate to 
incorporate a large area of country to the north.  In 1910 the administration carved out a 
region which they called ‘Gulu,’ and four years later, in 1914, an adjacent area to the east 
was annexed and named ‘Chua’.6  Together these came to be known as the Acholi 
district.  Because there are no written records of what is now Acholiland from before 
1860, material which describes pre-colonial life in the area, particularly that which relies 
on oral testimonies, is in large part, a manifestation of the construction of an Acholi 
consciousness.7  In recording testimony at different times from the late 1930s to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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produced during the post-colonial period, the most comprehensive of which is Ronald Atkinson’s The 
Roots of Ethnicity.  There is an important historiographical debate about whether or not the Acholi had a 
pre-colonial sense of collective belonging. For contrasting views see, Ronald Atkinson, ‘The evolution of 
ethnicity among the Acholi of Uganda: The pre-colonial phase’, Ethnohistory, 36:1 (1989), pp.19-43; Tim 
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1970s, authors, including the Italian missionary J.P Crazzolara, the British anthropologist 
Frank Girling, the Acholi historian Reuben Anywar and the American historian Ron 
Atkinson, were also making history. 8  Much of what they document cannot be 
corroborated, but even if they present distortions of the past, they also records facts of 
contemporary importance.9  This chapter draws upon this material to address a particular 
conceptual challenge which emerges from the historical sources and remains an issue for 
transitional justice scholars today: how to best go about understanding a society in which 
‘law’ is not necessarily a discrete process.  
 
Historically, the regulation of Acholi life is well captured by the concept of ‘legalism’ as 
described by the anthropologist Paul Dresch and historian Hannah Skoda. Legalism’s 
themes, Dresch argues, include,  
‘an appeal to rules that are distinct from practice, the explicit use of generalizing 
concepts, and a disposition to address in such terms the conduct of human life.  
They do not always coincide with … a ‘legal system’; far less do they account for 
everything one might call ‘law’.10   
 
Hannah Skoda elaborates, describing legalism as,  
 
‘rules that are distinct from practice and rules characterized by the claim to be 
more than simply spontaneous improvisations, but in some sense often 
systematic.’11  
 
The historical sources describe systems of prescriptive rules across pre-colonial 
Acholiland which could be contravened and ignored whilst also remaining valid.  This 
was a system of social regulation informed by a conscious morality which recognised a 
common standard of behavior, and had its own normative terminology for expressing 
both the ‘oughts’ and ‘musts’ of conformity as well as the moral distinction between right !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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8 J. Pasquale Crazzolara, The Lwoo Part II: Lwoo Traditions (Verona: Museum Combonianum, 1951); Frank 
Girling, The Acholi of Uganda (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1960); Reuben Anywar, Acoli ki ker 
megi (Acholi customs), (Kampala: Eagle Press, 1954); Ronald Atkinson, The Roots of Ethnicity: Origins of the 
Acholi of Uganda, 2nd Ed. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2010).  For a discussion of oral history in this 
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Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, (n.d).  
9 Okot p’Bitek argued along these lines see: Okot p’Bitek, Artist the Ruler, (Kampala: East African 
Educational Publishers, 1986), p.42; Girling, in ‘Acholi’, p.151, makes similar point.  
10 Paul Dresch ‘Legalism, Anthropology, and History: A view from Part of Anthropology’, in Paul Dresch 
and Hannah Skoda (eds.), Legalism: Anthropology and History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.1-
39, p.1. 
11 Hannah Skoda, ‘A Historian’s Perspective on the Present Volume’, in Dresch and Skoda, ‘Legalism’, 
pp.39-55, p.39.   
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and wrong.12  The social units that the sources refer to were filled with meaning that 
went beyond the descriptive.  So, for example, as Dresch writes, ‘one has to have an idea 
of kinsmen and of what they should do’, as distinct from personal experiences of a 
brother or a cousin, before one can ‘complain of them for not doing it’.13  These rules are 
not always necessarily ‘legal’, but they provide ‘a programme for living together’ and a 
‘public view of wrong, as distinct from private discomfort’.14  
 
Before colonial times legalism appeared to work ‘sideways,’ in the sense that it was 
regulated by a series of relationships, rather than by a state.15  There was not one centre 
of authority, but many, and their relationships were overlapping.  In what is now 
Acholiland there were perhaps as many as 70 chiefdoms consisting of patrilineal village 
groupings or clans (kaka).16  Sources note that an important characteristic of these 
domains was the ‘limited power and authority of those at their head’. 17  These royal 
chiefs, or Rwodi Moo, shared their political power with lineage heads (ladit kaka) of the 
numerous clans, some royal and some ‘commoner’.18  There were other important figures 
too. The Won Ngom, for example, was responsible for taking care of the spirit shrine of 
the chiefdom (abila), and the ajwaka was a medicine man or herbalist who the Rwot would 
have consulted about the ancestral and other spirits (jok) which were responsible for the 
fertility of the land, the health of the people, and success in hunting and war.19    
 
Allegiance to the royal chief, was based on what his rulership could offer in terms of 
collective security and defence.20  The lineage head was the ‘principal authority’ on the 
ongon, which was the collection of precedents passed down orally from one generation to 
the next.  It regulated relationships within and between villages in the same chiefdom.21  
But if the lineage head and his elders were unable to resolve disputes then the Rwot, or 
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p.84; Girling, ‘Acholi’, p.12-3. 
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one of his representatives, was expected to step in and arbitrate.22  If a villager refused to 
accept the decision of an elder or a Rwot, he might choose to relocate, perhaps with other 
members of his family, to another village, or chiefdom, where he had kinsmen.23  In 
other instances powerful Rwodi, particularly those who could rely on the coercive force of 
‘superior numbers,’ might seek to exile dissenters.  General acceptance of concepts of 
right and wrong legitimated exclusion.24  An early colonial administrator would later write 
about ‘turbulent spirits’ who were ‘either repressed or left the village’.25 
 
Every author writing about political and social order in pre-colonial Acholiland 
acknowledges the difficulties involved in using oral histories and/or provides examples 
of pre-colonial polities being governed in very ‘non-ideal’ and violent ways, particularly 
as Rwodi began allying with Turko-Egyptian slavers and ivory hunters in the mid-19th 
century.26  Nevertheless, without resorting to ‘degenerate’ and deterministic conceptions 
of culture, we can begin to identify at least two relational and symbolic notions present in 
historical narratives which correlate with the way in which social and moral order is 
regulated in many parts of Acholiland even today.  The first was that public authorities 
derived legitimacy from their moral values and their ability to maintain order by consent 
rather than by coercion.27  They were expected to demonstrate an ability to regulate order 
in a way that broadly guaranteed their community’s protection in their everyday lives.  
Thus, as Sverker Finnström points out,  
 
‘Acholi mythology and tales often stress that the power of the chief can never be 
absolute.  He must earn his position and demonstrate his ability to lead his 
subjects’.28   
 
This ties in with the second notion: the existence of a set of precedents and ideal 
normative principles that circumscribed a moral order but were not coagulated into a 
fixed body of law with associated sanctions.  The anthropologist Frank Girling who was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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doing his fieldwork in Acholiland in 1949, wrote of the absence of a ‘formally recognised 
body of laws’ that ‘regulated the behavior of all inhabitants of a domain towards one 
another’,29 and yet there did, and still does, exist a moral discourse – a ‘set of homilies’, 
expressing, in context, the idea of justice.30   Girling gave the example that whereas a Mato 
Oput ceremony would take place after a killing between villages in the same chiefdom, 
murders that took place within villages could not be compensated for because of the 
communal nature of economic life, and usually ended up with the expulsion of the 
perpetrator.31   This indicates a moral and social notion of what should happen under 
similar circumstances across space and time, which constitutes a view of life that was, 
and is, more complex than just the personal relationships between neighbours and kin.  
It hinges not just on the wrongdoing and the form of punishment, but also on the extent 
to which the case affects the ‘rest of life’.  The anthropologist, Holly Porter, writing 
about Acholiland in the modern period, has emphasized the importance of ‘social 
harmony’ as the ‘primary moral imperative in the wake of wrongdoing’.32  This, she 
describes as something akin to the Acholi concept of ‘piny maber’ or ‘good 
surroundings’.33  It represents, in essence, a shared desire for a,  
‘state of normal relations among the living and the dead, linked to an idea of 
cosmological equilibrium and a social balance of power and moral order’.34   
 
In practice, this can be attained through violent and exclusionary acts or through 
peaceful and forgiving acts.  The approach is usually contingent on the wrongdoer, the 
wrongdoing and the broader cosmological, and social implications of both to the wider 
community.   
 
This has been as perplexing to modern day development and human rights workers as it 
was to the first colonial administrators.  The past shares with the present the concern 
that Acholi ‘legalism’ lacks a ‘theory of law’ of the sort that shapes modern state-centered 
legal systems.  Thus, people are subjected to a form of ‘law in action’, a system of forms 
and rules which ‘typically define wrongs by circumstance’ rather than by jurisprudence.35  
The colonial conceit, which it remains hard to escape from today, was the anachronistic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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use of legal terms and concepts to understand legalism, as if, writes Dresch, ‘law and the 
state were always waiting to be born’.36  Writing in 1926 about ‘indigenous’ aspects of 
law, the District Commissioners of both Gulu and Chua intimated a sense of discomfort 
with the fact that these processes seemed to be based as much on politics and chance as 
on the law.37  For them ‘indigenous systems’ had no formal explanation for their place in 
society.38  In 1926, the Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province, E.B Haddon, 
dismissed the ‘law of the clan’ as ‘that of public opinion.’39  J.P Postlethwaite, the first 
colonial administrator of Gulu district, later wrote in his memoirs that ‘we meted out 
justice according to our own ideas without having, I fear, much real appreciation of 
natives’ own traditions’ which he also referred to as the ‘tribal under-life’.40   The more 
politically correct modern desire to ‘blunt’ the seemingly arbitrary edge of ‘customary 
justice’ is similarly rooted in a failure to engage with different understandings of what law 
is, or ‘what is know-able, say-able, and do-able about the law’ in Acholiland. 41  Thus in 
situations of legal and normative pluralism, external observers have tended to attribute 
meaning to actions, such as a preference for a particular ritual, while the inter-subjective 
discourse that reveals itself through those actions is neglected, often leading to policy 
prescriptions, (as will be demonstrated in chapter five), that fail to take root or lack 
relevance locally.42  This has been particularly noticeable in transitional justice promotion, 
where the focus is on traditional ‘mechanisms’ and ‘processes’ rather than the meaning 
systems that inform whether or not they can address the issue at hand.43   
 
The co lonial  encounter  
In the following sections we retreat back into history and explore some of the meta-
shifts that have occurred since colonial times and the different systems of justice, law and 
order, that each brought in its wake.  Stephen Humphreys has carefully identified the 
‘habits, techniques and themes of the colonial period’ which, he posits, ‘remain in the 
genetic makeup…of contemporary transnational legal development’, of which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Dresch, ‘Legalism’, p.35 
37 Morris, ‘Surveys’ 
38 Ibid. 
39 Dresch, ‘Legalism’, p.15 Morris, ‘Surveys’, p.171. 
40 J.P Postlethwaite, I Look Back (St Albans: Staple Press Limited, 1947), p.37; p.45. 
41 Gauri et. al, ‘Intersubjective’, p.165;  Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.163. 
42 ibid. 
43 There is, for example, a strong tendency in the literature on traditional justice in northern Uganda to 
‘codify’ traditional rituals.  See Chapter 1, ft.79. !
! 75 
transitional justice is a part.44  An abiding continuity has been the identification and 
remolding of indigenous systems, backed up by ‘formal institutional machinery that 
broadly imitated western equivalents’.45  This is explored in detail in Chapters 5 and 7, 
what follows a description of the historical pre-cursors of this form of ‘legal export’ in 
Acholiland.46  Scholars have written extensively about the ‘artificiality of the native court 
system’ imposed by the colonialists across British African territories, and how ‘little basis 
it had in the customary law that it aimed to ostensibly uphold’.47  Colonialism challenged 
legalism in Acholiland in fundamental ways.  The colonial system of native 
administration and indirect rule, ‘transformed cultural identity into political identity and 
ethnicity into tribe’ writes Mahmood Mamdani.48  It is the point of reference around 
which subsequent historical and political narratives were re-inscribed.  Colonialism did 
not erase or eclipse everything that came before it, but it detached the past from the 
present in an unprecedentedly dramatic way.  A state was imposed, markets were 
introduced, and social relations were re-regulated, impacting significantly on both gender 
and generational relations.49  In the process, as Frank Girling described, forms of 
organization were both ‘forcibly removed from above’ and ‘disintegrated from below’.50  
The duty-based principles of legalism were officially de-legitimated while the 
development of ‘law’ as an institution, and the enforcement of a legal apparatus, became 
a key means of social control.  What marked this period was the imposition of a new 
power system conjugated to a new legal culture.  
 
The British colonial rule that took shape across Africa after the Berlin Congress was 
called ‘indirect rule’, although, as Mamdani points out, it largely coexisted with elements 
of ‘direct rule’; ‘the civilizing mission (assimilation)’ he writes, ‘existed alongside the 
management of difference (pluralism)’.51  Indirect rule was pragmatic.  It made sense in 
the far-flung reaches of the empire, where resources and personnel were few, that the 
bulk of administrative duties should be devolved to ‘natives’.  The colonial logic of native 
institutions, in turn, valorized the language of pluralism.  Five years after the Indian 
Mutiny the British barrister Henry Maine published his hugely influential book Ancient !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Law, in which he appealed for a clear distinction to be made between ‘universal 
civilization’ and ‘local custom’, based on a better understanding of ‘historicity and agency 
of the colonised’.52   In Uganda, as elsewhere, the pluralism that came to shape the 
system was divisive. It embedded a parochial separatism that juxtaposed a universal and 
progressive civil law for ‘non-natives’ with different systems of customary law for 
‘natives’.53  The latter was bound, ostensibly, by ‘culture,’ and stuck in history.   
 
Maine’s original appeal had been for a closer understanding of the local and the intimate.  
In Acholiland, though, the local was seen, at worst, as a place of ‘lack,’ and at best as a 
place of transition.  What it ought to be transitioning towards, according to the colonial 
administration, was a ‘native’ system more like that which existed in the Bantu-speaking 
South, where chiefs held significant power and pre-colonial courts had operated.54  The 
answer was to disregard hereditary chieftainship and install ‘well chosen, outstanding 
Acholi’, to take up the position of Chief, ‘in the government sense of the term’.55  These 
chiefs were referred to in Acholi as Rwodi Kalam, ‘chiefs of the pen’.  The system, 
Kagumire argues, ultimately worked, ‘not because it was initially acceptable, but because 
the British had the physical force to back up their appointees’.56  In 1919, the Native Law 
and Native Authority Ordinances were introduced. Subject to the District 
Commissioner’s supervision, the Ordinances conferred jurisdiction to salaried chiefs over 
all ‘Africans’ in their territories, concerning matters relating to ‘native law and custom’.57  
These new guardians of law and order, sitting in native courts, which, in Acholiland, 
unlike in other parts of the protectorate, had to be established ‘ab inito,’ exercised their 
judicial powers at district, county and sub-county level. 58  By the time Acholiland had 
come under what Postlethwaite would later term ‘modern administration’, the judicial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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system in Uganda was the archetypal ‘bipolar’ structure that Mamdani writes about in 
reference to the British African territories.59  
 
So what was the ‘native law and custom’ of Acholiland according to the native courts?  
What is striking in colonial accounts is the apparent lack of engagement with, or interest 
in, the substantive nature of so-called customary law.  The legal scholar, Julius Lewin, 
writing in 1944, lamented that ‘we know little more now about the substance of native 
law than we did when these courts were first set up’.60  Mahmood Mamdani’s argument 
about the motives of colonial administrations throughout the British African territories is 
highly relevant here: 
 
‘As they sought out controllers of society, the search for good laws gave way to 
one for effective authorities.  As they came to appreciate the possibilities of 
control in the customary, their interests focused more on customary authorities 
than on customary law.  As the substance of law was subordinated to the quest 
for order, the claim to be bringing ‘the rule of law’ to Africa became handmaiden 
to the imperative to ground power effectively.’61  
 
The Attorney General of Uganda, H.R Hone, wrote in 1939 that the dispensation of 
justice in the northern region was ‘ill defined and primitive,’ and as a result district 
officials were given greater discretionary powers to ‘supervise’ and guide’ its court 
system.62  That these were actually modern courts for modern purposes was not lost on 
the E.B Haddon, the Provincial Commissioner, who, in 1926 noted that,  
‘the community is now more complicated; people have moved about and have 
left the old clan authority…a regular system of courts becomes necessary to deal 
with such crimes and to produce a common law which supersedes public 
opinion’.63  
 
So long as there was a single authority of custom, in this case, the  chief, and so long as 
the chief was answerable to the District Commissioner, he was very welcome to enforce  
his version of custom as law.  In 1926, the District Commissioners of Gulu and Chua 
were asked by the Chief Secretary of the Colonies to provide information  about the law 
that native courts administered and how it was ‘ascertained’.64  Both answers were 
tellingly vague.  In Gulu, the District Commissioner wrote only that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘native custom so far as not repugnant to natural justice and as whittled down by 
administrative influence and judicial supervision.  This is well known to all 
attending the court.  Native custom is as definite, neither more nor less, as 
English common law.’65 
 
In Chua, the District Commissioner was even less clear: ‘native customary law is 
administered which is ascertainable by consultation with chiefs and prominent men’.66 
Neither Commissioner, when asked, recommended separation of the administrative and 
judicial functions of the chiefs, stating that it would be both impossible and futile.  In any 
case, the colonial administration had a safeguard in place, the so-called ‘repugnancy 
clause’, which stated that chiefs could continue to exercise their ‘ancient powers’ so long 
as the ‘jurisdiction they exercised was not repugnant to natural justice and morality or to 
the specific laws of the Protectorate’.67   
 
Post- co lonial  per iod 
Overall, the bi-polar architecture of the Ugandan justice system changed very little 
throughout the colonial period and into independence (although, as shall be argued 
below, the procedures governing their constitution became gradually more democratic).  
The African Courts Ordinance of 1957 (later amended as the African Courts Act of 
1962) officially renamed the native courts as ‘African courts’.68  The Africa Courts Act 
made it clear that no lawyer or advocate could represent any party before an African 
Court.  Continuing the logic of the colonial period, it was argued that the added value of 
the courts was they administered a ‘simple’ law by a procedure that people understood 
and could access easily.  The involvement of lawyers, it was argued, would add unwanted 
complexity to matters.69  Even today, the Acholi sub-region has only one High Court, 
based in Gulu, and two chief magistrates’ courts, in Gulu and Kitgum, and case backlogs 
are severe. 70   Despite some academic and political interest in attempting to unify 
substantive English and ‘customary’ law into a single canon, this never happened in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Uganda.71  On independence in 1962, the reasons why were practical: it would have 
required a huge number of professional jurists, and Uganda did not possess the resources 
to train them.72  Before long, the independent state came to see the advantages of cheap, 
accessible customary courts.  Anti-colonial desires for a unified legal system that would 
re-capture the ‘customary’ from colonial perversions were eclipsed by a ‘triumphant 
modernism’ which regarded the modern court system as the ultimate objective, but 
accepted, just as the H.R. Hone had done in the 1940s, that the conditions for its 
emergence were not yet ripe.73    
 
The solution in the immediate post-colonial period was to see ‘the customary’ as a 
‘compromise, inevitable but hopefully temporary’.74  Indeed Milton Obote, Uganda’s first 
Prime Minister centralised power and undermined the autonomy of local courts and 
councils.  Under Amin’s military state, these institutions were banned altogether. 75  
When the NRM came to power, there was a major narrative shift.  The ‘customary’ and 
‘local’ were valorised again as part of an internationally praised decentralization agenda.  
The NRM’s 1995 Constitution expressed a vision of popular participation in the 
administration of justice.  Local village (LC1) and parish council courts (LC2), 
constituted by the elected members of their executive committees, were mandated to try 
a broad range of civil and criminal cases that could also be referred to larger sub-county 
(LC3) courts.  The LC system was supposed to deliver a more equitable and inclusive 
form of state power in local spaces.  In developmental parlance, this was 
‘decentralisation’ policy at its best and most ‘far-reaching’.76   Scholars working in 
southern parts of the country argued that the system was giving people their first real and 
direct experience of democratic politics, and that the relationship between state and 
society had been completely transformed.77  In Acholiland, though, this new experiment 
in local government and local justice was very different.  From the late 1980s, the local 
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councils, along with Local Defence Units (LDUs),78 became perceived and real agents for 
NRA counter-insurgency against the LRA.  Cooperation and loyalty were enforced 
through purges of members suspected of being rebel supporters, and thinly veiled threats 
equated opposition to government military tactics with support for the LRA.79  Rather 
than providing oversight of the NRM/A, in Acholiland the LCs had ‘localised’ the state 
down to the village level, and had come to represent ‘political oppression’ and ‘petty 
harassment’.80   
 
Li fe  at  the margins :  Continuity  and Change 
The previous sections paint a picture of often violent change and the imposition of 
authority structures in Acholiland since the colonial period.  This section describes the 
various, myriad ways in which waves of political change and new authority structures 
have been negotiated, evaded, and often hybridized with pre-existing methods of social 
regulation in the Acholi context.  While it is certainly true that the ‘law’ has been cynically 
deployed and manipulated by political elites ever since the colonial period, it is important 
to take note of E.P Thompson’s famous assertion that the law does not keep ‘politely to 
a level’ but is at ‘every bloody level’.81  The law may have been, as Mamdani argues, a 
method of social control during the colonial era and subsequently, but it played many 
other social roles, depending of the standpoint of the observer.  The ‘Acholi’ were not 
just the trampled upon subjects of colonial oppression, statism, militarization and NRM 
subjugation: some cooperated willingly with each new system and exploited new 
opportunities for power and resources; others resisted them wholly but in a way that 
demonstrated agency and new ideas about how to adjust to modern circumstances. Thus 
social order, law and morality have been negotiated in heterogeneous ways ‘at the 
margins’ in Acholiland during periods of great political and social upheaval. 
 
Despite contemporary colonial assertions about ‘pacifying’ the Acholi, and successfully 
‘teaching’ the ‘primitive natives’ to be ‘government men’, many people resented and 
resisted the imposition of chiefs and their unpopular administrative directives.82   It was a 
criminal offence not to obey their orders, and people were well aware that decisions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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79 Branch, ‘Exploring’, p.39; Finnström, ‘Surroundings’, p.94 
80 Branch, ‘Exploring’, p.40 
81 E.P Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p.96. 
82 For accounts, see, Bere, ‘Land’, p.51; A.B Adimola, ‘The Lamogi Rebellion, 1911-12’, Uganda Journal, 
18:2 (1953), pp.166-177; Postlethwaite, ‘Look’, p.58; p.65; Anywar, ‘Awich’, p.42.  
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made by a chief in his courtroom would be backed up, if need be, by the ‘excessive force’ 
of the colonial government.83  Writing in 1917, the Provincial Commissioner of the 
northern region stated that,  
 
‘if the villagers are going to resist the authority of the chiefs, every action must be 
taken and a good lesson given so that others will not follow suit’.84   
 
Despite administrative reforms, not much had changed by 1950 and the process and 
methods of punishments in the native courts remained deliberately severe.  One 
divisional chief, in whose court Girling had sat for days ‘watching him mete out beatings, 
fines and imprisonment’, admitted that,  
 
‘ “we must rule by fear.  The people are lazy, they do not realize what good 
things the Government is doing for them.  How can we Acholi progress unless 
we grow cotton, pay our taxes and dig latrines as the Government want us to 
do?”.85  
 
Girling continues that ‘the District Commissioner agreed, admitting that ‘fear was still 
the main sanction of the government’. 86  Girling’s own impressions were ambivalent.  
On the one hand he found those who shared the opinion of the old man who celebrated 
the fact that ‘today there is law in the whole country, no-one is killed by his enemy or 
robbed without someone being punished’.87  Sections of Acholi society clearly recognized 
the benefits that the new system offered.88  Girling wrote about a ‘new social and political 
class’ of Acholi, mainly drawn from the commoner lineages, who migrated to the 
Catholic and Protestant missions when they were first established, learnt English, and 
were the first to become priests, government chiefs, teachers, and administrative clerks.  
It was from their ranks that a small cadre of traders and small businessmen emerged, and 
it was the sons and daughters of this socio-economic group who held ‘the most 
important positions open to Africans’ in Acholiland and were the ‘first to react against 
the limitations of the old order’.89   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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85 Girling, ‘Acholi’, p.198. 
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Girling’s overwhelming sense, however, was that the colonial government were ‘little 
more than police’, and that people, where possible, would circumvent the jurisdiction of 
the chief in the settling of disputes and turn to ‘friends and close kin without either the 
knowledge or consent of the British officials’.90 One of his respondents explained that, ‘it 
is only through their ignorance of what goes on…that the officials do not prevent it’.91  
The ‘jural’ authority of the head of the household, won, remained the most widely 
accepted and practiced form of social regulation, and Girling explained that part of his 
role was to punish dependents for their misdemeanours.92   
 
Less than ten years after independence was declared, in 1971, Idi Amin’s attack on the 
Acholi (described in more detail below), witnessed a similar pattern of disavowal and 
recoiling from aggressive central state authority.  The anthropologist Aidan Southall 
wrote that for the ‘masses of ordinary people’ living under Amin, the choice was between 
joining the system or ‘withdrawing as far as possible from notice and keeping a low 
profile’.93  The majority, he argued, took the latter route and life in rural areas was largely 
self-regulated.94  Ben Jones points out that re-centralisation of local powers under Obote 
and militarization of those powers under Amin concealed the fact that ‘central 
government was relatively haphazard in its administrative reach’ and that there were 
‘practical continuities locally which made the differences from one government to the 
next appear less remarkable to the villager with a … dispute, than to the historian of the 
Ugandan state’.95   Two recent anthropological studies, the first by Holly Porter and the 
second by Erin Baines and Lara Gauvin, describe in detail the continued significance of 
intra-family and intra-clan discipline and the powerful authority that heads of families 
and households still exercise today in matters ranging from domestic and sexual violence 
to the land rights of children born in LRA captivity.96   As Porter argues in relation to 
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rape cases, in the very rare instances in which this is reported to the police it was usually 
because relatives of the victim sanctioned such an approach.97 
 
While relatives and clan elders remained central to dispute resolution and social ordering, 
other local authority structures emerged during this period.  Indeed authority structures 
during the colonial period were not just imposed from the top.  People began to re-order 
their own established systems locally.  The early colonial policy of forced displacement, 
introduced in part to deal with the sleeping sickness epidemic, and in part to ease 
administrative burdens by moving people closer to main roads, dispersed many of the 
old village lineages. 98   While some areas were more disrupted than others, by the time 
Girling arrived in Acholiland in the late 1940s it was common for neighbours not to be 
kinfolk. In light of these new arrangements, new social systems of agricultural production 
were organised, ‘spontaneously and without either the knowledge of the British 
Administrative Officers or the encouragement of local Chiefs’.99   At the apex of this new 
system stood what are still known today as ‘chiefs of the hoe,’ (Rwodi Kweri), who were 
responsible for organising the rotation of co-operative work parties (awak) in the fields 
of each local group.  The Rwot Kweri had a retinue of guards, messengers, and clerks, and 
had sanctions at his disposal if members did not obey orders.100  What emerged were a 
set of ties and regulations based on neighbourhood and proximity, rather than solely on 
kinship.  
 
In modern Acholiland these patterns of negotiation and re-negotiation of micro-level 
social and political arrangements has continued.  As noted above, the formal 
institutionalisation of local authority under the NRM, in the shape of the LC1 (village) 
and LC2 (parish) systems, was viewed with suspicion by the Acholi population during 
the long years of war and displacement.  Since 2006, however, people have been 
returning to their villages in large numbers and the LC1 village courts, conducted as 
community meetings, have become an ‘embedded’ and widely used form of justice.101  
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Today they are staffed by villagers who are trusted members of their community.102  
Indeed recent studies by Hopwood and Atkinson argue that the ‘self-regulating’ 
character of Acholi rural communities has ‘re-asserted’ itself in the short period since the 
end of displacement, particularly in relation to land disputes.103  Despite the LC1 and 
LC2 systems existing as a hybrid mixture of state and local authority, the form of justice 
dispensed, is guided by the ‘legalism’ described above and is linked strongly to Porter’s 
notion of ‘social harmony’.  As Hopwood argues, it is based on ‘custom’ in the sense that 
‘identification of wrongdoing, process of decision-making, and ideas of appropriate 
resolutions’ are not based on state law or notions of formal justice.104   
 
A fundamental form of social and moral regulation not yet touched upon is the role 
played by both religion and the spirit world in Acholiland.  Like other forms of authority 
and accountability, it is both abiding and subject to constant mutation.  During the 
colonial period, spiritual and ritual life continued to ‘make sense out of misfortune,’ and 
to provide avenues for social accountability, even if the arbiters of Acholi cosmology 
were changing.  In 1939 the Catholic missionary Alfred Malandra observed the presence 
of an abilia or ancestor shrine in every village he visited, noting that ‘it may truly be called 
the centre of their religious worship’.105  In the late 1940s Girling wrote that even the 
Protestant and Catholic mission villages had failed to make ‘inroads into the traditional 
ancestor cult, which is observed by almost all Acholi, whether or not they are 
Christians’.106  This terminology was later critiqued by Okot p’Bitek who, in the Religion of 
the Central Luo, offers the most detailed description of Acholi religious beliefs.  In his 
book he describes a belief that the spirits of departed souls, and especially ancestral kin, 
continue to have relevance, playing roles in the world of the living such as punishing 
contraventions of moral order, and thus must be both remembered and respected.  As 
p’Bitek explains, historically there have been two different forms of spirit in Acholi, each 
existing independently of the other (jok singular; jogi plural).  Chiefdom jogi were ancestral 
and chiefs, lineage elders and the won ngom mediated the relationship between these spirits 
and their people.  Free jogi, meanwhile, represented forces from outside, and could be 
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mediated either through the ajwaka, who worked on behalf of private clients for positive 
purposes, or by malevolent witches and sorcerers for destructive ends. 107  
Anthropological writings point to the large number of female ajwaki consulted in times 
of sickness and trauma, and the increasing incidences of free ‘jok’ possession from 
around the 1950s onwards, linked to external pressures.108  The new jogi were seen as 
more violent, more destructive and less manageable than the chiefdom jogi.109  Tim Allen 
argued that the possession of women by ‘free’ ghosts in Acholi and other parts of 
northern Uganda, and the ‘terrifying activities of the sorcerers’, were both associated with 
the,  
‘decline in the authority of ritual elders, bewildering social change, and the 
manifest incapacity of the ancestors to alleviate epidemics of previously unknown 
diseases’.110   
Indeed the proliferation of free jogi also led to a proliferation of accusations of witchcraft 
during the colonial period.  For many lineage-based elders this provided a means of 
reasserting their traditional authority, and Heidi Behrend highlighted the internal tensions 
between ‘rich and poor, elders and young men, and women and men’ that such 
accusations produced.111 
 
Christianity was largely absorbed into the broader ‘ideological superstructure’ of Acholi 
social life.  Early Christian missionaries regarded reverence for the spirits as satanic.  
Nevertheless, Behrend argues, in the course of the process of evangelization, not only 
was the Acholi religion ‘Christianized, but the Christian teaching was also Acholi-ized’112 
Today, because of the influence of Christian teachings, consultation with spirit mediums 
is a marginalized social practice which people tend not to speak openly about, but it 
continues to exist.  As will be explored, particularly in Chapter 8, people have complex 
spiritual beliefs, and can be committed Christians while still seeing the value of traditional 
consultation with the spirit world.113  The spiritual domain, as is discussed in more detail !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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below, has also been an active site of ‘alternative’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ ideologies, 
particularly with the rise of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) in the late 1980s.114   
 
Impl i cat ions 
What this chapter has argued so far is that there exist many ‘traditions’ of Acholi justice 
and many forms of public authority, but ‘the law’ is highly contested terrain.  State-
sanctioned formal law never achieved widespread normative grounding or institutional 
ubiquity in Acholiland.  In part this is because of the post-colonial decision to re-produce 
the colonial state-customary divide in law; in part it is because the state has never 
functioned effectively in Acholiland (as will be explored below).  This is not to say that 
an ideal set of local justice alternatives exist on the margins, but simply that there are local 
forms of justice which people use and are often considered effective.  The legal 
philosopher Herbert Hart wrote that in modern societies law is only known as law when 
most citizens conform to it and when legal officials consider it valid.115  In Acholiland 
neither pertains: there is a scarcely functioning judicial system: it is slow, expensive, 
inefficient and non-penal judgments are hard to enforce.116  People are often suspicious 
of the officials involved – particularly police and magistrates - who regularly request 
bribes or additional payments to carry out duties or act in a particular way.117   Family 
networks and local authorities, such as clan elders and village councilors, remain central 
to the dispensation and provision of justice. 118   These authorities generate and 
disseminate a non-juridical form of knowledge and are guided by a set of material and 
spiritual interests that formal state law does not speak to.119  Crucially though it must be 
noted that the resilience of customary forms of authority and justice in Acholiland is a 
political and socio-economic reality based on historical experience and dominant 
constellations of power and authority rather than a result of static cultural predilections.    
 
In general, as we shall see, external attempts to regulate, locally, the dispensation of law, 
order and justice are viewed with some suspicion and transitional justice, in essence, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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represents such an effort.  This is as true for ‘traditional justice/restorative justice’ 
advocacy as it is for ‘formal accountability/retributive justice’ advocacy.  Take the former 
for example: what Humphrey’s terms the ‘institutive moment’ in which colonial 
authorities imposed or co-opted local authorities, dis-regarded their actual content and 
‘jumbled’ together formal and informal processes in the service of ‘gradual evolution 
towards ‘“Western” institutional norms’ remains an accurate depiction of donor support 
for traditional justice practices, and the Ker Kwaro Acholi, in northern Uganda, 
examined in detail in Chapter 7.   This has been combined with the latter.  The 
government’s post-conflict strategy for the north, which is being implemented by the 
Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) and supported by donors, is to promote formal 
justice structures and to consolidate ‘state authority’ into the sub-region.  This involves 
building more magistrates courts, more police stations, and more prisons, and all the 
while ‘sensitising’ the populations to what these institutions are and how they should be 
used.120  This logic is central to donor support for transitional justice, the idea being that 
if judicial capacities are increased and people are ‘trained’ and ‘educated’ in what proper 
legal systems really look like, then the rule of law will be strengthened.  But individuals 
and communities are not just ‘users’ who make decisions separable from their social 
contexts.121  Pre-existing and reified institutions concerned with the rule of law, such as 
the police and the courts, acquire meaning through history, and through the shared 
meaning systems that generate contest and re-define them.122  In other words, transitional 
justice processes should not be viewed simply as a ‘problem of norm construction’ but as 
one ‘inscribed into the context of political struggle’.123  It is to the history of post-colonial 
political struggle;, of inclusion and exclusion from the state; and of armed conflict, that 
we now turn.  
 
Conflict and disorder 
Achol i  inc lus ion and exc lus ion 
Today, despite a strong ethnic-linguistic identity, there is also a clear sense among the 
Acholi that they are Ugandans, albeit marginalized Ugandans.  In the rest of Uganda, and 
particularly in the Bantu-speaking south, Acholiland and its people are commonly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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regarded as a perplexing aberrant, a foreign people in a forbidding and frightening part of 
their own country.  It is not uncommon for southerners never to have travelled to the 
northern region of the country.  Those who do so are often warned by their friends and 
family to approach their journey with great trepidation and care.  Of course, the South, 
and particularly Kampala, has a large Acholi population, but they remain, as David Kaiza 
remarks, ‘a walking question mark to their fellow countrymen’.124  How did this come to 
be?  The Acholi relationship with the colonial and post-colonial Ugandan state has been 
deeply complex and tumultuous.  The way in which this historical experience has shaped 
both internal and external notions of Acholi identity are crucial to the understanding of 
contemporary relationships with the NRM government and state authority. 
 
Given the exhaustive strategies of oppression perpetrated by the colonial government 
against the Acholi, it is ironic that a pervasive and resilient colonial stereotype held that 
the Acholi, as a group, were inherently militaristic and violent.125  These ‘characteristics’, 
colonial administrators argued, made the Acholi perfectly suited to fight for the British in 
their wars.126  In 1947, J.P Postlethwaite wrote proudly that the Acholi are ‘nowadays the 
tribe from which a large portion of both the King’s African Rifles and the police are 
drawn’.127  This points to the colonial pattern of regional and ethnic recruitment into the 
military.  At independence in 1962, northerners, and particularly Acholis, were over-
represented in both the military and the police.  This was in part due to fictive colonial 
stereotyping and in part a result of colonial economic policy which, until at least the 
1930s, discouraged cash cropping in the region, preferring instead to transfer Acholi 
labour to the large farms in the South.128  This created an economic asymmetry that left 
few options outside of the military for those poorly educated Acholi who did not wish to 
farm. 
 
Many socio-economic histories of colonialism in northern Uganda stop there.129 It is true 
that Acholiland itself was perennially under-developed and under-represented in national 
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politics. 130   However, at independence the Acholi enjoyed the highest levels of 
employment throughout Uganda, and were the next best represented group in the civil 
service after the Baganda.131  Educated Acholi took professional jobs in the civil service, 
either at district or provincial level; became teachers; or migrated to the South to be 
employed, largely, by the government.  To give some sense of the reliance of the Acholi 
on government employment on the eve of independence, there were 7,074 Africans 
employed in the public services in Acholiland, compared with 445 traders.132  Indeed, the 
striking thing about Acholiland and its inhabitants is not just the degree of exclusion 
since colonial times, but the extent and nature of inclusion into the modern Ugandan state 
from the late colonial period until Idi Amin began his violent rule in 1971.133  
 
In his political history of the Acholi, Adam Branch argues that by the 1950s a ‘dominant 
internal political order’ had taken shape in Acholiland.   This comprised a ‘community of 
interests’, perhaps the most prominent of which was the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, those large 
numbers of Acholi employed directly by the state or dependent on it in some form.134  
While there was no great post-war anticolonial sentiment in Acholiland, it was present in 
other British African territories and colonial authorities attempted to contain local 
grievances with the introduction of nominally representative consultative local 
councils.135  In 1943, councils were set up at district, divisional and county levels, which 
brought together appointed chiefs and the ‘emerging petty bourgeoisie’ as well as another 
disgruntled group – those lineage heads and elders who had heretofore been 
marginalized by the British. 136   When the political parties – the Uganda National 
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Congress (UNC), formed in 1952, and the Democratic Party (DP), formed in 1956 - 
began working in Acholiland in the early and mid-1950s, the councils became the 
lynchpin in a dynamic and mutable relationship between the centre and the periphery: a 
relationship which also came to define and politicize claims of Acholi ethnicity.137  
 
Indeed ethnicity had become a powerful clarion call in 1950s colonial Uganda.  It was the 
banner under which the Baganda in the southern part of the country had managed to 
extract important political and economic concessions from the Protectorate 
administration.138  As the Acholi District Council became more active it became aware 
that  political concessions and political clout on the national stage could only be secured 
through the articulation of a common Acholi identity.  Thus against the backdrop of 
serious internal Acholi divisions, which found expression in tensions between lineage 
based authorities and government chiefs; between UPC and DP supporters; between 
Protestants and Catholics; and between the more westerly part of the sub-region and the 
less developed east, an ‘administrative ethnic categorization’ was pragmatically 
embraced.139   Debates about a ‘head of the Acholi’ began as early as the mid-1940s, and 
by the early 1950s there was an overarching consensus in the District Council that the 
Acholi  needed a figure of equivalent standing to the Kabaka of Buganda, or the Western 
kings, in order to assert itself on the national stage.140  The machinations behind the 
filling of this position, which was not achieved until 1963, became a ‘significant element’ 
in Acholi party politics, illustrating the ‘interplay of social and traditional ties within party 
and area loyalties’ but also the symbiotic relationship between an emerging ‘Acholi’ 
identity and modern state building in Uganda.141  
 
In 1962 Milton Obote, a Langi from northern Uganda, became Uganda’s first Prime 
Minister.   Under Obote it was the northerners rather than the southerners who were 
seen to be receiving political privileges and benefits from the state.  The Acholi and 
Langi in particular, provided the social base that Obote needed to sustain his rule.  The 
nationalization of some foreign industries and the creation of parastatals increased the 
opportunities for patronage, and resulted in an economic bureaucracy staffed 
overwhelmingly by the Acholi and Langi, with the Acholi political class ‘profiting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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considerably’.142  This, combined with the fact that the Acholi and Langi were, again, 
disproportionately recruited into the military, led to accusations within the marginalised 
political classes of ‘Nilotic nationalism’ and ‘ethnic chauvinism’.143  
 
After the suspension of the constitution in 1966, the army became the key guarantor for 
regime survival.  By the time he was deposed, Obote’s army had grown from 700 troops 
at independence to 9000, of which over one third were Acholi.144  Idi Amin, a Lugbara 
from West Nile (another region in northern Uganda), and army chief under Obote, 
launched his successful coup in 1971, turning Uganda from a one party state into a 
military dictatorship.145  Amin synonymised the rule of Obote with Langi and Acholi 
dominance, and in July 1971 thousands Acholi and Langi soldiers were massacred at 
Mbarara, Moroto and Jinja barracks. The following year Amin launched another 
‘mopping up’ operation against Luo-speaking 146  army personnel, once again killing 
thousands.147  In addition to purging the military, Amin and his forces targeted Acholi 
politicians, civil servants and other prominent officials, both in central government and 
in the districts.148  Those prominent and influential Acholi who were not killed decided to 
flee, creating an extensive Acholi diaspora which would expand over the years and still 
exists today.  The structural dependency of the Acholi elite and middle class on the state, 
meanwhile, was to be their undoing, and it was a very rapid undoing.  Prospects for 
rehabilitation were depressingly bleak, with ‘no independent economic foundation on 
which to build a new mediating class between the peasantry and the government’.149  
 
When Amin was eventually overthrown in April 1979 by the Tanzanian army and the 
Ugandan Liberation Army (UNLA) led by Milton Obote, Uganda was ‘economically 
dilapidated’.150  Obote was back, and he claimed victory in the multiparty presidential 
elections in 1980.  Certain prominent Acholi were incorporated into the new Obote II !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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government, but there was no money to revive the massive patronage machinery that 
had been the lifeblood of the Acholi middle class and political elite under Obote I.  The 
principal route back into state employment was through the military, and the Langi and 
Acholi were once again over-represented in the UNLA officer corps.151  During 1981 
Yoweri Museveni, a former ally of Obote, established the National Resistance Army 
(NRA), and began a bush war in protest against what he and his followers regarded as a 
fraudulent Presidential election.  The guerilla fighting was concentrated in central 
Uganda, in a region called the ‘Luwero Triangle,’ just north of Kampala.  In January 1983 
Obote launched Operation Bonanza, a murderous military expedition, which caused 
more than 300,000 deaths.152 Blame for the profound suffering that resulted was placed 
squarely on the UNLA, and in particular on its northern personnel, so that even today, 
‘Luwero is the ghost that haunts the Acholi’.153  
 
Under Obote II, the fragile alliance between the Acholi and the Langi proved short-lived.   
The Acholi accused Obote of placing them on the front line while the Langi enjoyed the 
relative security of the officer ranks.  This festering resentment led, in July 1985, to a 
successful coup by Acholi troops, led by Acholi UNLA commanders Tito Okello and   
Bazilio Okello.   But the quick rise to power of the first Acholi president was never really 
cemented, and after some peace talks, or what became known as ‘peace jokes,’ with the 
NRA, Museveni quickly captured Kampala. 154  As soon as the NRA declared victory in 
January 1986, the Acholi dominated UNLA beat a hasty retreat north.  Since 
independence, each successive regime: Obote I, Amin, Obote II, and the brief rule of the 
Okello’s, had been characterized to some degree by tensions within the north.   But these 
intra-northern battles were now whitewashed in the service of a more powerful narrative, 
born in the south, which celebrated the coming to power of the NRA, and the end of 
twenty-five years of ‘northern’ dominance and rule.  
 
A function of the NRA rebellion and subsequent victory was to coagulate the north-
south regional divide for very clear political ends. Museveni and his cadre were 
predominantly Banyankole from Ankole in southwestern Uganda.  The NRA needed to 
build a popular support base and one of the key ways by which it did so was by appealing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to a broader southern regional identity. At the time, the Obote II government was trying 
to portray the NRA as an ‘alien’ movement, comprising Rwandan elements intent on 
destroying Uganda.155 The NRA responded with a similar tactic, differentiating between 
‘bantu-southerners’ and dangerous and incompetent ‘Nilotic northerners’. 156  Acholi 
commentators have since railed against what they regard as an erroneously imposed 
collective guilt for the violence of the Obote II government. 157  But Finnström correctly 
argued that the Acholi have found it ‘impossible to escape the past as expressed in the 
national memory’.158  When the NRM took Kampala in January 1986, what followed was 
the categorical marginalization of the Acholi in every aspect of Ugandan political, social 
and military life.  As Omara Otunnu describes,  
‘the cabinet was made up of less than 6 per cent Luo speakers, and their 
appointment to other government positions was similarly disproportionately low.  
The NRA was composed of…over 90 per cent Bantu speakers, and the police 
force saw over three quarters of its members summarily dismissed’. 159 
 
Acholiland was also subject to an unparalleled degree of state harassment and violence. A 
short passage in Finnström’s work is instructive.  His key informant, Tonny, recounts the 
NRM’s intervention, both physical and psychological, into Acholiland.  His point is that 
it was unprecedented.160  Finnström concludes that, 
‘Amin’s forces, which were responsible for the killing of thousands of Acholi 
individuals, targeted mainly politicians, soldiers and intellectuals.  Unlike 
Museveni’s army, claimed my informants when they compared their situation to 
that of the 1970s.  Amin’s soldiers never bothered to go deep into the rural areas 
to harass, loot and kill ordinary people’.161 
 
When the NRA aggressively pursued fleeing UNLA troops in 1986 and 1987, Acholiland 
was unstable and insecure.  This was a situation characterized by generational, spiritual, 
and identity-based insecurity, and a total lack of effective political leadership. It was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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certainly not the ‘ethnic political solidarity’ that the NRM envisaged, and yet, as Branch 
argued, the severity of the NRA attack on the north gave rise to the very rebellion they 
feared.162  By March 1986 an unlikely coalition of interests, including former Acholi 
politicians, sections of the defeated UNLA, Obote supporters, and even Amin 
supporters, had formed the Uganda People’s Defence Army (UPDA) in Juba, southern 
Sudan, with the aim of regaining national power through armed resistance to the 
NRM/A.163 When the undisciplined and poorly trained NRA 35th Battalion arrived in 
Gulu in August 1986, the counter-insurgency was so violent that by the end of the year 
the international media were covering the story, and accusations of genocidal behavior 
were being leveled at the NRM.164  President Museveni’s excuse was to blame reports of 
abuse on deviant soldiers: this was, he argued, an aberration and not the norm.165    
 
The coming o f  the LRA 
In 1988 the government offered an amnesty to the UPDA and a peace agreement was 
signed.  Many of those who refused to sign had already to defected to a novel and 
seemingly preternatural form of armed resistance.  It was experimental, and utterly 
confusing to the outside world.  In essence, though, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Mobile 
Force represented a way of making sense of a violent recent history, and a means of 
establishing a form of legitimate authority across the region. Alice claimed she was 
possessed by the spirit of an Italian who died during First World War.166  Lakwena, Alice 
said, told her to launch the Holy Spirit Movement and ‘to save the male youth’ of Acholi 
from the ‘malicious plan’ of Museveni to kill them all in revenge for ‘what happened 
many years back’.167  Lakwena’s mode of spiritual leadership and her rhetoric of cleansing 
and purging of wrongdoing, witchcraft, and sorcery had an appeal beyond Acholiland, 
and the HSM recruited successfully in both Lango and Teso. It is estimated that 
Lakwena’s army eventually numbered somewhere between 7000-10,000 troops.168  It was 
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not until she reached the outskirts Jinja, just to the northeast of Kampala, in November 
1987, that the HSM was finally defeated and crushed by the NRA.  
 
It is often said that Joseph Kony is a distant cousin of Alice Lakwena.  He was born in 
1961, in Odek, to the east of what is today Gulu district.  He was a Catholic altar boy, 
and people who knew him as a child recall him performing songs and dances at local 
church services.169  Kony had cut his teeth fighting NRA soldiers with the UPDA’s black 
battalion in Atanga, and by 1987 he was the local force commander.170  There are 
conflicting accounts of how the LRA came into being, in that same year.  In the early 
1990s, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) of Gulu said that Kony ‘failed to be 
accepted by his village as a prophetic leader and started a private gang’, which went on to 
commit minor crimes and disturbances.171  In his own words, Kony claims that he ‘came 
to the assistance of his people who had been deserted by elders, families and leaders’.172  
Kony started his movement as the Holy Spirit Movement II, renaming it the Lord’s 
Salvation Army, the United Democratic Christian Force, and later the Lord’s Resistance 
Army.  To this day it remains unclear whether he received the blessing of any of the 
lineage-based authorities.173  While some former UPDA and HSM fighters joined Kony 
readily, there was a general lack of popular support in the form of volunteers and 
material help.   
 
From the outset, a key factor in Kony’s thinking seemed to be the categorization of 
Acholi people into two broad camps: the genuine and the corrupt.174 The self-flagellation 
of the Acholi had its antecedent in Alice Lakwena’s assertions about the wickedness of 
the Acholi people, and their need to be cleansed.175  But Kony’s internal enemy was 
understood more specifically to be the Acholi who were collaborating with the NRM 
state apparatus.   The construction of such an enemy was a sign of the times.   The 
period during which Kony emerged onto the scene was also the period when the NRM 
began consolidating state power in Acholiland, setting up local government structures !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and LDUs.  These were staffed by ex-UNLA, ex-UPDA, and other Acholi civilians, all of 
whom came to be perceived by Kony and his leadership as co-opted agents of an 
‘ethnically exclusive central state’.176  In his self-appointed role as the arbitrator and 
custodian of a true and genuine Acholi identity, Kony also subverted traditional authority 
and customs, rejecting the role played by traditional leadership and elders in regulating 
Acholi life, and ordering the murder of clan leaders, ajwaka, and the burning of ancestor 
shrines.177  
 
The spiritual order of the LRA and the horrendous acts they have committed has been a 
source of morbid fascination for the international media over the years.  Kony is held up 
as the archetypal African warlord: brutal, irrational, bizarrely religious, child snatching, 
and insane.178  But while the media is still fixated on this stereotype, scholarship has 
moved on.  There is a growing body of work which analyses the strategic functions of 
spirituality and violence in the movement.179  Part of the enduring force of the LRA was 
the way in which Acholi cosmologies were employed as what Kristof Titeca has called 
‘fine-tuned instruments of torture.’180  For civilians and many NRA/UPDF fighters 
caught up in the violence, even to this day, there is a widespread feeling that Joseph 
Kony, regardless of whether or not he has a legitimate authority, has supernatural 
powers.  This belief derives from a deep familiarity with the traditional and religious 
idioms that Kony has drawn upon and subverted over the years.181 
 
The overarching national and international narrative about the LRA has been that it lacks 
any political agenda.  In 1997 the Ugandan Parliamentary Committee on Defence and 
Internal Affairs reported that it had ‘failed to establish the cause or causes for which the 
LRA is fighting’.182  A report from the United Nations in 2001 concluded that the ‘LRA 
has no coherent political or other objectives’.183  But Sverker Finnström questioned these 
assertions in his analysis of LRA ‘manifestoes’ gathered over a ten-year period (1997-
2007).  Whilst acknowledging the disputed provenance of these documents, he identified !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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clear secular priorities, including the restoration of multi-party politics via free and fair 
elections; the introduction of constitutional federalism; and the need to develop 
nationwide socio-economic balance.184   These demands are accurate reflections of the 
range of concerns that people express in Acholiland up to the present day.  These 
include the relative under-development of the north in comparison with the rest of the 
country; poor access to decent education and healthcare; the excessive power and poor 
accountability of the central government and the military; and a general sense of rejection 
and inadequacy which makes the people feel that northern Uganda exists only as a 
peripheral and problematic space.    
 
The difficulty, then, was not with the political agenda of the purported LRA/M 
manifestos; it was with the LRA’s strategies of violence, which remained bewildering to 
most Acholi.  The LRA conception of the internal enemy, linked as it was to those who 
collaborated with the government, made little sense to civilians, and had little grounding 
in political realities.  Many Acholi, for example, while being skeptical of the government’s 
control over the local council system, also understood that it represented a negotiating 
platform from which they might advance their own interests.185  Even more perplexing 
was the common LRA assertion that Acholi civilians were in willful acquiescence with 
the very government directives that were destroying their lives.  When the Acholi were 
forcibly displaced into camps, the LRA actually increased their violence against displaced 
civilians, attacking camps, burning huts, and insisting the occupants were supporting 
government policies.  In a telephone interview broadcast on the local FM radio in Gulu 
in 2003, Vincent Otti, Kony’s deputy, echoing similar pronouncements made throughout 
the war, threated more violence in the camps, which he argued were ‘inhabited by 
“government agents”’.186 
 
The lived experience of the Acholi in the years since 1986 contrasted  fundamentally with 
the overarching historical narrative of peace and rising prosperity in Uganda since 
Yoweri Museveni took power.  The policy of crowding people into IDP camps, which 
began systematically in 1996, had, by 2005, displaced more than 90% of the Acholi 
population.  The government made it clear that anyone found outside a camp would be 
treated as an insurgent and killed.  The IDP camps were ostensibly ‘protected’ by small !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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groups of UPDF soldiers and local defence units under their command.  In reality, 
attacks on camps were common, and abuses by both the UPDF and LRA were a regular 
feature of camp life for many.187   The camps totally devastated Acholi livelihoods, and 
inflicted the most unimaginably brutal living conditions, leading to a far larger number of 
deaths than those caused by LRA violence. 188  An unsettling thing about the camps is  
the extent to which they were actually a product of the dysfunctional relationship 
between military oppression and humanitarian assistance that has been so well 
documented in many post-Cold War contexts.189  In northern Uganda this new form of 
public authority, humanitarian relief, was ‘entangled in the structuring of the camps’: it 
fed, clothed and sustained these ‘rural prisons’.190   State violence and humanitarianism 
became mutually re-enforcing, initiating and perpetuating a form of ‘political mass 
persecution’ which Chris Dolan has called ‘social torture’.191    
 
Accounts of camp life describe a situation in which any ability to exercise the rights of 
citizenship or to seek accountability or redress for a wretched daily existence was 
nonexistent.192  Dolan described how the camps were administered by ‘multiple and 
overlapping authority systems’.193  People brought their own authority figures with them 
into the camps, most notably village elders and Rwodi Kweri, but they also came under the 
authority of the local sub-county council (LC3) under whose jurisdiction the camp lay, as 
well as ‘camp leaders’, who were civilians elected to administer the camps.194  The 
military, meanwhile, had an expansive mandate that ranged from demands that people 
move closer together to ensure their protection, to ‘warnings that people consider 
hygiene and sanitation to avoid the outbreak of disease’.195  There was a staggering lack 
of police services.  According to a Human Rights Watch report in 2005, many camps 
containing tens of thousands of people ‘have not a single police officer to monitor, 
investigate or prosecute crime’, including alleged abuses by the UPDF.196  The judicial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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system was virtually non-existent in northern Uganda during the conflict, and by the time 
the ICC arrest warrants were announced, the High Court in Gulu had not sat for five 
months, and the case backlog was ‘two to three years’.197 
 
Narratives of social breakdown and Repair 
 
In Acholiland today, people talk about how ‘camp’ life undermined Acholi traditions, 
cultural practices, and social institutions.198   In the late 1990s and 2000s conferences 
were held, and NGO reports were produced which articulated something akin to a 
theory of social breakdown.  It was said that a long history of war had destroyed the 
natural biotope of the Acholi social and moral order.199  Its ability to regulate conflict was 
thus severely compromised and could only be restored through the promotion of Acholi 
‘unity’ and the strengthening of ‘cultural heritage.200  This agenda was given additional 
impetus after the ICC investigation was announced in 2004.  The Refugee Law Project 
argued that the ICC and ‘Nuremberg-style trials’ were ‘not at all suited’ to northern 
Uganda and the type of conflict that had taken place.  They called instead for a resolution 
of conflict which ‘centres around the Acholi’.201  Shortly afterwards, the Canada-based 
Liu Institute for Global issues produced a report called Roco Wat I Acoli: Restoring Relations 
in Acholi-land, expressing concern that the ICC might ‘damage cultural identity and 
beliefs’.202  The report went on to document ‘traditional’ processes that might play an 
alternative role in efforts towards transitional justice.203  The Mato Oput compensation 
and reconciliation ritual attracted the most attention, and the term would later become 
synonymous with ‘traditional’ approaches to transitional justice in Acholiland. 
 
Adam Branch suggests that such arguments, when promoted and co-opted by donor 
agencies and internationally funded NGOs comprise a harmful and pernicious ‘ethno-
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justice’ agenda.  Drawing upon the work of the Beninese philosopher, Paulin 
Hountondji, he posits that the ethnojustice narrative describes,  
 ‘a single, coherent, positive system that is presented as being universally, 
consensually, and spontaneously adhered to by all members of that culture and 
that, even if in abeyance today, remains valid and should be revived’.204   
 
In its most concerning iterations, the ethnojustice approach actually attracts donor 
funding for training Acholi’s how to be Acholi.205  In 1995 the Uganda Constitution re-
instated the right of Ugandan citizens to adhere to the culture and cultural institutions of 
the community – a privilege that had been abolished by Milton Obote in the 1960s.206 
The articulation and codification of an ‘ethnojustice’ agenda has therefore developed 
synchronously with the newly created Acholi ‘cultural institution’, the Ker Kwaro Acholi, 
set up in 2000 and headed by an Acholi paramount chief, (lawirrwodi).  The KKA claimed 
custodianship over an increasingly singular definition of Acholi tradition, and the 
language used by advocates was of ‘rejuvenation’ and ‘reinstallation’.207   But this newly 
formed authority structure was contested from the outset, perhaps not surprisingly given 
the Acholi’s history with externally supported chiefly figures. 208   The ethnojustice 
narrative misleadingly implied that the KKA and its anointed chiefs had the exclusive 
and ancient right to restore a set of ideal social relationships that were somehow inherent 
in Acholiland.  This was buoyed up by calls from religious leaders who stressed the 
cultural proclivity of the Acholi towards forgiveness and reconciliation.209  The idealized 
notion that there is a distinct and uniform ‘Acholi’ way of dealing with the aftermath of 
the war has come to represent a powerful, transitional justice conception, one which is 
explored in depth in chapter seven.   
 
Rather than simply dismissing ‘ethnojustice’ narratives as mendacious and pernicious, as 
both Allen and Branch are prone to do, this thesis is concerned, firstly with 
understanding more carefully how and why such approaches are constructed, and in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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whose interests they serve.  Secondly, it is concerned with exploring in more empirical 
depth, whether, locally, such narratives have their desired impact.  One of the great 
dangers of relying too heavily on the seminal critiques of donor-supported ‘traditional’ 
agendas in northern Uganda, is that these have obscured a much broader realm of local 
practice, one that exists largely outside of the purview of donors, NGOs and traditional 
KKA chiefs.  It is this latter realm of activity that provides us with a much more accurate 
picture of the nature of Acholi ideas and practices related to justice and reconciliation 
and this remains of the focus of the final two chapters of the thesis. 
 
As a source of social unease it is important to remember that the degradation of 
prototypical Acholi tradition and practices has been a perennial concern, and was written 
about extensively by Frank Girling in the mid-century, by Okot p’Bitek in the 1970s and 
by Heidi Behrend in the 1980s.  The depiction of Acholi tradition as ‘pristine and 
hermetically sealed, with no prior history of social negotiation or change’210 is a rhetorical 
device and a political expression.  The boundaries are constantly shifting, and there is 
always a ground zero, before which tradition was unadulterated.  Today, that ground zero 
is ‘before the LRA war’; during the 1980s, it was ‘before Amin’; during the 1950s it was 
‘before colonialism’.211  Then, as now, there were calls for Acholi society to be restored 
to its ‘true condition;’ and then, as now, there were large sections of society for whom 
this call resonated very little, particularly, for example, those who have access to 
economic opportunities, and the younger generation as Branch has argued, but also for 
the many rural communities which have their own authority structures in place and who 
do not identify with a ‘chief’.212  There is a particular function of the narrative which 
holds that ‘traditional Acholi’ forms must be restored, and while it sounds coercively 
prescriptive, it should also be understood as an expression of social disorientation and 
shifting power dynamics: all of which have been recurrent themes in modern Acholi 
history.  While critics have been correct to highlight the problems with the ethnojustice 
agenda, it is equally important not to over-state its potential or actual impact.  As Chapter 
7 explores, the chiefly system set up with the help of donors to carry out traditional 
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reconciliation practices remains largely unimportant and marginal to local political life 
and local ideas about justice.  
Concluding discussion: Complicating prospects for transitional justice 
 
In a period of not much more than one hundred years, Acholiland has experienced   
colonialism, authoritarian statism, civil war, and, most recently, partial democratization 
and liberal peace building.  Each form of intervention has shaped contexts, produced 
new interests, and inspired a range of reactions.  Transitional justice, with its multiple 
conceptions, is no exception.    The way that people respond to and re-shape notions of 
justice and accountability can only be understood against the backdrop of historical 
experience and the inter-subjective understandings and relational and symbolic dynamics 
that this history has produced.  It is this which infuses otherwise rather abstract 
categories, such as ‘criminal justice,’ or ‘traditional reconciliation,’ or ‘customary 
authority,’ with meaning.   This chapter identified various patterns that have emerged 
from a socio-legal and political history of Acholiland since pre-colonial times. These 
should better inform our understanding of transitional justice in northern Uganda, and 
the ways in which people have reacted to it, re-shaped it, or simply ignored it.   
 
The first is an inherited legal dualism, which began as a programme of colonial social 
engineering and control.  It entered the post-colonial period as a regrettable but 
convenient compromise, was institutionally incorporated as a beacon of decentralization 
policy, and has since – as will be explored more in Chapter 8 - been locally ‘embedded’ as 
preferred method of justice.  This legal dualism as conceived at the policy level has been 
predicated on the logic of the master narratives outlined above.  But crucially, since the 
colonial era, public authority systems, whether it be the clan elders or local council 
courts, have been defined and re-defined through social practice.213  While the formal, 
informal and customary have undergone continuous processes of hybridisation, the 
reified distinction between the ‘formal’ and the ‘customary’ is still very much a political 
and socio-legal reality and it is not therefore surprising that as a notion it has been re-
produced in discussions about transitional justice.  At the same time, it is important to 
historicise this distinction and to understand it as a product of a particular historical 
experience rather than as somehow culturally determined.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
213 Gauri et. al, p.165.  
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This brings us to a second theme which is the tension between the local as lived and the 
local as imagined. In Acholiland today there exists an abiding form of social regulation 
which is not based on jurisprudence but on authoritative and familiar notions about what 
is ethically and spiritually appropriate in certain common situations.  This can be as 
exclusionary and violent as it can be inclusive and benign.  But as a form of social 
practice it exists outside of the purview of transitional justice discussions, which are 
based more on imagined notions of Acholi life.  So, for example, donor transitional 
justice conceptions, emphasise judicial ‘capacity building’ and human rights ‘sensitisation’ 
as a way of enhancing ‘access to justice’.  But such programmes do not take sufficient 
account of the deep-rooted, socially generated legitimacy of the systems that people 
already use.  Similarly, the ‘traditional justice’ agenda is more of a political vision than a 
true reflection of Acholi experiences.   It tells us something about how certain authority 
figures and constellations of interests would like Acholiland to be ordered, rather than 
how it actually is ordered, and it deliberately obscures the texture and heterogeneity of 
Acholi history and spirituality.   
 
Finally, we can observe that despite the Acholi being well integrated into the state at 
certain periods during the post-colonial era, the state has never really functioned 
coherently or legitimately in Acholiland itself.  By the time the NRM’s relentless assault 
on the Acholi began, the region was already beset by internal political weakness and deep 
spiritual insecurity.   This weakness manifested itself throughout the war in the lack of 
options that the Acholi had to air their grievances.214  Despite the various groups 
travelling to Juba to represent northern Uganda during the peace talks, it was the 
LRA/M that enjoyed the mantle of ‘spokesperson’ for the civilian population that they 
had been brutalizing for twenty years.  Despite the rather tokenistic popular 
consultations held during the talks, the transitional justice blueprint for Uganda was 
negotiated in a closed room by two parties.  One party was made up of representatives of 
a fratricidal rebel group, and the other of representatives of a state that had constructed, 
in the form of forced displacement, an unimaginably cruel architecture of violence and 
deprivation.  After Juba, when discussions about transitional justice became very 
technical and divorced from politics, this uncomfortable truth was obscured.  
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Nevertheless, as an indication of the injustice of particular forms of justice, it continues 
to influence the way that people in Acholiland debate accountability and reconciliation 
today.   It is to Juba that we turn in the next Chapter.   
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The previous chapter discussed complex notions of justice, accountability and identity in 
Acholiland in historical context.  It argued that transitional justice, to paraphrase Alain 
Badiou, can never be an ‘uninherited reality’:1 it will always be shaped, on application, by 
the structural, political and cultural context it inhabits.  This chapter begins our detailed 
journey into the domestic political trajectory that transitional justice took in Uganda since 
the Juba talks began in 2006. It focuses on the construction of the Accountability and 
Reconciliation agreements that came to form the national framework for a transitional 
justice policy to address the legacies of the GoU-LRA conflict.   
 
To date, academic debate about the role that justice issues played at Juba has focused on 
its exogenous role as either a facilitator or spoiler during the talks.  Some have argued 
that the signing of the AAR agreements proved that peace and justice could be negotiated 
simultaneously during peace talks.2  Others insisted that the agreements did not manage 
to overcome the fundamental impasse of the ICC arrest warrants and that this was the 
key reason why Kony failed to sign a Final Peace Agreement.3  Both interpretations 
brought the ‘peace versus justice’ dilemma into sharp focus, while the broader political 
context, including structural power dynamics between the two sides, historical 
understandings of conflict, and the internal dynamics of the negotiating parties, were 
obscured.   This chapter seeks to contribute to the literature with an analysis of the talks 
that contextualizes the justice and accountability debate at Juba in the domestic politics 
of the conflict. 4  In so doing, it draws upon a wide range of interviews with GoU actors 
involved in the talks, LRA/M negotiators, mediation team advisers and civil society 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Alain Badiou, The Century (New York: Polity Press, 2007).!
2 See Chapter 1, ft.5 
3 Ibid.!
4 The emphasis in this chapter is on the domestic politics around justice at Juba, rather than on the 
procedural nature of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (AAR) which can be found in 
the Annex, or the legal, political and administrative structure of ICC itself, or it’s own interpretation of 
what happened in northern Uganda. For analysis of the politics of the ICC referral see: Clark, ‘Chasing’; 
Branch, ‘International’; Allen, ‘Trial’.  For legal interpretations of the AAR and its Annex see, Nouwen, 
‘Complementarity’; Human Rights Watch, Benchmarks for Justice for Serious Crimes in Northern Uganda (New 
York: HRW, 2008); Otim and Wierda, ‘Uganda’.  
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representatives as well as newspaper reports and documentary evidence from the talks 
themselves. 
 
This chapter provides a detailed account of the Juba process focusing in particular on the 
motives and actions of key GoU and LRA/M actors around justice and accountability 
during the talks.  This lays the groundwork for a much clearer understanding of, firstly, 
how the AAR agreements came to be shaped and secondly, the trajectory that 
transitional justice took in Uganda, post-Juba.  The first part of the Chapter explores the 
events and debates leading up to the talks.  The chapter goes on to explore GoU and 
LRA/M approaches towards a political settlement at Juba, providing the context in 
which discussions about justice, accountability and reconciliation were framed.  It argues 
that the AAR agreements were informed by political expediency, narrow self-interest and 
possibilities for narrative shaping.  While they showcased the transitional justice ‘tool-kit’, 
the agreements were not rooted in engagement with its normative underpinnings, nor 
were they based on a political consensus about accountability and reconciliation. Rather, 
the AAR agreements were motivated by a desire to circumvent the ICC impasse and 
ensure progress on paper and the continuation of the talks, which, nevertheless, 
collapsed in December 2008 with the launch of Operation Lightening Thunder.  
 
Background to the Juba Peace Talks 
 
Since the late 1980s, the default approach of President Museveni and his closest military 
advisers towards the LRA has been outspoken impatience with negotiations and a 
declared determination keep fighting.  Over the years, elements within the NRM and 
NRA (later UPDF) have stood to gain from the continuation of the war in the north.5  
The government successfully portrayed the north - an area where it had virtually no 
popular support anyway - as a dangerous and peripheral space which must be ‘pacified’ 
in the interests of Ugandan peace and prosperity. This has allowed the GoU to 
conveniently ignore legitimate Acholi grievances, equating them with support for the 
LRA.6  The war has also provided a solid basis for GoU appeals to donors for increased 
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defence spending.7  It has proved highly profitable, particularly for UPDF commanders, 
who have allegedly appropriated war resources for personal enrichment.8  
 
The first major military campaign against the LRA was launched in 1991.  Operation 
North lasted for four months and was regarded a failure.9  Betty Bigombe, an Acholi 
who was appointed Minister of State for ‘Pacification’ of Northern Uganda in 1988, took 
a relatively independent position during those first military strikes, and this lent her some 
credibility with the LRA leadership.10  Towards the end of 1993 she made contact with 
Kony through intermediaries in Gulu, and began travelling to the bush for face-to-face 
meetings with the LRA high command.  In early 1994 Bigombe managed to negotiate a 
delicate ceasefire, which quickly unraveled when Museveni declared in February, at a 
political rally in Gulu, that the LRA had seven days to lay down their weapons and hand 
themselves in to government forces. This ultimatum, Museveni later argued, was 
unavoidable, because military intelligence had been passed his way which clearly 
demonstrated that the LRA were just buying time to re-arm, and this time, the weapons 
were coming from the Khartoum government in Sudan.11    
 
Betty Bigombe later claimed that the military consistently fed Museveni false intelligence 
in order to prolong the war in the north,12 and Adam Branch has argued that since 1994 
the GoU has used the ‘Sudan factor’ to further ‘demonize the LRA’ and to resist 
engaging the movement on the broader socio-economic and political issues underpinning 
the rebellion.13  Indeed Khartoum and the LRA were in contact by 1994, but it was not 
until the collapse of the ‘Gulu Ceasefire’ that the GoS began providing ‘significant’ 
support to the LRA, including financial and military assistance.14  This assistance was in 
retaliation for the GoU’s military and logistical support for the Sudan People’s Liberation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, The Politics of Elite Corruption in Africa: Uganda in Comparative African 
Perspective (Abingdon: Oxford, 2013), pp.68-90. 
8 Andrew Mwenda, ‘Uganda’s politics of foreign aid and violent conflict: the political uses of the LRA 
rebellion’, in Allen and Vlassenroot, ‘Myth’, pp.45-59, p.47-48. 
9 Andre Le Sage, ‘Countering the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa’, Institute for Strategic Studies (July 
2011).  
10 The word ‘pacification’ was removed from her title in 1992.  
11 Mareike Schomerus, The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview (Geneva: Small Arms 
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Lecture, Oxford University, 7 Feb 2012. 
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‘Myths’, pp.205-223; p.206; for a detailed analysis of the LRA-Sudan relationship, see Schomerus, ‘Sudan’. 
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Army (SPLA), which had been fighting a civil war against Khartoum since 1983.  By the 
mid-1990s, the LRA had become a proxy militia for the Sudanese government, engaging 
the SPLA directly in battle in southern Sudan.  With the support of the Bashir regime in 
Khartoum, abductions increased, and the LRA was now able to use southern Sudan as a 
base both for attacking the SPLA and for launching attacks inside northern Uganda.  
 
The period after the 1996 elections in Uganda witnessed a more organized and concerted 
local effort towards establishing peace in the north. This was also the time when forced 
displacement became an official counter-insurgency policy, and was proceeding, in 
collaboration with humanitarian agencies, on a massive scale.15  In 1997, the recently 
elected MP for Gulu, Norbert Mao, working in coalition with a group of Acholi 
opposition MPs, lobbied parliament to formally investigate the situation in the north.16  
The same year, an NGO, Pax Christi Netherlands, became involved in peace efforts and, 
through representatives, began engaging the LRA.  While this effort got off to a slow 
start, Pax Christi would later play an important role at Juba.17   Other initiatives were 
launched in the late 1990s. In May 1997 the Acholi diaspora organised a Kacoke Madit 
(big meeting) in London.  Funded by voluntary contributions, the meeting included more 
than 300 Acholi from Uganda and the diaspora, government ministers, religious leaders, 
and LRA representatives, including James Obita, who would later attend the Juba talks as 
an LRA/M delegate.  This was a seminal meeting in the construction of the ‘ethnojustice’ 
agenda described in the last chapter.  Despite in-fighting and tensions between delegates, 
agreement coalesced around the need, after years of war, to ‘re-instate traditional cultural 
values,’ and the vital role these might play in ending the conflict. 18  
 
By this point a campaign was also underway to design and implement a blanket amnesty 
law to encourage an end to the fighting.  The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative 
(ARLPI) met President Museveni in March 1998 and handed him a memorandum 
entitled, A Call for Peace and End to Bloodshed in Acholiland.  It called for ‘forgiveness and 
reconciliation as the centrepiece of the campaign for peaceful approach to the end of the 
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conflict’ and was supported by Kacoke Madit and the Acholi Parliamentary Group.19  
Despite broad parliamentary support for a blanket amnesty, in the past Museveni only 
ever expressed support for a limited amnesty for the ‘misled,’ and rejected the idea of 
pardons for ‘bandits like Kony and his deputy Otti Lagony’.20  But in May 1999 he 
changed his position, and endorsed the blanket amnesty approach whilst touring Gulu.  
The GoU line was that Museveni was responding to ‘popular consultations’, while the 
sceptics argued that the decision was part of his broader campaign to win support in the 
upcoming referendum on whether to move from one- party to multi-party rule.21   
 
Just one day after Parliament passed the Amnesty Bill in December 1999, President 
Museveni travelled to Kenya to sign the ‘Nairobi Agreement’.22  This, brokered by the 
Carter Center, was an agreement between President Bashir, who had been shaken by the 
1998 US military strikes in Khartoum, and President Museveni.23  Both made a formal 
commitment to stop funding and supporting rebel groups in the other’s territories.  In 
practice, both continued their relationship with the LRA and the SPLA respectively 
(neither rebel group was involved in the negotiations), but the agreement had some 
symbolic importance.   
 
As part of the Nairobi Agreement, Bashir allowed the Ugandan military to use southern 
Sudan as a base from which to launch their most intensive military offensive to date. 
Operation Iron Fist began in 2002, bolstered by the post 9/11 decision of the US to 
include the LRA on its Terrorist Exclusion List.24  Despite the deployment of 10,000 
UPDF troops and the aid of US logistical support and helicopter gunships, the Ugandan 
army failed to outmaneuver the LRA high command.  The weeks following the offensive 
saw a dismaying increase in LRA attacks and abductions, and between 2002 and 2005 the 
number of IDPs in northern Uganda sharply increased from 400,000 to 1.6 million.25 Jan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Egeland, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, visited in November 2003 and delivered his 
oft-quoted summation that this was the ‘the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian 
emergency in the world today’.  This, Sandrine Perrot argues, ‘floodlighted’ the situation 
in northern Uganda, and before long hundreds of UN agencies, NGOs, journalists, and 
consultants rushed into the area.26   
 
In March 2004 a second Iron Fist Offensive began, and was more effective in its direct 
targeting of the LRA leadership, forcing key figures to give up or escape, abandoning 
family members and recruits.  Towards the end of the year Betty Bigombe, who had 
been ousted in the 1996 elections, returned to northern Uganda as a USAID consultant.  
With President Museveni’s approval and the support of UN, aid agencies, and local 
officials, she began to re-open her links to the LRA.  Despite the ICC investigation now 
underway, the Ugandan government declared a ceasefire in November 2004 in the hope 
that Kony and his key commanders would come out of the bush and accept an amnesty.  
It was not long, however, before Sam Kolo, the LRA’s chief negotiator, was rescued by 
the UPDF, fearing for his life and claiming that Kony had ‘turned against him’.27  
Schomerus’s LRA informants, reflecting on the failure of that set of talks, argued that 
Kolo had been bought off by the GoU and that Betty Bigombe was too close to the 
GoU.28  According to Pax Christi, the ICC arrest warrants were the final nails in the 
coffin in which her attempt to persuade the LRA to accept the government’s amnesty in 
return for peace was buried.29  
 
Around mid-2004, there was a ‘major evolution’ in donor identity and approach towards 
the situation in the north.30  After several failed attempts to get the LRA to the 
negotiating table since the mid-1990s, USAID grew impatient and the US government 
adopted a more focused preference for a ‘quick and permanent’ military solution to the 
crisis.31  This provided more political space for other countries, most notably what Perrot 
calls the ‘ethical and Pearsonian’ Nordic countries, to take the lead in facilitating dialogue 
between the LRA and the GoU.32  The GoU was able to exploit donor divisions and bat 
away a potential referral of the situation in the north to the UNSC, but the spectre of an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Perrot, ‘Northern’, p.188. 
27 Allen and Vlassenroot, ‘Introduction’, p.17. 
28 Schomerus, ‘Eating’, p.61 
29 Simonse et. al, ‘NGO’, p.227. 
30 Perrot, ‘Northern’, p.191. 
31 Perrot, ‘Northern’, p.190-91 
32 Perrot, ‘Northern’, p.192. 
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‘internationalised’ conflict on Ugandan soil became very real during 2005, and it 
unnerved Museveni.33  Against the backdrop of donor impatience, national elections 
scheduled for 2007, and the hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Summit (CHOGM) that same year, the long-term LRA conflict became a high-stakes 
issue for Museveni.34  
 
Across the border in Sudan, major political shifts were occurring during this period. In 
January 2005 the SPLA/M and the GoS signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA).  On paper at least, this marked an end to the long-running north-south civil 
war. 35   When John Garang was inaugurated as the first President of the semi-
autonomous South Sudan (GoSS) in July 2005, he was insistent that the continued 
military presence of both the LRA and UPDF on GoSS soil represented an 
‘unacceptable’ threat to his people.36  Only three weeks after his Presidency began he was 
killed in a helicopter crash while returning from Uganda, where he had been meeting his 
historic ally and close friend President Museveni.  Garang was replaced by his deputy and 
head of the SPLA, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and Dr Riek Machar was appointed vice- 
president.  Machar’s relationship with Garang had not been straightforward, and during 
the Sudanese civil war the two had been at different points trusted allies and the bitterest 
of enemies.  The new GoSS leadership created a different dynamic in GoSS-Uganda 
bilateral relations, because neither Kiir nor Machar had a close personal association with 
Museveni.  Machar, meanwhile, when fighting in opposition to Garang’s SPLA, had 
formed connections with the LRA.   These new dynamics created a promising avenue 
through which to begin exploring peace talks, and Riek Machar, with the help of Pax 
Christi, made contact with the LRA in late 2005.  It was also in late 2005 that the five 
ICC arrest warrants were unsealed.  Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and three other LRA 
commanders were now publically wanted by the ICC.   
 
In February 2006 meetings took place between Pax Christi and LRA/M representatives 
in Nairobi.  Twelve days later, a small delegation, consisting of representatives from both 
took a chartered plane to Juba to meet Machar.37  Atkinson argues that during these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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meetings, a ‘formal accord’ was structured around three central points: the GoSS would 
facilitate peace negotiations between the GoU and the LRA; the LRA would cease all 
hostilities inside South Sudan; and, if the LRA did not accept these conditions, the GoSS 
would force them from South Sudan.38  He argues that the LRA were convinced that the 
GoSS were ‘serious about both the carrots and sticks that they were offering,’ and also 
very aware that the operating space they had in southern Sudan before the CPA was now 
greatly diminished.39  On 3 May Riek Machar travelled to remote Nabanaga on the 
Sudan-DRC border and finally met Kony face to face.  During the meeting Machar 
handed Kony $20,000 for food and ‘not weapons’.40  The encounter was filmed and later 
broadcast by Reuters.  Reports noted that Kony looked less relaxed than his deputy, 
Vincent Otti, who had done a lot of the groundwork with Machar leading up to the 
meeting.   At this point the GoU was outwardly skeptical.  The UPDF spokesman, Major 
Felix Kalayigye, insisted that,  
‘you can’t trust Kony.  He always makes these moves when his is desperate…we 
hope this time he means it but there is no ceasefire and we will continue to hunt 
him’.41  
 
As will be explored in more detail below, right up until the very last moment, the GoU 
position on talks was unclear.  Nevertheless, in July 2006 a GoU delegation travelled to 
Juba.  The LRA/M delegation had been in the GoSS capital since early June, preparing 
for the talks.42  On 14 July 2006, the two delegations sat down together with the GoSS 
mediation team43, and the Juba peace talks officially commenced.  On 5 October, a UN 
OCHA-managed donor trust fund, the ‘Juba Initiative Fund’, was set up to co-ordinate 
and channel support from donors to ‘facilitate the basic necessities of the Juba process’.44  
Money came in from the British, Danes, Austrians, Swedes, Norwegians and Swiss, who 
all acknowledged that the talks seemed promising, but felt that in light of the ICC arrest !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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warrants they were in difficult territory.  Donor support placed the Juba talks on what 
one analyst called a ‘short leash’.45  With the ICC Chief Prosecutor publicly trumpeting, 
just a week into the Juba talks, that the ‘best way to finally stop the conflict…is to arrest 
the top leaders’, it became quite clear that donors would only tolerate an agreement that 
addressed the accountability issue.46  With donor money also came pressure to ensure 
that agreements were drawn up and concluded quickly and decisively.  The UN also 
provided important political support but not until December 2006, when Jan Egeland 
gave his public endorsement.  The same month former Mozambique Prime Minister 
Joaquim Chissano was appointed UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for LRA-
affected areas.47 
 
At the outset, the talks were hastily organized around five agenda items: (1) cessation of 
hostilities (2) comprehensive political solutions (3) justice and accountability (4) 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and (5) a permanent ceasefire.  
As will be described below, the Juba Process was characterized by ‘a pattern of sputtering 
progress punctuated by frequent delays’.48  Between July 2006 when the talks began, and 
December 2008 when military Operation Lightening Thunder49 was launched against the 
LRA, there were periods of hyperactivity followed by long hiatuses.   
 
GoU and LRA/M approaches at Juba 
 
The following section explores how the two parties, the GoU and the LRA/M, 
approached the talks at Juba.  Neither side had much internal coherence.  When the Juba 
talks began there were a range of positions on the GoU side.  There were certainly senior 
government figures who appeared to have a genuine commitment towards the peace 
process. Others wished the talks well and felt it would be a ‘pleasant surprise’ if an 
agreement was signed, but were largely resigned to the probability that the whole process 
was ill-fated.  But those with the loudest voice, the largest concentration of power, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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control over information, were those in government and in the military who were intent 
on what one UPDF official called the ‘icing of an LRA surrender’.50  The priority 
remained military victory rather than a negotiated settlement.   
 
This range of positions was reflected in the composition of the GoU delegation at Juba.   
The head of the delegation, Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr Ruhakana Ruganda, was 
generally regarded to have been committed to the idea of a negotiated settlement.  A 
cable dated 20 September 2007 from the US Embassy in Kampala on the progress of the 
peace talks, notes that certain  
‘government civilian officials, such as Rugunda and many northern leaders, 
support an expedited process with clear direction that addresses domestic 
political considerations, such as public opinion in the north…Rugunda for 
example would view a military solution as a last resort’.51  
 
His appointment reassured those who had been sceptical about the Government’s 
intentions at Juba, but critics also wondered whether Ruganda may have been 
strategically placed to give the impression that the government was committed to the 
process.52  In any case, alongside Rugunda sat Colonel Charles Otema, commander of 
the UPDF 4th Division, who had led the fight against the LRA for many years.  From the 
outset Otema, personally, and the military he represented, were perceived to be ‘anxious 
to deal with the LRA as a security problem, and welcome a hard line’.53  
 
Joseph Kony did not represent the LRA/M at Juba, nor did any other senior LRA 
commander for that matter.   Throughout the talks the LRA leadership remained in their 
camps in Ri-Kwangba and Nabanga in South Sudan, near the border with the DRC.   
The LRA/M delegation team that Kony sent to Juba had ‘weak’ and ‘tenuous’ links with 
the high command in the bush, and was made up primarily of members of the Acholi 
diaspora.54  Before the talks began Machar had tried to convince Kony’s second-in-
command Vincent Otti to head the delegation, but he had refused.55  Father Carlos 
Rodriguez, a respected Spanish priest who had lived and worked in Acholiland for years, 
said on the radio in early July that,  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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an international review of peace initiatives (London, 2002), p.11. 
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‘I doubt that the 16-member negotiating team that Kony has named has any 
power to negotiate anything on behalf of the LRA, because these are ordinary 
people that have not been in the bush with the LRA’.56   
 
In contrast to the ‘often amateurish’57 demeanor of the LRA/M, the GoU had a high-
level delegation with far greater technical capacity, but both delegations shared a 
structural dimension. In both the political wing was subordinated to the military high 
command, headed, respectively, by President Museveni and Joseph Kony, neither of 
whom were present at the talks.58  Martin Ojul, the first Chair of the LRA/M delegation, 
gave expression to the difficult situation both negotiating teams found themselves in:  
‘no matter which side one belongs to, the real decision makers are not in Juba.  
For the government side, the finality resides in the hands and wisdom of the all 
powerful tenant of Kampala state house, located on plot 1, Nakasero Close, 
while for the LRA/M, the decision makers (The High Command) are roaming 
and oscillating (in) the densely forested triangle area stretching from Garamba in 
DRC, Obo adjacent areas of Central Africa (CAR) and Rigkwamba Tambura 
Yambio areas in Western Equatoria of Southern Sudan’.59 
 
By 2006 both sides had an interest in ending the war, but they arrived in Juba wanting 
different types of peace.  Right until the last moment, the GoU sent out mixed messages 
about their willingness to engage in negotiations.  From mid-June 2006 various 
government ministers made statements to the media which indicated that the GoU 
would not consider offering Kony amnesty, and was unwilling to send a delegation to 
Juba to meet a barely viable LRA/M negotiating team representing indicted 
commanders.60  By early July the position had shifted.  On 29 June the government 
announced that it would be sending a delegation to Juba, and five days later Museveni 
offered Kony a conditional amnesty.61  Some observers interpreted the GoU position as 
tactical rather than chaotic, aimed at keeping the LRA/M and mediation team guessing, 
and then taking  control of the situation and insisting on a ‘speedy, expeditious’ set of 
talks.62 President Museveni and the UPDF wanted a ‘negative peace’.63  They wanted to 
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neutralise the LRA threat quickly and decisively, and the talks were seen as generous way 
of offering the LRA a ‘soft landing’: ‘We are offering them an exit’, said Museveni, ‘there 
will be no negotiations of personal benefits, but discussion of mechanism of a soft 
landing’.64  On 20 September 2006, two months into the talks, President Museveni 
expressed impatience with having to address anything beyond a straightforward end to 
the fighting:  
‘Advise them to come out of the bush and stop talking about irrelevant things in 
Juba… they should be hanged for committing many atrocities.  But we want a 
shortcut to peace… We have elected leaders who can talk about rehabilitation 
but not them (LRA) who have been stopping development.  This is childish.  
They should have been hanged but the government is willing to forgive them’.65   
 
The LRA/M delegation’s public statements indicated a very different view, which 
emphasized the potential of the Juba talks to cement a more ‘positive peace’66, which 
included ‘comprehensive solutions’ and negotiations which would address the underlying 
causes of the conflict, the very things that Museveni was dismissing as ‘irrelevant’.  It 
should be noted, though, that at times it was not clear whether addressing the underlying 
causes of conflict meant providing money, status and protection to senior LRA/M 
figures, or whether the emphasis was on producing a more substantial peace settlement 
for northern Uganda: these two motivations largely coexisted and were seen, to varying 
degrees, as mutually supportive in the LRA/M.  
 
A profound lack of trust between both sides shaped the dynamic at Juba.  There was a 
strong assumption within the GoU ranks, even before the talks started, that Kony 
himself did not really ‘want’ peace.  Since the talks collapsed this has become part of a 
dominant post-Juba political narrative, one that largely absolves the GoU from any role 
in the failure of the talks.  During Juba this was the central justification for the GoU 
position on the need for negotiation deadlines and military preparedness. At the time 
there were important figures within the GoU who had a more nuanced view of Kony’s 
intentions. Rugunda, for example, argued that ‘he was looking for an opportunity where 
he could be rehabilitated but he was not sure about some of the issues, especially the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ICC.’67 Generally, though, the hawks had the President’s ear throughout the process.  In 
October 2006, three weeks after the LRA had failed, under the terms of an August 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoH), to assemble at Owiny-Kibul in southern 
Sudan, military chiefs gave the President an intelligence briefing at State House.  In a 
PowerPoint presentation, he was advised that: ‘based on available intelligence the LRA is 
preparing for war…most likely the talks will not succeed; high chance of return to war’.68  
The reality was more complicated, and LRA/M representatives insisted that the failure to 
assemble was due to unauthorized UPDF troop movement near the area.69  But already 
by October 2006, just three months into the peace talks, the dominant GoU position was 
informed by an apparent certainty that the LRA was purchasing military and 
communication equipment, retrieving arms and ammunition, training new radio 
operators in DRC bases, and cultivating and re-stocking with food stuffs in the Garamba 
zone.70  Stephen Kagoda, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a 
member of the GoU delegation at Juba explained that,  
‘honestly speaking, we went into the talks not expecting anything out of them.  
We did not expect Kony to come out…we knew that whenever Kony was under 
pressure, he would go for peace talks to re-organise’.71  
 
Of course it is impossible to know whether or not Kony ‘wanted’ peace and unwise to 
infer conclusions about his intentions, because he has never given very much away.  
Government and UPDF assertions about Kony’s intentions are more reliably interpreted 
as an indicator of their own perceptions, or the manner in which they chose to interpret 
the situation.  In the early stages of the peace talks it was the GoU who observers 
considered to be the most unwilling party at the table.  LRA/M delegates complained 
regularly that the government side was ‘more interested in negotiating surrender than the 
causes of the conflict.’72  The reluctance to address the broader socio-economic and 
political issues related to the war was shared across the GoU delegation.  Rugunda recalls 
that:  
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‘it was not just the President and State house that was uncomfortable.  I was 
uncomfortable.  Kony and his people had no right to talk about these issues.  
They had no mandate’.73   
 
But despite serious reservations, the GoU’s role in the talks was carefully choreographed 
and performative from the outset.  A senior Government official and part of the GoU 
delegation at Juba described how on 1 May 2006, a GoU team travelled to South Sudan 
in secret to discuss peace talks.  
‘there were people who believed that the government was not interested in peace 
so how do you convince those people we are for peace?  To show everybody that 
we are interested in peace.’74   
 
That, he argues, ‘was one of the major reasons’ for agreeing to the process.75  Betty 
Bigombe recalls how in private conversations with the President she convinced him that 
commitment to the Juba process was a ‘legacy issue’.76  This was a powerful argument, 
particularly in the context of recent international and domestic allegations of corruption 
and electoral malpractice, and the decision of some donors to re-programme direct 
budgetary support in response to the government’s failure to resolve the conflict in the 
North.77  ‘The war was tainting his image’, Bigombe recalls telling Museveni, ‘think about 
economic production and HIV/AIDs, where Uganda has been an example, solving the 
war like this would only enhance these successes’.78 
 
Museveni’s military advisers clearly understood that a government decision to withdraw 
from the process would be interpreted badly by the international community, which by 
late 2006 was engaging quite seriously with the talks. Military briefings given to 
Museveni, at least until early 2007, stressed the need to ‘prepare for a resumption of 
hostilities’ but also to ‘keep the Government mediation team intact to reassure the 
international community and population of government commitment to talks’.79  On 
October 21 2006 Museveni travelled to Juba.  According to LRA/M spokesperson 
Godfrey Ayoo, Museveni had had a meeting with the LRA/M delegation and said things 
which ‘were all abusive – indicating that he is never interested in peace talks’.80  Uganda’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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deputy foreign minister, and deputy head of the GoU delegation at Juba, Henry Okello 
Oryem, denied this, telling journalists that ‘to the contrary (Mr Museveni) used the 
opportunity to make it very clear that he had come all this way to support and encourage 
the peace process.’81  But in a contradictory, almost macabrely candid assertion of 
government strategy, one senior government official explained that at Juba, ‘we were 
pretending!  We knew he would never sign any stupid peace document!’.82    
 
A calculated risk for the GoU was the potential for the talks to provide too great a 
dialogic space to the LRA/M delegation.  There was a feeling, certainly by January 2007, 
that the diaspora delegates were gaining too much credibility among donors and 
mediators at Juba.  A Security and Intelligence briefing dated 12 January expressed a clear 
concern that the LRA/M delegation was becoming too effective as a negotiating party.  
The briefing raised the possibility that the LRA might ‘form a political wing,’ and stated 
that the LRA/M diaspora was courting Acholi intellectuals to make the movement ‘more 
intellectually credible’.83  In fact, by early January the talks had been in stalemate for a 
while, and on 9 January President Bashir and Vice President Salva Kiir had both 
announced separately that the LRA was not welcome in Sudan any longer.  Fears that the 
LRA/M were expanding their political capital were, however, possibly linked to the 
expansive demands it put forward in early November 2006 for proposals for Agenda 
Item 2, and a disquiet about the platform being given to LRA/M, especially when its 
mouthpieces, according to Museveni, were ‘uninformed Ugandans who have been out of 
the country for 20 years’.84 
 
As Zachary Lomo, former director of the Refugee Law Project, has argued, Kony and 
the LRA must be portrayed as lunatic:  
‘if you present him as someone with capacity then you risk shoring up support 
for him… the whole agenda was to mystify him, not to make him a credible 
force, it was vital to make sure he looked like someone with no plans’.85   
 
By early 2007 the military continued to counsel Museveni to stick to the talks, but 
increasingly stressed the need for specific time-frames with terminal dates, and robust 
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military preparation to move into Garamba ‘immediately after the talks collapse’.86  At 
this point it was the legal advisors to the Juba process who were exercising the most 
caution. On 12 December 2006 Owiny Dollo, a legal adviser to the mediation team, and 
former Minister of State for northern Uganda, held a meeting with Kony, Otti and other 
LRA commanders, at Ri-Kwangba, to discuss legal issues related to the ICC warrants.   
Owiny-Dollo travelled to State House in early January 2007 and sat down with the 
President: 
‘I told the President who already wanted military action, yes I agree, the man will 
not sign a document but this is a grand opportunity for you to show the world 
what Kony is’.  
The President, Dollo recalls, was belligerent, complaining that Kony was ‘fooling us’, but 
he was advised: 
‘please do not attack, let the Juba peace talks play itself out, we know he will not 
sign, then once and for all, the world will know who the spoiler is.  And the 
President, he went to the very end’.87   
 
Where would this duplicitous approach leave discussions on the third agenda item on 
accountability and reconciliation?  Barney Afako, another legal adviser to the mediation 
team, writes that at the beginning of the talks the mediation team had ‘persuaded’ the 
parties to deal with accountability and reconciliation as the third agenda item, noting that: 
‘This placement of the issue allowed for a gentle build-up towards the 
negotiations on justice.  More crucially it ensured criminal justice was located in a 
more appropriate context amongst the political, historical, social and economic 
justice issues that also needed to be addressed’.88 
 
But this was optimistic because it presupposed that there would only be one ‘appropriate 
context,’ and that this could be agreed upon.  The reality was that a singular or coherent 
narrative about the causes and events of the war, one shared by both parties, was an 
elusive prospect.89  From the outset Juba lacked the potential for a form of what Mark 
Osiel calls civil dissensus or ‘the kind of solidarity embodied in the increasingly respectful 
way that citizens can come to acknowledge the differing views of their fellows’.90  The 
power politics, asymmetries, deep distrust, and duplicity guiding the process provided no 
firm foundation upon which discussions  could  be based;  this  meant that there were no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Intelligence Briefing to Ministers and Security Chiefs, 12.01.2007, (on file with author).!
87 Author interview with Judge Owiny-Dollo, Kampala, 08.06.2012. 
88 Barney Afako, Negotiating in the shadow of Justice (London: Conciliation Resources, 2010).  
89 Lara Nettlefield, Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Hercegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s impact in a postwar state 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.29 
90 cf Nettlefield p.29; Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2000), p.29. 
! 121 
universally accepted rules which might govern exchanges, and no ‘procedures 
establishing agreement on how to disagree’.91  It is against this backdrop that the ICC’s 
role at Juba should be understood.  Certainly, the ICC’s investigation and arrest warrants 
shaped the debate on justice, and, more specifically, the AAR, but those debates were, in 
turn, informed by historical and political dynamics far wider and deeper than the 
controversial presence of the international court.    
 
Understanding ICC narratives at Juba 
 
‘The ICC can he lp us ’ :  GOU approaches 
When the GoU ICC referral was made public in 2004, most observers assumed that 
Uganda - a state party - had initiated the move.  The court was happy to play along with 
this interpretation, maintaining that it was ‘simply doing its job by following up requests 
from Rome Statute signatories’.92  Over time, the sequence of events has been called into 
question.  The former director of the Refugee Law Project (RLP), Zachary Lomo, 
recalled a private roundtable meeting with the ICC Chief Prosecutor in New York, in 
2006, hosted by the Open Society Institute.  According to Lomo:  
‘he was clear in this meeting that the court had taken the first steps with the 
Uganda case, and had been proactive about initiating a case there.  It was them 
that approached the Ugandan government.  He was asserting himself and 
wanting to show that he was pushing the case forward’.93      
 
Barney Afako agrees, arguing recently that the ICC arrived in Uganda ‘having lobbied for 
a referral’.94 At the time, international justice promoters were highlighting the court’s 
potential to end the conflict in northern Uganda, but as far as the GoU was concerned 
the referral was an attractive prospect because it could help its military efforts.  Stephen 
Kagoda was unequivocal about this:  
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‘we thought only a military operation would get rid of Kony but our military did 
not have jurisdiction in Sudan.  That is why we listened to the ICC: how else do 
we handle this?  The ICC can help us.’95   
 
A senior adviser to President Museveni concurred:  
‘when we briefly talked about transitional justice, we talked about it as an 
extension of military strategy; at first, we wanted the ICC but then it became 
clear that Kony might accept traditional mechanisms; after all, he is a weird guy, 
he changes his mind, so we needed the ICC to be flexible’.96 
 
The ambivalent position the GoU subsequently took towards the ICC, and its frustration 
with the court’s absolutist position on maintaining the warrants despite their spoiler 
potential in the peace talks, was down to a lack of knowledge about the role and function 
of the court.  Barney Afako points out that when they signed the Rome Statute:  
‘the Government of Uganda just thought they were signing another international 
treaty…I have spoken to several senior statesmen who now say they had no idea 
what they were signing up to’.97   
 
This is a view shared by government ministers involved in the Juba Process.  One 
explained that ‘the president does not understand the International Criminal Court…he 
never has done’.98  A senior UPDF official expressed frustration that: 
‘the Government of Uganda did not understand the impact of referral…they 
surrendered and admitted defeat in brining Kony to justice.  They did not get an 
opinion about complementarity and they did not think about an exit strategy.  
Political gains clouded appreciation of ramifications’.99   
 
At first it was presumed that the ICC would be flexible, and government officials were 
relatively loose-mouthed in their casual undermining of the ICC’s jurisdiction when it 
proved politically expedient.  At a ‘Reconciliation Stakeholders Conference’ in Gulu in 
December 2004, Rugunda told an assembled group of Acholi elders, religious leaders and 
politicians, that ‘the ICC is a tool that the government is using to investigate some of the 
leaders of the LRA’. 100   At the same time he acknowledged the possibility that 
circumstances might shift, and said that ‘if there are positive changes like peace talks by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the LRA’, then ‘the Government and ICC will work out an adequate agreement’.  In the 
meantime he said, ‘the ICC is being told now to go slow with its investigations’.101    
 
In the run-up to the beginning of the talks, Museveni made public statements to the 
effect that the ICC warrants could be withdrawn if the LRA behaved well.  On 16 May  
2006 he told journalists that if Kony was ‘serious about a peaceful settlement’, the GoU 
would ‘guarantee his safety’.102  Just ten days before the talks officially began, on 4 July 
2006, he offered Kony amnesty, conditional on whether he ‘responds positively’ during 
the talks and ‘abandons terrorism’.103  This offer was linked to a real frustration that the 
ICC warrants had not resulted in an effective regional military effort to ‘hunt’ Kony.  
Conflating the powers and functions of the UN and the ICC, Museveni complained that:  
‘the noble cause of trying Kony before the ICC has been betrayed by the failure 
of the United Nations, which set up the court, to arrest him, despite knowing his 
location in the DR Congo…I don’t have the capacity to hunt for Kony, they 
don’t allow us to hunt for him… the UN system has no moral authority now to 
demand for Kony’s trial after failing to arrest him for the nine months he has 
been in Congo.’104 
 
The arrest warrants still had an important function: they could be used as a bargaining 
chip during the peace talks, but only if the ICC would play the game.105  On 19 
September Rugunda suggested to reporters that the Acholi traditional justice process, 
Mato Oput could provide the solution to the ICC impasse at Juba:  
‘the ICC supports the Juba talks and they would like to see an end to the conflict.  
The ICC also wants justice done and is opposed to impunity.  In the mato oput 
system, we hope to have a win-win situation’.106  
 
But the reality was far more complicated.  The ICC had, in fact, never expressed public 
support for the Juba process, and just prior to Rugunda’s statement it had, according to 
the Daily Monitor newspaper, asked its Registrar to submit a written report by 6 October 
on the progress made so far in the execution of the arrest warrants, and the co-operation 
of the relevant states.  The ICC, the article stated ‘stressed that the arrest of Kony and 
his deputies was vital for their effective prosecution and prevention of further crimes’.107    
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‘ I t  might be a trap’ :  LRA ICC narrat ives  
In the early stages of the talks, on 20 September 2006, Vincent Otti said that he would 
sign a peace deal, but, referring to the ICC warrants, declared that ‘not even a single LRA 
soldier will go home before it is lifted… the ICC is the first condition, without that I 
cannot go home because it might be a trap’.108  President Museveni responded on Mega 
FM, the Gulu-based radio station, that indictments would be dropped but only when 
‘terrorists’ accepted a peace deal, saying ‘the removal of the indictments will be a reward 
for their signing of the agreement.  Otherwise you (rebels) will die on our hands or the 
hands of the ICC.’109  A few weeks later, on 9 October 2006, as the LRA/M was 
becoming increasingly frustrated by UPDF cessation of hostilities violations, Otti 
toughened up his position on the ICC in an interview with the Sunday Monitor newspaper, 
arguing that the LRA High Command would not sign a deal, let alone leave the bush, 
before receiving ‘documentary evidence’ the warrants had been dropped.110  
 
This was ‘the impasse’, widely reported in the press, and antagonistically raised on both 
sides.  But the political dynamics behind the impasse have been neglected in most of the 
literature.  A closer interrogation of statements made by the LRA leadership and the 
delegation in Juba, reveal a more nuanced set of attitudes towards the arrest warrants.  
Firstly, similar to the GoU, there was a clear lack of understanding about the legal basis, 
jurisdiction and powers of the ICC.111  Secondly, and most neglected, was a clear 
receptiveness to the idea of the Court as a forum for political expression, narrative 
shaping, and testimony.  When the talks were in their infancy there was a desire to 
engage with the ICC on the basis that it might have the potential to help the LRA/M tell 
their side of the story.  In January 2007, Vincent Otti told reporters,  
‘what I want to assure the world is that the Museveni government indicted the 
LRA leadership and some of its top commanders.  We were indicted without 
being questioned.  We were not even investigated.  That is why we decided to at 
least first of all send some of our delegates to go and find it properly from the 
Hague and from the court prosecutor to explain to them or we would like the 
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prosecutor to send his staff to come here and hear from us whether we have 
really committed crimes’.112  
 
Thirdly, was the realisation that this particular Court would never be a neutral arbiter.  It 
was regarded as structurally incapable of delivering a impartial historical record of events, 
or a fair allocation of guilt and punishment.   All three angles were expressed in the 
answer that Joseph Kony gave to Mareike Schomerus during an interview in June 2006, a 
month before the beginning of the peace talks.  When Schomerus asked him whether he 
had seen the ICC arrest warrants, he replied: 
‘We did not see any…but…as I am seeing you cannot hear the word from one 
side only.  You cannot say that Mr Joseph is guilty without hearing anything from 
(me), then you say that he is guilty. (…) the reason why I say like that, it is better 
if those people (the ICC), they hear, they come and talk to me as you are now 
talking (…) then they hear what I am saying and what Museveni is saying.  Then 
(after hearing both sides) they will come with that, that you are bad.  But this one, 
they only hear from Museveni side, from my side they did not hear any things.  
They did not question me, they did not ask me, they did not interview me about 
the ICC’.113 
 
The opening speech of the LRA/M delegation at Juba, delivered by spokesperson 
Obonyo Olweny, on 14 July 2006, contains a similar argument: 
‘whereas the LRA-indicted leaders are not afraid to submit themselves to the 
process ICC..because of its selective justice systems, like most of the UN 
systems, which favours the strong, we are of the view that the initiative for a 
negotiated settlement is the best option’.114 
 
Those who argue that Kony and the LRA/M’s ultimate aim was to achieve a guarantee 
of impunity, ignore the fact that the LRA were also opposed to the blanket amnesty put 
in place by the GoU in 2000.  Museveni’s July 2006 Amnesty offer was rejected by 
LRA/M spokesperson Obonyo Olweny, who called the offer ‘redundant,’ because ‘all 
party’s need to negotiate as equal persons’.115  Leader of the LRA/M delegation Martin 
Ojul noted that: 
‘the LRA/M’ does not agree with the principle of blanket amnesty… we have 
publicly and openly rejected this as government’s ploy to indiscriminately !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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criminalize all members of the LRA/M and hide its own role in the conflict 
under the carpet’.116  
The unequal political dynamics around the allocation of punishment and pardon were 
deeply troubling to the LRA/M, and informed a position far more complex and nuanced 
than a straight forward desire to evade accountability.   
 
Important differences divided the negotiating parties on the justice issue. The GoU 
wanted to use accountability and reconciliation options – and the ICC in particular - as a 
bargaining chip throughout the talks, in order to ensure a decisive military surrender of 
the LRA leadership.  The LRA/M’s position was arguably more substantive and 
nuanced: it saw in the law both an expansive opportunity and a perilous threat.  Could 
the presence of the ICC and arguments against its jurisdiction actually provide the 
discursive space the LRA/M craved, or was the law just another inscrutable and hostile 
power structure poised to come crashing down on them?  For the GoU, debates around 
the ICC were at times frustrating, but it was always able to maintain control over the 
political stakes of the justice issue.  For the LRA/M, the justice issue was existential: it 
was not the idea of accountability and reconciliation per se that was so troubling, but the 
power and knowledge asymmetry between the negotiating sides, a replication of the 
structural dynamics that had led to the conflict in the first place, and which was now 
foreclosing any opportunity for justice to be, in the eyes of powerful elements in the 
LRA/M, ‘fair’.   
 
Transitional justice conceptions in the making: the shaping of the AAR 
 
It was against this backdrop that the AAR was debated and drafted.  The talks had pretty 
much stalled by the early 2007.  It was at this point that Pax Christi Netherlands, now re-
named IKV Pax Christi, stepped in and facilitated a controversial series of largely secret 
‘back-channel’ meetings in Mombasa, which took place between 31 March and 6 April.   
President Museveni had consented to the initiative, and put his half-brother General 
Salim Saleh in charge of the GoU four-person team.  The LRA team consisted of five 
people, including Martin Ojul, leader of the LRA/M delegation, and LRA/M legal 
adviser Charles Ayena-Odongo. It was never explicitly stated who in the LRA high 
command had sanctioned either the team or the meetings but Schomerus argues that it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was quite clear it was Vincent Otti.117  Pax Christi argued that the talks were ‘not 
intended to replace the Juba process’ but simply to ‘help it along’, in a ‘friendlier’ 
atmosphere, ‘more conducive to mutual understanding than the prickly climate of 
Juba’.118   The meetings included a discussion on agenda item 3, which had yet to be 
negotiated at Juba.  Indeed, until that point, according to civil society leader, Michel 
Otim, discussions on the issue of justice and accountability had been attritional, and ‘tit-
for-tat’.119  So it was quite remarkable when, on 11 April 2007, Pax Christi issued a press 
release announcing that the issues related to accountability and reconciliation had been 
resolved:  
‘The two parties agreed that traditional institutions such as Mato Oput, Culo 
Kwor, Kayo Cuk etc. should play a prominent role in the reconciliation of war-
affected individuals and communities.  In addition to these traditional 
mechanisms and underscoring the unacceptability of impunity for crimes against 
humanity, alternative justice systems will be put in place that will address 
accountability and enable victims to seek justice for grievances.  To address 
grievances and historical conflicts at the national level the parties committed 
themselves to establish special forums.  The Government of Uganda has agreed 
to ask Parliament to enact legislation that recognizes traditional and alternative 
justice mechanisms as key elements in dealing with accountability for the 
offences committed during the war.  Once the justice systems are effectively in 
place the Government of Uganda will approach the International Criminal Court 
regarding the indictments against the four leaders of the LRA’.120  
 
The Mombasa text, Pax Christi would later argue, was ‘refreshingly straightforward’.121 In 
a nutshell, the GoU team committed itself to pass a law that would make it possible to 
resort to ‘alternative justice mechanisms’, including ‘traditional reconciliation’.122  The 
LRA/M, meanwhile, committed itself to an acknowledgement of the wrongs it had 
committed and the ‘unconditional submission’ of its members to processes of 
accountability and reconciliation.123  A few weeks later, on 21 April, Rugunda lay out the 
government’s position in light of the Mombasa meetings,  
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‘our position on the court indictments is that, the government will engage the 
ICC after a final peace agreement (is reached) and after the LRA have undergone 
the traditional system of mato oput’. 124  
 
Back in Juba things were a little less straightforward.  The talks officially re-started on 1 
June 2007, with some new faces in the LRA delegation, including Dr. James Obita, Santo 
Okot and David Matsanga.  As the talks started up again, the International Crisis Group 
(ICG) reported that both ‘international influence’ and the Ugandan legal advisers 
brought in by the GoSS mediation team were ‘instrumental in producing a fuller 
understanding of the need for robust accountability mechanisms’.125  This must have had 
some impact because when US State Department official James Swan met GoU 
negotiators in late May he was assured that the Mombasa approach was not the whole 
story, and that the GoU now had,  
‘a new approach on the issues of justice and accountability, which will focus on 
teaching LRA leaders about their judicial options, rather than focus on traditional 
reconciliation mechanisms’.126   
 
Before discussions on Agenda Item 3 officially began at Juba, the International Center 
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and other civil society organisations arranged a seminar 
for the two parties to encourage a discussion about the different justice ‘mechanisms’.  
The idea, according to one of the meeting organisers, was to move away from arguments 
about who did what and the focus on ‘traditional’ justice as the main solution; towards a 
more ‘technical understanding’ of the different accountability options open to the parties. 
‘After the seminar’, he said, ‘you began to see the points of synergy between the different 
legal teams’.127  This was probably because, for both parties, the stakes were so low.  For 
the LRA/M delegation, anything that provided for an alternative to the ICC was 
promising.  The GoU meanwhile, wanted to keep the ICC on the table as a bargaining 
chip, but that involved the need for viable alternatives to international prosecution.   
 
The mediations’ legal advisers took a hard-boiled and expedient approach. The general 
position, said a member of the mediation team, ‘was that nobody wants justice, justice is 
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coercive, it is inconvenient, you have to protect people from justice’.128 Interestingly, 
Barney Afako notes that,  
‘if you go back to the text of Juba, you will hardly find the word justice… we 
never used the term transitional justice, we simply described the kinds of things 
we could do practically’.129    
 
The overwhelming priority now for both negotiating teams was to agree on a national 
legal solution that would satisfy International Criminal Court standards.130 On 13 June, 
the parties reached a consensus on a set of ‘guiding principles’ on justice and 
accountability, and agreed that a national legal and institutional framework should be 
designed to deal with accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.131  The 
AAR itself was drafted with relative speed and ease, with ‘not many people in the 
negotiating room’.132  The agreement itself was drafted on the back of an envelope during 
a Eurostar journey between Paris and London.133  At one point the UN OHCHR 
expressed a keen desire to play a greater role in AAR discussions, but the mediation team 
refused.  This was not a deliberative process; it was pragmatic, and shaped by a 
diversionary logic that acknowledged the structural and symbolic power of international 
criminal justice, but also needed to find ways to contain and circumvent it.  Regardless of 
the absolutely central role that commentators gave to the ‘peace versus justice’ dilemma 
at Juba, the mediation team advisers note that the AAR discussions,  
‘were not serious, they were not what torpedoed the talks…the AAR was signed 
in a record time of one month and it moved much faster than other Agenda 
items’.134    
 
The LRA/M was reportedly unhappy that not all of the 20 issues it had recommended 
for the discussion had been addressed, but did not push it, and on 29 June 2007 both 
parties signed the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation.135  The agreement 
itself recommended national trials combined with traditional processes of accountability 
and reconciliation, and a commission for truth seeking and reparations. The talks were 
then put on hold for one month to allow the GoU and the LRA to consult with 
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populations in northern Uganda before drawing up a final implementing protocol, which 
became known as the AAR annex.136     
 
The AAR was made as broad and shallow as possible in order to keep all options on the 
table, provide the parties with plenty of room for manoeuvre, and, most importantly, to 
get some sense of progress on paper.   Negotiators had a range of transitional justice 
‘mechanisms’ to choose from.  From ‘traditional’ justice, to truth-seeking, to criminal 
prosecution, it was easy enough to draw up a list of potential justice forums that would 
satisfy everyone, simultaneously demonstrating compliance with international rules 
without having to make ‘broader domestic normative changes’. 137   This inventory 
approach was later ridiculed by Afako, who recalled that at one point people were 
wandering around asking, ‘so, what is this vetting thing?  Shall we have that too?’.138  
Rugunda meanwhile said revealingly that,  
‘on the AAR, we did not restrict ourselves.  The principles were accountability, 
reconciliation, development and peace.  We might not use everything that is in 
the AAR, but that is our political framework’.139  
 
The mediation team and its legal advisers were largely reactive in that that they were 
trying to find room for manoeuvre in the context of the constraints imposed by the ICC 
warrants.  The government, meanwhile, remained quite relaxed about an agreement that 
it was confident it could control.  The AAR was, in essence, a well-crafted decoy and fine 
tuned piece of trickery.   If this was a transitional justice conception at all, it was one 
informed by the narrow interests of the negotiating parties, a box to be ticked in order to 
allow the talks to continue.   
 
The LRA/M delegation also was guided by a diversionary logic, but saw additional 
reputation-enhancing opportunities in discussions around accountability.  In an eighteen 
page position paper submitted to the mediation team to inform the AAR drafting, Ojul 
was quite candid about ‘the embarrassing situation’ which the parties find themselves in 
with regards to the justice issue.140  The LRA/M was also clear about its preference for 
traditional justice as opposed to formal prosecutions, but rather than a last-gasp attempt 
to salvage a difficult legal situation, the concept was valorised and linked with notions of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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northern, and more specifically, Acholi identity and exceptionalism.  Representatives 
recognised the potential for this to create useful linkages between the delegation and the 
broader northern population, opening up a new front for the LRA/M and a means to 
capture some moral capital, both at home and abroad.  The approach was to indigenize 
or ‘africanise’ the justice issue, while at the same time framing traditional justice in the 
language of international criminal justice, and putting ‘Acholi’ processes forward as a 
potentially replicable and exportable universal solution to the current bind.  Ojul, for 
example, highlighted the unprecedented nature of the complicated legal situation, and the 
extent to which anything agreed at Juba might be path-breaking, particularly in its ability 
to shape a new approach to the relationship between international and traditional 
methods of justice after conflict:   
‘The truth of the matter is that this is a new area of international jurisprudence.  
As such what we are doing is likely to be subjected to the curious scrutiny of not 
only the ICC but also of international jurists.  We are laden with the task of 
setting up an international legal precedent’.141   
 
The LRA/M delegation in particular was said to have insisted that its preferred process, 
‘traditional justice’, was framed in a judicialised language in the AAR, in order to make it 
acceptable as an ‘alternative’ to both ICC proceedings under the framework of 
complementarity, and to domestic prosecutions. 142   ‘Language’ said one legal adviser, 
was very important to LRA/M delegates.  After Mombasa, he argued, they really ‘needed 
‘reassurance about language, reassurance that traditional processes could be made to 
sound credible internationally.143  Indeed, Pax Christi noted wistfully, that the text agreed 
in Mombasa on accountability and reconciliation appears ‘very roughly hewn in contrast 
to the legal finesse of its Juba counterpart signed on 29 June 2007’.144  It seems, however, 
that the inclusion of a more legalistic language was largely cosmetic, and did not 
represent a substantial normative or policy shift.  
 
Structural disassociation at Juba 
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As stipulated in the AAR, between 20 August and 27 September 2007 the GoU’s 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Amnesty Commission carried out consultation 
meetings across Uganda in order to ‘hear the voices of the people’ on issues of justice 
and reconciliation.  There was also a big meeting in Kampala with legal experts about  
how to implement the AAR.  Both processes were to inform an implementing protocol 
or ‘annex’ to the AAR.  The consultations had a total budget of around $400,000 and 
were largely funded by USAID, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. 145   As the 
government’s popular consultations proceeded, US Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer had 
a meeting with President Museveni.  The President described Juba as a ‘circus,’ and ‘his 
own Government’s parallel track as part of the foolery, and lamented that fools have a 
lot of audiences.’146  Two days later, on 8 September, President Museveni and DRC 
President Kabila signed an agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, that established a 90-day 
timetable after which Congo would take action against the LRA in Garamba National 
Park, so providing a new deadline of 31 January 2008 for a final peace deal to be reached.  
The LRA/M meanwhile was slowly moving forward in organizing its own popular 
consultation proposal. It called for 500 delegates to travel to the LRA Ri-kwangba 
assembly, and asked donors for $2.1million, later revised to $1.8 million, to fund the 
expedition.  The proposal included a meeting between Kony and northern Ugandan 
leaders, and later a meeting of experts to help the LRA draw up implementing protocols 
for Agenda Items 2 and 3.147   
 
LRA/M consultations eventually began in Gulu on 6 November.  This was against the 
backdrop of the defection of LRA Operations Chief Opio Makasi, who arrived in 
Kampala on 1 November (the same day as the LRA negotiating team), to a great fanfare 
of publicity and heavy press coverage.  According to the US embassy,  
‘the two simultaneous arrivals present a dilemma for the Government’s military 
and civilian camps: supporting the LRA delegation’s consultations while at the 
same time wanting to exploit Makasi’s defection to encourage others’.148  
 
The LRA/M consultations were dominated by the uncertainty at this stage about  the 
death of LRA second in command Vincent Otti.  African observers who travelled with 
the LRA/M delegation said that the team had ‘virtually no way of communicating with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kony, who calls them but they cannot call him.’149  Vincent Otti’s murder and the 
internal confusion within the LRA/M delegation, caused in part  by speculation about  
growing links between some individual members and the NRM, created an open goal for 
the GoU.  Reflecting on his experiences travelling to Garamba during the three year 
peace process, the Madi paramount chief, Ronald Iya, notes that ‘what I saw from my 
time with the LRA commanders was that the late Vincent Otti was the force behind the 
peace talks’.150  There was plenty of speculation as to why Otti was killed, but did the fact 
that he was the ‘force’ behind the peace talks mean that Kony was opposed to them?  Iya 
argues that it was not as straightforward as that, but 
‘he acknowledged that he felt under a lot of pressure from Otti.  Why is Otti 
pushing me with this?  Why do these negotiations have to be so fast?  Peace 
negotiations can take 30 years’.151  
 
In early January the LRA/M delegation travelled to Ri-Kwangba to present Kony with 
the findings of the November-December popular consultations on justice and 
accountability. The team waited several days to see Kony, but they were met instead by 
senior commander, Caesar Acellam, who said that Kony had ‘another engagement’.152  
Just days after the delegation returned from the Bush, Ojul was dismissed as Chair, 
purportedly over his growing links with the NRM and his involvement in the Mombasa 
meetings.153  But despite internal chaos and confusion in the LRA/M ranks, the period 
from the end of January to the beginning of March 2008 were, superficially at least, some 
of the most productive of the entire Juba process. Talks resumed on 30 January and the 
next six weeks or so witnessed developments at breakneck speed.    
 
The broad conclusion from both the GoU and LRA popular consultations, perhaps 
unsurprisingly because it is so logical, was that generally people wanted to ‘use a 
combination of traditional systems and the formal legal system to achieve accountability 
and reconciliation’.154  The AAR agreement, on paper at least, seemed to incorporate 
these demands.  On 19 February 2008 the parties signed an annex to the AAR which 
described the ‘implementing mechanisms’ that would be put in place.  This included the 
setting up of a ‘special division of the High Court of Uganda…to try individuals who are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict’, as well as a ‘national truth- 
telling process’, instructions for the setting up of a ‘reparations scheme,’ and a more 
defined role for ‘traditional mechanisms’.  The annex also outlined a commitment by the 
GoU to approach the UNSC and request that the ICC, ‘defer all investigations and 
prosecutions against the leaders of the LRA’.155  On 23 February a permanent ceasefire 
was signed, and a week later LRA/M delegates, now headed by Dr. James Obita, 
travelled to Ri-Kwangba to show Kony the final texts.  The following day, the final two 
documents, the agreement on DDR, and its implementation protocol, were signed by the 
delegations in Juba.  
 
Throughout the talks, but particularly after Otti’s death in late 2007, the GoU and the 
LRA/M delegations had an approach at Juba that was structurally dissociative.  In both 
cases there were a group of individuals responsible for the day- to- day functioning of the 
talks (when they were not in hiatus), who entered into negotiations, drew up agreements 
and signed documents, purposefully detached, for a myriad reasons, from the entirety of 
their contexts.  On the GoU side, agenda items were signed in the knowledge that State 
House was busily preparing a military offensive.  On the LRA/M side, the same 
agreements were signed in the knowledge that the LRA high command in the bush were 
the ultimate guarantors of any agreement, but were not being adequately consulted.  It is 
not clear what either delegation did with this ‘knowledge’ at Juba, but it was certainly 
‘disassociated’ from deliberations, and compartmentalized throughout the process.  This 
perhaps explains why the agreements were drawn up in bursts, and why progress often 
seemed notable, and why some people even referred to the ‘spirit of Juba’.156  
 
This dissociation became particularly severe in the LRA/M team in 2008.  Any form of 
justice, whether ‘traditional’, domestic or international, remained worrying to the LRA 
high command, regardless of what had been formally agreed.  Despite this, after the 
signing the two final documents in late February, both parties settled upon 9 April 2008 
as the date to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA).  One hundred and fifty people, 
including chief negotiator Riek Machar, journalists, UN workers, Acholi elders and local 
village chiefs, assembled in a make-shift camp in Nabanga to witness the signing 
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ceremony.157  But after five long days, Kony did not come.  On 18 April, Kony 
demanded a meeting with Ugandan leaders to discuss the implications of AAR and its 
annex.  On 22 April, Obita told a US embassy staff member that Kony needs,  
‘ “an explanation of why he should face three forms of justice: mato oput; Special 
Division of the High Court; and the International Criminal Court” and that 
“Kony’s questions illustrate his lack of understanding of the agreement” ’.158   
 
In response, Rugunda agreed to a meeting of legal experts in Kampala from 6-8 May, 
funded by the Netherlands Embassy, to clarify issues relating to the Special Division of 
the High Court and other requirements. Obita and other LRA delegates were due to 
attend before travelling, with northern elders and religious and traditional leaders, to Ri-
kwangba, to report back to Kony.    
 
At the Kampala meeting Obita stated the urgent need to, 
‘explain to the High Command all of their concerns on issues of accountability 
and reconciliation, and henceforth to reassure them that the Agreement in Juba is 
a good one… this workshop will provide the clarity we need to take to the field.  
Proceedings in the workshop as well as the final document should be as simple as 
possible, in layman’s language’.159   
 
What is clear from the workshop report is that the AAR and its annex raised a number of 
highly complex legal issues, jettisoning Barney Afako’s wish that ‘by the end, everyone 
should be able to give an outline of accountability in simple terms’.160    Nobody could 
actually explain how the AAR, a chicane agreement that had been swiftly drafted to keep 
the talks going, was actually going to work in practice.  Each side dealt with this growing 
realization in a different way.  For the broad northern Ugandan constituency at the 
workshop, including the LRA/M delegation but also local leaders and civil society, this 
was a palpably exigent and deeply consequential point.  The Acholi paramount chief 
pleaded for ‘simple interpretations…which will instill confidence in him (Kony) to sign 
the agreement’.161  In contrast, the GoU’s language became increasingly detached and 
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programmatic, emphasizing the ‘mechanisms and procedures’ to be put in place to 
implement the agreements.162   
 
The GoU ‘technical’ approach made political sense at this stage.  As a delegation they 
appeared calmer and more composed, as if the gradual internal combustion of the 
LRA/M was now inevitable, and in any case they had a solid military plan ‘B’ now in 
place with both the US and the DRC on board.  All the GoU needed to do was keep up 
the appearance of constructive engagement until LRA/M procrastination and failed 
deadlines became insufferable to everyone involved.  One US cable noted that ‘for its 
part, the GOU appears mostly content to allow the LRA to work out its internal 
problems while it encourages LRA defections’.163  At this stage the domestic, political, 
and diplomatic momentum was behind the GoU, and they knew it.  People in northern 
Uganda had started returning from the camps, and their priorities were changing.  The 
hardening of the LRA’s position in late 2007 and throughout 2008 and a spike in 
abductions, was now seen as far more of a threat to peace than the GoU’s apparent 
desire to conclude a deal.  Northern opposition politicians could no longer credibly  base 
their messages and campaigns solely on the bad intentions of Museveni.  The GoU were 
well aware of this, and the delegation’s deputy leader, Oryem, noted that the GoU would 
‘go ahead and play its role…which would contrast starkly with the LRA’s bad faith’.164  
 
Returning ‘justice’ at Juba to it’s rightful place 
 
The structural and systemic issues to be tackled at Juba were far more extensive and 
complicated than the ICC arrest warrants,  yet the warrants came to symbolise the 
intractability of existing power asymmetries in Uganda.  Ayena Charles, the LRA legal 
adviser for a large part of the process, recalls that Kony raised the ICC issue regularly 
and persistently: 
‘Kony would say, it does not matter what we agree to do so long as I will be 
hanged at the ICC…he put a strong condition that no way can he support peace 
talks unless the ICC is dropped’.165   
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On 25 May on one of the occasions when Kony refused to sign the final agreement with 
the GoU, he reportedly said, ‘I would rather die in the bush than go to the ICC and be 
hanged’.166  Taken out of context it is an oft-quoted summation of the intractability of 
the ICC issue at Juba.  But it was not necessarily the ICC per se that was so troubling, it 
was what it came to represent.  The court and its warrants became short hand for two 
sentiments. The first was the fear of retribution and non-acceptance generally.  
Interviews with people who visited Kony suggest that even in the absence of the ICC 
warrants, issues relating to personal safety against the backdrop of such serious 
wrongdoing were paramount in his calculations.  At a meeting of community leaders in 
July 2007, just a month after the AAR had been signed, district leader Norbert Mao 
described how, despite the Amnesty Law and the rhetoric amongst religious and 
traditional leaders about forgiveness and reconciliation, many of Kony’s relatives had 
been murdered in Odek in revenge attacks. Michael Otim argued that Joseph Kony felt 
that he:  
‘could never secure a favourable deal because of the level of atrocity that had 
been committed.  He realized he could never really return to the community after 
the pain that he had caused…Kony was faced with several dilemma’s, my own 
reading was that he had a paranoia; a feeling that he knows he has committed so 
much that no form of forgiveness could ever come genuinely so the peace talks 
must be some sort of trap’.167     
 
Ayena Odong came to a similar conclusion:  
‘from his body language, he was too scared because he was aware of what he had 
done and could not believe he would be forgiven.  Of course ICC gave him even 
greater impetus not to sign.  ICC, it was just an excuse but I wish he had been 
denied that excuse’.168   
 
The second sentiment that the court came to represent was an overwhelming feeling that 
any political ‘opportunity structure’ that may have existed at the beginning of the talks 
had, certainly by the first rejection of the FPA, been closed.  As the talks progressed and 
trust in the process waned it became increasingly clear that the LRA/M was incapable of 
overcoming the communication and narrative blocks  imposed by existing domestic and 
international power dynamics.  Kony may have been afraid of how people might react to 
him but it was also the case that, as Owiny-Dollo puts it, ‘he never believed he would be 
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given a fair trial’.169  The concept of legal neutrality seemed to exist as a theoretical 
possibility in the minds of the LRA/M, but it could never be translated to the political 
context that they found themselves in with any confidence.  The ICC came to embody 
this barrier.  The court, an inscrutable international organization, linked inextricably to 
the NRM in the minds of the LRA/M and much of the northern Ugandan population, 
carried with it an apparent power to shape narratives and allocate blame and punishment.  
It represented, in extreme form, the spectre of absolute silencing and total renunciation.   
 
Amongst the LRA/M delegation the same words and phrases kept coming up in relation 
to Kony and the high command: the need to reassure them that the agreement is ‘well-
intentioned’, that the peace talks are ‘not a trap.’ 170  The LRA/M delegation was 
enthusiastic about the prospects of ‘traditional justice,’ but it is not clear that the high 
command, particularly Kony himself, had confidence in local accountability alternatives.  
He knew little about the rituals that were being proposed, and had never heard of Mato 
Oput.171  Indeed despite LRA/M signatures on both the AAR and its annex, Kony 
himself was never party to decisions or clear about the implications of what was being 
agreed. Ronald Iya recounts that at the final meeting of northern Ugandan leaders and 
LRA/M delegates in Garamba on 28 November 2008, Kony:  
‘did not know all the details in the signed agreements and that he wanted speak 
directly with Museveni.  He accused his delegation of being thieves and said that 
his commanders felt the agreement did not give them much’.172   
 
In a US cable concerning the same meeting, Rugunda described Kony as ‘living in a fools 
paradise’.  The cable goes on to describe how:  
‘accounts of the encounter reveal that Kony and his senior officers are living in a 
reality shaped by isolation and misinformation about the outside world… In one 
instance, Kony railed against Martin Ojul…and said he could not accept the 
Protocol on Accountability and Reconciliation, which is at the heart of the FPA 
and which had been negotiated by Ojul.  He stated that he could not accept an 
agreement negotiated by thieves who stole donor money and were being paid by 
the GoU’.173   
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Ayena Charles, who had been present at the Mombasa meetings, later complained that 
the AAR and annex were not a true representation of the LRA/M position as he had 
understood it:  
‘to a great extent they missed out on our original idea for the Agenda item 3. We 
wanted traditional tribunals or committees that would sit to hear between 
communities and agree how to conduct hearings…The AAR veered off the 
regional pathway that I was proposing’.174   
 
He later said that the LRA/M never actually signed the AAR annex, which is confusing, 
because they did. 175   He left the LRA/M delegation in February 2008 in unclear 
circumstances, so perhaps what he meant was that he never endorsed the signature.  But 
as an indication of the lack of communication, incoherence, and structural disassociation 
that marked the Juba process, and particularly the shaping of the AAR and its annex, his 




In sum then, justice at Juba was far more complex than abstracted peace-versus-justice 
portraits suggest.  The ICC did play an important role in the talks, but mainly in that it 
channeled contention and became a symbol against which issues of concern were 
mediated and articulated.176  In the end, the AAR and its annex displayed almost the 
entire range of transitional justice processes that had been developed and endorsed 
throughout the 1990s.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the agreements represented a pragmatic 
and self-interested compromise: a maze of protective possibilities and narrative shaping 
opportunities, and a way of moving on from the frustrating constraints imposed by the 
ICC.  Both sides could ultimately agree on the importance of these objectives.  For 
donors and activists, the agreements were seen in a different light: as a game-changing 
commitment to the transitional justice during peace talks.   
 
But outside of the Juba role-play, Museveni was planning his military Plan B, and Kony 
was increasingly distant from his delegation and concerned about self-preservation.  The 
AAR and its annex were the product of the structurally dissociative approach by both 
parties.  At points of hyperactivity during the three year process agreements were reached !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 Author interview with Hon. Ayenda Odong, Kampala, 12.06.12!
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! 140 
and signed, but their procedural and substantive aspects masked the highly complex 
dynamics at play, and represented a simulation of what a set of agreements perhaps, 
might, or should, look like, if the conditions were right.  Nevertheless, even when the talks 
completely spun of their axis in December 2008, the AAR agreements as a blueprint for 
transitional justice still existed, and the government, as part of its ‘good guy’ act, had 
announced its commitment to implementation.  The reality is that for the GoU the AAR 
agreements largely became an irrelevance after Juba, but, as shall be explored in the next 






5. ‘Somehow this whole process became so artificial’: Donor and GoU 
approaches to transitional justice post-Juba 
 
The AAR agreements presented a veritable shopping list of transitional justice processes 
but when it came to policy design and implementation things became a lot more 
complicated.  The agreements highlighted serious policy dilemmas. Firstly, it was not 
clear under which applicable law the special division of the High Court would try 
suspects and the future of the 2000 Amnesty Act needed consideration.  Secondly, there 
was no detail on how formal and informal processes might work together, and the 
precise nature of a truth body and a reparations scheme were left wide open.   As 
standalone policy frameworks, the AAR agreements were ambitious.  Full and 
meaningful implementation would require not only far-reaching institutional reform but 
also a profound re-imagining of the relationship between the executive, legislature, 
judiciary and military; and the relationship between war-affected citizens and state 
authorities.  As discussed in the last chapter, this was not the spirit in which the AAR 
was drafted or signed.  In the absence of a political transition there was very little 
impetus amongst entrenched political elites for serious engagement with AAR 
implementation.    
 
As a result, transitional justice in Uganda quickly became a donor-driven affair.  This 
chapter explores the position of the major donors funding transitional justice policy 
post-Juba1 and the political tactics that the GoU adopted in response.  The first section 
of this chapter provides context for understanding donor engagement in Uganda and 
outlines the financial support provided for transitional justice policy.  The second section 
describes how donor support for transitional justice was incorporated into governance 
and rule of law programming, part of a broader international trend that was explored in 
Chapter 2.  It goes on to interrogate how ‘post-political’, technocratic approaches to 
transitional justice policy and programming operated in practice, with a particular focus 
on the perspective of donors engaged in the process.  The remainder of the chapter 
looks in detail at how donor technocratic approaches to transitional justice have 
interacted with GoU political tactics and strategies.  In particular it examines how the 
GoU has managed through various means, including calculated indifference, political 
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opportunism and damage limitation, to dismiss, circumvent or instrumentalise efforts to 
implement the provisions of the AAR.  The focus in this chapter will be on reparations, 
truth-telling and traditional justice.  The next chapter will examine in detail the trajectory 
of criminal justice processes through an examination of the Ugandan war crimes court 
and the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo.   
 
Setting the Scene: Donor engagement in Uganda 
 
Uganda was one of the first sub-Saharan African countries to adopt liberalization and 
pro-market policies during the 1990s, and it was handsomely supported and rewarded for 
this effort.  Donor involvement in Uganda nearly doubled between 1989 and 1994, and 
has risen steadily since.2  In 2012, $1.65 billion of foreign aid was received.3   Uganda’s 
largest donor is the United States, which gave $396 million between 2011-12, followed by 
the World Bank and the EU institutions, which gave $188 million and $160 million 
respectively.4  In 2011/12 it was estimated that aid accounted for 19% of the annual 
national budget.5  The majority of aid is directed towards ‘social infrastructure and 
services’, state sector reforms such as privatization, civil service retrenchment, public 
expenditure reform, decentralization, and more recently, efforts to rehabilitate the north 
of the country.6  
 
The last three years have seen high-level corruption scandals, the passing into law of 
controversial legislation including the Public Order Management Bill (POMB) and the 
Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA), as well as patchy progress in economic growth.  These 
have tarnished Uganda’s image as a World Bank ‘development model’ and ‘star 
performer’.7  Nevertheless, Uganda is still regarded as a state that maintains serious 
commitment to socio-economic development.8  Rhetoric from outsiders about Uganda 
as an international success story may have been tempered, but overall donor involvement 
in the country has not changed significantly.  Ali Marie Tripp convincingly describes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Aili Marie Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime, (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010), p.186. 
3 http://www.oecd.org/countries/uganda/UGA.JPG 
4 Kerry Smith, Uganda: Resources for Crisis Response, vulnerability and poverty eradication, (Global Humanitarian 
Assistance: November 2012), p.17. 
5 ibid. 
6 Tripp, ‘Paradoxes’; Smith, ‘Uganda’ p,9. 
7 Tripp, ‘Paradoxes’, p.185. 
8 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda 
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modern Uganda as a semi-authoritarian regime, adept at seducing donors with the 
language of democratization, decentralization, military reform, and conflict resolution.9  
It maintains a particular hold over the West because it provides foreign policy 
cooperation in an area of major geo-political and strategic significance.10  The importance 
attached to this is particularly clear in the case of the United States, which, in March 
2014, rather clumsily announced a significant increase in military aid to Uganda to assist 
in the effort to ‘hunt’ for Joseph Kony on the very same day that a review of US aid 
policy was initiated in response to Uganda’s draconian Anti-Homosexuality Bill passing 
into law.11 
 
Since 2000 there have been a few occasions when donors have threatened to, or actually 
withdrawn aid, from the Ugandan state, because of corruption, human rights violations, 
and the deteriorating situation in the north, but this has usually been re-programmed 
through other donor modalities.12  An important recent example, whose implications are 
yet to be fully realized, was the decision by both the Netherlands and Denmark to 
withdraw aid from the state’s Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) following the passing 
of the AHA.  In February 2014 the Netherlands announced that it would be suspending 
its $9.5 million annual fund for JLOS, while Denmark announced a ‘restructuring’ of 
development assistance, directing roughly $8.3million of aid away from support to the 
Ugandan Government and towards civil society and activities within the private sector.13  
These sums represent a small proportion of Uganda’s total ODA but a significant 
proportion of support for JLOS, which has been tasked with devising and implementing 
a transitional justice policy.   Most notably, the Netherlands in 2012/3 funded roughly 
half of the entire sector-wide approach (SWaP) budget, and under the 2012-16 JLOS 
Strategic Investment Plan this contribution was projected annually until 2016.  Less 
quantifiable at this stage is the short and medium term impact of the withdrawal of 
Denmark and the Netherlands from the sector.  Having been major SWaP donors 
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pushing for active JLOS engagement in transitional justice, it remains to be seen whether 
institutional priorities will change in their absence.  At the time of writing it is unclear 
how the funds provided by Netherlands and Denmark will be replaced, if at all.14  
 
In short then, funding and support for transitional justice activities under the auspices of 
JLOS is currently in flux.  What follows is an account of how that support was framed 
and delivered in the recent past, during the period between the signing of the AAR 
implementing protocol in 2008 and the decision by key justice sector donors in February 
2014 to suspend funding to JLOS.  An analysis of the donor approach towards TJ will 
shed light on the trajectory of state-level transitional justice initiatives.  The context 
provided above is important because support for transitional justice slotted into a pre-
existing relationship between donors and the Ugandan state based on cooperation and 
socio-economic support, and rarely on sensitive political aid or disputes.  
 
Funding and structures for transitional justice policy development, post-Juba 
 
Not long after the annex to the AAR was signed in February 2008, the Ugandan cabinet, 
in a clever public relations exercise aimed at convincing the international community of 
its commitment to the Juba process, instructed JLOS to begin planning implementation. 
A fifty member Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) was set up under the 
chairmanship of the then Principal Judge, Justice Ogoola, of the High Court.  The 
working group existed under the auspices of JLOS and its members were made up of 
JLOS officials.  At this time a Final Peace Agreement remained elusive, but the TJWG 
did not concern itself with ‘political’ matters.15  Technical staff involved in the TJWG 
saw it as the policy making body charged with taking the AAR forward, regardless of 
whether Kony signed a final agreement.16   Not long after its inception the TJWG was 
divided into five ‘sub-committees’, each responsible for a facet of the AAR: (i) 
court/legal mechanisms; (ii) traditional justice mechanisms; (iii) truth telling body; (iv) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 At an EU-Africa Summit on 2 April 2014, the 28 members of the EU agreed that cutting aid to Uganda 
over the AHA was not necessarily the best way forward and that ‘other options should be explored’, 
particularly as Museveni is a ‘strategic security ally’.  See, ‘Aid cut over gays law unhelpful’, Daily Monitor, 
10.04.14 http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Aid-cut-over-gays-law-unhelpful---EU/-
/688334/2272844/-/qgxjf2/-/index.html (accessed 20.04.14).  
15 Sarah Nouwen quotes Ogoola as saying that whether or not Kony signed the FPA was a ‘political 
question’ that ‘lawyers should stay clear of’, see Nouwen, ‘Complementarity’, p.180; See also, James 
Ogoola, ‘Lawfare: Where Justice Meets Peace’, Case Reserve Journal of International Law, 43 (2010), pp.181-88. 
16 Author interview with JLOS official, Kampala, 30.04.2012. 
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budget/finance; (v) harmonization between instruments.17  The first four groups were 
supposed to work simultaneously and come up with draft policies for each area.  It was 
later decided that public consultations should take place, and sub-committees two and 
three were combined for this purpose.18  The ‘court/legal mechanisms’ sub-committee 
got off to a quick start, and almost immediately began examining the legal and 
administrative issues around the setting up of a special ‘war crimes’ division of the High 
Court.  The ‘War Crimes Court’ was launched by administrative decree in July 2008 and 
the dynamics behind the setting up of the court and its first war crimes trial are explored 
Chapter 6.   It was not until nearly five years later, in May 2013 that JLOS presented a 
draft Transitional Justice Policy addressing the other AAR provisions. It claimed to be an 
‘over-arching framework…designed to address justice, accountability and reconciliation 
needs of post conflict Uganda’.19   These claims are explored in more detail below.  
 
Donor funding for transitional justice has been allocated through the JLOS SWaP fund, 
a sector budget support mechanism championed by donors as a way of increasing 
domestic coordination on justice issues and at the same time improving aid effectiveness.  
Essentially a basket fund, it appealed to donors as a ‘compromise between pure budget 
support and the desire for tracking and auditing funds’. 20   Donors have set up 
complementary structures, including a JLOS Development Partners Group, which 
provides a forum for all donors who provide support to the sector.21  As well as funding 
through SWaP, donors also provide off-budget project support to JLOS.  At the time of 
research, the JLOS Development Partners Group (DPG) was co-chaired by Denmark 
and Ireland and also included Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.  
It also had a number of multilateral members, including UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, 
ICRC, UNWOMEN, and UNFPA.  At the time of writing Denmark and the 
Netherlands were co-chairing the JLOS DPG. 22  Across the broad range of JLOS 
activities, each development partner has a ‘focal’ point.  Denmark and Ireland were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Author interview with JLOS advisor, Kampala, 03.05.12. 
18 Author interview with ULRC senior official, Kampala, 24.4.12. 
19 Justice Law and Order Sector, National Transitional Justice Policy, Prepared by the National Transitional 
Justice Working Group (3rd DRAFT, May, 2013) (on file with author).  
20 ‘Harmonising Donor Practices’, OECD DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2003)p.40; Author interview 
with donor official, Kampala, 22.05.2012; The SWaP budget is separate from the entire JLOS budget for 
each institution.   
21 Rachel Odoi-Musoke and Sarah Callaghan, ‘The experience of Justice Sector Reform in Uganda’, Paper 
Delivered at IDLO Conference, (n.d) (on file with author).!!
22 See, http://www.jlos.go.ug/index.php/2012-09-25-13-11-16/development-partners (accessed 
01.07.2013).  Both DFID and the EC participate in the Development Partners Group as non-contributing 
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responsible for the ‘TJ focal group’ from the outset, and this group continues to meet 
when the need arises.23  It should be noted that as ‘donors’ are referred to throughout the 
rest of this thesis, it is justice sector donors that make up the JLOS DPG that are being 
referred to, unless specifically stated otherwise.     
 
Initial donor funding for transitional justice activities were all provided ‘off-budget’ 
because the JLOS Strategic Investment Plan II, which covered the period 2006-2011, was 
introduced before the AAR agreements had been signed at Juba.24  The JLOS Strategic 
Investment Plan III (SIP III), which runs during 2012-16, lists transitional justice as a 
‘key thematic area’.25  The SWaP budget for the 2012/13 was roughly $19.3 million 
dollars.26  The GoU and the Netherlands contributed roughly $9.7million each, while 
Denmark provided around $71,000 to fund the appointment of an International 
Technical Advisor (ITA) for transitional justice. 27   The day-to-day running of the 
International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda is supported by a different 
budget line, but SWaP funding does include technical support to the ICD.  Other justice 
sector donors that make up the Development Partner’s Group (DPG) still prefer to fund 
transitional justice activities off-budget.28  
 
Linked to transitional justice objectives but not explicitly framed as such, is the 
government’s Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), 
which started in July 2009 and is programmed to run until June 2015.29  The first 3-year 
phase of the PRDP came to an end in June 2012.  ‘PRDP II’ commenced in July 2012.  
This programme is administered by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and its 
overall goal is to ‘stabilise Northern Uganda and lay a firm foundation for recovery and 
development.’30  Its four strategic objectives are (i) consolidation of state authority in 
northern Uganda, (ii) the re-building and ‘empowering’ of communities, (iii) the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 UNOCHR is now also a ‘focal’ group partner.  
24 Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), The Second JLOS Strategic Investment Plan (SIPII), 2006/7-2010/11. 
25 Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), The Third JLOS Strategic Investment Plan (SIPIII), 2012/13-2016/17. 
26 Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS), Annual Performance Report 2012/13 (2013) (on file with author), 
p.81 
27 ibid 
28 For example, Norway funded the Ugandan Law Reform Commission to carry out its study ‘Traditional 
Justice, Truth Telling and National Reconciliation’ (July 2012) which was supposed to inform the drafting 
of the national TJ policy.   
29 The first 3 year phase of the PRPD came to an end in June 2012, ‘PRPD II’ commenced in July 2012 
and is due to run until June 2015. 
30 Republic of Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Peace, Reovery and Development Plan for Northern 
Uganda, (PRPD), Phase 2, July 2012-June 2015 (2012) (on file with author), p.2. 
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‘revitalisation’ of the economy and, finally, (iv) peace-building and reconciliation.  This 
latter objective, known as ‘SO.4’, was, during PRPD I, a way of channeling funds to the 
Amnesty Commission, to support the amnesty process and reintegration of ex-
combatants, although this only accounted for 0.4% of the entire PRPD budget.31  It was 
not until the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), a donor basket fund set up in July 
2011, began promoting links between the OPM and JLOS, that the two institutions 
began discussing overlapping transitional justice areas.  Even now, that co-ordination 
remains weak and fundamental tensions exist between the institutions over the future 
role of the Amnesty.32  In the ‘PRPD II’, reintegration and resettlement of ex-combatants 
remained a priority, alongside a new focus on community dispute resolution and 
reconciliation, involving ‘enhancing the roles of community level mechanisms, taking 
into account how traditional and formal mechanisms interact’.33  SO.4 was to make up 
roughly 3% of the PRPD II budget.  Support to the Amnesty Commission continued to 
be provided ‘on-budget’ and all other activities were to be funded off-budget, by donors, 
and sub-contracted to NGOs working on related issues.34  This has not come to pass 
however, because the OPM was hit by a major corruption scandal in late 2012 and donor 
support for the PRDP II has since been frozen or re-directed.35 
 
Donor approaches to transitional justice in Uganda 
 
In order to understand how transitional justice fared at state level in Uganda since 2008, 
it is important to consider not only how much money has been spent, but also the 
identity and the approach of the donors spending it.   For reasons of relative socio-
economic progress and foreign policy cooperation alluded to above, aid to Uganda from 
US and European donors tends to be described in terms of ‘technocratic assistance’ that 
partners with government rather than challenging it.36  This is certainly true in relation to 
support for the justice sector, where donors shy away from issues that are politically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Ibid. 
32 Author interview with DGF official, Kampala, 31.05.2012; Author interview with donor official, 
Kampala, 05.06.2012.   
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34 ibid; Author private email communication with OPM official, 07.08.2012. 
35 See, for example, ‘Donors cut all direct aid to government until 2013’, Daily Monitor, 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Donors--cut--all-direct-aid--government--until-2015/-
/688334/1635792/-/tc4u1pz/-/index.html  04.12.2012 (accessed 06.12.2012).!!
36 Thomas Carothers, ‘Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?’, Journal of Democracy, 20:1 
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sensitive, such as the overall balance of power in the country, and the independence of 
the judiciary. 37  Certainly, donors provide support to politically engaged civil society 
groups, including those working on human rights and democracy issues, but there is 
rarely much of a direct kickback when these groups and their activities are sidelined or 
under threat.38  Although donor support for transitional justice has been framed in an 
expansive and normative language that emphasises its role in ‘promoting the enjoyment 
of sustainable peace and reconciliation,’ and ‘deepening democracy’ this remained fairly 
abstract.39  In reality, donors have been far more comfortable talking in terms of what 
Thomas Carothers and Diane De Gramont call ‘circumscribed institutional 
improvements’, which focus, for example, on administrative coherence, capacity 
building, and service delivery.40  Support for the International Crimes Division of the 
High Court for example, is oblique, and aimed primarily at building the capacity of the 
judiciary, which, it is believed, will strengthen the rule of law.41   Chapter 2 explored the 
genesis of this approach towards transitional justice a ‘neutral technology’, below it is 
examined in more detail in the Ugandan context.   
 
In Uganda, transitional justice has been enveloped into the broader peace-building and 
development objectives of donors and linked specifically to rule of law strengthening.  Its 
trajectory has, in turn, been determined by the logic of these approaches, which are, in 
the words of Carothers, ‘developmental’ rather than ‘political’.  The developmental 
approach conceives of change as ‘slow and iterative’ and thus favours aid that: 
‘pursues incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and 
socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing governance and the building of a 
well-functioning state’.42   
 
Such an approach is in contrast to ‘political’ interventions which direct aid at ‘core 
political processes and institutions, especially elections, political parties and…often at 
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advantages and disadvantages of each, see Carothers, ‘Democracy’ and Youngs ‘Trends’.  
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important conjunctural moments and with the hope of catalytic effects’.43  An example 
might be USAID’s aid to Serbia and Belarus in the 1990s, and more recently, its funding 
for training political opposition parties in Zimbabwe.  Carothers and De Gramont 
identify a general pattern which indicates that the better the overall relationship with a 
state, the more likely it is that the approach will be developmental.  Conversely, a 
negative relationship will encourage a more directly political response.44   
 
In Uganda, the governance, human rights and peace-building programmes that TJ has 
been subsumed under, are also informed by a particular idea of democracy, which 
Richard Youngs identifies as ‘democracy as process’, rather than ‘democracy as 
product’.45   European donors, he argues, tend to favour the former and are less 
concerned about pivotal political moments such as elections, or direct engagement with 
forms of political competition.  Democracy ‘as process’ presents political reform 
objectives as part of broader, longer-term developmental agendas which also embrace 
social and economic ‘modernisation’.46  As Youngs argues: 
‘it is the broad direction of change in developing societies that is presented as the 
crucial criterion of assessment…. anodyne process-oriented aims are usually 
pronounced: the ‘transformation’ of particular sectors; ‘political modernisation’; 
the ‘rule of law’ and ‘pluralistic civil society’.47  
  
In scholarship, the distinction between ‘process’ and ‘product,’ ‘political’ and 
‘developmental,’ tends to fall along geographical lines, with the US being associated with 
‘political and product’ based approaches, and European donors with ‘process and 
developmental approaches’.48  This categorization is not strictly exclusive, and in Uganda 
donors have generally been politically non-confrontational, technical and ‘governance’ 
focused.    
 
In Uganda, the two donors responsible for chairing the TJ focal group, Denmark and 
Ireland, both incorporate transitional justice into their broader ‘governance’ development 
programming.  Danish support for JLOS resides in its Uganda Good Governance 
Programme, which emphasizes ‘democratic development, peace-building, provision of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Carothers, ‘Democracy’, p.5. 
44 De Gramont and Carothers, ‘Development’, p.114; Carothers, ‘Democracy’, p.14 
45 Richard Youngs ‘Democracy as Product versus Democracy as Process’, in Mareike Van Doorn and Roel 
von Meijenfeldt (eds), Democracy: Europe’s Core Value? (The Hague: Eburon Delft, 2007). 
46 Youngs, ‘Trends’. 
47 Youngs, ‘Democracy’, pp.67-8. 
48 Carothers, ‘Democracy’, p.12-18. 
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justice, human rights, accountability and better service delivery.’49  Specific objectives for 
JLOS, including ‘improving efficiency and effectiveness’ of the judiciary, ‘supporting 
reforms in the High Court’ and ‘development of performance enhancement 
mechanisms’. 50   Ireland, meanwhile, emphasizes ‘access to justice for poor and 
vulnerable people’ as a key part of its governance agenda. 51   Capacity building is 
emphasised by both and defined narrowly, (as it is in most developing country contexts), 
as engaging with bureaucratic skills development around budgeting and programming 
and the strengthening of institutional systems (JLOS and the judiciary), through 
assistance with policy formulation, financial management, legal training and technical 
resources.52  A central plank in the donor approach towards transitional justice in Uganda 
has also been the recruitment of expatriate experts and consultants to guide the 
process.53  Expressed as technocratic governance reforms, these objectives fit well with 
theories about ‘developmental’ and ‘process-based’ approaches to democratization and 
democracy assistance.  At the UN, the OHCHR takes the lead on transitional justice, and 
is supported by other UN agencies, most notably UN Women, under their ‘access to 
justice’ programme.  The core work of the UN in this area is described as organizing 
meetings and starting up conversations; ‘we create space for advocacy around an issue’, 
one UN official said.54  Such technical support then expands into other areas, for 
example by assisting JLOS to develop the procedures of the International Crimes 
Division.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the JLOS Strategic Investment Plan III 2012-6, drafted with 
donor supervision, incorporates this language of technical governance reform, stating 
that a future transitional justice policy in Uganda will aim to: 
‘enhance access to justice and basic services for victims in Uganda’s conflict- 
affected areas (…) and to contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law 
across the country…this will require the adoption of a relevant policy and legal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Danida, Uganda Good Governance Programme, 2011-16 (2011).  
50 IrishAid, Country Strategy Paper, 2010-14, (2010); Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Multi-
annual Strategic Plan 2012-14 in Uganda (2012). 
51 IrishAid, ‘Country’, p.9.  
52 Ibid; Danida’, ‘Uganda’;  
53 As well as the International Technical Advisor on Transitional Justice at JLOS, Norway funded external 
consultants to help the Uganda Law Reform Commission draft its study on traditional justice and truth 
telling (see ft) and USAID funded the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILGP) staff to draft 
the legislation necessary to establish the War Crimes Court (discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter). 
54 Author interview with UN official, Kampala, 04.10.2012. 
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framework accompanied by institution building and strengthening to give effect 
to respective policies and laws.’55   
 
The assessment by donor partners of progress made so far in the area of transitional 
justice uses language that is similarly rationalist and neutral in tone. In a public speech, in 
2012, for example, the Dutch Ambassador, explained that the ‘bumpy road so far’ in 
progress on transitional justice related to delays in ‘witness protection policy’ and the 
need for more attention to be paid to ‘firm and proactive outreach’.56   This ‘elephant in 
the room’ type of analysis is both cautious and incremental.  But this is not surprising in 
the context of a donor approach that prefers to stress the concept of partnership, even 
with problematic regimes, and that shies away from direct political confrontation, even 
when the process that is being advocated and funded by donors has deeply political 
connotations.  The squaring of this circle is explained well by Zoe Marriage’s application 
of psychological theory to aid agency behavior.  She notes that the presence of 
conflicting information or attitudes, termed ‘cognitive dissonance’, is difficult to process 
and deal with, and that ‘when dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the 
person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the 
dissonance.’57  As will be explored below, this has provided the GoU with useful room 
for manoeuvre and chicanery when it comes to transitional justice policy discussions. 
 
What is striking about this approach towards transitional justice – one that evades direct 
political dialogue and focuses on ‘technical fixes’ - is that it represents a significant 
ontological shift from earlier approaches.  As was argued in Chapter 2, the transition 
paradigm laid the intellectual framework for the concept of transitional justice when it 
first emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. 58  Rejecting the analysis of modernization theorists 
such as K.K Rostow, who focused attention on the structural socioeconomic conditions 
required for evolution from oligarchy to democracy; the transition theorists focused on 
the ‘rapid fall and replacement of authoritarian regimes’, 
‘They define(d) transition quite broadly as the interval between one political 
regime and another.  Yet they emphasise(d) one particular path for transitions, 
one that is neither violent nor revolutionary but proceeds through negotiation 
between the outgoing authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 JLOS, ‘SIP III’, p.11  
56 Speech by Judith Mass, Chair JLOS DPG, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, to the 17th 
Joint GoU-DP Justice, Law and Order Sector Review, Imperial Hotel, Kampala, 27.09.2012 (on file with 
author). 
57 Zoe Marriage, Not Breaking the Rules Not Playing the Game: International Assistance to Countries at War 
(London: Hurst, 2006), pp.204-205. 
58 Ibid. 
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often relies upon formal or informal pacts or agreements that provide security 
guarantees to both sides’.59   
 
The key argument was that transactional political choices were central to the realisation 
of democracy, and that these choices would be made by elites during bargaining around 
political outcomes, in the form of elite pacts.   In other words, change was located in the 
domain of political competition and deliberation during a specific transition period.  The 
influence on early transitional justice scholars and practitioners was clear and as the field 
emerged, its recommendations were specific and fell under Carothers’s ‘political 
approach’ category, or Young’s ‘product’ approach.  The need to ‘settle past accounts’ 
using a ‘distinct’ set of measures: prosecutions, truth-telling, restitution or reparation, and 
reform of abusive state institutions60 would advance democracy and the requirement for 
political bargaining was absolutely central to this realisation.61   
 
In Uganda the same justice tools derived from this intellectual project have been 
promoted by donors.  This is despite a radically different operating environment and  
different ontological assumptions about how change happens.  The phenomenon that 
donors envisage is externally driven and part of a long and open-ended process of legal-
institutional reform and behavioral normative shifts.  The agency and choice of political 
elites is sidelined and transitional justice is promoted as a ‘neutral technology’ and placed 
outside of the domain of domestic political bargaining.  In particular, it is attached to 
technocratic concepts of the rule of law and human rights promotion. The assumption 
has been that these are mutually re-enforcing with the consequence that form ‘becomes 
secondary to generalized and politicized notions of good’.62   As will be explored in more 
detail below, in Uganda, donors see transitional justice more as an evolving process 
towards liberalising political change than a product in itself.  Here, as a self-sustaining 
narrative, it re-binds itself to original ideas that shaped the field.  Transitional justice has 
always conflated formalist and substantive rule of law concepts with teleological 
understandings of change, assuming that one will flow from another.63  Stromseth, 
Wippman and Brooks have cautioned against this approach, arguing that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Rostow, ‘Stages’; Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Donald Horowitz, and Marc Plattner, 
‘Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 25:1 (2014), pp.86-100, p.87 
60 Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.325; 352-354.   
61 This was the position of the three papers commissioned for the 1988 Aspen Institute Conference 
written, respectively, by Herz, Zalaquett, Malamud-Goti, see Arthur, ‘Transitions’, p.350; 353-5. 
62 McAuliffe, ‘Transitional’, p.49.!
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‘assuming that substance will naturally flow from form – or that a normative 
commitment to substantive values (such as respect for individual or minority 
rights, a commitment to non-violent means of resolving disputes etc.) will 
naturally flow from structurally independent courts and from newly drafted 
legislation that highlights those values…,’  
 
is simplistic.64  Despite this, in Uganda such an approach is clearly present and it allows 
transitional justice to be promoted as part of a broader package of governance reforms, 
in a context where the state appears to be ‘de-democratizing’, i.e. transitioning more 
towards authoritarianism than towards democracy, because the institutional and political 
elites that inhabit the state, and their political interests, are not the key unit of analysis.  
 
Inside and outside of politics: contrasting donor and GoU approaches to 
transitional justice 
Donor ant i -pol i t i c s  
An opinion widely shared, and expressed by one JLOS official, was that ‘donors are 
essential for transitional justice to move forward’.65  As described above, the main role of 
donors since the AAR was signed in 2007 has been to fund and provide technical 
assistance for ‘holistic’ transitional justice policy development in Uganda.  What follows 
is an account of the general approach guiding mid-level justice-sector donor actors who 
engaged, on a regular basis, with AAR implementation from 2008-13.  This section 
includes an analytical overview of the political approach of the GoU to AAR 
implementation in the same time period, in order to highlight major dissonances between 
the two.  The final section of this chapter explores the specific domestic political 
trajectory of three AAR processes to date: truth-telling, reparations and traditional 
justice.   
 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the asymmetry between donor and broader JLOS 
interest in transitional justice was the fact that the first and second drafts of the third 
JLOS Strategic Investment Plan (2012-2016) did not include anything on transitional 
justice. One donor official explained that the immediate response from donors was to 
ask: ‘where is TJ in this? And after that,’ she continued, ‘you see them really !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can Right Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after 
Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.73!
65 Author interview with JLOS advisor, Kampala, 03.05.12; Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 
05.06.2012.  The argument that TJ is ‘donor-driven’ was made by every donor and JLOS official 
interviewed during fieldwork. !
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incorporating things’.66  In a revealing formulation of the ‘partnership’ dynamic, another 
donor official explained that:  
 
‘with SIP III, we said you need to have TJ there to indicate you see it as a need 
[…] the engagement we reached with JLOS is: we will support you within your 
SIP III framework, so bring transitional justice in.’67   
 
A UN official described the transitional justice content in the final SIP III as a ‘cut and 
paste from various donor manuals’.68  In August 2011, donors funded two transitional 
justice ‘technical’ advisors to join the JLOS secretariat because of a concern that ‘there 
was no-one to actually move TJ forward from the inside’: one, an expatriate, was to 
provide ‘international’ expertise, and the other was to focus on ‘national’ dimensions.69  
The advisors were funded by donors but employed by the Ministries and their role was 
to work with the Ugandan government institutions but also to provide a point of contact 
with donor officials.70  
 
Developments in Uganda over the last few years, including the violent crackdown on the 
post-election Walk to Work protests in 2011, the installation of serving army officer 
General Nyakairima as Minister of Internal Affairs in contravention of the constitution, 
and the passing of draconian legislation with violates freedom of association and human 
rights, such as the POMB and the AHA, all point towards what Charles Tilly describes as 
a ‘net movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding 
consultation’.71  When donors were asked why they invest in TJ in such sub-optimal 
circumstances in a country that is, to use Tilly’s phrase, ‘de-democratising’, there was 
acknowledgement that political context is not sufficiently considered.72  A senior JLOS 
official recognised that this was a ‘good question,’ but was unwilling to reflect on it, 
suggesting that it be put to donors instead.  When pushed, she acknowledged that she 
had ‘never had that discussion’ about political context with donors.  At a follow up 
meeting a few months later, the question was put to her again:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 30.04.2012. 
67 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 30.04.2012. 
68 Author interview with UN official, Kampala, 02.09.2013. 
69 ibid. 
70 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 22.05.2012; The International Technical Adviser position 
was not renewed in 2013. 
71 Charles Tilly, Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.13-14. For an analysis of this 
process in the Ugandan context see for example, Tripp, ‘Paradoxes’; Mwenda, ‘Personalising’ and Helen 
Epstein, ‘Uganda: The General Challenges the Dictator’, New York Review of Books, 24 April 2014.  
72 Tilly, ‘Democracy’.!!
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‘taking a step back is not something I have done…it pops up here and there in 
JLOS as an issue but in the CSO space, people are more free to ask those kinds 
of questions.  At the political level there is denial about TJ.  At the technical level 
there is a realization that this needs to be addressed but there is not enough 
critical analysis of context’.73  
 
A UN official agreed that:  
‘donors are not having a conversation about the goals and strategies of TJ and 
that is a great failure (…) Using TJ strategically for serious constitutional and 
structural reform: then you are using TJ well.  But the checklist approach is 
dangerous.  TJ could end up doing more damage’.74   
 
When asked about the prospect of the 2013 draft Transitional Justice Policy (discussed in 
more detail below) making it into law, one donor official, responded:  
‘Will Cabinet approve it?  That is a good question.  Accountability is a difficult 
issue.  Yeah, I don’t know enough about the political environment’.75   
  
It was not only donors who were failing to engage with the political context.  One 
former senior NGO staff member, who had himself coordinated civil society 
programmes on transitional justice, lamented the approach of NGOs, which had, in his 
view, been:  
‘ticking all the boxes… truth, prosecution, national audits… we just bang it all 
together and that is not useful, none it is grounded on concrete data’.76  
 
Where a rationale for funding transitional justice was expressed amongst donors it was 
framed in one of two ways.  The first was the argument that Uganda, compared to other 
countries in the region, is redeemable under the right tutelage.  ‘Uganda is not the worst’, 
said one donor, ‘there is international supervision’. 77   The second justification 
emphasised a gradual and incremental opening up of dialogic space on accountability, the 
implication being that this would cross over into positive reform.  As one donor 
explained: 
‘we may not be able to achieve all our goals in the stated time and the way it is 
envisioned… I still think that in the context we are in, it is worth pursuing just so 
that we can at least start a conversation…public discussion and dialogue with key 
stakeholders is a first, initial step’.78   
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75 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 03.09.2013. 
76 Author interview with former NGO official, (by skype), 27.05.12. 
77 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 22.05.2012. 
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The logic, informed by liberal state-building ideas, was that technocratic agents, working 
through alternative donor funded bureaucracies, would design and deliver TJ processes 
which would, in turn, build the institutional capacity of the Ugandan justice sector and 
strengthen the rule of law. 79  The language employed by donors downplayed the 
existential political and personal struggles mediated through processes of justice, and 
played up the degree to which development agencies and local bureaucracies could 
control these processes.  This approach towards AAR implementation appeared to 
assume a level of institutional independence that has never existed in the Ugandan 
context. 80  It did not take sufficient account of what Kim Lane Scheppele calls the 
‘interacting parts’ of the legal order.81  Rule of law and governance indicators that have 
been central to donor funded transitional justice programming in Uganda were confined 
to discrete measurements such as the number of judges that had been trained in 
international criminal jurisprudence. 82   These could be objectively measured as 
standalone data in external efforts to strengthen discrete institutions such as JLOS, but 
said little about the ‘political cultures’ that framed the way in which the people interacted 
with these institutions.83  The approach of donors also neglected a central moral and 
practical dilemma, which was whether it was prudent to support a sitting government, 
whose own security apparatus was implicated in major international crimes against its 
own citizens, to design and develop its own programme of transitional justice.  Indeed, 
while the political leadership was being written out of the transitional justice equation, it 
was also, potentially being empowered.  Indeed just because donors were reluctant to 
engage in Ugandan politics, it did not follow that their efforts had no political 
implications. 
 
According to a JLOS official, donors ‘cut out a lot of steps;’ you cannot, she argued, just 
meet with technical people, ‘with this government, unless you involve the top leadership in 
the first discussion of a project, then it just does not go anywhere’, because, as she 
explained, those who design the policy reforms are seldom the ones who either authorize 
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or implement them.84  This was a problem with the NGO approach too.  According to a 
staff member, NGOs had failed to get a proper grip on ‘insider stuff’.85  He explained 
that in 2010 his organisation began talking about the need to get a clearer and more 
nuanced sense of the ‘political terrain’ around transitional justice, including trying to 
identify who in the political structure needed to be engaged with; but the impetus 
‘petered out’.86  This was echoed in more immediate terms during a long meeting with a 
donor staff member, a northern Ugandan, who had moved in and out of the NGO 
policy and political world for many years.  Speaking in confidence and emphasizing the 
‘personal’ nature of his ideas, he explained that: 
‘On TJ, there is no serious thought from donors or NGOs, no lead transitional 
justice person has emerged.  Look, this is a legacy issue.  You need to negotiate 
with the government around what it is you want to address.  And maybe, you 
need to reach an agreement that at a certain level, no we will not go after them.  
Museveni – we will not touch you. There is a genuine interest in associated issues 
– the government wants to build a strong sense of national identity.  Patriotism; 
constitutionalism – there is a national guidance department in the OPM.  This is 
a framework that TJ could feed into, that makes it possible.  This is where 
government interest could lie.  It is about where these different agendas can 
meet.  The question has to be, OK, how do you frame an agenda for that 
conversation?  Because how you frame it could tear this country apart’.87   
 
What he highlighted were the messy political interactions and compromises that attend 
these processes, and that a policy that required political compromise and ‘buy-in’, could 
not proceed at a purely technical level.  The need for transitional justice, his quote 
implied, had not been constructed by advocates as a ‘story that had a chance of 
surviving’ in the Ugandan political context.88  To paraphrase Larry Diamond, if there is 
one absolute precondition for transitional justice, it is the presence of a set of elites that 
decide, for whatever reason, that it is in their interests to pursue.89  This was expressed 
through the private and ‘off-record’ comments of many donor staff, who were highly 
insightful about the inadequacies of the donor approach yet trapped within a system of 
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institutional constraints and macro-forces that they, as individuals, had little incentive or 
power to address.  
 
Another problem with failing to engage sufficiently with the domestic political context 
was that a lack of desired ‘outputs’ (explored below), was explained away too 
simplistically as being down to a straightforward and homogenous ‘lack of political will,’ 
without sustained analysis of how or why.90   Criticism of the government about the 
failure of the PRPD’s SO.4 to make any headway during its first phase was indicative of 
this.  A political adviser to the OPM explained that she felt that the government was 
being ‘wrongly maligned’ by NGOs for inactivity around SO.4 because a proper 
discussion had never taken place between donors and the Government about the peace-
building and reconciliation objectives.  She complained that ‘USAID, UN Women, they 
do not tell us what they are doing, and then they turn around and say, oh well, the 
government is just not engaged’.91  This was a problem that a donor staff member 
acknowledged, noting that the criticism directed at the government over the failure of 
SO.4 was ‘dishonest’ and ‘did not tell the whole story’.92  Lack of progress, she argued, 
was down to a lack of dialogue and joint strategy between donors, the Government, and 
NGOs.  
 
GoU pol i t i ca l  pragmatism and calculated indi f f erence 
In light of all this, an important question emerges about the GoU and its own motivation 
for keeping TJ on the table.  From the moment the AAR agreements were signed off, the 
GoU has rooted its approach firmly in the politics of pragmatism.93  Transitional justice 
could at once be embraced and circumscribed depending on the political moment.  In 
2008, GoU support for taking the AAR agreements forward was based on a confidence 
that any future policy making and implementation could be tightly controlled.  In March 
2008, Minister of Internal Affairs Rugunda warned the US Ambassador that the 
implementation of the Agreement would not necessarily ‘follow the letter,’ but that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 ‘Political will’ is described by a Hammergren as the ‘slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon’, usually 
identified amorphously as something that is ‘lacking’, see Linn Hammergren, Political Will, Constituency 
Building, and Public Support in Rule of Law Programs, (Washington DC: Centre for Democracy and 
Governance, 1998). 
91 Author interview with OPM official, Kampala, 05.06.2012. 
92 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 22.05.2012; Participant observation, PRPD workshop 
with donors and civil society, 03.06.2012.!
93 Mac Ginty, ‘Routine’, p.298.!
! 159 
Government intended to move forward on its obligations.94  The Government, from the 
outset, saw the AAR agreements as a broadly optional framework subject to GoU 
supervision and discretion.  
 
During Juba, and immediately after the AAR agreements were signed - when debates 
about international justice and criminal prosecution for war crimes were so intense - 
there was a feeling that taking transitional justice forward would garner significant 
international prestige, not to mention donor funds.  One Minister explained that it is 
important to ‘dress these justice things up for international credibility’.95  The political 
leadership understood that despite their own indifference or reservation, transitional 
justice needed to be on the agenda because at the international level it was considered to 
be the ‘right thing to do’.96  As one Ugandan legal expert noted, ‘it is one of those things 
that any government should be doing; something that they cannot afford to remove 
from the agenda’.97  The motivation for compliance was cosmetic and status-aspirational.  
Uganda, argue Andrews and Bategeka is ‘best in class’ in Africa and even beyond when it 
comes to accountability organs, the problem is that laws are not being implemented and 
processes are being ‘poorly executed’.98  They conclude that one explanation for this is 
that reforms are ‘being introduced to make government look better based on externally 
defined best practices.’99  Transitional justice in Uganda should be understood against 
this broader context.   
 
Despite the reputational gains on offer, however, transitional justice remained a marginal 
issue, even within the JLOS sector.  This was most clearly demonstrated by the fact that 
as a policy it remained absent from the first draft of the JLOS strategic plan for 2011-16.  
Unlike Latin American countries which were transitioning to democracy in the late 80s 
and early 90s, and unlike Rwanda and South Africa, where addressing the past was so 
central to both the political formation of a new national identity and the very future of 
the nation state, transitional justice has never been an existential or deeply consequential 
political issue for the majority of Ugandans, and the political class understood this.100  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The sorts of dilemmas that existed in those contexts, and the requisite political and 
intellectual engagement connected to them was simply not widespread in Uganda.   
 
In May 2013 JLOS produced a draft Transitional Justice Policy for Uganda.101  The first 
of its kind in an African country, commentators celebrated its publication as a ‘historic 
step’. 102 At this point, however, the policy exists in a very basic draft form only and is 
largely a re-statement of both the AAR and its annex with very little detail on the 
specifics of implementation.103  Indeed the draft policy recommends the setting up of a 
Transitional Justice Commission with a ten-year mandate to oversee discussion of 
enabling legislation.  Even if they have had to couch their dissatisfaction in the thinly 
veiled language of ‘partnership’, donors have been impatient about the lack of political 
commitment to the draft policy.  In May 2013, Anne Webster, the Irish Ambassador 
emphasised that the Development Partner’s Group had been ‘waiting for the transitional 
justice policy for the last three to four years’ and that: 
‘it would be good if the executive arm of the Government could publicly express 
commitment to the transitional justice (sic)..., particularly to fully participate in 
the truth telling processes and reparation, which the citizens are eagerly waiting 
for’.104   
 
But while political representatives have been sent to some of the JLOS-TJWG meetings, 
since 2008, there was rarely any explicit clarity about the political position of the 
government on the matters being discussed.105   When asked to whether such clarity 
might exist in the future, one senior JLOS official lamented, ‘well, that is not so apparent 
right now, so I cannot say’.106  Of all the technical JLOS staff interviewed, not one was 
optimistic about the chances of the policy actually being implemented.  NGO staff were 
also concerned that the policy would not be prioritized, and that the process was more 
than likely to stall either at Cabinet stage or before-hand.107   
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Political will is complicated, and there are numerous reasons why the political leadership 
has not, in practice, shown commitment to the full range of processes listed in the AAR 
agreements.  The first has been a cost-benefit calculation that long-term, intangible 
‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ activities, would not provide the sort of political capital that 
might justify government investment beyond vague declaratory support.  Take the 
‘reconciliation’ objectives in the PRPD for example.  Reflecting on the first phase of the 
PRPD, a senior official in the OPM said that ‘we could only give lip service to SO.4 
under PRPD I.  It was never going to give us quick wins for re-settlement, and anyway, 
we lack expertise in this area’.108  This ‘lack of expertise’ was cited as a reason for 
subcontracting all reconciliation activities in the second phase of the PRPD to NGOs, 
which were said to have a comparative advantage in this area.  Government officials in 
the OPM claimed that the government was good at creating ‘hardware;’ it could develop 
infrastructure such as school and health clinic buildings.  It was not, however, so 
effective at the ‘software’, the training of teachers; the provision of medical supplies and 
– most pointedly in the case of the PRPD – the necessary requirements for peace-
building and reconciliation.  In some senses this was a politically convenient self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and donors complained that the Government should be taking the 
opportunity to build capacity in this area rather than ‘privatizing’ it.109  The Government, 
however, felt no compulsion to address the ‘comparative advantage’ issue, and 
understood that it had more to gain from investing in those PRDP provisions which 
resulted in physical buildings, something visible and tangible to generate a sense of 
progress.110  This was a calculated move quite possibly based on a true reflection of the 
people’s priorities in the north.  In the three population-based surveys conducted by the 
Human Rights Centre at the University of Berkeley, California, in 2005, 2007 and 2010, 
respondents listed their priorities as education, health, and basic food security.  In one of 
the surveys, only 3% of respondents listed justice as a priority.111  
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Indeed, across Uganda as a whole, there has been a relatively narrow domestic demand 
for transitional justice since the AAR agreements were signed, and very little active 
lobbying from politicians, even those from the affected areas.  There has been limited 
debate, and limited knowledge on the part of parliamentarians, and MPs have rarely 
organised themselves around issues of transitional justice or reconciliation.112   This has 
partly been due to parliamentary structures which encourage MPs to organize themselves 
in regional groups.  On occasion the ‘northern parliamentary group’ has raised these 
issues, but it remains unlikely, despite the efforts of some NGOs, that transitional justice 
and reconciliation, as imagined in the AAR agreements, could become a national issue or 
national priority.113  One NGO staff member explained that NGOs quite naturally push 
the donor agenda on this issue, but the Government’s perception – often justified – 
tended to be that little connection existed between NGO demands and the people’s 
priorities.114  
 
As one Uganda Law Reform Commission (ULRC) official explained, donors put 
pressure on JLOS to stick to their work plans - ‘because they have given us all this 
money’ – so deadlines were given and to some extent adhered to, but there was very little 
correlative domestic political pressure to encourage the government to actually commit 
to what was being produced.115  Meanwhile, as one UN official explained, work on 
transitional justice in JLOS is everybody’s second job: there may, she argued, ‘be 
commitment in JLOS but that is not where the leadership should be coming from.  You 
cannot have the sector pushing the government’.116  The unofficial State House position, 
argued one senior presidential advisor, was that transitional justice, and ideas around 
accountability and reconciliation were ‘just palliatives,’ and that the real change that 
people desire will come when the NRM can ‘create a Uganda that people can identify 
with,’ noting that ‘we need time to do that, it will take generations’.117  His insisted that 
donors make everything so technical, complicated, and time-pressured, and that having !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to accommodate to their ‘fads’ is part of the game, but not a particularly productive 
pastime.118  Indifference to transitional justice on the part of the government was not 
necessarily part of a deliberate strategy.  As one donor official noted: 
‘in the beginning I thought, they are not mobilizing, meaning they made the 
decision not to mobilize, but I just don’t think they had even thought about it 
and made a conscious decision whether they wanted to push this or not.  That is 
my honest opinion.  There are just more important issues in the country and the 
sector’.119   
 
Another reason why transitional justice has received so little political attention is that it 
did not fit well with the emerging government narrative about war and peace in northern 
Uganda.  Some argued that the lack of real engagement with transitional justice was part 
of the broader marginalization of the North.120  But this argument neglected the fact that 
the government was engaging in the North, however superficially, and that part of this 
engagement involved the shaping of a particular narrative about the war and its aftermath 
that touched only fitfully with the broader transitional justice framework.  As early as 
2007 the government was beginning to talk about how peace-talks and government- 
sponsored development programmes for the north must be conceptually de-linked.  In 
September 2007, US representatives urged President Museveni to formally launch the 
PRPD, noting that there now existed an adequate degree of stability for the programme 
to operate.  Museveni’s response was that:  
‘he wanted to correct the common misconception that peace in the north was the 
result of the negotiations.  According to Museveni, the current stability was not 
the result of the peace talks but from Kony being pushed into Congo.’121  
  
The president did not want anybody thinking that the PRPD was in anyway a concession 
to LRA/M demands.  On the contrary, the fact that the LRA/M had finally been chased 
out of northern Uganda by the UPDF meant that the GoU could finally provide 
development support to the area.   
 
This tied into a broader argument that the people in Acholiland, after years of delusion, 
have finally come to see that President Museveni was only ever trying to end the war and 
develop the north.  Minister Rugunda explained the NRM’s support in the North in the 
2011 elections in these terms,  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘it is because there is peace for the first time.  People there were being told all the 
time that it is Museveni causing this war.  Now they see they were being told lies.  
They see the truth now’.122   
 
A senior NRM official expressed a similar view,  
‘people like peace and they realized that the LRA rebellion, having supported it, 
was not delivering anything.  They saw that the UPDF was dying for them’.123  
 
Described triumphantly as a Marshall Plan for the North, the PRDP has been framed as 
something the government has chosen to give to the North, having secured peace for its 
inhabitants, and not something that it owes to the North, having overseen a devastating 
twenty-year war in the region.   The distinction is important, because the former implied 
government largesse and generous political concession, while the latter implied some 
culpability for what happened.  As one JLOS official explained, if the government starts 
talking about reparations then it suggests that ‘we are at fault’.124  The political leadership 
generally seemed to feel that it had done its part in addressing and resolving the conflict, 
and that it could now move on and focus on different things.  The PRPD, and not the 
AAR agreements, were thus considered to be the main government response for 
recovery and development in the North.125  
 
The domestic political trajectory of truth, reparations and traditional justice 
 
Truth and reparat ions :  damage l imitat ion and pol i t i ca l  opportunism 
As noted by the Irish Ambassador to Uganda, Anne Webster, there has been a particular 
political reticence over reparations policy and the future of a truth telling body or 
process.126  Both policies exist in the draft Transitional Justice Policy, and were signed up 
to in the AAR agreements, but since 2008 the oft-repeated line, as expressed by ministers 
and senior officials, tends to be that reparations would be very difficult to meet, and that 
the terms of reference of a Truth and Reconciliation Body would be near impossible to 
agree on.   
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The Deputy Attorney General, Frederick Ruhindi, warned publicly in July 2012 that 
‘when we think about reparations we need to be very careful about what we can swallow 
and what we cannot swallow’.127  In a private meeting, he elaborated:  
‘reparations in terms of money is very difficult to meet.  It is not good to have 
high expectations.  Get in, build schools, health facilities that function.  That is 
better than interventions at a household level’.128   
 
A senior official in the OPM was similarly circumspect about a reparations policy, but for 
slightly different reasons.  His argument was that talk of reparations and compensation 
would ‘spark emotions and pain of the people’, and that the only sustainable way to 
‘soothe’ the minds of the people would be to ‘empower them through economic 
revitalisation’.129  In April 2014, in response to an advocacy campaign funded in large 
part by UN Women, Parliament passed a resolution calling for ‘gender sensitive 
reparations’ for the Acholi region, although it remained unclear how this would be 
translated into policy.  While the Prime Minister gave his support to the resolution, he 
had earlier requested that the original motion be re-worded so that ‘it acknowledges 
government interventions in the North’ and counters the ‘wordings’ which ‘portrayed 
that the government had done absolutely nothing for the North’.130   
 
Despite a general political objection to a formal reparations policy, reparation and 
compensation have frequently been promised, and occasionally delivered on an ad hoc 
basis, to score political points.  One donor official noted that politicians are very aware 
that the issue of reparation and compensation carries some resonance with communities, 
so, she explained, ‘they talk freely: we will give you this, we will give you that’.131  Since 
the peace talks collapsed in 2008, there have been numerous reports of President 
Museveni offering ad hoc reparation and compensation to populations in northern 
Uganda during political rallies and campaign speeches.132  In northern Uganda the most 
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well known pledge has been the one-off payment of UGX50million (roughly $20,000) to 
the Atiak Survivors Group in August 2013.  This Group, discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8, was formed after a massacre in Atiak village in 1995.  Perpetrated by the LRA 
and allegedly commanded by Vincent Otti, it is estimated that about 300 people were 
killed during the attack.  To date the government has also paid out money to the Acholi 
War Debt Claimants Association.  In 2006 the Claimants took the government to court, 
demanding compensation for animals that were looted or perished during the insurgency.  
The following year the government proposed and was granted an out of court 
settlement, which involved the gradual payment of UGX12.1billion (roughly $4.6m 
million) to the claimants.   
 
In both cases, these payments have sparked serious controversy and major tensions 
within the region.  The Acholi War Debt Claimants executive committee has been 
accused repeatedly of stealing the compensation.  The most recent case was in mid-2013, 
when the association’s Chairperson acknowledged that members of the executive 
committee had squandered a substantial portion of the UGX 5 billion (roughly $4.9m) 
given that year.133  These stories are reported in the national and local press, alongside 
coverage of farmers trekking for miles, spending money on opening bank accounts and 
then finding that the compensation they are owed is no longer available or is so paltry a 
sum that it failed to justify the lengths people went to receive it.  In Atiak meanwhile, 
inter-communal tensions broke out between two ‘rival’ survivor associations, after the 
August 2013 payment, with each one claiming sole right to Museveni’s pledge.  This is 
amid accusations that certain members have been inappropriately dividing the cash 
payment among themselves.134  Evidence from other contexts suggests that these sorts of 
problems may continue in the absence of a proper reparations policy.135  But despite 
occasional lip service, there is little to suggest that such a policy will emerge.136  Ad hoc !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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cash payments that can be linked to election campaigning or other political projects, such 
as land acquisition, are a more attractive prospect for a President who relies on the 
monetization of support and leverage.137   Meanwhile, the divisive impact of ad hoc 
reparation plays into the politically convenient stereotype that portrays an innate Acholi 
tendency toward internal combustion and chaos.   
 
As with reparations, there has quite clearly been no political support at state level for a 
policy of truth telling or national reconciliation initiatives.138  The AAR agreements 
proposed the establishment of a ‘body’ with a mandate to ‘inquire into the past and 
related matters’.139 According to JLOS-TJWG officials working on the Norway-funded 
study report on ‘traditional justice, truth-telling and national reconciliation’ between 
2009-12, a national truth commission was top of the agenda for certain donors.  The 
ULRC explained that shortly after the Juba talks collapsed, donors were bringing in 
experts to help JLOS staff design truth commission templates.  This was a divisive move 
amongst JLOS staff, some of whom began to feel that Uganda was being treated like a 
‘laboratory for external ideas about transitional justice’.140  Tensions in this particular area 
were informed by Uganda’s difficult historical relationship with truth commissions.  
Indeed the world’s first ever truth commission was held in Uganda under Idi Amin’s 
military dictatorship.  A similar body was set up by President Museveni when he came to 
power in 1986.141  According to the ULRC, popular consultations revealed that people’s 
attitudes are shaped, in part, by their historical experience of these bodies:   
‘when we talk to people during consultations they are not interested in a truth 
commission.  People are not interested for historical reasons.  Those that have 
been established in Uganda have not been implemented and reports have not 
been realized.  People understand that resources provided for a truth commission 
will add no value’.142   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Other JLOS officials were nervous about the patronage opportunities that a big, new 
donor supported institution in Uganda might offer.  ‘If the donors go ahead with this,’ 
said one,  
‘the government would ensure that it is not fruitful.  There is no goodwill on the 
government side for national reconciliation.  But, of course, they would take the 
money… “this thing will not bear fruit” they will say to themselves, “but I will 
take the money!” ’143 
 
Beyond the fact that truth commissions have been held in other parts of the continent, 
and in particular that ‘South Africa was brought up’, it was not clear what the specific 
donor rationale was for pushing it in the Ugandan context, although it does relate back 
to Kritz’s earlier concern that transitional policy:  
‘often depends less on the well-grounded and often proven policy considerations 
than on whether the junior member of staff writing the policy memo has some 
experience with the South African TRC or another transitional justice process’.144 
 
There was also a clear institutional divide between JLOS and the OPM on the issue of a 
truth commission.  While some JLOS officials appeared open to the idea, yet 
circumspect, OPM officials were uniformly opposed. One senior PRPD official at the 
OPM was shocked that the idea had been proposed in the first place, demanding to 
know, during an interview in 2012: 
‘how would that work?  You think the Government will sit there and talk about 
its wrongdoing in the North…that just won’t happen!’.145   
 
The feeling amongst OPM officials was that there have been other conflicts in Uganda 
and people have moved on, and that is how it is expected it will be in the North.  The 
very fact that OPM officials were unaware that the idea of a truth commission was on 
the table in the first place also shows the lack of communication between the two 
government institutions tasked with designing and overseeing the implementation of 
transitional justice related activities in northern Uganda.   
 
The truth commission idea died a quick enough death.  One JLOS official summed up its 
trajectory concisely: ‘the development partners group had been pushing it at one stage, 
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but it takes politicians out of their comfort zones. If they do not like it, then it stops’.146  
Indeed, the strategy of senior government ministers and officials is either to raise the 
spectre of the ‘truth’ as a de-stabilising force, or to circumvent it through bureaucratic 
obfuscation.  At a workshop in Kampala, Chief Justice Odoki expressed concern about 
simplistic prescriptions for truth commissions in Uganda. ‘The truth’, he said, ‘is a very 
complex concept, which must be treated with caution.  At best it is subjective’.147 The 
Deputy Attorney General was quite clear that it would be an impossible political task to 
achieve consensus on the temporal mandate of any future commission. A senior official 
at the Ministry of Internal Affairs batted away the issue, instrumentalising a bureaucratic 
logic which rehearsed the complicated administrative procedures that setting up such an 
institution would require, emphasizing in particular the length of such a process, and 
ending with thinly veiled obfuscation: ‘because, you have to think, suppose at TRC was 
set up.  How would we finance it?’.148  It is notable that the draft 2013 Transitional 
Justice Policy is vague, asserting that ‘truth-telling’ is crucial to peace-building, but 
accepting that ‘truth-telling’ would require ‘communal and political acceptance’.149  More 
recent donor and NGO efforts in this area have been focused on support for inter-
Acholi truth telling and national documentation initiatives.150   
 
The GoU approach towards both reparations and formalized truth telling illustrates the 
capacity of the Government to control and manage these processes whilst also 
circumventing them.  Whether through damage limitation, political opportunism, or 
divisive political tactics, the GoU has successfully diverted donor attempts to establish 
these processes in law, and to entrench the norms that underpin them. 
 
‘Tradit ional  just i ce ’  post  Juba, GoU plat i tudes and donor norm promotion 
Here we return to perhaps the most talked-about element of the AAR agreements: their 
stated support for a range of ‘traditional justice rituals’, which ‘reconcile parties formerly 
in conflict after full accountability’ (see annex), to become part of a broader transitional 
justice strategy.151  As was described in Chapter’s 3 and 4, this had an appeal for the GoU !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and donors, but also for many interested parties in northern Uganda.  For the GoU, the 
approach to traditional justice as a post-conflict accountability and reconciliation tool has 
been largely platitudinous.  The narrative has been framed to portray the Acholi as 
‘other’, while at the same time locating the causes, consequences and solutions of the 
twenty-year war within the region itself.  In 2012, a senior government Minister 
stonewalled questions about the implementation of the AAR with the statement that: 
‘look, we support mato oput, and that has been effective’.152  The reality is far more 
complex than that, as will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8.   
 
In July 2013 JLOS produced a compendious Norwegian-funded study on traditional 
justice processes across Uganda.153  One of the key donor and NGO criticisms of the 
study was that it failed to define clearly the criminal jurisdiction of traditional 
mechanisms, and their legal relationship with the formal sector.154  To the consternation 
of NGOs and donors, this major gap remains in the draft Transitional Justice Policy.155  
After the AAR was signed a sub-committee of the TJWG was set up specifically to 
consider how all the different TJ processes could link together, but, according to one 
JLOS official:  
‘the group did not appreciate the importance of their job.  In the end people just 
wrote “one pagers” on each of the processes and there was no report on how 
they might be integrated.  So, the policy has zero on linkages.  We had no time 
and were given no extra pay.’156  
   
Justice sector donors have spoken in public about the need for TJ in Uganda to be 
‘holistic’ and ‘integrated,’ yet there is no magic formula for achieving such an outcome.  
Indeed the question about the relationship between formal and customary law was 
inherited from the colonial period, and still represents a profound challenge that affects 
many areas of public and private life in Uganda.  The policy of the government on 
related issues has been to surrender to the legal and political complexity of the issue.  
Legal experts argue that the formal and the informal will ‘always exist in tension’.157  A 
presidential advisor agreed, explaining that both formal and informal justice will continue 
to exist in Uganda, but in an ‘uncomfortable mixture’.158  Indeed last year Uganda’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Marriage and Divorce Bill, which would make marital rape illegal, was shelved after 
public consultations found large scale opposition to the Bill among men, on the basis 
that it undermined traditional and religious understandings of marriage and property 
relations.159  The solutionism of donors who speak in abstract terms about ‘holism’ and 
‘inter-linkages’ in transitional justice overlooks the broader jurisdictional tensions around 
real and perceived public authority in a bifurcated legal system.  
 
The stated desire to ‘harmonise’ the AAR provisions into a package of TJ measures has 
thus proved elusive so far.  Since 2008 though, certain donors have focused their efforts 
on the KKA, in an attempt to make it, and the traditional justice it promotes, more 
human rights friendly.160  Given that the GoU has been disinterested in ‘intra-Acholi’ 
reconciliation, this has been an area where donors have had significant freedom of 
maneuver.   In May 2013 the Irish Ambassador Anne Webster addressed JLOS with a 
familiar directive:  
‘it is imperative for all of us to reflect broadly on how best traditional justice 
mechanisms can be strengthened and capacitated to enhance compatibility with 
human rights principles’.    
 
This sentiment fits with the World Bank’s 2011 recommendation that ‘traditional’ 
systems be ‘pulled’ in the direction of international norms and values.161  Since 2008 the 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, as an institution, has become a significant forum for donor 
experimentation around transitional justice and peace-building.  In early discussions 
about ‘Acholi’ justice, particularly after the setting up of the KKA in 2000 and the 
passing of the Amnesty Law that same year, NGO reports were published which 
recommended that the KKA begin documenting and ‘codifying Acholi law’, particular in 
relation to the ‘Mato Oput’ ritual.162  With the support of Danida a pamphlet called the 
‘Law to Declare the Acholi Customary Law’ was produced as early as 2001. Amongst 
other things, it outlined in a legal format the ‘procedure and other requirements for 
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blood compensation (Mato Oput)’.163  Copies of the ‘red book,’ as it is known, are hard to 
get hold of nowadays, because the KKA has agreed to update the pamphlet in line with 
human rights standards.164  A more recent Ker Kwaro Acholi publication entitled ‘Some 
of the Acholi Cultural Practices’, published with financial support from UN Women, in 
2009, highlights two of the core values of the KKA as follows: ‘to uphold respect for 
Human Rights and dignity’ and ‘developing innovative and inclusive policies’.165  In 2012, 
UNHCR was working with the KKA.  A KKA programme officer noted that: 
‘UNHCR has given us a small grant for a period of six months to create a 
handbook.  We need to explain to the Chiefs what is expected of them on human 
rights, so that they do not violate human rights’.  
   
When pressed on the reaction of the chiefs to these edicts, the programme officer stated 
that there would be ‘trainings and sensitisations… the UNHCR is going to help us with 
capacity building’.166 
 
The Ker Kwaro Acholi have, as Claire Paine points out, learnt very quickly how to 
include ‘trigger’ words in project proposals and other materials, ‘adapting needs to the 
supply on offer,’ and inducing demand rather than creating it.167  The KKA Strategic Plan 
2009-14 contains numerous development buzzwords: ‘rights based approach’; ‘gender 
mainstreaming’; ‘conflict transformation’; ‘participatory community development’; 
‘capacity enhancement’ – the list goes on.168  In the past the KKA has received funding 
from USAID, Danida, the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), UNDP and UN 
Human Rights, amongst others.  There is a political economy behind the alignment of 
local concerns to the world-view of donors.  The reconstruction of forms of Acholi 
tradition in the image of liberal human rights ideals and donor programmatic language 
becomes transactional: it provides access to resources, both material and reputational.  It 
is also an aspirational act.  The appeal of codification for the KKA, NGOs, and donors, 
is an attempt to inscribe local processes within what Hannah Skoda calls ‘broader, even 
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universal frameworks of civilization and rightful order’.169  This dynamic is explored in 
more detail in chapter seven.   
 
This is where the relationship between transitional justice, peace-building, human rights 
and democracy, becomes very complicated.  Donor approaches to traditional justice in 
particular, have been a paragon of what Milja Kurki calls ‘depoliticised, instrumental, and 
technical forms of human rights promotion’.170  The problem has been that the ‘process 
of recognition and reform,’ and the ‘pull’ towards respect for international norms, 
remains fundamentally non-democratic and inequitable because neither has allowed for 
genuine political contestation.  The approach to traditional justice as a transitional justice 
tool, post-Juba, has made two assumptions.  The first has been the ‘unanimity’ fallacy 
that all Acholi agree on what ‘tradition’ is and what function it should play in their 
lives.171  The second has been the belief that the induced appending of human rights and 
other idealized liberal norms to purportedly traditional structures is in itself a progressive 
act.  The commitment that donors have asked the KKA, and, by proxy its broader 
constituencies to uphold, required automatic acceptance of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms that the international community promotes: for example, the rights of 
minorities and the rights of individuals.172  There has not been enough space for genuine 
deliberation around these issues, and too little forensic analysis of how the universalist 
legalist paradigm might translate into local contexts.  Holly Porter, for example, finds 
that women in Acholiland who have been subject to sexual violence do not benefit from 
the services offered by the ‘people of human rights’.173  This was partly because access to 
those services is limited, but also because relatives and elders were considered to be the 
‘primary sources of decision making’ on response to rape.174  This is a socially embedded 
practice.  Similarly, at several public dialogues across the Acholi sub-region, men and 
women expressed doubts about ‘this thing of children rights’.175  One local councilor in 
Anaka summed up the sentiment in his assertion that a serious impediment in reconciling 
with the former LRA combatants was the imposition of children’s rights - ‘rights are fine’ 
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he said ‘but what about responsibilities?’ 176  Despite this, human-rights based 
interventions have been promoted by donors as technical, practical, and apolitical, rather 
than what they actually are, which is contested, or as Milja Kurki argues, ‘foundational, 
normative and political’.177  What was equally concerning was that the donor and NGO 
logic seemed to be that if popular consultations did not follow the script it was not 
because the policy was wrong, but because people did not know what was best for them.  
One particular discussion about the possibilities of post-conflict traditional justice with a 
donor went as follows: 
D: ‘The issue you have in Uganda is that you cannot base something on what 
people say because these people are not informed and not educated.  They don’t 
think about the other questions that might be linked to what they are saying, like 
OK, your traditional justice is fine but what about women’s participation?’. 
 
I: ‘When you say ‘people’ who do you mean’?  
 
D: ‘You know, when you go into the villages and do consultations.’178   
 
A JLOS official expressed concern about the way in which outreach and consultation 
had been carried out on transitional justice since 2008.  ‘What donors and NGOs here 
call consultations’, she said, ‘you are just consulting people on things they do not 
understand’.179  This pointed to a broader trend clear in NGO practice too, which was 
essentially to neglect or misinterpret the capacities that people already had, and to pay 
too little attention to existing social practices and the intersubjective meaning that shape 
them.180 
 
Conclusion: The political space for inaction 
 
After the collapse of the Juba peace talks, transitional justice was subsumed under the 
broad donor rubric of governance and peace-building programming. The 
anthropomorphism of transitional justice into a technical governance intervention has 
clearly shaped the domestic political trajectory that it has taken.  This chapter argued that 
the donor approach was based on a misjudged determination that transitional justice 
policy could be negotiated, developed and implemented in the absence of any serious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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engagement with the political leadership of the state.  Such studious avoidance of politics 
has placed transitional justice, as an idea, in a chimerical and quasi-mythical space 
between donor intent and GoU non-committal.  
 
The transitional justice conception put forward by donors combined broad-brush 
objectives related to liberal peace-building and state-building with a managerial approach 
which emphasized application through technical interventions.   In practice, it stood little 
chance against a politically adept regime intent on shoring up power and maintaining the 
status quo.  This was especially so in the Ugandan context where transitional justice 
remained a minority domestic concern and was regarded as a specifically ‘northern’ issue.  
The political leadership has deployed various tactics to circumvent and manage the 
question of AAR implementation.  Where players recognised political capital it was 
usually linked to easy electoral gains (ad-hoc promises of reparations); or enhanced 
reputational status (the first domestic war crimes court); or political narrative shaping 
(traditional justice).  Where they recognised a threat (a call for a truth commission), it was 
easy enough to neutralize.  ‘Somehow’, acknowledged one donor, ‘this whole process 
became so artificial’.181  The following chapter explores dissonant transitional justice 
conceptions in more detail through an in-depth analysis of the first trial by the 
International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda, that of Thomas Kwoyelo.   
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In July 2008, as Kony’s signature on the Final Peace Agreement was still being sought, 
Principal Judge Ogoola, chairman of the newly-founded JLOS Transitional Justice 
Working Group, issued an administrative circular.1  It outlined his plan to set up a new 
division of the High Court - the ‘War Crimes Court’ - and highlighted staffing and other 
administrative arrangements.  The AAR agreements envisaged, on paper at least, that any 
future domestic war crimes court would comprise just one element in a wider matrix of 
transitional justice.   What actually happened was that the court was cherry-picked for 
support, while progress on other transitional justice requirements, explored in the last 
chapter, largely stalled.   This chapter explores the political dynamics behind the setting 
up of the court and its first trial, that of former LRA member, Thomas Kwoyelo.  
Following on from the last chapter, it continues to examine the dissonance that existed 
between the transitional justice expectations of donors and the messy reality of political 
machinations in the Ugandan context.   
 
This chapter puts forward three central arguments.  The first is that the process of 
setting up the Court was detached from the Juba talks and this shaped its construction.  
Engagement at the donor and ‘expert’ level focused on the ‘technical aspects’ of 
applicable law and administrative coherence, primarily by officials who had not been 
involved in the Juba negotiations.2   Second, while the Kwoyelo trial was a political trial, 
it did not play out in a conventional ‘victor’s justice’ sense because in many instances, 
President Museveni and other embedded Ugandan elites demonstrated ambivalence both 
towards the court and its first trial.   The whole process, from the initial investigation 
onwards, was an endoscopic view of the complex legal, institutional and political 
conflicts between prosecution and amnesty in Uganda.  While donors, JLOS institutions, 
parliamentarians and the UPDF all had an active stake in this conflict, the State’s political 
leadership maintained an equivocal and tenebrous stance which allowed all options to be 
kept open, whilst undermining justice sector institutions, including the new war crimes 
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court.  Third, the broader socio-political role of the trial exceeded its legal outcome3, thus 
the final part of the chapter explores the way in which the trial was interpreted ‘on the 
ground’, in Acholiland, including by the local leadership.   To date, analysis of the trial 
from the bottom up has been limited to journalistic and NGO accounts which tend to 
over-simply the ‘victim’ perspective as being either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the trial without 
exploring why this might be the case.4  As will be shown, perspectives on the trial shifted 
depending on whether individuals or communities ‘individuated’ or ‘de-individuated’ 
Thomas Kwoyelo and his alleged crimes.  Meanwhile, local leaders in northern Uganda 
made calculated decisions about how to present the Kwoyelo trial against the 
background of broader political narratives about the war.    
 
Setting up the Court 
 
As early as March 2008, immediately after the signing of the AAR annex, Principal Judge 
James Ogoola began preparations for the setting up of the Special Division of the High 
Court.   In private meetings with US officials he acknowledged that the creation of the 
Court was a ‘special case’ and required some careful planning.5  Senior members of the 
judiciary have since complained about lack of consultation, and the ‘preferential’ donor 
treatment provided to the Court.  Justice Ogoola, a noted champion of the AAR 
agreements and promoter of transitional justice in Uganda, was singled out for particular 
criticism.  ‘Setting up that court’, argued one senior lawyer, ‘was not a collective judicial 
process but a single decision of a judge who wanted to steal the limelight of the Juba 
Process’.6  Apprehension centered on the relationship between transitional justice and 
the rule of law and related directly to concerns that have been expressed in other 
contexts, in which ‘post-conflict justice is hived off as a separate and specialized issue’ 
and the newly built courthouse comes to represent an ‘edifice isolated from ongoing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!Christiane Wilke, ‘Staging Violence, Staging Identities: Identity Politics in Domestic Prosecutions’, in 
Paige Arthur (ed.) Identities in Transition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.120.!
4 See for example, See for example, ‘Col. Kwoyelo Rearrested Within Minutes of His Release By High 
Court in Gulu’, Acholi Times, 14.11.2011, http://justiceandreconciliation.com/2011/11/col-kwoyelo-
rearrested-within-minutes-of-his-release-by-high-court-in-gulu-acholi-times-14-nov-2011/ (accessed 
10.01.12) and Haggi Matsiko, ‘The Kwoyelo Trial: A pre-emptive attach on truth?’, The Independent, 
22.07.2011, http://independent.co.ug/news/news-analysis/4418-the-kwoyelo-trial-a-pre-emptive-attack-
on-truth (accessed 10.01.12); See, ‘Public Divided Over Kwoyelo Trial’, Daily Monitor, 10.07.2011 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1197660/-/item/1/-/6n7y9n/-/index.html 
(accessed 01.02.2012). 
5 08KAMPALA410 2008-03-17 SECRET 
6 Author interview with Ugandan legal expert, Kampala, 22.05.12; During a meeting with legal experts in 
Kampala in May 2012, it was explained that the constitutionality of the ICD itself was questionable.  
! 178 
development and perhaps even substituting for real reform’. 7   Concerns about 
transparency of the process or viability of the court did little to deter donors.  ‘We really 
support that Court’, said one donor.  Indeed, so much so, that as Sarah Nouwen writes, 
in mid 2008:  
‘while parliament was still to decide on the law applicable in any domestic 
international crimes proceedings, while the fate of the Amnesty Act was still to 
be determined…. while the Chief Justice was yet to formalize the SDHC8 … the 
judiciary presented to donors a preliminary budget for a start up phase of the 
SDHC … the judiciary did this successfully and donors and international NGOs 
embraced the WCC’.9 
 
Initial donor support came in the form of off-budget ‘capacity building’ subventions, 
including funding for needs assessments, training workshops, technical guidance, and 
study tours for JLOS staff and government ministers to The Hague, Sierra Leone, and 
Bosnia.  Donors also financed the WCC premises and ‘radio jingles’ celebrating the set-
up of the new court.10   
 
In November 2008 Uganda won the bid to host the first ever Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, to be held in Kampala between 31 May -11 June 2010.  As the 
date approached, two potentially embarrassing issues loomed large.  The first was that 
the much-heralded War Crimes Court had a building, judges, and an administrative 
structure, but no cases.  The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Ugandan 
Police Force, and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), had been unwilling to 
proceed with building up cases for conflict related crimes in the absence of any political 
or legal direction as to the applicable law and jurisdiction of the WCC.11  This linked to 
the second problem: Uganda had not yet incorporated the Rome Statute’s obligations 
into domestic law.  An ICC Bill was drafted as early as 2004, but it did not become a 
political priority until early 2010, with the prospect of thousands of delegates from ICC 
state parties, observer states, international organisations, and NGOs, arriving for a 
Review Conference in a country that had failed, so far, to enact its own ICC legislation.    
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Parliamentarians were lobbied by the JLOS-TJWG, the WCC judges, and donors, and in 
March 2010, two months before the planned Review Conference, an ICC Bill was passed 
into Ugandan law.12  The 2010 ICC Act makes genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and modes of liability as defined by the Rome Statute, offences under 
Ugandan law.13  When the practice directions of the ICD were eventually issued by legal 
notice in May 2011, the court was officially re-named the ‘International Crimes Division’ 
(ICD).14  According to Paragraph 6 (1), the court shall try genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, but also terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and all other 
international crimes listed in Uganda’s 2010 ICC Act; 1964 Geneva Conventions Act, 
Penal Code Act and ‘any other penal enactment’ (italics added).15  An official at the ICD 
explained that ‘the idea was to make the court busy and it was decided that judgments 
cannot be limited to war crimes or we would just be sitting here’.16  Why?  Firstly, there is 
a strict prohibition against retroactive application of the law in the Ugandan 
Constitution, which meant the DPP would not charge an individual for crimes under the 
ICC Act that were committed prior to 2010.17  The second impediment was that while 
there were no restrictions as to the category of persons the ICD had jurisdiction over, 
Uganda’s Amnesty Act remained in effect (after a brief lapsing between May 2012 to 
May 2013, which is explored in more detailed below).  An amendment to the Amnesty 
Act in 2006 stated that the Minister of Internal Affairs could bar certain individuals from 
receiving amnesty through a statutory instrument made with the approval of Parliament, 
but no such ‘instrument’ has ever been sought by the government.18  The 2007 AAR 
instructed the government to ‘introduce any amendments to the Amnesty Act…to bring 
it into conformity with the principles of this agreement’ but to date no such amendments 
have been tabled.19 
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The ICD in its original formation was seen as a ‘court of complementarity,’ and from the 
outset the domestic and international architects of the court wanted its structure to 
‘mirror’ the ICC as far as possible.20  Thus ICD practice directions stipulated that at least 
three judges sit on the ICD.   In 2012 that number was four, but due to the lack of cases 
ICD judges currently ‘move around doing other High Court trials’.21  Departing from 
normal Ugandan judicial practice, the ICD has an integrated structure with an in-house 
registry, a dedicated international crimes section of the DPP, and ‘focal point’ CID 
investigators working on ICD investigations.22  Sentences for crimes under the ICD’s 
jurisdiction range from short-term imprisonment to the death penalty.23  Decisions made 
by the ICD can be appealed against to the Constitutional Court in the first instance, and 
after that to Uganda’s Supreme Court. The Ugandan government and international 
donors continue to fund the ICD through normal justice sector budgeting, through the 
SWaP budget, and also through additional program support.  There is no detailed 
breakdown of justice sector funding, but the interpretation of one senior donor official 
linked to the setting up of the ICD from the outset was that,  
‘the ICD, all the set-up of the Court, all the training of the judges, I don’t know, 
99% is donor funded.  It was completely donor driven and it still is’.24 
 
Since 2012, support for the ICD has been included in the JLOS Strategic Investment 
Plan III, which states that:  
‘the sector will focus on the overall strengthening of the International Crimes 
Division (ICD) of the High Court of Uganda by providing necessary technical or 
logistical support; this may include ensuring the ICD is equipped to handle cases 
of gender based violence….’.25   
 
The main role of justice-sector donors to date has been to assist ICD officials to 
complete guidelines on witness protection law, while UN Women undertake training on 
how to prosecute sexual and gender based violence.  There is also additional ‘capacity’ 
for training for judges and staff.26   
 
Justice sector donor officials acknowledged that formal processes were moved forward 
quickly because there was more funding for them and because as a ‘technical’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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intervention it was quite easy to coordinate around the setting up of the Court.27   It was 
to be in Kampala, where the donors were based.  The Principal Judge at the time, James 
Ogoola, was a determined advocate for the establishment of the Court, and a proactive 
figure whom donors believed would provide strong leadership.   Setting up the ICD, said 
one JLOS official was ‘easy…you just get some funding.  Donors like to support the 
ICD, they see it as something going on’.28  There was no deliberate ‘sequencing’ of TJ 
measures; rather, the conviction at the time was that other AAR objectives, and the 
resolution of the thorny question of the blanket amnesty, would eventually fall into 
place.29  
 
GoU enthusiasm for pushing forward with formal justice processes in the form of both 
the ICC Act and the ICD was motivated by two things.  The first, alluded to above, was 
related to international status and prestige, not to mention international funds.  One 
judge argued that the Court was a ‘great innovation in bringing Uganda into the 
limelight’.30  Indeed, according to a Ugandan lawyer who worked closely with the ICD, 
the GoU was ‘very susceptible’ to donor pressure in this area, in part because of the 
reputational rewards it could derive from ostensible compliance with the donor agenda.  
He argued that: 
‘involvement from donors was key – particularly EU members.  The formation 
of the ICD was a result of heavy donor pressure.  The trial of Kwoyelo was a 
result of heavy donor pressure.  Uganda, in turn, was keen to show that it was a 
leader in the field’.31  
 
The Ugandan judiciary, moreover, has generally prided itself on being robust and 
independent.32  There was certainly a feeling that, according to one JLOS official, ‘we as a 
country, we are developed, we have an elaborate court system, we can deal with this’.33   
Indeed the administrative circular announcing the plans to establish the new division of 
the High Court highlighted that Uganda was already an ‘exporter’ of international justice, 
because it had legal representatives at the ICC, the SCSL, and the ICTY.34   
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The second GoU motive, linked to the first, was the desire to re-capture the jurisdiction 
of the LRA conflict from the ICC, but more conceptually than practically.  There were 
vague murmurs that the government might try to push for domestic prosecution of the 
remaining ‘ICC 3’ if they were ever captured, but the consensus was that this was 
unlikely.35  In the past, the desire for domestic capacity in this area was framed in terms 
of the ICC’s ‘complementarity’ principle.  At the time of writing this remained the case 
but ‘complementarity’ was understood more explicitly as a method of prospective 
impunity.  The Ugandan political elite had been on a steep learning curve since 2003, and 
there is currently a much fuller understanding of the nature of the ICC and the danger it 
represents.  Particularly irritating for the current regime has been the routine cry of 
political protestors, ‘take Museveni to the ICC!’, particularly in reaction to the violent 
crackdown on the Walk To Work protests which followed the 2011 Ugandan election.36  
In the context of the ICC indictments following the post-2007 Kenyan election violence, 
and the Arab Spring uprisings in early 2011, these calls hardened the attitude of the 
Government towards the Court.37  A desire to re-assert judicial and political jurisdiction 
over the prosecution of crimes committed during the war in northern Uganda, and 
particularly those perpetrated by the UPDF, made sense in this context.  Lawyers close 
to the Court argued that ‘complementarity is the only way out,’ and that the Government 
had been bruised by the perceived obstinacy of the ICC.38  Having its own ICD was not 
only a status symbol but also a way of containing and controlling the ‘judicialisation’ of 
politics related to government and rebel violence against civilians.  
 
Despite the wording of the AAR agreements and the Statute of the Court, it became 
clear very quickly that prosecution of UPDF or Government-linked war crimes by the 
Court would be a political impossibility.  In July 2008, the same month as the ICD was 
established, Human Rights Watch released a report urging the ICC to investigate UPDF 
atrocities in the north.39  In reaction, the UPDF’s acting spokesperson urged that this call 
‘should be ignored’ and that ‘anybody with evidence against the UPDF should direct it to 
the government investigative agencies’.40  Despite the fact that the ICD had jurisdiction !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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37 Ibid. 
38 Author interview with Ugandan legal experts, Kampala, 22.05.2012 and 09.05.2012 
39 Human Rights Watch, ‘Courting History: The Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years’, 
Human Rights Watch (July 2008). 
40 08KAMPALA1090, 05.04.2008. 
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over UPDF/NRA,41 the political reality, according to one senior JLOS official was as 
follows: 
‘UPDF prosecutions? It is completely out of the question.  The DPP would 
never investigate because the ICD is a victor’s court.  When those in authority 
come through with a gun, they will be unlikely to support accountability.  
Keeping the UPDF out protects the NRM from the time when they were 
fighting in the Bush’.42  
  
The official response to questions concerning NRA/UPDF impunity was two-fold.  
Followed by long pauses and nervous laughter, officials in the DPP office explained that 
there were no investigations under way because there were no leads.   One official argued 
that:  
‘we have called upon the affected communities to come up, but apart from 
talking so much about this and about that, there is really nothing.  You know, 
cases are built on evidence and we have requested for some information to 
initiate the investigations against the army’.43    
 
The other line is that accountability systems are already in place for UPDF crimes.  DPP 
officials have even argued that UPDF soldiers were tried for war-related offences in 
civilian courts in the North during the war, despite the fact that the High Court in Gulu 
was barely operational during this period.44  The more common response was that UPDF 
soldiers are tried in the Court Martial system, and that any other legal processes would be 
‘too lenient’.45  Minister Rugunda was visibly annoyed by the suggestion that the UPDF 
might be tried in the ICD: 
‘There are existing accountability mechanisms for the UPDF – we have martial 
law and soldiers have been tried.  It is the LRA that lacks accountability systems.  
The UPDF is already subject to rigorous accountability systems and this is the 
way the Parliament of Uganda has chosen things to be’.46  
  
The judiciary – both judges and officials – remain skeptical that there will be UPDF trials 
under the current government.   
 
The structural bias embedded in the ICD is a logical extension of the structural 
differences between the two sides at Juba and a reflection of Juba’s outcome, which, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 HRW, ‘Justice’, p.16!
42 Author interview with JLOS official, Kampala, 18.05.2012. 
43 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 02.05.2012. 
44 The DPP official argued that she had come across at least fifteen cases during the war, many of which 
resulted in death sentences.  Civil society refutes this claim, arguing that they have never seen evidence of 
these cases, and that the court system throughout the north was largely inactive during the war.  The DPP 
official promised to show me the files, but then told me that she had lost them. 45Author interview with Minister Rugunda, Kampala, 04.05.2012.!
46 Ibid. 
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although not decisive, involved no domestic political transition.  It was quite clear from 
the outset that the ICD was not going to be an institution capable of providing the legal 
space through which disagreements between GoU and the LRA could be fairly 
channeled.  Again, this pointed to the tension between transitional justice and rule of law 
promotion. Despite the two being conflated in donor programming and the SIP III, 
those who opposed the Court argued that its hasty set-up and poor prospects 
communicated the wrong message about how criminal procedures should work.47   
 
The Prosecution of Thomas Kwoyelo 
 
The trial of Thomas Kwoyelo – the first domestic war crimes prosecution in Uganda - 
provides a fascinating exemplar of the international and domestic political machinations 
that shape the post-Juba accountability debate in Uganda.  The trial, to date, has been 
packed with drama, intrigue and politics.  Debates have centered around two interlocking 
issues: the disputed seniority of Kwoyelo in the LRA, and the institutional, political, and 
legal conflict between amnesty and prosecution.  
 
The tr ia l  so far  
Thomas Kwoyelo is a former LRA member who was taken into custody by the UPDF in 
Garamba National Park in north-eastern DRC in March 2009.  According to the CID 
investigating officer, Kwoyelo was wounded and captured by UPDF soldiers during 
armed combat, and transferred back to Uganda by the UPDF.48  Initially Kwoyelo was in 
the custody of military intelligence for approximately three months, in a location that was 
not disclosed by the Ugandan authorities.  According to one of Kwoyelo’s affidavits this 
period of detention was spent at the private residence of an official of the Chieftaincy of 
Military Intelligence on the outskirts of Kampala.  Kwoyelo stated that he was forced to 
sleep on the floor with no bedding or toilet facilities, and that he endured solitary 
confinement for twenty one hours a day, as well as sleep deprivation during 
interrogations that could last up to two days.49  The Chief Investigating Officer refuted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Author interview with Ugandan legal experts, Kampala, 22.05.2012 and 09.05.2012; see also McAuliffe, 
‘Transitional’, p.9.!
48 1st Respondent’s Affidavit in reply (Lawrence Ogen Mungu, Assistant Inspector of Police, attached to 
CID headquarters, Kibuli), 16 August 2011; Kwoyelo’s indictment notes that he was arrested at Garamba 
National Aprk by the UPDF after getting injured in a fire fight on 2 March 2009. 
49 Affidavit in support of the Constitutional Reference No.36 of 2011, Thomas Kwoyelo, Respondent (on 
file with Author); According to an Enough! Project report, ‘many’ former combatants are kept in ‘safe 
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these claim, and stated that Kwoyelo was held in detention at the 1st Infantry Division 
Headquarters in Kakiri, Wakiso District, for ‘recuperation’.50  Three months after his 
capture, the police formally requested that the UPDF hand Kwoyelo over for 
prosecution, and on 4 June 2009 he was charged before Gulu Chief Magistrates Court 
with offences under the Penal Code Act, including kidnapping with intent to murder.51  
State Attorney Sam Oola explained to the Court that inquiries into Kwoyelo’s alleged 
crimes were ongoing, and requested an adjournment. 52  Kwoyelo was remanded to 
prison in Gulu, and later transferred to Luzira maximum security prison near Kampala.   
 
Whether on his own accord or under pressure from his legal team, Kwoyelo applied for 
amnesty in January 2010 while in custody at Luzira.53  On 19 March 2010, the Amnesty 
Commission wrote a letter to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP).  This standard 
letter stated that the ‘the Amnesty Commission considers him as one who is qualified to 
benefit from the Amnesty process’.54  It requested the DPP’s certification, under sections 
3 and 4 of the Act, that Kwoyelo was not being detained for any other crimes, unrelated 
to the rebellion.55  The DPP never responded to this letter, so amnesty was not granted.  
Instead, in August 2010, two months after the ICC Review Conference had taken place 
in Kampala, Kwoyelo was charged at Buganda Road Magistrates Court with twelve 
counts of violation of Uganda’s 1964 Geneva Conventions Act.  The counts included 
grave breaches of willful killing, taking hostages, and extensive destruction of property in 
the Amuru and Gulu districts of northern Uganda.  When Kwoyelo’s trial eventually 
opened at Gulu High Court (the ICD used these premises for the trial), on 11 July 2011, 
the prosecution submitted an amended indictment, adding 53 alternative counts under 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
houses…illegal and irregular places of detention used by the Ugandan military and secret services – run by 
the …CMI, in Kampala’, often for up to three months or longer.  See Ledio Cakaj, Too Far From Home, 
Enough! Project, (February, 2011), p.8. 
50 1st Respondent’s Affidavit in Reply (Lawrence Ogen Mungu, Assistant Inspector of Police, Attached to 
CID Headquarters, Kibuli), 16th August 2011 
51 ‘LRA’s Kwoyelo Charged With Kidnap’, New Vision, 04.06.2009, 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/683670 (accessed 07.08.2012). 
52 1st Respondent’s Affidavit in Reply 16th August 2011; ‘LRA’s Kwoyelo Charged With Kidnap’, New 
Vision, 04.06.2009, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/683670 (accessed 07.12.12).  
53 According to the Respondent’s Affidavit, Kwoyelo applied for Amnesty on 4th January 2010 and ‘the 
matter was forwarded to the DPP for certification’; According to Kwoyelo’s affidavit, the application was 
made on 10th January 2010. 
54 Letter from Amnesty Commission to DPP, 19th March 2010, (on file with author). 
55 Affidavit in support of the Constitutional Reference No.36 of 2011, Thomas Kwoyelo, Respondent (on 
file with Author); Nouwen, ‘Complementarity’, p.215. 
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Uganda’s penal code, including murder, kidnapping and robbery. 56    Kwoyelo pleaded 
not guilty to all charges, and his defence team immediately indicated that they had 
preliminary objections relating to the constitutionality of the case, which are set out 
below.   
 
Two weeks later, on 25 July, a second court session was held, during which Kwoyelo’s 
legal team requested a ‘reference’ to the Constitutional Court in order that their 
objections to the case be heard.  On 16 August, the Constitutional Court heard oral 
submissions from both sides regarding the defence counsel’s objections, which were 
two-fold.  The first objection was that the Kwoyelo was being denied equal treatment 
under Uganda’s Amnesty Act by being refused amnesty. 57   The second was that 
Kwoyelo’s initial detention period under the UPDF was unconstitutional.  In a surprise 
move, which will be explored in more detail below, the Attorney General’s representative 
argued that the Amnesty Act itself was unconstitutional, and should not therefore 
prevent Kwoyelo’s case from proceeding.  On 22 September, the Constitutional Court 
delivered its ruling.  Focusing on arguments relating to the Amnesty Act, it found that 
the Act was constitutional, and that this should bar Kwoyelo’s case from proceeding 
because he was being treated unequally under it. 58   The DPP immediately appealed 
against the decision to the Supreme Court.  Two and half years later, in March 2014, the 
Supreme Court finally sat to hear the Attorney General’s appeal, and after hearing 
submissions from both the Attorney General and the defendant’s legal team, the judges 
ruled that they would make a decision ‘on a date to be announced in the future’.59  
Following the Constitutional Court’s September 2011 ruling, Kwoyelo’s lawyers 
presented a petition to the High Court requesting that he be released from prison.   In 
January 2012 the High Court ruled in Kwoyelo’s favour, but to date he remains in Luzira, 
because the DPP continues to refuse to certify the granting of Amnesty.60  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Uganda’s ICC Act had only come into force in March of that year, and restrictions in Uganda’s 
constitution against the retroactive application of laws resulted in a decision not to charge Kwoyelo under 
it.   
57 Constitutional Petition 036/2011 (Arising out of HCT – 00 – ICD- Case 2/2010).  
58 For a concise descriptions of the arguments it deployed to uphold the Act, see Nouwen, 
‘Complementarity’, p.220. 
59 ‘Rebel Chief Kwoyelo Yet to Know Amnesty Fate’, New Vision, 19.03.2014 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/653701-rebel-chief-kwoyelo-yet-to-know-amnesty-fate.html (accessed 
19.03.2014).  
60 Kwoyelo’s lawyers have lodged a petition to the African Commission on Human And People’s Rights to 
challenge his continued pre-trial detention, but the ACHPR has not yet made a ruling.   
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Kwoyelo narrat ives 
Kwoyelo’s own narrative, expressed through his legal team and in various court 
documents, is that he was abducted by the LRA in 1987 at the age of 13 while on his way 
to Pabbo Primary School in Gulu district.  He was never afforded an opportunity to 
escape, and like other abductees he gradually rose in rank until he became one of the 
commanders of the LRA.  Following the failure of the Juba peace talks, he was captured 
at Garamba and imprisoned.61  For Kwoyelo, the injustice lay in the fact that other 
officers, more senior to him, including Brigadier Banya, who was captured by the UPDF 
in 2004, and former LRA spokesperson Sam Kolo, who surrendered in 2005, both 
applied for and were granted amnesty under the Act.62  His submission claimed that he 
was not only a victim of unequal treatment, but also of gross government negligence, 
because the Government of Uganda failed fundamentally in the duty of care for its own 
citizens.  In one of his affidavits he states that: 
‘the same state which should have protected me from abduction as a child is the 
same state that is prosecuting me when I have since renounced armed 
rebellion’.63 
 
The prosecution’s narrative was that Kwoyelo was, at all times relevant to the indictment, 
a senior commander/officer in the LRA.  Specifically, the indictment argues that:  
‘all attacks by the LRA which took place in Kilak County, Amuru District, 
between 1987 and 2005… were either commanded by him or were carried out 
with his full knowledge and authority’,  
 
and that during his time as a senior LRA commander he:  
‘occupied several senior positions at various times, including commander of 
operations, director of military intelligence, and in-charge of sick bays.’64  
 
Kwoyelo, according to senior DPP officials, was not only ‘high-level’, he was also a 
willing recruit, who joined the LRA of his own accord in his twenties.65  In addition, it is 
claimed that the prospect of amnesty did not immediately appeal to him.  According to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 The date of Kwoyelo’s capture remains unclear.  According to his affidavit he was captured in 2008 by 
the UPDF in Garamba whilst assembling to await the outcome of peace talks; according to prosecution 
documents, he was captured in March 2009 in Garamba; Constitutional Petition 036/2011 (Arising out of 
HCT -00-ICD-Case 2/2010) (on file with author). 
62 Caleb Alaka’s statement, Republic of Uganda Constitutional Appeal No.01 of 2012, arising from 
Constitutional Petition No.36 of 2011, Arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case no. 02/10, (on file with author) 
63 Affidavit in support of the Constitutional Reference No.36 of 2011, Thomas Kwoyelo, Respondent (on 
file with Author). 
64 Amended indictment, (on file with author). 
65 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 2,05.2012 
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some sources he came under considerable pressure from both his family and his legal 
team before his was willing to apply for it.66  
 
Commentators have pointed to the fact that the ICC decided not to issue a warrant for 
Kwoyelo during its own investigations.67  According to Human Rights Watch, the ICC 
investigated some of the incidents covered in the indictments against Kwoyelo, but 
Kwoyelo himself was never the subject of an ICC arrest warrant.68  DPP officials 
working on the case said that the ICC has shared evidence on Kwoyelo that it did not 
intend to use for its own indictments, and that the relationship between the ICC and the 
Ugandan prosecuting authority was ‘very supportive’.69 
 
The puzzle o f  the prosecutor ia l  s trategy  
From international legal observers to local communities in northern Uganda, the 
question on everyone’s mind was always ‘why Kwoyelo?’.  As one donor official put it – 
perhaps a little too graphically - ‘it’s the question I think about in the shower in the 
morning’.70  The answer given by a senior DPP official was rather straightforward, and 
highlights the convenient timing of  his capture:  
‘at that time, because peace talks had just collapsed but the AAR was in existence, 
his arrest was timely and that is why we picked on him’.71  
   
A powerful local politician from Kwoyelo’s home area in northern Uganda also linked 
his arrest and prosecution to the post-Juba political climate.  Comparing the treatment of 
Kwoyelo to that of senior commanders who had received Amnesty before him, he 
argued that: 
‘Amnesty was meant for someone who came and says, ‘chairman, come and pick 
me, because I have escaped’, or for Sam Kolo, who had an arrangement with the 
security organ of the Government.  Even Banya, I went to welcome him from 
Atiak (….)Why was he not sent to court?  Because at that time the issue of 
dialogue with LRA was very high – so it was a strategy by government to revise 
the propaganda of the LRA that if you escaped you would be killed or sent to 
court.  So that was a PR strategy of the government.  In a war situation the 
government uses any tool. By the time they arrested Kwoyelo, government had 
the wings, it is flying, knowing that it has already swept the courtyard, now the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 2.5.2012; Field notes, Kampala, April-June, 2012.  
67 See for example, Human Rights Watch, Uganda: Q&A on the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, (July, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/07/uganda-qa-trial-thomas-kwoyelo (accessed 08.09.2011) 
68 Human Rights Watch, ‘Justice’, p.10. 
69 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 02.05.2012. 
70 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 05.06.2012. 
71 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 02.05.2012.!
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message can be different, now the government can say, ‘when you go by 
rebellion – this is what the government will do to you’.72   
 
The timing of Kwoyelo’s capture also allowed his fate to become tied up with broader 
concerns related to the political economy of donor interest in the fledging court.  In early 
2010, as the DPP was deciding what to do about Kwoyelo, preparations for the ICC 
Review Conference in Kampala were beginning in earnest.  As one Prosecutor noted, ‘we 
could not declare amnesty for him when all eyes were on the Court, remember that it 
was the ICC Review Conference here in Kampala that year’.73  A lawyer close to the 
process expressed a similar sentiment, ‘so much has been sunk into the Court.  They had 
to have that first trial’.74  Nevertheless, the decision of the prosecution to bring a case 
against a former LRA member, who had evidently applied for amnesty whilst the 
Amnesty Act was still in operation, remained surprising.  It raised serious questions 
about prosecutorial strategy and expected outcomes.  As Human Rights Watch noted 
about the Amnesty Act:  
‘by its terms the act appears to preclude all cases against  LRA members so long 
as they reject rebellion, irrespective of the ICD or of the crimes in which LRA 
members may be implicated’.75  
   
Moreover, other senior LRA members had benefitted from the amnesty since the ICD 
has been in operation.  Most notably, Charles Arop, the former LRA director of 
operations, who surrendered himself to UPDF forces in DRC in November 2009, and 
was granted amnesty later that year.76   
 
On what grounds did the prosecution legally justify its decision to prosecute a suspect 
who had applied for Amnesty?  Two key arguments have been put forward by the DPP, 
the AG, and by supportive politicians.   The first was that international law does not 
recognize domestic amnesties so Kwoyelo was charged under the Geneva Conventions 
Act, which relates to international armed conflict (a critique of this logic follows below).77  
At a meeting with the DPP in mid-2012 the impression given was that the fate of the 
case hinged in large part on the ability of the State Attorney to prove that the LRA !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Interview with local political, Pabbo, 27.08.2013 
73 Author interview with DPP official, 02.05.2012. 
74 Author interview with Ugandan lawyer, Kampala, 22.05.2012 
75 HRW, ‘Justice’, p.13 
76 Ibid. 
77 Another commonly heard justification for the trial – particularly among JLOS officials - is that the 
Amnesty Act does not apply to Thomas Kwoyelo because he was ‘captured’.  This cannot be supported on 
legal grounds because Part 3 Section 2 of the Act applies to anyone who is in ‘detention’ and in any case,  
Amnesty has been granted to those who have been ‘captured’ on numerous occasions.   
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rebellion was part of an ‘international’ conflict.  However, the ICC in its own indictments 
had characterized the conflict as an internal one.  According to one official, ‘we informed 
the ICC of our position and they have told us, ‘no, not for us’, but we are not bound by 
them’.78  The problem with the ‘international crimes’ argument is twofold.  Firstly, the 
idea that amnesties are illegal under international law is often linked to the argument that 
Uganda must adhere to its obligations under the Rome Statute.  The Rome Statute, 
however, has no clause in it forbidding Amnesty.  Also, while the ICC OTP has 
maintained its position that the ‘ICC 5’ are under the jurisdiction of the Court and must 
not be granted amnesty, they have never explicitly condemned the granting of amnesty to 
other categories of offender.   The second problem with the ‘international crimes’ 
argument was framed in the following terms by Sarah Nouwen:  
‘Kwoyelo has not been charged under the Geneva Conventions but under the 
Geneva Conventions Act.  This latter act, like the Penal Code Act, is a domestic 
act.  Crimes under domestic law are excluded from the scope of the Amnesty Act 
only if there is an Act explicitly stating so.  There is none that does’.79 
 
A second, and related, legal argument has already been referred to above: the AG’s 
argument that Thomas Kwoyelo could not derive any legal rights from the Amnesty Act 
because the Act itself was unconstitutional. 80  The blanket amnesty provision, the AG’s 
representative told the Constitutional Court judges in September 2011, infringed on the 
constitutional independence of the DPP and the judiciary to:  
‘consider the facts/circumstances of individual cases, available evidence, and then 
take the specified issues into consideration and make an independent decision to 
prosecute or not to prosecute’.81  
  
The fact that the Attorney General was condemning a law that he himself had been 
involved in enacting was not lost on his representative, who accepted the ‘rather unusual’ 
nature of the case.82  Nevertheless, it was her contention that a problem with an existing 
law had been identified - in her words a ‘justifiable case of human error’ - and that the 
Attorney General had a legal obligation, under his mandate, to rectify the situation.83  
The Amnesty Commission, for its part, was bewildered by what was going on in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 02.05.2012. 
79 Nouwen, ‘Complementarity’, p.217. 
80 Constitutional Petition 036/2011 (Arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/2010) (on file with author). 
81 Ibid 
82 According to Nouwen’s interviews, the Attorney General himself was unaware that his representative 
would be making arguments to this effect, and the Deputy AG was explicitly unsupportive of the argument 
that the Amnesty Act was unconstitutional, see ‘Complementarity’, p.223-4.  Despite this, the same 
arguments were reiterated by the AG’s representative at the Supreme Court hearing in March 2014. 
83 Constitutional Petition 036/2011 (Arising out of HCT-00-ICD-Case 2/2010) (on file with author). 
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courtroom.  The Commission Chair, Justice Onega explained that the Attorney General 
was ‘directly colliding’ with the Amnesty Commission and because they had no 
information about what was going on, Commission staff decided, ‘fine, we’ll go to the 
court and see what they say; that was all we could do’.84   In a rather pointed example of 
the disjunction between different government institutions, the Amnesty Commission was 
presenting its budget and personnel changes to parliament on the very same day that the 
Attorney General was contesting its existence in the Constitutional Court.85  
 
Lawyers and NGO staff believe that the DPP and his officials were cognizant of the 
conflict in the legal framework concerning Kwoyelo’s prosecution but also confident that 
they had a strong case.  It was presumed that the political leadership wanted a conviction 
(although it is hard to substantiate this).  When the case came before the Constitutional 
Court, however, it simply could not succeed.  On the one hand this might be interpreted 
as testament to the independence of the Ugandan judiciary.  On the other hand, for 
those international NGOs and donors who supported individual accountability and no 
longer approved of the Amnesty Act, this was a failed opportunity for judicial activism. 
According to senior DPP officials, the Constitutional Court decision was a great surprise 
and has, ‘discouraged us from future investigations because it makes it feel futile if there 
is a blanket amnesty’.86  The reaction of the JLOS-TJWG was also downbeat and a report 
drafted by the JLOS international TJ technical advisor, expressed ‘concern about the 
implications’ of the Constitutional Court ruling.87  
 
A legal expert close to the process has argued that the involvement of certain JLOS 
institutions has been very ‘negative,’ and that they have ‘taken ROL principles apart 
because they just want a conviction for Kwoyelo’.88  The argument that the trial has 
undermined the rule of law in Uganda should be disconcerting for donors, who justify 
their funding of  JLOS in terms of building the rule of law.  Donors took a similar line to 
JLOS in their reaction to the Constitutional Court ruling.   In private interviews, they 
emphasised their distaste for the blanket amnesty, and their desire to see a war crimes 
conviction at the ICD.  To some extent this influenced their allocation of technical 
assistance to the Court.  Before the trial began a senior official from the JLOS secretariat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Author interview with Justice Onega, Kampala, 13.06.12 
85 Author interview with members of Kwoyelo legal defence team, Kampala, 09.05.12!
86 Author interview with DPP official, Kampala, 02.05.2012 
87 JLOS, Justice at a cross-roads?  Special report on the Thomas Kwoyelo Trial (2011).  
88 Author interview with Ugandan legal experts, Kampala, 22.05.2012 and 09.05.2012 
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wrote to Danida requesting support for Kwoyelo’s defence team in the preparation of 
their case.89   Invoking the fair trial principles of the ICC, he pointed out that ‘the Rome 
Statute…requires both parties to be effectively represented...the justice of the case 
requires that all parties be afforded the same legal assistance’.90  Prior to this request in 
June 2011, just a few weeks before the trial was due to commence, one of the then six 
ICD judges, Justice A.S Choudry, wrote a strongly-worded letter to the divisional head, 
the Hon. Justice Akiiki Kiiza, which noted, amongst other things, that the lack of 
assistance to the defence counsel and the limited time they had to prepare their case 
would result in ‘trial by ambush as we lack the required procedures for a fair hearing.’!91! 
Nevertheless, Danida refused the JLOS request, arguing that it was up to the State to 
fund legal aid.92   According to one donor official, the feeling was that funding defense 
for war crimes was: 
‘hard to do… as donors so much money goes into supporting the victims and 
NGOs in the region and then at the same time you want to fund someone who is 
defending someone who killed families in that region?’.93   
 
The decision not to provide resources and facilities to assist in the preparation of an 
adequate defense, despite a donor- funded needs assessment which highlighted major 
problems with the ‘state brief’ system, was clearly questionable from the fair trial 
perspective that donors themselves were promoting.94  Whether it was the correct 
decision or not, it created a perception among civil society groups and members of the 
Ugandan legal community that donors were more interested in funding a conviction than 
a fit-for-purpose ICD.  It also illuminated the contradictory nature of ‘technical’ 
approaches which purport to be ‘beyond’ politics, but are in essence political 
interventions in the sense that they shape power relations through the allocation of 
resources.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 The letter to Danida is referred to in a subsequent letter that Gandenya Paul Wolimbya, Senior Technical 
Advisor, JLOS, sent to Mr. Gabriel Oosthuizen, Chief of Party, PILPG, dated 22.09.2011 (on file with 
author).  Kwoyelo secured private counsel after waiting a year in prison without state counsel but his 
private counsel complained about the lack of research and investigative resources and that they were given 
an unacceptably short and predetermined time line for the beginning of trial: ‘a 30 day deadline from the 
date at which the defence first received any substantive disclosure to the beginning of the trial’, Author 
interview, Kwoyelo defence lawyers, Kampala, 09.05.12 and 22.05.12. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Letter from Justice Choudry to Hon. Mr. Justice Akiiki Kiiza, 25.06.2011 (on file with author).  It should 
be noted that Justice Choudry himself has not been a stranger to controversy see ‘Justice Choudry fate 
rests with Judicial Commission’, The Independent, 29.11.2008 
http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/news/330-justice-choudry-fate-rests-with-judicial-
commission (accessed 03.04.13). 
92 Gadenya, ‘Letter’. 
93 Author interview with donor official, Kampala, 05.06.2012 
94 See PILPG/ICTJ-Facilitated Needs-Assement Mission Final Report (March 2011). 
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The strange case of the lapsing and re-instatement of the Amnesty Act 2012-13 
 
If the Courts were refusing to stamp out the Amnesty Act, other routes would have to be 
sought.  This became of paramount concern to justice-sector donors, the AG, and the 
DPP, particularly after the Constitutional Court ruling effectively blocked any future war-
crime related prosecutions at the ICD.   When the Amnesty Act was passed in 2000, 
donors viewed it as a pragmatic peace-building initiative, encouraging its application and 
extension as part of the effort to end the war in northern Uganda.95  After Juba, and with 
a new raft of possible TJ measures on the cards, the attitude of justice-sector donors 
changed.  This, argued the Chair of the Amnesty Commission, was a challenge for the 
institution, because donors who once provided funds no longer wished to be associated 
with amnesty.96  Indeed the Amnesty Act has always been a temporary measure, subject 
to periodic renewal.97  Thus after the Constitutional Court decision, donor and JLOS 
efforts coalesced around convincing the government to amend or lapse the Act, which 
was due to expire on 24 May 2012.   In early 2012, donors pushed for JLOS to set up a 
‘task force’ at the technical level to consider possible options for the future of the Act.  
The work of the task force was to be co-ordinated by the two donor funded JLOS 
technical advisers, and was to include both ‘popular consultations’ on the Amnesty, and 
research to be undertaken by UN Women.  The JLOS task force released an ‘options’ 
paper in April 2012, which toed the donor line, noting that: 
‘the co-existent nature of the Amnesty Act with other national laws intended to 
promote accountability for serious crimes presents an obstacle to the State’s 
capacity to fulfill its duty to pursue justice and accountability of war crimes and 
gross human rights violations… The Amnesty Act, given its current context, has 
fulfilled and outlived its original role and purpose.  Indeed, this was a common 
view expressed in consultations on the Act with key stakeholders, both 
government and non-state actors’’.98  
  
Later, a JLOS official confided that these consultations ‘were quick and we could have 
done more’.99  The paper presented four ‘options’ to the JLOS leadership committee100: 
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natural lapse of the act; partial lapse of the act; extension without amendment; and 
extension with amendment.  Drafted by the international technical advisor to JLOS, the 
paper was in clear opposition to the third option, largely on the grounds of international 
legal obligations to prosecute war crimes. 
 
After the publication of the options paper meetings took place within the JLOS-TJWG 
about the future of the Act, and civil society observers were active in the discussions.  
The broad consensus in early May appeared to be that the Act should be extended for 
one year, with amendment, and that the amendment should include provision for a 
‘conditional’ amnesty, linked in the future to other transitional justice processes such as 
truth-seeking, traditional justice, reparations, and judicial accountability. 101   What 
followed in subsequent weeks was a surprising train of events.  In mid-May 2012, in spite 
of discussions within JLOS on the future of the Act, the Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Hilary Onek, extended the Amnesty Act without amendment for one year.102  It was 
worst-case scenario for justice sector donors.  Then, two weeks later, on 25 May 2012, he 
completely changed his mind, and issued a statutory instrument which declared that the 
‘operation of Part II of the Amnesty Act’, had  ‘lapsed’. 103  Part II of the Act comprised 
the central clauses, which mandated the process by which an individual could apply for 
and receive amnesty.  At the same time the Minister extended, for one year, sections I, 
III and IV of the Act, which outline its rationale, and support for the day-to-day 
functioning of the Amnesty Commission and its role in providing resettlement and 
reintegration-support to former combatants.  So, within a two-week period in May, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs had moved from ‘extension without amendment’, to the 
lapsing of what commentators would soon be calling the ‘heart’ of the Act.  In terms of 
‘options’ for the future of the Act, these two positions stood in diametrical opposition.  
In a rather bizarre explanation of the process by which these decisions had been reached, 
Onek said:   
‘In the second week of May, me not being a lawyer, I said, OK we just have a 
blanket amnesty extension.  Then I was corrected by JLOS, that this amnesty was 
not compatible with our law.  Amnesty should be handled on a case by case basis !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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by JLOS.  So Part II is now lapsed.  So on advice from JLOS the Act is extended 
for one year, without Part II, until we have new laws in place’.104  
 
By all accounts, at a meeting of the JLOS leadership committee, after Onek’s initial 
decision to extend without amendment, the Minister of Internal Affairs came under 
serious pressure from the Attorney General, who was reportedly adamant that the 
Leadership Committee go along with the lapsing option.  One observer noted that: 
‘the AG persuaded convincingly that they should go with the lapsing option and 
the onus must be on the DPP to clarify the situation now.  Discretion must now 
be with the DPP to ensure transparency in the prosecutorial policy and to ensure 
that victims are not prosecuted’.105   
 
A donor official provided a similar account of what had happened:  
‘I think the AG or the DPP just made a really good case against blanket amnesty; 
that it was interfering with their work at the ICD.  I think they were probably just 
the most informed voices in the leadership committee’.106   
 
The extent to which donors were involved in these machinations was not clear.  In 
private, the key civil society organisations lobbying against the decision to suspend Part 
II argued that donor opposition to the Amnesty was being pushed via the JLOS 
secretariat.   While some donor staff expressed genuine shock at the lapsing of Part II of 
the Act, others were more defensive.  One argued that ‘those guys who support the 
amnesty are fanatical.  It is not logical’. 107   A senior official at the Democratic 
Governance Facility was unequivocally supportive of the lapse: ‘yes, of course the 
government should stop this Amnesty.  We need accountability.  We need to stop this in 
Africa!’.108  Another donor official regarded the Minister’s decision as a ‘major step 
forward’ that should be ‘celebrated’.109  In a revealing interview a senior JLOS official 
noted that, ‘there is a reason we encouraged the Minister to do it that way’.  She 
explained that in consultation with donors it was decided that, ‘if we just kept renewing it 
or amending it there would have been no political impetus for a TJ policy, you know 
how things are in Uganda’.110  The logic was that while Amnesty was in place, progress 
on the broader TJ policy would stall indefinitely.  Without Amnesty it would be 
incumbent on the Government to engage with TJ and to do something to move the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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various processes forward. This approach was later criticised on two grounds.  The first 
was that the lapsing of the amnesty in this way was procedurally non-democratic, and 
this was raised as an objection by several civil society organization.111  The second was 
that without the requisite political engagement, there was little to suggest that a 
transitional justice policy drafted at the technical level would catalyse the substantive 
political change required for implementation and enforcement.112  The Refugee Law 
Project would later criticise what it perceived as the myopic approach of JLOS and by 
extension its donor partners.  When the JLOS draft TJ policy was circulated in May 2013 
for comments, the RLP argued that it was ‘rushed’ and comprised an ‘incoherent 
Transitional Justice Policy Framework for the sake of filling the legal gap created by the 
lapsing of Part II’.113 
 
The drama continued.  On 21 May 2013, JLOS held a consensus-building workshop on 
its draft transitional justice policy, which recommended unequivocally that ‘there shall be 
no blanket amnesty’.114  Three days later, on 24 May 2013, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs directly contradicted this, and reversed his lapsing of Part II, thus fully re-instating 
the Act – and blanket amnesty - for another two years.115  That same month a report 
from the powerful Defence Committee in Parliament was published, arguing that the 
2012 decision to lapse the Act was erroneous. The Minister of Internal Affairs later 
concurred, stating that he had made a mistake, and had come under international 
pressure.116  In the year between the lapsing of the Act in May 2012 and its re-
instatement in May 2013, a group of activists and NGOs working in northern Uganda 
launched an advocacy campaign and put pressure on MPs and the Government to bring 
back the Amnesty.  But the immediate catalyst, according to UN sources, was the visit of 
the US War Crimes Ambassador, Stephen Rapp, and his staff, who travelled to Uganda 
in May 2013 and requested that both the JLOS secretariat and the DPP soften their 
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stance on the Amnesty.117  The position of the US was, according to one UN official, 
that the amnesty was central to the success of US-supported military efforts against the 
LRA in central Africa.118  It is not clear what President Museveni’s position was on this, 
but as a JLOS official noted, ‘once the Defence Committee and the military say 
something, there is nothing small fish like the DPP or ICD can do’.119   This highlighted 
power asymmetries between JLOS and the military but also exposed serious divisions in 
donor policy towards transitional justice.  Despite USAID providing off-budget capacity 
building funding for the war crimes court in 2008, the broader US position has always 
been more supportive of the Amnesty than its European counter-parts funding the 
justice sector.120  As 24 May approached, legislative drafters were contacted by Prime 
Minister, Amama Mbabazi and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Jacob Oulanyah, and 
were directed to draft the necessary legislation to fully reinstate the Act.121  
 
Analysing the Kwoyelo trial and the strange journey of the Amnesty Act 
 
The procedural and ideological conflict between prosecution and amnesty was thrown 
into the spotlight during the first war crimes trial at the ICD.  The Kwoyelo trial became 
an arena within which different spheres of institutional power interacted and competed.  
The legal issue was over accountability for war crimes; the political issue was over which 
institution was going to ‘own’ these processes.  At the time of writing this remained 
unresolved.  The President and the political leadership have refrained from taking a clear 
public position on the relationship between prosecution and amnesty.  This should be 
understood in the context of what the political analyst Gaaki Kigambo terms ‘President 
Museveni’s overall strategy of stifling the emergence of strong institutions as his primary 
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strategy for regime survival’.122  In 1997, Andrew Mwenda, a Ugandan journalist and 
political commentator wrote an article called ‘Personalizing Power’ in which he talked 
about ‘one-man rule engineered (…) by President Museveni’.123   Today, experts agree 
that political decision-making and political control are ultimately vested in the presidency 
and moreover, that Museveni has consistently kept institutions weak because he is 
concerned about the emergence of independent power centres that might challenge his 
authority.124    
 
The political, legal, and institutional machinations behind the arrest and indictment of 
Thomas Kwoyelo are indicative of this broader political context.  According to DPP 
officials, Kwoyelo was captured soon after the peace process failed, and his case was 
therefore widely publicized in the Ugandan media.  Unlike ‘others who have come after 
him’ who are ‘almost at the same level’, the DPP was, therefore, made aware of his arrest 
early on, before the UPDF could help facilitate an amnesty request.125  Indeed the 
amnesty process has benefitted the UPDF considerably as a military strategy, and in the 
past it has facilitated amnesties for former LRA combatants then quickly incorporated 
them into the UPDF to fight the LRA.126  For obvious reasons former LRA commanders 
are of particular value to the UPDF in their fight against Joseph Kony.  According to a 
DPP official: 
‘People are being captured and we are not even informed about it and we have 
no opportunity to get involved before they are taken to the Amnesty 
Commission.  One LRA suspect, we had investigated him before the capture, and 
we were not informed by the UPDF that he was captured and then benefitted 
from Amnesty’.127   
 
Institutional linkages between the DPP and the UPDF were weak, and DPP officials 
were certain that if they had not actively lobbied for a referral the UPDF would 
‘probably have been taken him to the Amnesty Commission’. 128   The Amnesty 
Commission, for its part, was also invested, both ideologically and materially, in the fate 
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of returning combatants, but the Commission has always been insecure.  Its existence 
and future role has been in question ever since it was set up with the reluctant support of 
President Museveni in 2000.  Government and donor support for the Commission has 
been halting and unpredictable; its legal mandate weak, and it has always suffered serious 
financial and capacity constraints.   
 
As the trial Kwoyelo proceeded it became a battleground for different institutions with 
conflicting mandates and ambitions to take institutional and moral precedence in 
decisions about the fate of returning combatants.  The DPP wanted to reclaim what they 
saw as their constitutional authority to determine whether or not those guilty of crimes 
under Ugandan law be prosecuted or not.  The Amnesty Commission was fighting for 
survival in an increasingly hostile donor and GoU environment.  The UPDF wanted to 
stay in control of those it captured or who fell into its custody as part of its military 
strategy in an unfinished conflict.  The ICD itself, and JLOS as an institution, wanted to 
show off its donor-funded court, and prove that Uganda was capable of prosecuting the 
perpetrators of domestic war crimes.   
 
The political leadership hovered above this institutional wrangling and deliberately 
avoided coming down on one side or the other.  It was, one analyst said, ‘like a cat 
standing on a high wall: you are not sure which way it might jump’.129  On the one hand 
the Kwoyelo trial could be interpreted, as so many domestic war crimes trials have been, 
as a clear-cut instance of victor’s justice.130  The marching band that attended the opening 
of the trial in Gulu High Court added to the perception that what was happening was 
part of a theatrical demonstration of state power.  Indeed, of all the transitional justice 
mechanisms listed in the AAR, the ICD was the GoU’s dominant strategy for dealing 
with LRA crimes. It was pushed forward quickly and decisively.  Despite this, the 
political leadership has never expressed a clear position on the relationship between 
prosecution, amnesty and military jurisdiction.  ‘This’, said one DPP official, ‘makes our 
work very hard’. 131  Two themes which have characterized Ugandan politics since 1986 
explain the Government’s reticence.  The first has been a desire to keep its options open, 
and to keep legislative processes rumbling on, whilst at the same time containing them so 
that they do not pose a political threat or close down political opportunities.  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fluctuations in the fate of the Amnesty Act exemplify this.  The trajectory of one senior 
Government Minister’s approach is instructive.  In February 2012 she argued – during a 
discussion about the fate of the Kwoyelo trial - that ‘the amnesty is flawed and 
unpopular in the North’132. A few months after its lapse she changed her mind.  Speaking 
as the MP for her northern constituency, she said, ‘we need the Amnesty back.  I know 
there are problems with it, but people need it, it has an important psychological 
function’.133  Indeed as one lawyer understood, ‘asking for the nullification of the 
Amnesty Act was a curious move in 2012 because the government still needs that Act’.134   
  
The second theme, already alluded to above, has been Museveni’s strategy to concentrate 
and ‘personalize’ power in the hands of the executive branch of government, usually with 
the aid of the military and security apparatus.135  A key part of this strategy has been to 
co-opt, manipulate and undermine the institutions – the legislature, the media and the 
judiciary – that might post a challenge to the executive.  That is not to say that those 
institutions do not – to different degrees - act independently; it is more the case that, in 
the words of Tripp, they have been ‘fairly defenceless against assaults on their 
integrity’.136   Even the judiciary, which is generally regarded as enjoying a significant 
degree of independence, ‘has operated primarily on the defensive, trying to hold on to 
existing rights rather than pressing for greater freedom’. 137   This kind of ‘semi-
authoritarian’ political set up, in which institutions are weak, undermined, and often 
vehicles for patronage, has potentially serious implications for current donor support for 
TJ, which, at the level of the State at least, has been concerned with institutionalizing 
efforts to confront the past.    
 
As was discussed in the last chapter, and has been alluded to above, the sort of 
deterministic state-building logic put forward by donors prioritises building capacity for 
institutions and opening up conversations, the focus being on what Sriram refers to as 
‘longer-term institutional restructuring rather than shorter term and contentious political 
activities’.138  In Uganda, donor efforts to promote transitional justice through support of 
new institutional arrangements in the form of the ICD might create new structures, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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these are shaped by existing power arrangements.  In a semi-authoritarian state like 
Uganda these power arrangements exist in tension with the state-building, governance 
ambitions of international donors. An independent judiciary, respect for political and 
civil rights, fair and equal treatment of all persons before the law, are all necessary 
components of the ideal liberal conception of the practice of transitional justice.139  They 
are also, however, the very elements that restrict and threaten the ability of a predatory 
semi-authoritarian executive to both control political life and stay in power.   
 
On a visit to the ICD building in mid-2013, the sense of inertia and of expectations not 
met was palpable.  Housed in a former residential mansion in the upmarket Kololo 
district of Kampala, the court was a ghost-town. A clerk noted with resignation that the 
donor rented premises had been ‘designed to look like the ICC’ and that they hoped to 
erect a glass panel between the defendants seating area and the rest of the courtroom to 
complete the modeling.140  Not so long ago, the newly appointed judges were enthusiastic 
about their new court; the role that it might play in shaping future jurisprudence and the 
regional and international status it might afford the Ugandan judiciary.  The registrar 
lamented that ‘we were expecting so many indictments’.141  An ICD judge leveled his 
frustration towards the decision of Kwoyelo’s defence to refer to the case to the 
Constitutional Court, ‘this this was supposed to be our time to shine!’, he said.142  Despite 
initial promise, the ICD no longer holds much credibility within the Ugandan judiciary.  
According to one lawyer, ‘many of the judges are now trying to leave the ICD. It is losing 
credibility everyday’.143  A JLOS official concurred, ‘those in JLOS not involved in war 
crimes, they make fun of the people who go on donor-funded trips, they say, ‘what are 
you doing; you only have one suspect!’.144 !
 
One gets the strong impression that donor funding for legal reform and law-related 
institutions is viewed by the political leadership as a containable intervention, one which 
can be almost effortlessly out-maneuvered.   The Ugandan leadership understands how 
to provide broad declaratory support for certain international norms and agendas 
without having to compromise its own hold on power.  Donors may quietly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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acknowledge this, but they have hedged their bets, basing their support for transitional 
justice on the speculative and suppositious logic that doing something is better than 
doing nothing, and that under the right tutelage in the form of ‘capacity building’, a 
Ugandan War Crimes Court is a force for good.  As this chapter has argued, whether or 
not this is the case remains very much open to question.   
 
A journey up to Acholiland 
 
In the final section of this chapter we leave the corridors of power in central Kampala 
and travel up to Acholiland.   This allows for a fuller understanding of the ICD as more 
than just a court but rather as an arena in which ‘subjectivities are shaped’.145  What 
follows is a closer examination of the ways in which the Kwoyelo trial re-enacted 
‘periods of violence and state repression’ and how respondents’ different experiences of 
that recent history produced varying interpretations of the ‘justness’ of the process.146  
Indeed the Kwoyelo trial has been a topic of intense media and public interest.  
Journalists report ‘divided’ views amongst generic ‘LRA victims’, who are reported as 
either seeing Kwoyelo as someone who has wrought havoc and calling for justice to be 
done in a court of law, or as seeing Kwoyelo as a victim himself, and asking that he be 
forgiven and reintegrated back into his community through ‘traditional’ methods.147  
NGOs working in northern Uganda, meanwhile, are quoted as criticizing the trial 
because of its selective nature.148  Some go further, arguing that legal prosecutions are 
culturally inappropriate in this context. 149  In every research site in Acholiland, these 
views came up.  But there were also some observable patterns in the way that people 
talked about the trial that are not captured in journalists’ or NGO accounts. 
 
Attitudes towards the Kwoyelo trial tended to shift depending on whether the 
respondent ‘individuated’ or ‘de-individuated’ Thomas Kwoyelo.  The approach people 
took was usually shaped by their own wartime experiences.  People who suffered directly 
at Kwoyelo’s hands or who knew others that had done so described a profoundly violent 
and dangerous man who willingly joined the LRA in his adult life and went on to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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perpetrate the most heinous crimes.  Kwoyelo’s trial thus connoted an, albeit vague, 
opportunity structure to achieve some form of redress or revenge for the wrongdoing 
that was experienced.  The attack on Pagak camp in Amuru in May 2005 stands out as a 
particularly distressing example of what Kwoyelo was allegedly capable of.  Former camp 
leaders said that during the attack he personally ordered the slaughter of more than 
twenty women, many with babies on their backs.  His victims were taken to a nearby 
parish and beaten with logs.  Most died as a result of their injuries.  Camp leaders later 
found one woman who had survived: 
‘a person came on bicycle from Amuru side, he said “there is a woman at the 
junction, she is just crawling”.  I organized for youth to come to the corner.  She 
had been terribly beaten.  She was making these signs, directing us to the place 
where the women had been slaughtered.  At that time, she did not even know 
that the child she was carrying on her back had been beaten to death’.150   
 
It is alleged that Kwoyelo commanded that particular massacre in order to punish the 
female camp residents, who had recently greeted defected LRA fighters into the camp 
with ululations, a celebratory chant that is common across Acholiland.151  
 
During his trial the media were interested in the presence of Kwoyelo’s elderly, barefoot 
mother in the court room, and the fact that Kwoyelo himself was a diminutive figure, 
short and slight.  This lent credence to the notion of Kwoyelo as child-like and a victim, 
and sympathetic quotes from his relatives were reported in the media.152  In the area 
where he grew up, however, near Pabbo, men and women frowned deeply when his 
name was mentioned.  One community leader explained that:  
‘even if he is set free, his relatives might accept him but his neighbours who 
suffered?  No, he will not be OK.  In Acholi when you kill my relative, then I 
really think you should be killed’.153  
 
The women in particular open their eyes wide, they want people to know what Kwoyelo 
did to them and their families during the war.  ‘He was a prominent commander’ said 
one, and ‘he abducted our children; killed our children…we have fears that if he returns 
he will continue to wreak havoc and commit crimes’.154  A group of men agreed:   
‘Thomas Kwoyelo makes us really unhappy.  We feel so aggrieved by what he 
did… he is our son but he committed a lot of atrocities here in this place. We are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not very happy with him.  You have come here and one of the things you notice 
is that the place is quiet.  It is quiet because Kwoyelo wiped away the boys of this 
area, the able bodied youth, who could be doing a lot activities now’.155  
 
Some requested longer, private interviews, because, in the words on one woman, ‘what 
Kwoyelo did to me and my family was really unspeakable’.156   
 
Indeed those respondents who particularised the crimes that Kwoyelo committed, and 
categorically individuated him, his trial was welcomed, often unreservedly.  The legal 
intricacies of the case and objections on the basis of unfair treatment under the Amnesty 
Act cut little ice.  Those who claim to be victims of Kwoyelo want him ex-communicated 
from their social and moral worlds by whatever means possible.  In Amuru District, a 
local politician spoke of ‘three categories’ of people who are ‘beyond reconciliation’ 
when it comes to Kwoyelo: those who suffered direct violence; those whose children 
were abducted, and those who knew of his atrocities.  Many people expressed quiet 
admiration of the restraint the government had shown in keeping him alive and allowing 
legal proceedings take place.  One man said:  
‘if it were the people who were to have arrested him then I think they would have 
killed him, but good enough it is the government who did so’.157  
   
Those who supported the trial also appeared to place a surprising level of trust in the 
legal process.  A former camp leader explained that:  
‘in my opinion you should use the law against Kwoyelo because as a layman we 
think he may have committed crimes of killing people and abducting others but 
according to the law he may have committed other crimes.’158 
 
In the area from which he hailed elders appeared willing to transfer their traditional 
disciplinary roles to the GoU, and to allow the Government to act as Kwoyelo’s 
overseer.  Not only was he perceived to be a deeply de-stabilising force, his crimes were 
also understood as too numerous and profound for the local community alone to be able 
to deal with.  
 
Some hoped that he would face life in prison after his trial; others called for the death 
penalty.  Others expressed some hope that a period of incarceration would allow him to 
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see the error of his ways and ‘learn his lesson’.159  The argument that his prosecution sent 
a bad message to those still in the Bush who might be planning to defect was turned on 
its head: ‘no, it sets a very good example to those who have been given amnesty and later 
went back to captivity to commit more atrocities’, explained a group of men near 
Pabbo.160  The relationship between trials, incarceration, and reconciliation, is fluid and 
unsettled, and when people talked about the trial they portrayed a frustrated sense of 
turmoil about how punishment, compensation, and reconciliation, can and should fit 
together.  This did not preclude certain processes or prioritise one over another; it tried 
to make sense of the range of options and constraints that people faced in their search 
for redress.  This comment by an elder was representative of this kind of thought 
process:  
‘In Acholi, there is a law that says if you kill someone, you should be killed.  Then 
I could forget.  Because I would not want to see him walking and my relatives are 
no-where to be seen.  So, he should be put in life prison.  Yeah, maybe that 
would sound better.  And government should also find a way of compensating 
for all the things people lost.  In that way a person like Kwoyelo could be 
forgiven.  And then he could come forward for Mato Oput.  But it is very 
impossible for him to do that with each victim.  That is why I say that the 
government must provide.  If they did, it would then be unfair to put him in 
prison according to tradition.’161 
 
Thus it was not clear whether people were ‘beyond reconciliation’ as stated by the local 
politician in Pabbo or whether traditional and informal processes were beyond capacity 
when it came to a case like Kwoyelo.  The potential of the trial was interpreted in 
accordance with the concepts of punishment and redress that people were familiar with: 
death; expulsion from the community; and compensation.   People’s support for the trial 
was also linked to a belief that the GoU carried responsibility for ensuring that the 
process bestowed some measure of tangible and material benefit to the communities 
affected by Kwoyelo’s violence.   
 
Despite support for the trial, people rarely expressed knowledge of, or engagement with, 
the actual proceedings.  There were logistical reasons, such as the expense involved in 
travelling to Gulu.  A more pained and profound response related to the prospective 
trauma of failed expectations.  One man explained how the chance of seeing Kwoyelo 
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released would make him ‘feel too bad’.162  Another knew that even though he felt 
Kwoyelo should ‘go through a court of law’, he was not under any illusions that the trial 
itself could help him personally to come to terms with what he experienced.163  As a 
senior community leader he supported the trial, yet also evaded it, and when asked 
‘why?’, he answered, ‘because, where should I start from?’.  He looked down, gathered 
his thoughts and continued:  
‘when the attack happened, one of the things I remembered was a woman who 
we only found the ashes and the skull.  She was a very active woman, doing 
income-generating activities, selling fish.  When the attack happened she ran to 
her hut to gather her money before escaping.  They locked her in and burnt the 
hut’.164   
 
The enormity of what occurred at Pagak in May 2005 was distilled into this one painful 
story, and somehow, while not directly answering the question, he raised another, far 
more complex one, about the limited role that legal processes play in healing the trauma 
caused by what one woman called the ‘unspeakable’ violence that Kwoyelo is alleged to 
have perpetrated.  A local sub-county chief in an area where Kwoyelo was operational 
explained that:  
‘in general terms, we support that trial but the community has developed a 
resilience and the court issue is a technical issue which the lay man may not 
comprehend so people get on with their business’.165   
 
This raises important questions about the relationship between macro-transitional justice 
processes and micro-level post-war existence, which is explored in more depth in 
Chapter 9.   
 
Outside of the place ‘from where he grew,’ and away from those areas in Acholiland 
directly affected by operations that he allegedly commanded, people are far more anxious 
about the plight of Thomas Kwoyelo.   As a man, people ‘de-individuate’ him, and his 
plight and his trial become abstracted and slotted into a broader narrative of structural 
violence and inequality between the GoU and the North.   The trial no longer represents 
an opportunity; instead it is framed as spectral and comes to symbolize people’s fears 
about the refractory nature of ‘distanced’ justice.166  The focus of most people’s concerns 
was the uncertainty posed by the seemingly arbitrary decision not to grant Kwoyelo !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 Key informant interview, Amuru District, 20.08.13 
163 Key informant interview, Amuru District, 27.08.13 
164 Ibid. 
165 Key informant interview, Amuru District, 20.08.13!
166 Holly Porter uses Gready’s term ‘distanced’ justice to discuss formal state-led processes in the context 
of post-conflict northern Uganda, see Porter, ‘After’. 
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amnesty.   Because they were unfamiliar with his crimes, cost-benefit calculations about 
the trial were framed in a completely different way.  On the one hand it was feared that 
the trial would deter those who remain in the Bush from returning, and on the other 
hand there was concern that those senior commanders who had already been granted 
amnesty would become nervous and even belligerent.  Either way, the Kwoyelo trial 
disturbed the ground upon which peace was believed to rest.  
 
Interestingly, opposition to the Kwoyelo trial was often expressed with reference to the 
ICC’s role in northern Uganda.  This might be because the ICC and the ICD are often 
conflated in people’s minds.  The problems for which people blame the ICC are 
attributed also to the ICD.  The key criticism is that the Court is a political tool of the 
GoU, and will not apply the law equally to both sides of the conflict.  In a public meeting 
in Gulu to mark the ten-year anniversary of the ICC, one young man stood up and said:  
‘we are victims of a war.  Museveni triggered this and we are still watching the 
games that are being played.  So how is far is the ICC and its arm in Uganda for 
us?  Our relationship with them is like trying to romance with an impotent man 
whose effort is a wastage of resources’.167 
 
His solution, which was greeted with cheers from the crowd, was that the ICD should be 
closed until Museveni is placed in the dock, ‘and then the court can start its work!’168 
Unfortunately, opposition to the Kwoyelo trial is too often framed in cultural terms, as 
an instinctive African aversion to ‘western’ forms of legal accountability.  This criticism 
by educated Acholis was, however, a direct expression of north-south politics, which had 
little do to with the idea of the court per se, and much more with who is in political 
control of its operations.  According to a local politician, unresolved political tensions 
between the NRM and ‘the Acholi’ made widespread support for the Court impossible. 
He explained that ‘there are those here who hate this government and they oppose the 
court because it is under Museveni.  Whenever the government puts a hand here’, he said 
placing both hands on one side of his desk, ‘they feel they should leap this side’, he said, as 
he raised one hand in the shape of an arch and slapped it down on the other side of the 
table.  This kind of argument finds support outside of Acholiland, in other areas of 
northern Uganda affected by LRA violence, particularly Lango, West Nile, and Teso.  A 
cultural leader from West Nile, for example, saw ‘Acholi’ opposition to the Kwoyelo trial 
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as a part of an Acholi-wide conspiracy to keep quiet about what happened during the 
war: 
‘Kwoyelo was a sector commander for Adjumani.  When I saw him in Garamba I 
said, you have caused our people too much suffering and he just laughed.  They 
always laugh.  In Acholi those people will say “forgive him, he is our son”.  Why?  
It is because they see death as a part of war.  So they will say “after all”, he is our 
son.  “After all” is war and they say he was commanded to do it.  He was not the 
one in control.  Amnesty?  No, he cannot have amnesty.  He did not surrender.  
That man, he should be on trial.  That trial is fair’.169 
 
This comment may not accurately reflect the complexity of different attitudes towards 
the trial within Acholiland, but gave interesting insight into more politicized 
understandings of ‘Acholi’ intentions as interpreted by non-Acholi northern Ugandans 
also affected by the violence.   
 
In most cases, people either individuated or de-individuated Kwoyelo on the basis of 
their war time experience.  Local politicians and leaders, however, made a more informed 
and calculated decision about how to present Kwoyelo and his trial.  Norbert Mao, 
former MP and District Chairman of Gulu, was one of Kwoyelo’s greatest champions 
and a promoter of the de-individuating narrative, which painted Kwoyelo as an innocent 
man who was abducted and forced into terrible crimes against his own will.  ‘Above all’ 
Mao told a journalist in July 2011, shortly after running against Museveni in the national 
elections that year, ‘Kwoyelo was a child that should have been protected by the 
government’. 170  Anglican Bishop MacLeord Baker Ochola II, an influential Acholi 
religious leader and peace advocate, has been another vocal opponent of the trial, and of 
the ICD in general, arguing that ‘it is wrong to bring Kwoyelo to Court.  That division of 
the High Court will polarize people of Uganda… our cultural justice system will bring 
people together’.171  A local politician from Kwoyelo’s area who supported the trial 
argued that both Mao and Ochola ‘misfire’. ‘Mao’, he argued, ‘should have come and 
crosschecked with the people here’; and, as for Ochola, he was promoting ‘only one 
verse of the Acholi reconciliatory set up because traditionally we have very severe 
punishments in Acholi’.172   
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Indeed politicians and government officials who support the trial individuate Kwoyelo.  
They recount his crimes, and go into detail about his character and his refusal to 
surrender.  Using a similar logic to his alleged victims, his wrongs are defined by 
circumstance rather than by ‘law’.173  As a local NRM politician noted, 
‘The Government also takes into consideration that person in the Bush.  You 
see, if someone is active, government decides that person can still be dangerous 
when at large.  These are State things.  That is how you can weigh how likely they 
are to reform.  Like Banya, he was just a Mzee, moving around the Bush, he was 
never implicated in orders.  But the Kwoyelos with the community here, it is all 
muddy.  His footmarks are tainted, it is bloody.  That is what Government does, 
to find out these things.  I don’t think if you were sitting in State house you 
would say, oh, lets set that one free’. 174   
 
Conflating the judicial and executive arms of the State, he argued that  ‘the Government’ 
had to make decisions about who to prosecute on the basis of prospective deterrence. 
Kwoyelo himself was likely to have been aware of such calculations because in late 
December 2013, after over four years in pre-trial detention, he gave his first public 
interview to a journalist from the Government-sponsored New Vision Newspaper. He 
said that he had benefitted from a ‘peacemaking and reconciliation programme’ and now 
‘realised my past mistakes’.175  In a message directed to President Museveni he stated his 
commitment to ‘work with the Government at all cost’ and pledged that ‘once 
considered for clemency, I swear I will never go back to rebel activities’.176  It is not clear 
whether Kwoyelo’s lawyers advised him to make this statement or whether he simply 
‘gave a passing journalist some good copy’.177  It is unlikely to have escaped his attention 
that senior LRA commander, Caesar Acellam, who was reportedly captured on 12 May 
2012, was not handed over to the police, but instead has undergone what the UPDF 4th 
Division Intelligence Officer, Major Patrick Bugiriwa described as ‘rehabilitation’: 
‘if the higher command feel that he has been rehabilitated enough to join the 
UPDF ranks then why not, we believe people can change as we have a process of 
continuous sensitization and brainwashing so as he becomes a better person… 
the UPDF system that we have been using of brainwashing rebels will never lead 
to any betrayal’.178   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 Dresh, ‘Legalism’,p.20; p.34. 
174 Key informant interview, Amuru District, 27.08.2013. 
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177 Paul Bradfield, ‘The latest twist in the case of Thomas Kwoyelo’, 03.01.2014. 
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The alternate fate of senior LRA commanders who were captured or surrendered after 
Kwoyelo was not just a legal anomaly, it was indicative of a political and military 
approach that eschewed defined rules of engagement when it came to conflict-related 
crimes, and evaded the formulation of policy that encouraged such rules.  Thus what 
Nouwen called ‘no policy’ in relation to the Kwoyelo trial, is the product of an 
entrenched political culture that resists subordination to the Law, and believes that ‘law 
exists not to limit the state but to serve its power’.179  The transitional justice conception 
of the Ugandan political leadership is not normative, directional or linear.  It is reactive 
and pragmatic, and its fate rests ultimately with the President, who, as one of his advisors 
pointed out, does not see things these things as ‘permanent’, because ‘laws and even the 
constitution…these are living documents not static ones, we need to revisit them as 




Donor capacity-building interventions for conflict-related criminal justice processes have 
had a modest effect in the sense that new laws have been drafted (ICC Act), law-related 
institutions (ICD) have been built, and staff have been trained.  But technical support in 
this area has not resulted in a tangibly different interpretation of the role of the law, or 
the role of the judiciary, amongst entrenched political elites of the sort envisaged by the 
dominant liberal transitional justice paradigm.  As one local politician in Gulu explained, 
‘Uganda could compete in the World Cup of laws’, it is the implementation that is the 
problem.181  In the post-Juba rush to fund the Court - to see concrete evidence of a 
transitional justice policy in motion - donor money and donor pressure built a war crimes 
court that was politically and structurally incapable of delivering a fair trial by 
international standards.  But, as this chapter has argued, political elites were not 
sufficiently engaged to capitalize on this new court in the way that critical observers 
might predict.   The court itself was not instituted as a theatre of state power; instead, it 
became the arena within which a rather clumsy battle between different state institutions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
enough-lra-s-acellam-is-welcome-to-join-updf-4th-division-intelligence-officer&catid=8:acholi-
news&Itemid=101 (accessed 10.07.2013). 
179 Carothers, ‘Revival’, p.5  
180 Author interview with presidential advisor, Kampala, 04.05.2012. 
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played out.  It is true that the prosecutorial strategy of the DPP was a reflection of the 
structural power asymmetries between the GoU and the ‘defeated’ LRA, but the 
Kwoyelo trial did not really produced any winners.  The political leadership, meanwhile, 
has never articulated a coherent government position, or really even an expression of 
concern, about either the ICD or the tensions between prosecution and amnesty that its 
first trial exposed so clearly.   The transitional justice conception of donors working in 
the area  - the idea that peace, democracy and rule of law will be strengthened through 
institutional capacity building - is a hostage to circumstances.   The formal apparatus of 
donor supported transitional justice structures exist largely, as one lawyer put it, in 
‘cyber-space,’ exogenous to the everyday realities of the Ugandan political system.182  
 
At the same time, as this chapter has argued, the ICD should be understood as more 
than a legal institution and the first war crimes trial should be understood as comprising 
more than just a set of legal arguments and judgments.  In communities affected by LRA 
violence, people either ‘individuated’ or ‘de-individuated’ Thomas Kwoyelo based on 
their own war time experiences.  The different representations of the defendant that 
emerged and the varying conceptions of the ‘justness’ of the trial highlighted the 
complicated nature of victimhood in the Acholi context.   But schematic representations 
of Kwoyelo were also used by political actors, both at the local and national level to 
‘compete for attention and identification from different parts of the audience’ in ways 
that were essentially detached from the legal aspects of the process.183  Political support 
for and opposition towards Kwoyelo’s prosecution and detention were rooted in the 
logics of war, political identity and political power and this narrative shaping eclipsed the 
‘purely legal outcomes’ of the trial.184 
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7. Selecting tradition and forcing forgiveness? Mediated reconciliation 




In discussions about transitional justice in northern Uganda, distinctions are commonly 
drawn between JLOS-led, donor-driven formal conceptions on the one hand, and ‘local’ 
conceptions on the other.1  Since the late 1990s the Acholi leadership – political, 
religious, and cultural – have promoted ‘local approaches’ and presented them as a 
morally superior alternative to ‘external’ systems of justice.2  The logic behind these 
approaches is informed by the complex war and now relative peace that the Acholi 
inhabit. This was a conflict in which ‘victims and perpetrators often trade(d) 
places…each side ha[d] a narrative of victimhood’ and now, in the aftermath of the 
conflict and displacement, they have to find a way of living together again.3  Advocacy 
around ‘local approaches’ to transitional justice has centered on the restorative 
possibilities of two processes: traditional Acholi reconciliation techniques, and Christian 
forgiveness.  The two processes are conceptually distinct, but advocates and scholars 
often conflate them, or create linkages between the two.4  
 
Groups promoting forgiveness and reconciliation – most notably religious leaders under 
the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and ‘traditional’ leaders, under the 
Acholi cultural institution, the Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), have engaged closely with 
transitional justice discourse in their advocacy.5   The promotion of forgiveness and 
reconciliation at the communal level has also been associated with the local government 
administered District Peace and Reconciliation Teams (DPRT), particularly in Gulu and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In practice of course, the distinction is not a neat one and the Amnesty Act in particular appears to fall 
somewhere in the middle of the divide.  
2 In this they have been supported and sometimes coached by national NGOs and donors. See Bradbury, 
‘Overview’.  
3 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘The Logic of Nuremberg’, London Review of Books, 35:21 (2013), pp.33-35. 
4 See for example, Amy Finnegan, ‘Forging Forgiveness: Collective Efforts Amidst War in Northern 
Uganda’, Sociological Inquiry, 80:1 (2010), pp.424-447 p.432; Daniel Philpott, ‘The Justice of Forgiveness’, 
Journal of Religious Ethics, 41 (3), pp.400-416; Charles Baguma, ‘When the Traditional Justice System is the 
Best Suited Approach to Conflict Management’, Journal of Global Initiatives 7:1 (2012); ‘Uganda: The 
Challenge of Forgiveness’, Fetzer Institute, (April, 2012) http://www.fetzer.org/our-work/projects/uganda-challenge-
forgiveness (accessed 07.08.2012). 
5 The Mato Oput Project, Community Perspectives On the Mato Oput Process, (October 2009) p. 4; See for 
example, Navigating Justice, Reflections on the Role of Acholi Traditional Justice, Report of the Gulu Seminar of the 
Ker Kwaro Acholi, (February 2009); Wade Snowdon, Pursuing Peaceful Means to End the LRA Conflict: 
Recommendations by the ARLPI, (April 2010)  
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Nwoya districts, where they are more organised.  There are also several prominent 
NGOs and humanitarian organisations that have engaged in advocacy around ‘local 
approaches’.  Most notable are the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) and the 
Refugee Law Project (RLP).  The Amnesty Commission and the organisations running 
the receptions centres – those responsible for ‘reintegrating’ former LRA members back 
into their communities - have also been active promoters of forgiveness and 
reconciliation.   
 
This chapter focuses on elite articulations of what local responses to mass atrocity ought 
to comprise, as opposed to what they actually look like in practice (the subject of the final 
chapter). Throughout the chapter, a particular point is stressed: although there are 
important epistemological and practical distinctions between the traditional justice and 
the Christian forgiveness agendas, both represent a heavily mediated and sometimes 
coercive ‘ideal type’ response to mass atrocity in northern Uganda.  Much has been 
written about the evolution of an externally supported traditional reconciliation agenda in 
Acholiland.6  Yet we know very little about how this operated in practice, and how it has 
been experienced by communities affected by the violence.  The first part of the chapter 
focuses on the political construction of the KKA; local attitudes towards this form of 
public authority; and experiences of externally supported rituals conducted under its 
auspices.  It argues that the KKA, as an institution, does not enjoy widespread legitimacy 
or credibility in Acholiland and that the chiefly authority system is widely regarded as 
external to local practices and understandings of justice, social repair and reconciliation.   
 
To some extent, this analysis provides additional empirical depth to the findings of 
influential scholars, most notably Adam Branch and Tim Allen, who have, in the past, 
provided comprehensive critiques of ‘ethnojustice’ narratives and donor-driven 
traditional justice in northern Uganda.7  This analysis also, however, departs from, and 
challenges these existing critiques in two fundamental ways. Firstly, in demonstrating 
clearly that external attempts to create a ‘traditional’ justice system in northern Uganda 
have not been successful in practice – largely because people have chosen not to use it - 
it restores a greater sense of agency to Acholi people.  The somewhat dubious argument 
that external support for a traditional justice agenda would be directly responsible for a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Bradbury, ‘Overview’ and Latigo, ‘Northern’.  For critical appraisals, see Allen, ‘Trial’, Allen ‘Bitter’ 
and Branch, ‘Ethno-justice’.   
7 Ibid.!
! 214 
resurgence in oppressive patriarchy negated this agency and over-stated the extent to 
which authorities which lack credibility and legitimacy are able to regulate local life.8  
Secondly, and relatedly, this analysis attempts to create a much clearer conceptual 
distinction between externally supported ‘traditional’ justice agendas, particularly those 
mediated by the KKA, and the much wider realm of local practice pertaining to ideas of 
redress, punishment and reconciliation. To date, the scholarly focus has been too heavily 
concentrated on the former and the unintended consequence is the implication that 
beyond a range of externally constructed ideal-type traditional processes, nothing else 
exists, or, if it does exist, it is somehow tarnished with the same brush.  This chapter and 
following chapter provide analysis not only about the way in which people have reacted 
to the KKA and its traditional justice and reconciliation agendas, but also about everyday 
approaches to justice, reconciliation and healing in the context of post-conflict 
Acholiland.  This, it is hoped, will open up new ways of thinking about ‘local’ approaches 
to transitional justice in northern Uganda.  
 
The second part of this chapter examines the promotion of Christian forgiveness in 
post-conflict Acholiland.  It argues that the form of forgiveness promoted by the 
religious leadership has been demanding and often unyielding, and should be understood 
as such.  It also explores the different rhetorical devices employed by NGOs and local 
politicians to encourage forgiveness across the region. The final part of the chapter 
complicates the rhetoric of these agendas by examining the way in which forgiveness has 
been enacted in Acholiland; what this tells us about local conceptions of forgiveness; and 
the implications this has for contemporary inter-communal relationships, in particular 
between former LRA members and those who have never experienced life in the bush.  !
Conceptualising forgiveness and reconciliation promotion in the Acholi context 
 
This brief section introduces two important background considerations regarding 
forgiveness and reconciliation which are fleshed out as the chapter progresses.  The first 
is that in Acholiland, forgiveness has been formally associated with the Amnesty Act.9  
The Act itself uses the word ‘forgiveness’ to describe its rationale.10  In Acholi, as is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See Branch, ‘Ethnojustice’, p.616; 626-7; Allen, ‘Bitter’, p.253. 
9 See, for example, Jeffrey, ‘Forgiveness’; Finnegan, ‘Forging’.  
10 Amnesty Act (2000) 
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explored below, the same word timo-kica is used to denote both the amnesty and 
forgiveness.  In their comments, some informants described this as a difficult conflation 
and made the distinction between inter-personal/communal forgiveness and forgiveness 
as a broader political project.  For example, one man in Agago district explained that: 
‘Forgiveness is in the hands of the government.  It is not for us to decide.  But 
Banya cannot come here….but if he came here there is nothing we can do 
because the government has given him amnesty.  Our view is different – 
especially for leaders – we feel they should be dealt with.  But government 
disagrees. But these who were abducted, we really do feel bad for these ones but 
still it is hard.  But the government they say, it is you, you the people who want 
to forgive.  Maybe it was subjected to opinion polls or something.  We do not 
know the results’.11   
 
There exists then, a complicated relationship, observed in other contexts too, between 
political forgiveness, which Andrew Schapp argues ‘bargains away’ the choice of the 
victim/s to forgive and, what one informant referred to as, ‘natural’ forgiveness, which, 
as Hannah Arendt famously argued, denotes a degree of agency.12  In northern Uganda, 
the involvement of religious leaders and NGOs in the promotion of forgiveness places 
their activities somewhere along the spectrum of coerced and natural forgiveness and this 
is examined below.   
 
The other important consideration is that, for the most part, local leaders and NGOs 
have promoted both forgiveness and reconciliation as intra-Acholi processes.13  These are 
theological, psychological and spiritual processes that are expected to take place between 
LRA perpetrators and their victims, both within and between Acholi communities.  The 
government’s role in the conflict, as both Branch and Allen have argued, is conveniently 
sidelined and macro-level reconciliation of the type envisaged in the AAR agreements 
through a truth body is no longer on the political agenda.14  However, as will be explored 
below, the conceptual distinction between micro and macro level reconciliation is rarely 
observed or accepted by people in Acholiland. 
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Traditional authorities as the arbiters of transitional justice and reconciliation 
 
As described in Chapters Three and Four, when more than 300 Acholi religious, cultural, 
and political leaders and diaspora members met in London in 1997 for the Kacoke Madit 
(big gathering) to try to ‘generate a consensus for peace and reconciliation among the 
Acholi’, broad agreement was reached on the need to promote Acholi ‘unity,’ and 
strengthen ‘cultural heritage’. 15 After the meeting, KM commissioned International Alert, 
a London-based NGO, to produce a report about the views of Acholi ‘opinion leaders’ 
on both dialogue with the LRA, and on broader intra-Acholi ‘reconciliation’ processes.  
The landmark report, entitled ‘The Bending of Spears: Producing Consensus for Peace and 
Development in Northern Uganda’ was written by Dennis Pain, who was Oxfam’s country 
representative in Uganda from 1984-87.  Pain’s highly dubious conclusion that ‘Acholi 
traditional resolution of conflict and violence stands among the highest practices 
anywhere in the world’, was a clarion call for international funding for a mediated 
reconciliation agenda for Acholiland.16  Central to this would be the restoration of a 
chiefly public authority structure – now allowed under the terms of Article 246 of the 
1995 Ugandan Constitution,17 and the revival of certain rituals, most notably, Mato Oput 
because, according to Pain:  
‘all Acholi know that because of the atrocities, particularly against children, since 
1994…all involved must go through Mato Oput reconciliation.’.18 
 
Mato Oput literally means the drinking of a bitter root of the oput tree and there is some 
evidence that variants of this process were traditionally used in cases of murder or 
accidental death.19  There is also plenty of evidence to suggest that at the time Pain made 
his recommendations, this particular ritual was not in widespread use, and knowledge of 
its meaning and requirements was weak.20  
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16 Pain, ‘Bending’, p.2.  17!The 1995 Ugandan Constitution re-instated the right of Ugandan citizens to adhere to the culture and 
cultural institutions of the community. Museveni’s formal recognition of the traditional leaders and 
kingdoms was largely an effort to circumscribe their function and role, particularly in relation to the 
growing power of the Buganda kingdom.  See, Nsibambi, ‘Restorations’, p.47!
18 Pain, ‘Bending’ p.2; p.110.  Pain also recommends the revival of a ritual called ‘Gomo Tong’, or ‘bending 
of the spears’, last performed between the Acholi and West Nilers in 1986.  As Allen argues, ‘this was a 
ceremony that occurred at the end of the war, symbolizing the termination of the fighting’ between tribes 
(see Allen ‘Trial’ p. 165).  Pain’s idea was to combine Mato Oput and Gomo Tong reconciliation rites.   
19 Girling for example, writes in quite a bit of detail about Mato Oput, see Girling, pp.65-67. 
20 Acord, ‘Background Papers presented to the conference on peace research and the reconciliation 
agenda’, Gulu, northern Uganda, COPE Working Paper no. 32 (London: Accord, 2000).   
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Pain’s report sparked donor interest.  In January 1999 the Belgian Government provided  
funding for the international NGO, Acord, to examine the chieftaincy system in 
Acholiland, and suggest how it might be strengthened and institutionalized in order to 
carry out Pain’s prescriptions.21  The first step was to identify the royal lineages of each 
clan.  This was reportedly a fraught and highly complex undertaking given the degree of 
displacement and social change that Acholiland had experienced since independence, not 
to mention colonialism and pre-colonial slave raiding incursions.22  Despite concerns 
expressed by Acord about the capacity and legitimacy of ‘traditional’ systems, donors 
liked the idea of channeling support through a defined chieftaincy structure that could 
promote ‘codified’ traditional reconciliation methods.23   
 
The Acholi cultural institution, the Ker Kwaro Acholi, was set up in 2000.  The head of 
the Payira clan, the largest clan in Acholi, was appointed Paramount Chief (Laworwodi) 
and 52 (now 54) clan chiefs were officially recognized and incorporated into the 
institution.  When Payira chief, Rwot David Acana I passed away just prior to his official 
coronation he was replaced by his son, Rwot David Acana II. 24  Because of the security 
situation, his coronation did not take place until 17 January 2005.  President Museveni 
was in attendance and made a speech warning cultural institutions against ‘fragmenting 
society’.  Shortly afterwards he donated the new Paramount Chief a ‘double cabin pick 
up truck worth over sh50m ($19,000).’25  The controversial Roco Wat I Acholi report, 
singled out by both Tim Allen and Adam Branch as a seminal document in the 
promotion of the ‘ethnojustice’ agenda, presents a consensual picture of spontaneous 
adherence to a long-term Payira clan paramountcy.26  But in discussions with non-Payira 
elders and even Chiefs, it is noted with some chagrin that the Paramount Chief position 
was originally intended to be ‘rotating’, but that this has not come to pass.27  The failure 
of Acana II to relinquish his position has discredited the institution in the eyes of those 
Acholi who were optimistic about what the KKA might deliver, and has confirmed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Allen, ‘Bitter’, pp.244-249.!
22 Liu Institute, ‘Roco Wat’, p.31 
23 See Acord, ‘Background’. Codification was one of the key recommendations of Baines, ‘Roco Wat’ 
report, and as was discussed in Chapter five, donors provided funds for this.   
24 Ocana has spent the last three years in the, studying for a degree, reportedly in business and 
development at Coventry University.    
25 ‘Museveni attends Rwot Acana Coronation’, 16.01.2005,  
http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/412440  
26 Liu Institute, ‘Roco Wat’ p.31. This does not hold true given that in 1999, after the death of Rwot Acana 
I, the succession of his son to the throne was contested by at least two other clan chiefs: one from the 
Lamogi and the other from Pajule.  source 
27 Author field notes, Acholiland, June-October 2013. 
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Payira desires for hegemony and power amongst those who were already skeptical.28  For 
many people, the Ker Kwaro Acholi structure is more reminiscent of colonialism than of 
an ideal, unadulterated past.  As one influential elder remarked: 
‘Rwots were imposed on people; from way back in colonial times this was the 
case.  Of course, culture evolves, and now you find politicians and donors 
appointing Rwots.’29   
 
Because it is largely donor funded, the KKA has come under pressure to restructure 
itself to resemble and operate more like an NGO.30  It has a secretariat headed by a 
‘Prime Minister,’ with a programme coordinator and programme officers, and is housed 
– perhaps fittingly - on a hill in Gulu town in the premises of the old Colonial 
administration and tax authority.31  Like all recognized cultural institutions, it receives 
five million Ugandan Shillings (roughly $2000) a month from the central government.  In 
November 2010, on his first official day of election campaigning in the Acholi sub-
region, President Museveni commissioned houses to be built for every Rwodi Moo 
associated with the KKA.  On the same day, he ‘cut the tape’ at a newly built four 
bedroom house at the Paramount Chief’s palace in Purongo sub-county, Nwoya district.  
Museveni used the opportunity to reiterate his position that ‘cultural leaders should not 
involve themselves in politics’.32  The money to fund the construction of the houses 
came from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) under the Peace and Recovery 
Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP).   A senior staff member in the OPM 
referred to the KKA chiefs as ‘change agents’ who have been ‘put back into the 
community’ by the Government of Uganda, but who are still ‘limping.’33  Despite their 
relatively modest nature, the breezeblock houses stand out today in rural Acholi settings 
as a symbol of privilege and exception, and as such they arouse considerable suspicion.34   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 These sentiments were expressed numerous times in interviews with Acholi elders across the sub-region 
during field work, June-October 2012; July-September 2013.  The contested nature of the ‘paramount 
chief’ role is discussed in Finnström, ‘Surrondings’, p.45.  
29 Author interview with elder, Gulu District, 28.07.2012 
30 This is evident in the Ker Kwaro Acholi Strategic Plan 2009-2014 (on file with author). 
31 Finnström, ‘Surrondings’, p.45.  
32 ‘Museveni Gives Acholi Chiefs Houses’, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/738566 November 17 
2010; ‘Government builds 54 houses for chiefs in Acholi’, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-
/688334/1160868/-/c1krj9z/-/index.html May 12 2011 
33 Author Interview with Benon Kigenyi, Principal Assistant Secretary, Pacification and Development, 
Northern Uganda, Office of the Prime Minister, Kampala, 06.06.12. 
34 Author fieldnotes, Acholiland, June-October 2012. 
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Perhaps it is not surprising that this ‘cadre of chiefs supported by foreign donors and the 
government’ has struggled to establish legitimacy within Acholi society.35  Not long ago, 
a group of local government councilors in Gulu ranked the KKA as the most corrupt 
institution in Acholiland, and even threatened to write to donors to request that they 
suspend all funding to the institution.36  In November 2013, both Danida and the 
Netherlands embassy publicly declared that money allocated to the KKA for ‘peace-
building’ and ‘reconciliation’ activities had not been properly accounted for.37   Acholi 
religious and political leaders increasingly distance themselves from the KKA, criticising 
it on the grounds of inauthenticity. Local politicians who criticise mismanagement of 
funds at the KKA make a clear distinction between this corrupted institution and the rest 
of Acholi society.  One Councilor, Wilson Chagga, said that across Acholiland there are:  
‘Very few instances of corruption and mismanagement of funds but we hear it 
time and time again from the cultural institution.  We need to find ways to stop 
the mismanagement of funds for the Acholi people.’38  
 
Not long after these accusations were made, the Lamogi clan, the third largest in 
Acholiland, threatened to break away from the KKA, citing corruption and an 
impenetrable leadership structure.  A Lamogi elder said that the clan had been: 
‘Left with no option but to distance itself from an institution that has failed to 
live according to values and bettering and reintegrating its people.’39  
 
The concern that privileged access to external funds has made the chiefs ‘tools of 
outsiders seeking economic benefit and political control’ 40 has become particularly 
marked due to the alleged collusion of certain chiefs in GoU attempts, since the end of 
the conflict, to grab Acholi land for investment purposes.41   
 
Charges of corruption confirm fears amongst other Acholi leaders that support for the 
KKA, as currently constituted, may no longer be a pragmatic option.  The tone of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Branch, ‘Displacing’, p.159 
36 ‘Gulu Councillors Rank Acholi Cultural Institution Most Corrupt in the Subregion’, 
http://www.acholitimes.com/index.php/acholi-news/1965-gulu-councillors-rank-acholi-cultural-
institution-most-corrupt-in-the-sub-region 06.01.2014 
37 Ibid. According to the report, the Dutch ambassador reportedly wrote to the KKA in November 2013, 
demanding a refund of UGX 230 million (roughly $92,000) granted to ‘foster reconciliation’ 
38 ibid 
39  ‘Lamogi Clan Threatens Breakaway’ http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Lamogi-clan-
threatens-breakaway/-/688334/2140462/-/60x77ez/-/index.html 10.01.2014 
40 Branch, ‘Displacing’, p.159  





informants tends to be reflective, as if what is being discussed is a failing or soon to fail 
experiment.  As one religious leader explained: 
‘At first we started working well and were working collaboratively with the 
traditional leaders but now the community are complaining so much at the 
traditional leaders…Benefits from government tie them up, homes, tokens for 
support, all this brings compromises where you cannot shout very much because 
you are benefitting.  Their voice has now been silent and they are not so much on 
the ground.  We need to get back our community to the real Acholi culture.’42  
 
Local politicians are similarly disillusioned with the way in which external funds for 
traditional authorities have undermined alternative strategies for peace-building and 
reconciliation.  According to a 2011 independent evaluation of the Northern Ugandan 
Transitional Initiative (NUTI), a USAID program which provided funds to the KKA, 
most of the criticism of the project came from political leaders who:  
‘think the resources meant for reconciliation could have been used differently.  
There is a feeling that the money spent lodging elders, removing them from their 
communities, and taking them round (against the practice of each chief dealing 
with the rituals in his own realm), could have been better spent.’43   
 
Indeed this tension also reflected the reality that local government and NGOs have had 
to compete with the KKA for limited donor and state funds, particularly around the 
crowded objectives related to peace-building and reconciliation.   
 
A particular complaint amongst local political and religious leaders and certain NGOs 
was the failure of the KKA to take a proactive stance on the lapsing of the Amnesty Act 
in 2012. According to one elder and civil society leader who had been integral in 
organizing the local campaign calling for the re-instatement of the Act, ‘The KKA 
hesitated.  Will this not rub the Government up the wrong way?   They did not want to 
antagonize the Government.  They hesitated on dissemination.’44  The lawyer advising on 
the process said that he had to call Acana personally to ‘convince him to support the 
declaration’.45  The KKA leadership privately confirmed this version of events, and the 
Prime Minister has been open about his preference for accountability over amnesty.46    
Civil society groups and religious leaders running the campaign worried that the Prime 
Minister and the Paramount Chief had become so close to the government they were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Author interview with religious leader, Gulu District, 12.09.12 
43 Annina Mattsson, Robert Opio and Emery Brusset, ‘The Rising Tide: Uganda Country Program Final 
Evaluation’ USAID Evaluation, (2011), p.18 
44 Author interview with civil society leader, Gulu, 25.06.2012 
45 Author interview with legal advisor to Amnesty campaign, 18.06.2012 
46 Author interview with Kenneth Oketta, KKA Prime Minister, 11.09.2012.!
! 221 
unable to campaign on behalf of the ‘children still in the bush’.  The narrative of the 
children still in the bush, the paradigmatic victims of a senseless war, carries enormous 
rhetorical sway, particularly amongst those who continue support the amnesty.  As will 
be explored in more detail below, the forgiveness agenda which overlaps and emerged in 
parallel with the traditional justice and reconciliation agenda - albeit spearheaded more by 
religious leaders - intoned that caring for and about these children is what it means to be 
Acholi.   The idea that the Acholi cultural institution would diverge from the certainty of 
unconditional amnesty was regarded as an abhorrence that seemed to confirm what 
appeared to be growing discourse about the un-Acholiness of the KKA.  
 
Political leaders have used this ‘un-Acholi’ rhetoric to critique the ostensible 
professionalisation and institutionalisation of the KKA.  While there is acceptance 
amongst political leaders and civil society that ‘development-speak’ and what Richard 
Wilson refers to as ‘human rights talk’ are the language of power and money.47  There has 
also been a general dissatisfaction with the failure of the KKA to insulate itself from this 
and provide a different kind of leadership.  For an institution whose legitimacy within 
Acholiland was always contested, one of the main criticisms of the KKA has been that it 
is ‘just another NGO’.48  Accusations of corruption (both material and spiritual), laziness 
and detachment have been linked to a broader lamentation that somehow Acholi 
traditions and cultural practices, in general, have been undermined by the decision of the 
KKA to allow its programs to become so heavily mediated by donor priorities.  Writing 
in 1999, Mark Bradbury pointed out that ‘for many, cultural revival is about ‘social 
reconstruction’ but also a means to establish a distinctive Acholi political voice and 
identity.49  The LCV Chairman, the most senior local politician in Gulu, described a 
feeling of disillusionment: 
‘What is the meaning of going to NGO workshops, of taking money to buy goats 
for ceremonies?  How do you facilitate and pay cultural leaders when it is their 
responsibility to do these things?  What if the money stops?  Will they stop?  It is 
monetizing the activities of cultural institutions and I have told Rwot Acana that 
he needs to do more to stop the KKA from being run like an NGO.  Structures 
such as project officers do not exist in the traditional institutions.  Project 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Richard Wilson, ‘Tyrannosaurus lex: The anthropology of human rights and transnational law’ in Mark 
Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds.), The practice of human rights: Tracking the law between the global and the local 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 342-368. 
48 This was a quote given by the LCV during an interview on 10.09.2012 but it is representative of broader 
attitudes. 
49 Bradbury ‘Overview’ p.18 
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coordinators are now more important than the traditional chiefs.  Right now they 
are just an NGO and people have lost confidence.’50 
 
A well-respected elder shared these feelings: 
‘The Ker Kwaro Acholi is a sad story.  That cultural institution and its true value 
and impact has been eroded and overtaken by imposed structures. There is a 
crisis in traditional leadership.’ 51  
 
Frustration centered on the fact that the KKA had not achieved a distinct logic of its 
own.  Rather than having a pluralizing effect on the regulation of Acholi society, it 
became just another expression of the NGO-ifcation of administration in northern 
Uganda.  Whether it was government enticement to promote state interests or 
NGO/donor pressure to conform, the KKA was seen to be influenced too easily by 
centralizing and homogenisng discourses, and failed to offer the possibility of a different 
and meaningful form of post-conflict adjudication.52 These findings challenge Branch’s 
argument that external support for Acholi chiefs ‘has the potential to silence those who 
do not identify with this revived male authority.’53  This has not played out in practice, 
partly because external support itself appears to have de-legitimated this form of public 
authority. 
 
This links to another observable tendency, which was that people often judged the 
functioning of the KKA against its own rhetoric and inflated discourse.  The efficacy of 
KKA chiefs and the organization as a whole was measured against the ‘pristine golden 
age’ type criteria of the ethnojustice narrative, and found wanting.  It was common to 
hear people complain that Chiefs could be seen in restaurants and discos around Gulu 
town.  People found it hard to reconcile these modern tastes with a narrative that 
emphasized the majesty and authority of traditional rulers.  In interviews with local 
political leaders (mainly at the LC1 and LC2 levels), and elders across Acholiland, the 
same issue arose repeatedly. It was common to hear remarks like these: 
‘There is a problem.  You see, in the olden days the traditional chiefs were really 
respected, they don’t get salary but people they did take them some food there… 
They are always receiving visitors.  So the people did take them foods like sim 
sim.  When they go hunting, they always bring meat.  But one of these days, the 
Chiefs have also become a nuisance. You now find them all around town in 
restaurants even discos. They are being paid salaries by the government; the 
government is building them houses.  They are not supposed to handle politics !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Author interview with Martin Ojara Mapenduzi, LCV Chairman, Gulu District, 10.09.2012  
51 Author interview with James Latigo, Gulu, 04.07.2012 
52 Wilson writes about pluralisation and centralization in ‘Tyrannosaurus’, p.348-9 
53 Branch, ‘Ethnojustice’, p.626. 
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but the government is now giving them cars, money, like the leader of the chiefs 
is getting about 5 million shillings from the government!  The NGOs give them 
help too, like certain NGOs have distributed bicycles for the chiefs… Even if 
people are suffering the Chiefs don’t come and tell the government that people 
are suffering.  The Chiefs are just quiet because they are being pocketed by the 
government.’54   
 
The ideal traditional justice narrative depicted the chiefly authority structure in an 
unsustainably ‘ideal’ way.  It had created a rod for its own back, and in many ways the 
KKA became an easy scapegoat for general disillusionment with post-conflict recovery 
in northern Uganda.55  
 
Role of the chiefs in traditional justice and reconciliation 
 
External support for the implementation of a traditional justice and reconciliation 
agenda, argued Tim Allen, is ‘premised on the assumption that local rituals performed 
under the auspices of chiefs would, in some undefined way, lead to social 
reconciliation’.56  But as the preceding section has argued, the authority of these chiefs 
and of the KKA in general has been highly contested, and challenges to their legitimacy 
and spiritual and political authority impacted on this particular conception of transitional 
justice.  
 
Reconciliation is usually translated into Acholi as ‘Roco Wat’, which means to restore 
social relationships.  Finnström cautions against overly romantic definitions, and has a 
minimalist interpretation based on his own fieldwork, arguing that it equates to 
‘acceptance of the necessity for social interaction.’57  For this to be possible after 
wrongdoing, there normally needs to be some combination of acknowledgement, 
reparation, apology and often ‘restorative punishment’ too.58  Porter’s concept of ‘social 
harmony’ encapsulates what most people envisage ‘reconciliation’ looking like in 
Acholiland.  She describes this as a ‘state of normal relations among the living and the 
dead, linked to an idea of cosmological equilibrium, and a social balance of power and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Author interview with elder and former Sub-County Chief, Bur Coro, 26.07.2012 
55 For an example of this disillusionment see, Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), 
Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis (September, 2013).!!
56 Allen, ‘Bitter’, p.248. 
57 Finnström, ‘Surroundings’, p.154. 
58 Daniel Philpott, ‘Reconciliation: An Ethic For Responding to Evil in Global Politics’, in Rennee Jeffery 
(ed.) Confronting Evil In International Relations: Ethical Responses of Moral Agency (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), pp.115-49. 
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moral order.’59  ‘Social harmony’ here describes a settled state of affairs in which society 
can function, rather than a normative category.   An important point, as Clark notes in 
the context of Rwanda, is that reconciliation is a ‘process’ as well as an ‘end-point.’60  
Mato oput attracted so much attention initially because proponents portrayed it as a 
‘reconciliation ritual’.  In actual fact, it is the long – sometimes months or years long - 
negotiation process leading up to the performance of the ritual itself, which is the 
process by which relationships are restored and made meaningful again. 
 
Traditionally, the Rwot Moo would not have been directly involved in many of the rituals 
that donors have funded the KKA to carry out since 2005.  In an interview with a chief 
of one of the Payira sub-clans at his PRDP funded house near the edge of Murchison 
Falls National Park in Purongo, he struggled to recall how Mato Oput was carried out and 
said that he had yet to witness a war-related ceremony.61  He got up from his seat and 
came back with a file thick with notes from NGO meetings and ‘trainings’ he had 
attended: they included instructions on everything from ‘women’s rights’ to alternative 
dispute mediation (ADR) guides. Other interviews betrayed a similar lack of knowledge 
and lack of confidence on the role originally ascribed to the KKA by donors and others.  
One NGO staff member who worked closely on reconciliation and transitional justice 
programmes, recounted how the Chief of Patiko had requested her presence as a 
‘technical adviser’ at a meeting with local people about traditional cleansing processes.  
She responded by telling him, ‘but you are the ones who are supposed to know these 
issues!  I do not know these issues so why should I be there?’62   
 
The debate about Mato Oput as a form of post-conflict reconciliation in Acholiland 
remains largely theoretical.  In 2013, in the fifteen years since the publication of Dennis 
Pain’s report, the KKA could only list five Mato Oput ceremonies conducted under their 
auspices in relation to the LRA conflict.63  Three were conducted in Pader Town, and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Porter, ‘Rape’, p.13. 
60  Clark, ‘Justice’, p.44. 
61 Author interview, Rwot Otto Alex, Purrongo, 15.08.2012. It was explained that because the current 
Paramount Chief is also the Payira Chief, a sort of deputy chief was appointed to preside over the Payira 
clans. 
62 Author interview with senior NGO staff member, Justice and Reconciliation Project, Gulu, 24.07.2012 
63 Author interview with Kenneth Oketta, Prime Minister, KKA, Gulu, 11.09.2012.  Enquiries about how 
many Mato Oput ceremonies have taken place under the auspices of the KKA for non-war related crimes 
reach a dead end very quickly.  In an author interview, one programme officer was insistent that ‘this 
information is very confidential’ but did not explain why.  In another author interview, the Prime Minister 
was less obstructive, acknowledging that record keeping had been poor and that the numbers might exist at 
the level of the chief but have never been checked or collated.  Anthropologists Holly Porter and Sverker 
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other two took place in Lamogi, in Amuru District.  They were followed closely in a 
documentary film made for Al-Jazeera called ‘Bitter Root’.64  The documentary portrays 
the sense of uncertainty that attended the process as it was expanded to cover complex 
war related crimes.  All five were cases in which former LRA combatants approached 
their respective Rwodi Moo and requested the initiation of the Mato Oput process.   
 
Fifteen years on from the publication of Pain’s report people remain divided on Mato 
Oput.  Even the most ardent supporters of the process are resigned to the fact that the 
right conditions are not in place to allow Mato Oput to become an effective intra-Acholi 
reconciliatory practice on a mass scale.  The structural impediments are too severe.  
According to elderly informants, those who conducted Mato Oput in the past for murder, 
the offender needed to initiate the process and was required to provide some detail of 
what took place: who they killed, and how.  This may have been possible in isolated 
murder or manslaughter cases but would prove much harder in the context of a 20-year 
war which spread throughout much of northern Uganda. In any case, as many 
informants explained, an admission of guilt was highly unlikely in today’s circumstances.  
Confessing to a crime exposes you, and cannot guarantee your security or impunity.  
Whether rational or not, people were afraid that they would be taken to the ICC or to 
the War Crimes Court, or that they would face revenge attacks from their victim’s family 
or clan members.  Secondly, few families could to provide compensation, and unless it 
was substantial, the victim’s family would be unlikely to accept the initiation of the 
process.   
 
Indeed there was a strong sense across the different research sites that ritual alone, in the 
absence of significant material compensation, was not sufficient.  As a senior member of 
staff in the Gulu District Reconciliation and Peace Team (DRPT) explained:  
‘Mato Oput is not really happening.  People just decided well, it’s OK but it’s not 
very practical.  Others would say, someone has killed my father and you expect 
me to carry that Calabash and drink from it?  We were questioned a lot when we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Finnström both note that that during their extensive field work they came across one one Mato Oput 
ceremony, but neither were for ‘battle related deaths.’ See Porter ‘Rape’ p.144; Finnström ‘Surrondings’ 
p.105.  The Lui Institute ‘Roco Wat’ report gather information from respondants about 49 Mato Oput 
ceremonies apparently conducted between 2000-2005. Nearly all of them are for murder and manslaughter 
committed before 1990 and the records are incomplete, p.91-94. 
64 ‘Bitter Root’, Al Jazeera, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2011/10/20111012152024670219.html 28.06.12 
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visited the communities to promote Mato Oput and in the end it just did not 
pick up.’65   
 
Even within the Ker Kwaro Acholi itself there was skepticism.  According to the Prime 
Minister:  
‘the magnitude of atrocities is far beyond what traditional processes are capable 
of dealing with.  The current population has never come to terms with this sort 
of practice.  This is the first time people have experienced it. We are using 
traditional methods in a modern situation.  You can traumatise them even more 
with traditional methods of compensation because we are now in a monetary 
system.  So people say – you say my brother is worth only two heads of cattle?  
We need money for the orphans; we need school fees.’66  
 
In Odek sub-county, near to Joseph Kony’s birthplace, a group of men and women 
explained that Mato Oput was uncommon in the area since the conflict ended: ‘Mato 
Oput’, said one:  
‘is when you really know that you killed somebody and you want to reconcile.  
But here it was a general thing and it is very hard.  So it did not happen.  It was 
not appropriate.’67  
 
Thus the idea that Mato Oput could be transformed into a comprehensive system of post-
conflict traditional justice under the auspices of the KKA remained a distant and 
contested prospect.   
 
Numerous other ‘traditional’ processes aimed at broader intra-Acholi reconciliation have 
been funded since the mid-2000s.  Catholic Relief Services (CRS), International 
Organistion of Migration (IOM), Caritas, and UNDP were among the organisations 
involved in supporting programmes such as ‘traditional cleansing’ and Chief’s Tours, 
particularly from 2004 onwards. 68   In discussions with people in Acholiland, external 
support for these traditional practices was usually associated with USAID and the two 
consecutive peace-building programmes it funded.  The first was the Northern Uganda 
Peace Initiative (NUPI), launched in 2004, which included within its mandate the 
strengthening of ‘intra-Acholi’ reconciliation processes.69  This was followed by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Author interview with Goretti Okech, Community Development Officer, Gulu District Council, 
31.06.2012 
66 Author interview with Kenneth Oketta, Prime Minister, KKA, Gulu, 11.09.2012 
67 Author led discussion group, village near Odek sub-county, Gulu District, 26.07.2012 
68 A range of donors and NGOs supported these processes. They include USAID (under NUPI and 
NUTI); Caritas, IOM, CRS and UNDP, Danida, World Vision, Gusco, Concerned Parents Association  
(see, for example, Liu Institute records, ‘Roco Wat’ pp.96-7, which point to 31 funded ceremonies taking 
place between 2003-5).   
69 NUPI was initially launched with the aim of of providing technical assistance to prepare the GoU 
Presidential Peace Team for the peace talks with the LRA.  By early 2005, it had been revised – in 
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Northern Uganda Transition Initiative (NUTI) in 2008, which continued to provide 
support in this area.  These donor-funded traditional ceremonies were largely performed 
at a communal level and they varied in purpose.  Sometimes the ceremonies were 
conducted during mass burials, at other times the function was a more general ‘cleansing 
of the dirt in the community.’70  
 
A particular grievance amongst communities has been the way in which external funding 
has distorted traditional practices and compromised their meaning.  Examples were given 
of instances in which practices were re-shaped in a way that no longer made sense.  
Traditional cleansing rituals, for example, were often misleadingly infused with 
forgiveness and reconciliation language.  One former LRA combatant who now runs a 
support group for formerly abducted persons just outside Gulu town recalled a NUPI 
funded mass cleansing ceremony which involved a common welcoming home ceremony 
called nyono tong gweno (‘stepping on the egg’) which is undertaken when someone who has 
been away from a long time returns to their household.  But this ritual was expanded.  It 
was even mis-labelled Mato Oput and it was expected carry the reconciliatory function 
normally associated with the climax of that process.71  The problem, according to him, 
was that this was contrary to the norms of the community, which demanded a process of 
acknowledgement, negotiation and dialogue and compensation before a perpetrator can 
be fully reconciled with the community.  ‘What happened’, he explained:  
‘was part of a project fund, but under true custom, the perpetrator clans are 
supposed to contribute goats and chickens.  When money is generated from 
outside it seems artificial and lots of people did not turn up.  Under proper 
procedures, the clan of the victim and the clan of the perpetrator have a process 
in which they sort out how they will proceed.  I know many people – even some 
prominent ones around who perpetrated Lukodi72, and those persons did not 
turn up.  Families want to make amends but they understand that what NUPI 
was doing was superficial.’73   
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accordance with the shift in US policy - to include the strengthening of ‘intra-Acholi, Regional and 
National Reconciliation processes’.  This included a Chief’s tour, ‘grass-roots’ reconciliation activities and 
support to traditional ceremonies.   The program ran until April 2007 under the auspices of a contractor 
called PADCO.  A second USAID programme, NUTI, was then launched and also included support for 
these activities and was run under the auspices another contractor, Casals & Associates Inc, and ran from 
2008-2011. See ‘Mattson et. Al ‘Rising’ and Stefan Jansen et. al ‘Evaluation of CRD and NUPI, USAID 
Uganda’, (July 2007) p.30 (on file with author).  
70 Liu Institute ‘Roco Wat’ p. 96-7 
71 Indeed NUPI referred to all of the 54 such ceremonies it funded across the region as Mato Oput.  See 
Latigo, ‘Northern’, p.105. 
72 An LRA massacre took place in Lukodi on 19 May 2004, it is estimated that 60 people were killed when 
the LRA raided Lukodi IDP camp.  
73 Author interview, Bungatira, Gulu District, 25.07.2012.  
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Part of the problem people identified with the mediated, externally supported 
‘traditional’ rituals, particularly those that aim to reconcile the living, was their hasty 
transmutation into ‘forgiveness rituals.’74 
 
This has created suspicion in communities about the intentions of the Chiefs who take 
donor money to carry out practices in a way that people feel is inappropriate.  As many 
informants explained, traditionally it was not the role of the Chief to conduct ceremonies 
like the ‘stepping on the eggs’, which were carried out at the level of the household.  
Under donor supported programmes, it was being done at a communal level, often 
under the auspices of a Chief, creating a perception that social practices were being 
subverted in a way that compromised their utility and broader purpose.  One informant 
complained that, ‘those NGO projects are not correct and the chiefs are growing them, 
saying ‘we need money for eggs’, ‘we need money for goats’.75 The concern that Chiefs 
were benefiting financially from the distortion of traditional practice was widespread. 
Another informant explained:  
‘It is the NGOs like Caritas who are involved in these things.  They give the 
traditional chiefs money to buy eggs and you know in Uganda, eggs these days, 
even though it is only 1000 shillings, these chiefs will say, no, it is 10,000 shillings!  
So that is also a way, these days, that those chiefs are eating.’76   
 
In particular cases, the role or perceived role of external interference and its distorting 
consequences, was even more explicit.  A prominent political leader and elder in the 
eastern part of the sub-region, who also described himself as a ‘cultural consultant’, 
recalled how in March 2012 he was contacted by an organisation based in the US which 
offered to fund and document a reburial ceremony for Luigi Obol, the late father of 
Joseph Kony.77  The idea was to exhume him from St. Joseph’s Cathedral in Gulu, where 
he had been buried during the war, and to re-bury him at his ancestral home, near Odek 
sub-county.  According to the elder, and corroborated by reports in the Acholi Times, 
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74 Allen, ‘Trial’, p.166 
75 Author led discussion group, near Omot sub-county, Agago District, 02.08.2012 
76 Author interview former Sub-County Chief, Bur Coro, Gulu District 26.07.12 
77 Author interview with David Okidi Lumedo, 10.08.2013.  My informant could not remember the name 
of the NGO but his testimony matches (in date and location) two stories that appeared in the Acholi 
Times.  In those stories, the Acholi Times names two US NGOs as the ‘Starky Foundation’ and ‘Wondros 
Productions’.  During this period, the Starkey Hearing Foundation was carrying out a project in Gulu and 
Wondrous Productions is a film production company that has in the past documented the Starkey Hearing 
Foundation’s missions.  The Starkey Hearing Foundation, however, denies any involvement in what 
happened (author email communication).   
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the aim of the ‘US NGO’ was to ‘interlink’ the reburial with a Mato Oput ceremony 
between Kony’s clan and the rest of the Acholi.78 He noted that:  
‘The Americans came with a huge misconception about Mato Oput because 
according to them, exhuming and burying the father of Kony: it would reconcile 
the clan of Kony with all other clans.’79   
 
This, he argued, caused ‘a lot of bitterness’ because, in his words ‘they were taking a 
cultural way of doing things, getting it wrong, and calling it tradition’.80  But his objection 
was less to do with the way in which actual practice was being re-shaped and more to do 
with the political implications of what was being proposed.  He rejected the interlinking 
of the reburial of Joseph Kony’s father with Mato Oput between Kony’s clan and the rest 
of the Acholi because such a process would fundamentally misrepresent the nature of the 
war.  ‘How’ he asked,  
‘can you reconcile the Acholi without including the government role? It is the 
government that must pay blood feud and reconcile with Acholi clans through 
Mato Oput’.’81   
 
Reports in the Acholi Times reveal that people in the community around Odek felt the 
same way.  Luigi Obol’s brother was quoted as saying: 
‘we are not going to be forced into Mato Oput…It was the government of 
Uganda and the LRA rebels who were engaged in a rebellion, not us.’ 82   
 
The incident highlighted something important.  In the areas affected by LRA violence, 
Mato Oput was rarely talked about in the way that the ‘ethnojustice’ narrative supposed.  
People rarely referred to it spontaneously and, as was described above, were equivocal 
about the role it might play in restoring communal social relations.  What was more 
apparent was the way in which the processes that attend traditional concepts of 
reconciliation: acknowledgement, dialogue, and compensation, were celebrated, and then 
refracted as a checklist against which the Government of Uganda scored miserably.   
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78 ‘The Remains of Kony’s Father Buried in his ancestral home’, 19.03.2012 
http://www.acholitimes.com/index.php/8-acholi-news/28-the-remains-of-kony-s-father-reburied-in-his-
ancestral-home    
79 Author interview with David Okidi Lumedo, 10.08.2013 
80 ibid 
81 ibid 




The sentiments expressed by the community in Odek were not unusual.  The idea that 
national level, political reconciliation was just as important and pressing as inter-
communal reconciliation was widespread.  One former Sub-County Chief explained:  
‘the people, they want the truth, the Acholi want the government to tell the truth, 
why don’t they come and make a real Mato Oput.  If they can do that then within 
one year you would see a complete change of attitude.  Even me, I would 
forgive.’83  
 
In a rural part of Gulu district, a group of elders, extrapolated from some of the concepts 
related to Mato Oput, and applied them to the relationship between the Acholi and the 
Government of Uganda:  
‘the tensions that are there, it is between us and the government.  According to 
our tradition, in the absence of compensation, the perpetrator will be looked at in 
a bad light and you will be seen as a disgrace, people can conspire to do bad and 
seek revenge against you.  It is important that this has to be sorted out.  We can 
extend this cultural belief from the individual level to the level of government.’84 
 
In most discussions, the concept of Mato Oput was used to describe a need for political 
efforts at peacemaking.  The insularity of the ‘ethnojustice’ narrative was actively resisted.  
People talked about Mato Oput in a conventional sense as being a process that takes place 
between a perpetrator’s clan and a victim’s clan and then seamlessly extended that 
concept to the need for acknowledgment, compensation and reconciliation between the 
government and the Acholi.   
 
To conclude this section, Sverker Finnström was right when he wrote that it is not for 
scholars to delineate ritual,85 but, as described above, it is possible to identify situations in 
which ritual has become so distorted by external forces and agendas that it no longer 
carries a societal function, no longer has meaning, and no longer serves the purpose for 
which it is designed.  The problem relates to those instances in which outside influences 
combine with a deep level of political, cosmological and spiritual insecurity to produce a 
type of practice no longer carries any meaning.  The relationship between people and 
their culture no longer makes sense.  The philosophy behind the process becomes too far 
dislocated from its original meaning: it becomes distorted and even harmful.  People lose 
their moral control over the processes at play, and communities do not achieve the 
cosmological and social healing and re-balancing that ritual action is premised on.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!83!Author interview with local councilor, Bur Coro, 26.07.12 
84 Author led group discussion near Odek sub-county, Gulu District, 26.07.2012 
85 Finnström, ‘Reconciliation’. 
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It is important to emphasise though that the concern people expressed was not with the 
alteration of the ritual or the external funds per se.   This was supported by the fact that 
there are instances where external support for ritual occasions is lobbied for, gratefully 
received, and appears to have a positive impact.  This was most notably the case in 
relation to the mass cleansing of areas containing unburied bones.  As the displacement 
camps were gradually disbanded, NGOs and the Acholi leadership began to encounter 
deep concern from people about resettling where the dead had not yet been reconciled 
with the living, and incurring the wrath of ‘cen’.86  During her time as a Technical Advisor 
on Community Reconciliation at the Concerned Parents Association (CPA), Holly Porter 
re-called that Mato Oput was not once requested by communities, rather:  
‘there was overwhelming demand for a ritual that cleansed the earth, cooling 
down the spirits of those who died violently without decent burials – the dead 
needed to be reconciled with the living.’87  
 
The actual ceremonies, when they took place, were externally funded and adapted quite 
significantly by those taking part, but this was not considered to alter their efficacy.  They 
met an articulated need and served a clear and immediate purpose.88  External support 
for reconciliation between the living has proved to be a much more complex and fraught 
process, one that cannot be fast-tracked through external support for ritual because the 
ritual itself makes little sense unless the necessary conditions for social repair, in the form 
of acknowledgement, dialogue and compensation, are present.  This represents an 
unresolved tension, because generally people do not have the resources to pay for 
compensation. Meanwhile, inter-communal acknowledgement and dialogue, or what civil 
society in northern Uganda refers to as ‘truth-telling’ is a difficult topic and people are 
ambivalent.  Clark’s distinction between truth-telling and truth-hearing (in the Rwandan 
context) is pertinent here.  Across research sites, there was a clear tension between the 
desire for the truth to be told, and the concern that hearing it might further disrupt 




86 Holly Porter provides an excellent discussion of the concept of ‘cen’, see Porter, ‘Rape’ p.99  
87 Discussion with Holly Porter; August 2012; see also, 
http://otjr.csls.ox.ac.uk/materials/podcasts/155/OTJRConferenceProgramme_18.6.09_.pdf  
88 ibid 
89 Clark, ‘Gacaca’, pp.186-121. 
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Forgiveness  promotion:  re l ig ious l eaders ,  NGOs and local  government 
On the wall of the Gulu Archdiocese Justice and Peace Commission, there is a poster 
which shows two men on their knees, leaning forward and drinking the bitter root from 
a shared calabash during a Mato Oput ceremony.  Underneath the picture a caption reads 
Mato Oput: Communal Reconciliation strengthened with Christian Values.  Forgive us our trespasses 
and we forgive those who trespass against us.  Acholi religious figures – with the notable 
exception of the Pentecostal leadership – have gradually embraced what they see as 
traditional Acholi techniques of reconciliation.90  Religious leaders have meshed socially 
restorative cultural traditions with a broader Christian meta-narrative that extols the 
virtue of forgiveness.  The now retired Anglican bishop Ochola, for example, has argued 
that Mato Oput is biblical and Christian.91 Archbishop Odama, the Catholic Archbishop 
of Gulu since 1997, has a schema of forgiveness which distinguishes between the 
‘cultural’ and the ‘divine,’ and he regards Mato Oput as a valued example of the former, 
despite the latter being ‘purer and absolutely unconditional.’92    
 
Religious and mainly Christian themes related to the ideals of forgiveness and 
reconciliation have thus shaped the public discourse about transitional justice in northern 
Uganda.93  This fits a broader international pattern – visible, for example in South Africa, 
Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Northern Ireland, in which religious leaders have played an 
important role in configuring the terminology and ideas about how to deal with a violent 
past.94  Religious leaders channel their advocacy and transitional justice work through the 
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), which was set up in 1995 to promote 
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90 This was by no means inevitable.  When the possibilities of Mato Oput in peacebuilding were first 
extolled, religious leaders were hesitant about supporting cultural religious practices which their 
predecessors had dismissed, sometimes violently.  According to Patrick Loum, the Co-coordinator of the 
ALRPI, religious leaders gradually came to the conclusion that what the cultural leaders were practicing 
was ‘similar to cleansing in the old testament’ and that this has ‘allowed the religious leaders to work in 
collaboration with the cultural leaders on transitional justice’, (author interview with Patrick Loum, Gulu, 
23.07.2012).  This approach echoes that of Desmond Tutu, who famously conflated Christian spirituality 
with notions of African mysticism in his promotion of the South African TRC. 
91 Author interview with retired Bishop Ochola, Gulu, 11.09.2012 
92 Author interview with Archbishop Odama, Gulu, 24.09.2012 
93 According to the 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census, 41.9% of the Ugandan population list 
themselves as Catholic and 35.9% list themselves as Protestant.  In Acholiland, Catholicism is better 
represented.  The most recent detailed figures are out of date however.  Finnström quotes the 1991 
national census which finds that 70% of the Acholi population are Catholic and 25% are Protestant. He 
also points out correctly that more recently, Pentecostalism has gained force in the sub-region.  See 
Finnström, ‘Surroundings’, p.246. 
94 Thomas Brudholm, ' On the Advocacy of Forgiveness after Mass Atrocities '. in T Brudholm & T 
Cushman (eds), The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity : Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) pp. 124-153; Richard Wilson The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 
Legitimising the Post-Aparthied State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p.9 
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reconciliation, healing and forgiveness in the context of the LRA conflict.95  The political 
position of the ARLPI finds its expression in the provisions of the Amnesty Act, which 
it credits itself with devising and pushing through parliament.96  Scholars and activists, 
meanwhile, have emphasized an innate Acholi proclivity toward forgiveness after 
atrocity.  In an influential publication, Lomo and Hovil quote a religious leader as saying 
that:  
‘culturally, people’s ideas of forgiveness are entrenched.  They don’t kill people; 
they believe the bitterness of revenge does not solve the problem.  So it was easy 
for people to accept the idea of amnesty.’97  
  
This rhetoric has, as Tim Allen argues, promoted a ‘kind of received wisdom that the 
Acholi people have a ‘special capacity to forgive’.98 
 
There is no one single definition of ‘forgiveness’ and the word has no translation in 
Acholi.  The closest phrase is ‘timo-kica’ which means to give someone mercy. ‘Timo kica’ 
was adopted as the phrase to describe the Amnesty Act.  This renders confusion between  
political and interpersonal notions of forgiveness very likely, particularly amongst 
external researchers and practitioners who are not familiar with the Acholi context.99  
The concept of timo kica does not fit neatly with Christian notions of forgiveness, and 
this will be explored further below.  The form of forgiveness being advocated by Acholi 
religious leaders, particularly the Catholic and Pentecostal leadership, is demanding, and 
well captured by Robert Enright’s ‘positive’ definition as:  
‘a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment, and 
indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly injured us, while fostering the 
undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or 
her.’100  
  
The forgiveness being asked of people is not simply to refrain from revenge or feelings 
of revenge, but actively to accept the wrongdoer and the committed wrongdoing.  The 
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95 Today, on its website, the ARLPI refers to itself as an ‘interfaith peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation organisation’ and it brings together leaders from six different religious groups and 
denominations: Anglican, Catholic, Muslim, Orthodox, Pentecostal and Seventh Day Adventist; for a 
discussion on the origins of the ARLPI, see Bradbury, ‘Overview’, p.21. 
96 Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, ‘Position Paper on Amnesty Law’ (12 February 2004).  
97 Zachary Lomo and Lucy Hovil, ‘Behind the Violence: The War in Northern Uganda’, ISS Africa 
Monograph 99 (March, 2004), p.64  
98 Allen, ‘Trial’, p. 4-5 99!This conceptual and definitional confusion was according to my research assistant, more of a problem 
for distanced observers.  In his own translations he was sure to be clear about making the distinction, 
particularly between the Amnesty Act itself and the broader notion of ‘mercy’.  !
100 Quoted in Renee Jeffrey, ‘Forgiveness’, p.80 
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ability to forgive, meanwhile, is interpreted as a sign of ‘human perfection’, in which the 
‘deepest qualities of humanity’ are re-established.101  
 
Whether or not the forgiveness being promoted is contingent or non-contingent on 
other circumstances (for example acknowledgement of wrongs by the perpetrator, or 
compensation), religious leaders all, to some extent, proscribe a particular emotional and 
moral response to injustice and atrocity.   At the ‘unconditional’ end of the forgiveness 
promotion agenda sits the hugely influential Catholic Archbishop John Baptist Odama of 
Gulu.  The Pentecostal leadership also supports this position.  To Odama, unconditional 
forgiveness is divine and represents absolute moral virtue, and a refusal to forgive is 
morally untenable.102  The forgiver and the unforgiver exist in a binary relationship: the 
former is healthy, humane and civic minded; the latter is sick, revenge ridden and even 
dangerous.103  A bio-medical language was used in which forgiveness was painted as a 
panacea for individual and societal recovery.  Odama deployed this kind of language 
frequently, arguing, for example, that: 
‘Forgiveness is medicinal, it heals the wounds of hatred and anger and lets you 
see beyond one or two occasions when a death case may have happened.  By 
forgiveness you are removing the dust so that purity and glowing beauty of the 
human person can be seen.’104   
 
When asked how he and his fellow Catholic priests counsel their congregations he 
explained that people are asked:  
‘Are you going to keep this anger in yourself permanently?  It causes damage.  
Why do you want to torture yourself?  You will end up unloading this on another 
innocent person.  So forgiveness, and especially unconditional forgiveness, is the 
best.’105   
 
Odama saw two antithetical responses to the experience of injustice and atrocity: either 
you forgive, or you will desire revenge, which in turn was a spiritual pollutant and 
‘devilish emotion’.106 Pentecostal leader James Ochan had a similar approach arguing 
that:  
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101 cf. Brudholm, ‘Advocacy’ p. 127;133; 102!Author interview, Archbishop Odama, Gulu, 24.09.2012!
103 Brudholm and Rousoux write about this approach in different contexts, in, Thomas Brudholm and 
Valerie Rousoux, ‘The unforgiving: reflections on resistance to forgiving after mass atrocity, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 72:2 (2009) pp.33-50, p.35; Brudholm, ‘Advocacy’.  




‘Forgiveness is unconditional, it protects you and makes you feel better.  In some 
cases they may say you need this and that before forgiveness but for us 
Pentecostals, we just say forgive.’107   
 
When asked how this actually works in practice, Ochan told the story of his brother’s 
wife:  
‘She was gang-raped by about 30 rebels.  I tell her God has left you with a 
husband, Jesus Christ and the Church.  Things are not so bad.  We are here for 
you.  The more you delay to forgive, the more you harm yourself.’108  
 
There is a beguiling emancipatory logic to the promotion of forgiveness.  As Muslim 
leader Sheikh Khalil put it, ‘people must do it to set themselves free.  Otherwise you are 
in bondage, with wounds in your heart that will even affect your health.’109 
 
The religious leadership often engages in a ‘forgiveness journey’ rhetoric.  Exalting 
stories are told in which a victim transcends his or her feelings of vengeance and 
becomes a forgiving, enlightened and purposive individual.  In Odama’s case, the story 
was about two best friends, both of whom had been abducted by the LRA.  One of the 
boys managed to escape, the other rose to a more senior rank and decided to punish his 
friend for escaping by murdering his mother. He was captured shortly afterwards by the 
UPDF and was sent to GUSCO reception centre a few weeks later. Here he met his 
friend, who had fled to the reception centre after finding out about the death of his 
mother.  As Odama recounts it, when they first saw each other:  
‘They approached each other, and as they came nearer, that boy whose mother 
was killed, he got up and he embraced the one that killed his mother.  He said, “I 
saw you kill my mother.  It is no use to destroy two lives, I forgive you”.  The 
boy that killed the mother began to weep; wailing, it was too much.  He was sure 
this boy could have taken revenge.  But the forgiveness had more power than 
being injured.  He pleaded to the boy, “please, I am weak; I need your support”.  
The other one, he upheld him and said, “don’t cry, don’t cry” and they became 
the greatest of friends again.’110   
 
For retired Anglican Bishop Macleod Baker Ochola, who has been a charismatic and 
vocal protagonist in transitional justice debates in northern Uganda, particularly since the 
mid 1990s, true forgiveness was conditional upon acknowledgement of wrongdoing.  So 
long as someone could tell the truth about what they have done or witnessed, they must !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Author interview with Pastor James Ochan, Gulu, 28.09.2012 
108 Author interview with Pastor James Ochan, Gulu, 28.09.2012 
109 Author interview with Sheik Musa Khalil, Gulu, 12.09.12 
110 Author interview with Archbishop Odama, Gulu, 24.09.2012 
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be forgiven and reconciled with their communities.  Ochola recognised a tension 
between Acholi values of forgiveness which were ‘not automatic’ and the Christian 
values of forgiveness being promoted across Acholiland, which tended to focus on the 
need for an unconditional forgiveness.  His emphasis on the necessity of ‘truth telling’ 
before forgiveness was an attempt to bridge the concepts because he recognised:  
‘A great tension in communities…if someone wrongs you and there is no 
acceptance of responsibility it is a just cause (lapee) for revenge.  Even though 
Jesus would not agree.’111  
 
Muslim leader Sheikh Musa Khalil, articulated a similar relationship between 
acknowledgement, repentance and forgiveness and related this back to the Koran:   
‘The Koran tells us you must confess, verse 160 says you must not conceal.  So 
our major duty is to sensitise the community with Koran and bible, so they will 
not fear.  Acholi culture is similar to the Koran, truth-telling is best.’112  
  
The onus then remains on the victim to forgive after a confession is delivered.  This 
applies even to the key architects of the LRA insurgency, including Joseph Kony.  
Ochola claims, if he came back today, and if he were to repent, ‘they must forgive 
him.’113  
 
Forgiveness promotion in Acholiland is not limited to the religious leadership.  Because 
of the Amnesty Act and the mandate of the Amnesty Commission, it was also part of 
government policy, and various NGOs as well as the local political leadership have 
adopted it as a method of peace-building and reconciliation.  It has been associated, in 
particular, with the District Peace and Reconciliation Teams (DPRT), as well as the 
organisations running the various reception centres across Acholiland, notably World 
Vision, Gulu Save the Children Organisation (GUSCO), Caritas and Concerned Parents 
Association.114  Indeed the Amnesty Commission’s ‘re-settlement’ and ‘reintegration’ 
function has been largely outsourced to the centres, which in turn, have called upon 
religious leaders to help them ‘sensitise’ communities about forgiveness.  Each centre 
had a slightly different philosophy and mandate, but they were set up gradually between 
1995-2004 to receive, rehabilitate and resettle formerly abducted people – ‘FAP’s in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Author interview with rtd. Bishop Ochola, Gulu, 11.09.2012 
112 Author interview with Sheik Musa Khalil, Gulu, 12.09.12 
113 Author interview with rtd. Bishop Ochola, Gulu, 11.09.2012 
114 There were several such centres across Acholiland and in other affected areas, notably in Lira, Lango 
and Soroti, Teso.  The most comprehensive evaluation of the reception centres is Allen and Schomerus, 
‘Homecoming’.  
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NGO parlance – who had either escaped from the LRA themselves or been rescued or 
captured by the UPDF.   
 
Two important themes inform NGO and local government forgiveness advocacy, and 
both relate to the nature of the war in Acholiland.  The first was the argument that the 
vast majority of LRA fighters, even those in senior ranks, were abducted against their will 
so that for the duration of their time in the LRA, their personal autonomy was entirely 
suspended.  They were not, therefore, culpable for their actions.   This comprised a sort 
of historical contingency narrative in which the victim could easily have been the 
perpetrator and the perpetrators themselves were victims.  The Gulu District Speaker 
summed up the rhetoric well:  
‘today is me, tomorrow is you…those who return, they did not apply to go into 
the bush, they were forced to commit crimes, and now we must receive them 
back into our community.’115   
 
Focus group discussions revealed that the majority of respondents had been ‘sensitised’ 
by NGO ‘anti-stigma’ interventions – either face to face or via the radio.  These 
interventions were designed to shape the way in which camp, and, more recently, re-
settled populations, received returning combatants.116  During group discussions people 
explained how this form of ‘sensitisation’ represented a defining moment in which 
feelings of anger, revenge and bitterness were invalidated, despite often being preserved 
privately.  A representative comment was one made in Amuru District, just north of 
Gulu town, an area which was home to the largest IDP camp during the war:  
‘At the peak of the insurgency, around 1996, at the time when there was no 
amnesty, no GUSCO, we had problems here.  People had attitudes of revenge 
against those formerly abducted children. Before trainings began we had a lot of 
discrimination and stigmatisation, even in small gatherings like this.  The 
trainings helped us see those returning rebels in a good light because their 
abduction was against their will.’117   
 
A community development officer at World Vision, who worked on reintegrating ‘FAPS’ 
back into their communities explained that:  
‘sometimes the community will realize that the boy has worked in the area, 
maybe even several times, and then they realize, it is this boy who killed my 
relatives.  In that kind of situation we bring in religious leaders, they will bring in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 Author interview with Gulu District Council Speaker, Okello Peter Douglas, Gulu, 07.08.09  
116 Focus group respondants referred most commonly to World Vision and Caritas ‘sensitisations’ on 
forgiveness and acceptance.  World Vision refers to ‘substantive resources’ allocated towards anti-stigma 
campaigns, see World Vision Uganda, From Despair to Hope (April 2013), p.32 (on file with author). 
117 Author led group discussion Amuru District, 09.08.2012 
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Christianity and call for forgiveness and we will ask those people that are 
resisting, ‘what if he was your son?’118    
 
This brings us to the second, interrelated theme that forgiveness promoters draw upon 
and it dovetails with the perception of suspended personal agency described above.  It is 
the manner in which the war in Uganda has, in the words of Adam Branch, been ‘defined 
around children, whether former LRA recruits or the so called night commuters’.119  The 
deplorable abduction of children by the LRA was strongly featured in international 
campaigning to end the war.120  This is what Laura Edmondson calls the ‘master 
narrative’ around the LRA insurgency: the rigid and non-dynamic presentation of a small 
cadre of enslavers and a swollen mass of innocent, helpless and incapable children.121  At 
its most extreme, even the enslavers were cursorily infantalised.  During interviews for 
example, both Archbishop Odama and Bishop Ochola referred separately to recently 
captured LRA commanders Thomas Kwoyelo and Ceaser Acellam as ‘children’.122  The 
inconvenient reality is that many LRA abductees had diverse and meaningful experiences 
in the bush and affected communities recognise this.  Ben Mergelsberg’s study of young 
male returnees, for example, depicted a range of complex perspectives on life with the 
LRA, none of which fit neatly with the dichotomous master narrative described above.   
The young men had ‘self esteem’, they had a sense of independence, and they 
acknowledged experience of two different worlds: ‘both worlds have their pleasant sides 
and both worlds can be terrifying’.123  This complexity has been obscured by forgiveness 
advocacy which asks not just that people forgive, but also that they accept a particular 
version of events, regardless of their own direct personal experiences of the conflict and 
its aftermath.  
 
Tensions between forg iv ing,  forge t t ing and reconc i l ing  
There are four memorial sites in Acholiland and Lira that are currently being developed 
by the Uganda National Museum, with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs, and curated as forgiveness spaces.  The director of the program – who had 
recently returned from a course in South Africa explained the logic behind the initiative:   
‘Why preserve a bad history?  Songs and dances, they pass messages: we had a 
bad past and now we are telling people to forgive each other…our main focus is 
not about the history…we want to transcend history. It is about focusing 
forward.’124   
 
This forward-looking agenda finds a more sinister expression in the perplexing link that 
is often established between forgiving and forgetting.  A local politician and member of 
the Gulu District Reconciliation and Peace team was quite clear about this: ‘yes, of 
course, we want them to forgive but we want them to also forget.  We don’t want them 
to remember.’125  A senior District staff member recalled how before the DPRT was set 
up with support from Save the Children in 2008, people were returning from the bush 
and being rejected by their communities.   She explained that the approach of the DPRT 
was to:  
‘Train the community to accept people back and to ensure less rejection.  We 
said, yes, you will be bitter but you have to let them come home on a 
humanitarian basis… we did community dialogues with a reconciliatory function 
– to ensure people forgive and start living in harmony again.  We tell them that 
former abductees were forced to do atrocities in their own communities and that 
time heals.  DPRT is supposed to neutralize people’s minds about revenge.  We 
are trying to neutralize the minds of the community.’126   
 
ARLPI leader, Musa Khalil used the same sort of obliterating logic: ‘we have to change 
the brain of the people to forget about the war.’127  This applied as much to the formerly 
abducted people as it did to those who never fought in the bush.  At the World Vision 
reception centre, a senior member of staff talked about the use of play therapy, a form of 
counseling widely used at the centre to ‘rehabilitate’ the ‘FAPs’. She explained that it is 
has been used to ‘reverse their minds so that they can leave the past and move ahead’.128  
The idea that forgetting could be mediated by a religious leadership or by NGOs or the 
District council was unsettling, and for many, confusing.  In one group discussion in 
Nwoya District in western Acholiland people remembered a ‘training’ by an NGO when 
they were still in the camps:  
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‘one of the cardinal themes was that we were told to forget the past, what had 
happened.  It was very important to put the past behind us.  But you can’t forget.  
That awareness that bad things happened is there, so we have it in our heads.’129 
 
This coercive and disciplinary approach has been critiqued by Brudholm and Rousoux 
who have stressed the need for ‘sustained and ethical reflection on the advocacy and 
practice of forgiveness, not least in the context of transitional justice and 
reconciliation’.130  Indeed, during field research, respondents expressed clear concern 
about what was being asked of them.  At a group discussion in Agago District, some 
members misunderstood the goal of the discussion, which was to examine themes of 
forgiving, forgetting and co-existence.  One elderly man was concerned that he was going 
to be ‘asked to forgive again’ (italics added).  He continued: 
‘amongst us there could be some who could have lost their dear ones and this 
thing, it really affected us so we may not be at liberty to embrace mercy, the 
amnesty.’131   
 
It transpired that the community had had ‘trainings’ on reconciliation and forgiveness 
and that for some it had made them ‘feel so bad’.  Reflecting on the work she did in the 
community, a local government community development officer had a moment of 
reflection:  
‘you know, it is almost unfair when we expect someone to let go – it is very, very 
unfair, forcing someone to forgive.  How do you train someone to forgive?  It 
comes from within.’132   
 
What she highlighted, perhaps unwittingly, was the ambiguous and uncomfortable 
relationship between different levels of forgiveness: state sanctioned forgiveness; 
externally mediated communal forgiveness, and interpersonal forgiveness.  In a long 
discussion with the head of the Gulu NGO forum, who had himself been a reception 
centre worker for ten years, he explained that community re-settlement and re-
integration ‘preparedness’ in the form of forgiveness advocacy was ‘no guarantee that 
people are prepared to live together – such togetherness is really still a challenge.’133  
What NGOs call ‘forgiveness sensitisation’ has certainly trained people that revenge, 
bitterness, and stigma, are somehow wrong or deviant, but this did not translate into 
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acceptance.  Again, this highlighted the unresolved tension between forgiveness, truth 
and reconciliation, because, as the Gulu NGO forum leader explained:  
‘for forgiveness to work, for forgiveness to become reconciliation, it needed a 
system that helped people, it needed truth-telling and compensation but truth-
telling needs protection because if I tell you, yes, I killed your uncle, won’t you 
just rise up and kill me?’134 
 
The tensions between different levels of forgiveness were clear to many people in 
northern Uganda.  During a lively discussion with a group of young men in Amuru 
District, a distinction was made between ‘strands’ of forgiveness.  One young man who 
had spent almost his entire life in the camps but had never been abducted explained that:  
‘there are two strands.  You have natural or true forgiveness and it comes when 
the two parties meet in some kind of natural way, when they come and meet and 
discuss and then true forgiveness can be realized.  And then you have the radio 
approach and that one is different.  It is more orientated towards the side of the 
government, where we have amnesty.  It is more those outside parties trying to 
bring us all together.  But I really feel it should come from my mind and my heart 
that the two people should meet and that process will be more natural.  Natural 
forgiveness is different from the forgiveness that comes from sensitisation.’135   
 
The complexity of this young man’s response illustrated the fallacy of the zero sum 
blissful forgiveness versus violent revenge discourse.  As will be explored further below, 
it has not been reflective of people’s every day experiences or the choices that they have 
made.  The elevated tales of unconditional forgiveness and dangerous revenge were 
largely apocryphal.  The use of stark antithetical moral terms has distorted our 
understanding of individual and communal motives in today’s northern Uganda: it has 
become a misleading gauge by which behavior is measured.  Typically, for example, a 
refusal to forgive or to engage in discussion about forgiveness and reconciliation is 
pathologised by forgiveness promoters as being caused by an internal deficiency (‘trauma’ 
or ‘bitterness’) or a pernicious external influence (‘alcohol’).  The same elderly gentleman 
in Agago District who rebuffed what he saw as an attempt to impose forgiveness, also 
asked, perhaps provocatively, ‘how will you deal with me?’, a recognition that his 
resistance was somehow deviant.  At the other end of the spectrum, the resettlement of 
former LRA fighters into their communities, and the relative lack of overt violent 
revenge related to the conflict, has been interpreted misleadingly as representing 
something akin to unconditional and abiding forgiveness.  The tenor of this analysis, 
which relies on absolute moral categories, acts as an impediment to a more perceptive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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examination of reality: are people’s attitudes to forgiveness and revenge really that 
spectacular?  Or are they ambiguous, subtle, and contingent upon other societal forces?    
Is forgiveness an ethical or religious position, or is it rooted in political pragmatism and 
even resignation, or perhaps a mixture of the two?136  Indeed if we neglect these 
questions, we also neglect the very real possibility that there exist a range of ‘possibilities 
of vindication and repair between the extremes of vengeance and forgiveness.’137 
 
The forgiveness agenda has always carried a function in Acholiland, because of the 
nature of the LRA conflict, which is why it is only rarely openly contested.  The political 
danger of forgiveness is now, however, becoming increasingly apparent.  As discussed 
earlier, the themes that inform the promotion of forgiveness have drawn upon the 
internecine and fratricidal nature of the war.  Pastor Ochan explained candidly his own 
experience, growing up in a village near to where Joseph Kony was from:  
‘it was so friendly at the beginning, we would talk and squat.  Everyone gave 
these rebels their support.  They were our own tribesmen.  We offered them 
every sympathy that has made reconciliation easier, even today.  Those ones in 
the bush are our own relatives.  Whether you like it or not, preaching about 
reconciliation is easier because you are talking about people’s families.’138   
 
Whether or not sections of the ‘traditional leadership’ gave their blessing to Kony and 
the LRA in the early days is a highly contested issue.139  The point Ochan makes about 
‘people’s families’ has an inescapable truth to it though.  As a result the forgiveness 
agenda tends to fall on deaf ears in LRA-affected areas outside of the sub-region.  One 
NGO worker explained that in West Nile for example, ‘people are not amused that ex-
combatants are moving freely, they say, these are the ones who put us through this.’140  
Even religious leader Musa Khalil expressed fear about how the forgiveness agenda looks 
to those on the outside:  
‘Now, people are still scared because the LRA are still out there, but the day of 
the last bullet, without justice…think about the killing in Lango, where they still 
harbor pain, in Teso, West Nile, people still harbor so much bitterness, you don’t 
know what they are thinking; what they are planning.’141  
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A recent trend has been for local politicians, and even religious leaders, to raise the 
security implications of forgiveness.  In August 2012 a delegation of Acholi leaders – 
religious, political and traditional – visited the LRA-affected areas in CAR and DRC and 
came back quite bruised by the anger directed towards them and the Acholi as a whole.  
Khalil, for example, recalled how in DRC a group of elders were ‘full of quarrel and 
finger pointing’ telling him, in reference to the LRA fighters operating in the area, ‘you 
come and you take your sons away from here!’142  In CAR the Gulu LCV Chairman was 
shouted down when lobbying for an amnesty law similar to the one in Uganda.  Local 
leaders asked him:  
‘ “these people cause havoc in our country.  How can you accept someone who 
has killed, who has raped?”  They keep asking us these questions and we have no 
answer.’143   
 
Indeed forgiveness in Acholiland carries a unique logic, it has been equated with 
Amnesty and was designed to address political and social reconstruction in a context in 
which victims, perpetrators and victim/perpetrators had to live side by side.  In areas 
outside of Acholi affected by LRA violence, the call for forgiveness has not necessarily 
translated.   
 
The problem with conflating forgiveness and reconciliation 
 
The expansive notion of forgiveness put forward by advocates in Acholiland has often 
been conflated with the concept of reconciliation. Together, forgiveness and 
reconciliation are too often understood to comprise the ‘Acholi’ way, when in fact, it they 
represent a powerful vision of the way that things could or should be.   The way in which 
people actually enacted or understood concepts of forgiveness and its relationship to 
reconciliation were complex and are explored below.  This provides important 
background for understanding how former LRA members have – if at all – re-settled 
back into their communities, a topic that will be explored in more detail in the following 
chapter.   
 
As discussed above, the relationship people described with the forgiveness that they 
enacted was ambiguous.  If religious doctrine was mentioned in relation to forgiveness, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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tended to be ideas about judgment and divine retribution that were emphasized.  Linked 
to this was the commonly expressed assertion that forgiveness was contingent and 
fragile, or, as one respondent called it, ‘transitional’. 144   Rather than pronounce 
forgiveness in God’s name, people left the status of the relationship open and uncertain.  
The acknowledgement that claims for revenge and ‘bitterness’ must be surrendered did 
not equate to absolution for the wrongdoing that has been perpetrated. Instead it 
represented a pragmatic transfer of judgment and punishment into the hands of a trusted 
higher authority.  A young man who had witnessed a massacre in which two of his own 
brothers were killed and dismembered insisted that what happened ‘does not affect me 
now… it cannot’; when asked why, he explained that ‘God will judge Kony and those 
people.’145 A sense of powerlessness was implied and can be found elsewhere in people’s 
argument that they ‘have’ to forgive for a range of pragmatic reasons, none of which fits 
neatly with Christian doctrine.  Explanations for forgiveness are captured well by 
Rosalind Shaw’s use of Begona Aretxaga’s term ‘choiceless decisions’ whose logic is 
located in ‘everyday requirements of living.’146  In one village in Amuru District, a group 
of women explained that ‘one of the things we have to do is to just pray and forgive 
these people, you cannot retaliate or there will be more war’; far away in another village, 
in Agago District, a group explained that ‘if you are not for forgiveness then there would 
be no government structures here or government presence because there would still be 
war.’147 Forgiveness was described here as a social act: as a way of restoring civic life but 
not necessarily a complete change in sentiment towards the wrongdoer or the 
wrongdoing.148 
 
Across research sites, people expressed ambivalence in their attitude towards the form of 
forgiveness they had taken, as if it had an unstable quality to it.  In Amuru District, a 
group of men explained that what they have in their village is ‘some kind of makeshift 
forgiveness, just to help us reach some point but we really feel that there are issues that 
we need to handle.’149  The volatile nature of their forgiveness was illustrated by the idea 
of ‘triggers’ that set in motion a whole range of feelings that are normally suppressed or 
controlled.  One young man who was training to be a doctor, explained that:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘If you come back home from the Bush, here we are youth, and we will interact.   
So I can pretend that I have forgiven you but it is not in my heart so if one day 
you hurt me, then my reaction will really be vigorous and I will just fight.  But 
verbally people have forgiven each other, but no, if you hurt me I will really react 
with what is in my conscience and I will act.  So that is what is happening here.’150 
  
Another man sitting next to him chipped in, ‘yes, anything, anything can trigger people 
into feeling bad and bring you back into consciousness’.151   The idea of ‘triggers’ was 
raised several times across research sites to describe the relative fragility of co-existence, 
and the most common were said to be disputes over land, where things ‘become 
confrontational.’152  The other ‘trigger’ widely cited was drunkenness.  In Nwoya District, 
for example, elders explained that when those who have suffered become drunk, they 
feel uninhibited and, as one woman put it, ‘they quickly remember what happened here 
and they become bitter.’153  People who never fought in the Bush described these triggers 
as factors that quickly perforate the forgiveness that they hold.  Returnees on the other 
hand, saw the ‘triggers’ differently, as excuses to marginalize, exclude and stigmatise 
them, and in their view, as evidence of the superficiality of people’s claims about 
acceptance.   
 
Of the fifty returnees interviewed for the research, every single one said that at some 
point they had been ‘stigmatised’ by their families or broader communities for having 
spent time in the LRA.  Forty-eight had been through either a ritual or religious process 
on their return but this was portrayed more as a one off event that allowed for co-
existence, and nothing more enduring. Although most were also able to re-count 
instances in which a family member or member of the community had shown them 
kindness and acceptance, the overwhelming feeling was that despite talk of forgiveness 
and ritual cleansing they were being punished for having spent time in captivity.   
Instances in which this stigma translated into violent physical acts were largely linked to 
domestic violence.  Most of the time ‘stigma’ manifested itself as a form of low-level 
bullying and intimidation.  It was common, for example, for returnees to say that they 
would avoid larger gatherings of people, particularly in the trading centers for example, 
where people might get together and drink.  In Amuru District, one woman explained 
that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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‘If they see you there and they have been drinking, they will say “do not come 
here because it is possible that you may strangle us!”.  So we avoid these 
situations.’154   
 
In Nwoya District, one woman said that she had recently won a traditional dancing 
competition and then people began accusing her of cheating, ‘people began to say that I 
was not alone, I mean that the other spirits had possessed me and helped me to win’.155   
This kind of treatment was recognized as an issue by local authorities, many of whom 
spoke quite openly about the ‘stigma’ that returnees commonly face. A sub-County chief 
in Agago district explained that:  
‘even after these rituals, this stepping on the egg, people say, that child, it belongs 
to the LRA, it is a child of Kony, a “come back home’”  It is very obvious that it 
happens and it is always there.  To some extent it deters them from moving 
forward.  Many get withdrawn from communities because you go out and people 
point fingers.  It is worst when they first come back and they have not yet proved 
they can live peacefully.  Then some just really fail to reintegrate – especially 
those who maintain their negative habits – thieves  and robbers.’156   
 
The Speaker of Gulu District Local Council was very candid in his assertion that:  
‘people have not forgiven at all.  Let me be really honest.  People are still holding 
these issues in their hearts and minds and to say that they have forgiven?  No, 
that would be a wrong assumption’.157   
 
He went on to describe stigmatization as ‘rampant’, at the clan, family and household 
level, but emphasized its non-public nature, its veiled and unremarkable character.  
Indeed people’s forgiveness was usually expressed as a commitment to forgo violent 
revenge.  This did not translate automatically into ‘reconciliation’ between the wrong-
doer and the victim, and his broader community.  To understand this, it is helpful to go 
back and re-examine the concept of ‘timo-kica’, which is the Acholi phrase that people use 
to translate ‘forgiveness’ but which actually means ‘to give mercy’.  In discussions about 
‘giving mercy’ a clear distinction was made between this and the Christian notions of 
forgiveness that stress the unconditional restoration of relations.  One Acholi NGO 
worker who had been interested in these issues for a long time explained this in a way 
that clarified the complicated dynamics around coexistence, stigma and rejection:  
‘timo kica means, I give you mercy, it means we can co-exist.  And anyway, if 
someone gives you timo-kica, they will be keeping an eye on you.  The pressure is 
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really there.  If you are given timo-kica, you better watch yourself, you better 
watch that you don’t slip up.’158  
 
The most immediately relevant issue to most people was not the act that was committed 
in the past but behavior in the present.  Acceptance was conditional, to a large degree, on 
an ability to exhibit what was often described ‘normal’ behavior.  People often made a 
distinction between those returnees who had made ‘good relationships’ with the 
community and those who had not.  Part of the role of the community was to enforce a 
collective code of behavior.  As an NGO worker explained, ‘if they make a mistake it is 
also the community who is to blame, there is a collective responsibility to ensure that 
returnees behave well’.159  People gave numerous examples of returnees who stole from 
people’s gardens, refused to dig, and threatened people with comments like, ‘if you start 
disturbing me, I will use the same methods as I did when I was in the Bush’.160  Whether 
or not such cases were really true, or as common as people claimed, the violent, free-
loading, and provocative returnee, certainly looms large as part of people’s narrative 
about everyday life in current Acholiland.   
 
A desire to modulate and control the behavior of returnees was clearly apparent across 
research sites, and the stated desire ‘to regulate the identity of those who were abducted’ 
remains strong.161  In discussions with GUSCO and World Vision staff in 2012 and 2013, 
it was explained that ‘FAPs’ must essentially be re-programmed and taught how to be 
normal before they can be successfully re-settled in their communities.  One GUSCO 
worker explained that she always advised returnees to: 
‘Be loyal and respectful to the people at home.  They must always help where 
possible in order to make their life easy unless we teach them how they are 
supposed to behave in the community, they may do things that the community 
feels is not normal.’162   
 
This kind of advice was referred to as a form of ‘counseling’ for those who had returned 
from the Bush.163   A description of abnormal behavior was hard to pin down; it ranged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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from being withdrawn and quiet to being rude and disrespectful to the authorities at the 
centre.164  There was more clarity on how best to fit in with the community: this boiled 
down to two important attributes: productivity and inconspicuousness. The former 
would help ease the burden on conflict-affected and resource-stretched families, and the 
latter would help assure people that you had not picked up violent or threatening habits 
in the bush; that you were not infected with cen (bad or vengeful spirits).  Returnees who 
experienced significant distress on their return, or other physical illness, were particularly 
vulnerable to these charges.  The criteria for ‘reinsertion’ were summed up well by a 
Reverend in the eastern part of Gulu district: 
 ‘the most important thing that people want is that when you come back you 
need to stay in a good mood with those who are already in the village.  If you 
come and start disturbing people they will not like that.  The most important 
thing is that you must behave well in the community.  You must stay quiet and 
you must dig.  People don’t want them if they cannot cooperate with the people 
at home.’165   
 
A formerly abducted man explained that he had settled back into his community well 
because his behavior had been exemplary, ‘I want to tell you’ he said, ‘that people can 
abuse you if you have bad behavior but if you behave well, they will not have the 
opportunity of saying a word.’166 
 
The problem outlined above, is that dominant narratives about ‘local’ Acholi approaches 
over-simplify the complexity of forgiveness and reconciliation in this context.  The 
resulting risk is two-fold.  Firstly, that people’s actions and attitudes are misunderstood; 
their inter-communal ‘forgiveness’ and ‘reconciliation’ are essentialised and interpreted as 
more abiding and comprehensive than is actually the case.  Secondly, that rhetoric 
around ‘Acholi forgiveness and reconciliation,’ has obscured the more complex 
conditions that shape possibilities for re-settlement and acceptance (or stigma and 




This chapter explored the dynamics of forgiveness and traditional reconciliation 
promotion in Acholiland.  It argued that the self-appointed arbiter of the traditional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reconciliation agenda, the Ker Kwaro Acholi, has not managed to achieve widespread 
credibility or legitimacy across Acholiland.  It has been perceived as being too dependent 
on external sources of funding and agendas and too close to the government.  Attitudes 
towards external support for ritual action, however, were more nuanced.  The efficacy 
and relevance of such processes to communities affected by the war was context-specific 
and highly dependent on the extent to which particular cosmological and moral needs 
were addressed.   This chapter also explored the advancement of ‘forgiveness’ as a 
response to mass atrocity, both as a theological and spiritual appeal and as a pragmatic 
peace-building approach.  It found that mediated calls for forgiveness could be coercively 
demanding and uncompromising and that people’s relationship with the forgiveness that 
they enact was often deeply ambivalent.   
 
During field research it was common to hear assertions like, ‘forgiveness is embedded in 
our culture’ or ‘in our culture there is nothing like revenge’.167  These claims were usually 
a normative expression of the way that things should be, an ideal type vision. 
Nevertheless, this narrative has carried a lot of weight in broader transitional justice 
debates and therefore has significantly implications.   Firstly, because ‘forgiveness’ and 
‘reconciliation’ are promoted as cultural givens, the agenda has often served to 
depoliticse the transition discourse – it has obscured the politics and pragmatism behind 
the decision to forgive; and presented it as inevitable; and it has also implied a link 
between forgiveness and reconciliation that does not appear to play out in practice.  Tied 
to this has been a false impression that forgiveness and reconciliation agendas, as 
promoted by the Acholi leadership and sections of the NGO industry, have, in practice, 
been any less mediated or coercive than ‘formal’ state led processes like domestic 
prosecutions.  Indeed what was quite apparent was the degree to which the ‘local 
approaches’ discourse, despite claiming to represent the grass-roots, often suppressed 
discussion and contestation about how to respond to mass atrocity.  Finally, by setting 
too much store on ‘scripted’ responses around forgiveness and reconciliation, we risk 
missing the ‘hidden’168 and the ‘after’ and do not sufficiently engage with the more 
complex ways in which people use and experience ideas and practices related to ritual, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 These quotes were given to the author respectively by Mark Avola, Director of Gulu NGO Forum, 
02.10.12 and Lucy Akello, Executive Director, Archdiocese of Gulu Justice and Peace Commission, 
24.09.12 
168 The ‘hidden’ here refers to James Scott’s powerful distinction between public transcripts (‘the open 
interaction between subordinates and those who dominate’) and hidden transcripts (‘dicourse that takes 
place ‘off-stage’, beyond direct observation by powerholders’), See James Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp.2-4. 
! 250 
religion, forgiveness, and reconciliation, in order to try to negotiate meaningful relations 
in the aftermath of the war.  This is explored in the next chapter.   
! 251 





There is an Acholi proverb which is framed as a rhetorical question: you tell me to keep 
silence when they have thrown a bone which has hit my eyes?  The ‘bone in the face’ is a metaphor 
for experiencing wrongdoing and then being asked by relatives and friends not to 
retaliate.  It represents the tension between an instinctive desire to react to the experience 
of being harmed or wronged, and the broader consequences of those actions.  There are 
different versions of the story behind the proverb, and in each one, friends and relatives 
of the aggrieved counsel ‘keeping quiet.’1  The proverb expresses a state of unease, a 
situation that is unresolved and perhaps unresolvable.  It is not clear whether one should 
sympathise with the advice of the collective or with the frustration of the individual: the 
message remains subtly ambiguous.   There is something human about this uncertainty.  
 
By contrast, transitional justice conceptions, whether espoused by donors or the Ker 
Kwaro Acholi hierarchy, by government ministers or religious leaders in Uganda, share 
one thing in common: they are predicated on idealized conceptions of justice and 
reconciliation.  Implementation of the various mechanisms in the TJ ‘toolbox’ aimed at 
achieving these ends, and ‘sensitisation’ of the affected communities to their purpose, is 
regarded mainly as a technical matter.  This chapter takes a different starting point, one 
which focuses less on pre-articulations of fixed objectives, and more on the question of 
how people in Acholiland are actually negotiating everyday life in the aftermath of such a 
deeply destructive conflict.  The chapter examines two over-lapping concerns.  Firstly it 
elaborates further on how core concepts of justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation are 
understood in context.  Second – given that transitional justice interventions are sporadic 
and irregular – it interrogates how people, in their own words, describe the most 
significant means by which social relations are being navigated in the context of post-
conflict life.    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For different versions of the story, see Andrew Banya, Adoko Gwok (Kampala: Foundation for African 
Development, 1994) p.23  
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During focus group discussions and key informant interviews, four central themes 
emerged, which form the basis for the way in which the discussion proceeds here.  The 
first was the role played by self-help groups, normally savings and loans associations and 
farming groups; the second was the relationship between justice, reconciliation, and 
conceptions of time and space, with a particular focus on the role of ritual; the third 
theme was around local systems of justice and the public authorities that people actually 
use to resolve war-related disputes.  Particular emphasis was placed on land disputes and 
this chapter goes on to explore what their settlement tells us about broader approaches 
to justice in the Acholi context.  The fourth theme to emerge was around the dynamics 
of re-settlement and ‘re-integration’ of former LRA members into their communities or 
what Juan Diego Prieto – in the context of post-conflict Columbia – has called actual ‘co-
existence situations’. 2    All four themes define post-conflict life in Acholiland and 
complicate the dominant transitional justice conceptions explored in the previous 
chapters.  
 
Moving through: the role of groups 
 
As a preliminary observation, it was striking that the phrase ‘transitional justice’ was not 
one that people outside of the Acholi elite used spontaneously.   Despite this, there did 
appear to be some variation in knowledge about JLOS and civil- society- led TJ agendas, 
and this hinged partly on the exposure of various communities to external advocacy and 
technical support on the issue.  In Lukodi and Atiak, for example, survivor associations 
were formed with external assistance, and were linked to particularly brutal LRA 
massacres.3   In both places these associations were developed from existing savings and 
loan groups (bol cup), and were forged through their relationship with the Gulu-based 
Justice and Reconciliation Project.   Both areas have some strategic importance.  Atiak is 
a trading centre on the road to the South Sudan border.  It is located near some serious 
land disputes which have erupted between the Government and the local population,4 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Ibid p.525 
3 The Atiak massacre took place on 20 April 1995 when a group of LRA soldiers, allegedly led by Vincent 
Otti entered Atiak town in Amuru District.  It is estimated that roughly 300 people were killed.  The 
Lukodi massacre took place on 19 May 2004, when the LRA allegedly raided the village of Lukodi killing 
up to 60 people. 
4 In nearby Lakang and Apaa, there have been serious disputes over what are regarded as central 
government attempts to open up land for outside investment.  See, for example, ‘Apar and Lakanag 
residents must relinquish contentious land for tourism, Museveni’, 
http://acholitimes.com/index.php/perspectives/letters/8-acholi-news/171-apar-and-lakang-residents-
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and has a vocal sub-County government. Lukodi, meanwhile, was the site of one of the 
ICC investigations.  Only twenty kilometres from Gulu town, it is a popular destination 
for researchers and visiting officials who are based in Gulu for only a short amount of 
time.  In the last five years, villagers have hosted ICC officials, senior ICTJ members, 
JLOS outreach teams, and more recently the ex-prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, under the auspices of the US lobby group Invisible Children.5   
 
‘In certain areas’, explained one NGO worker, ‘people are more knowledgeable because 
they are so “researched” and the kind of argument you are going to hear from them is 
different.’ 6   This was an accurate depiction.  During a 2012 visit, the survivors’ 
association in Lukodi, recently re-named the ‘Community Reconciliation Team’, 
described how they had been trained on accountability issues by the JRP, and that they 
could now push for certain concessions.   The executive committee members using 
programmatic NGO language explained that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
‘Our main task is to mobilize our fellow victims and survivors. We are now being 
trained on reparations and traditional justice.  When visitors come, we attend to 
them, like the ICC, one of them came last month and they consult us on issues 
that they feel they should get right from the grassroots people.’7 
 
The Atiak Massacre Survivor’s Association was also familiar with the broader transitional 
justice related agendas.  As was explained in Chapter Five8, President Museveni attended 
annual memorial prayers in Atiak in April 2012 as part of his visit to ameliorate some of 
the tensions over land in the area.  His ‘pledge’ of fifty million shillings to the association 
was motivated by the political dynamics around the local land disputes, but the demands 
of the group were framed in the language of compensation for suffering caused by the 
massacre. 9  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
must-relinquish-contentious-land-for-tourism-museveni; ‘Museveni says Amuru land be given to wildlife 
body’, http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/-/691252/1391134/-/format/xhtml/-/12fo8cz/-/index.html 
5 ‘Luis Moreno Ocampo visit Northern Uganda’, Invisible Children Blog, 2.04.2014, 
http://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2014/04/03/ocampo-visits-invisible-children-northern-uganda/  
(accessed 01.05.2014).  
6 Author interview with NGO staff member, Gulu, 24.07.2012 
7 Author led discussion group, Lukodi, 25.07.2012 
8 See Chapter 5, pp.159-61. 
9 Justice and Reconciliation Project, ‘New Video of the Atiak Massacre Memorial Prayers’, April 20 2012, 
http://justiceandreconciliation.com/2012/04/new-video-of-the-attiak-massacre-memorial-prayers/ 
(accessed 31 January 2013);  ‘Atiak massacre survivors get livelihood support from government’, Daily 
Monitor, 30.01.14, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Atiak-massacre-survivors-get-livelihood-
support-from-government/-/688334/2165418/-/6vbq1fz/-/index.html (accessed 05.02.14). 
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Both groups spoke the language of transitional justice in part, but this was not straight-
forward ‘mimicry’ of donor and NGO agendas.  It was quite evident that in each place 
the groups had to make their objectives relevant to the community, and this meant re-
framing and tailoring towards local priorities many of the lessons learnt in the various 
‘trainings’.  In both Lukodi and Atiak, the survivor associations helped lobby for and 
maintain the memorial sites where annual remembrance prayers take place.10  In Atiak, 
however, the survivor association explained that it had boycotted the memorial event in 
2011 because it did not approve of the way in which sub-county and local government 
officials were curating the occasion for their own strategic gain.  The group expressed 
particular disdain for the sub-county’s habit of:  
‘inviting someone to narrate her experience so that she gets traumatised, cries, 
falls down and then that is it.  They make money, we don’t see the money and we 
feel as if they are using those experiences for their advantage’.11   
 
The Association requested that the sub-county officials remove the victim testimony 
from that part of the programme on the basis that:  
‘we didn’t want it to be like that, where someone has to tell everyone what 
happened to them on that day, we don’t want to remember it like that, we need 
scholarships for our children, we need a government school.’12   
 
In Lukodi the memorial was conceptualized in a similar way: as a symbolic reference 
point for community demands and concessions.  The Community Reconciliation Team 
was not set up for reasons conventionally associated with transitional justice, but rather 
to secure practical material support for development purposes.  The two key reasons 
which were identified were the number of women and orphans in need of financial 
support, and the fact that people had lost their assets during the war.  In discussions with 
members of both associations it was acknowledged that unless material needs are 
addressed the groups serve very little local purpose.  The chairman of Lukodi’s 
Community Reconciliation Team explained that until he had ‘trained’ his community in 
the potential of the memorial and the survivors association to ‘sort out these 
development issues’, they saw it as ‘nothing very helpful’.13  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For a study of memorial projects in Acholiland, see Julian Hopwood, We can’t be sure who killed us, 
International Center for Transitional Justice and Justice and Reconciliation Project (February, 2011).  
11 Author led discussion group, Atiak, 08.08.2012 
12 Ibid 
13 Author led discussion group, Lukodi, 25.07.2012 
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In addition to externally funded and externally supported ‘survivor’ groups, informants 
pointed to the numerous local, co-operative-style village groups based on systems that 
predated the war.  What was interesting was that these groupings were also presented as 
a key way in which communities were coping with the legacy of the conflict.  This 
applied to those who had been in the bush just as much as it applied to those who had 
not.  In three places, for example, farmers’ groups operated on an informal basis, 
particularly among women.14  In both Gulu and Agago districts, women explained that 
farmer groups had been an effective way of coping with poverty, and with their 
memories of the conflict.  ‘In the process’, said one woman in Gulu district,  
‘we talk in our small groups and make development decisions; we discuss 
matters, such kinds of things they help us to forget.  Such activities release 
us…they bring us together and in the process it forces unity among us’.15   
 
In Agago, women explained that the farmers’ group had been set up to support the Bol 
Cup, rather graphically named, ‘Okony too ateda’ or (help the victims who were boiled), 
because often people do not have the money ‘ber bedo’ to contribute, so instead they will 
offer to help dig in the village.16  This is one of the ways we ‘live together peacefully and 
support each other’, explained one woman.  In another area of Gulu district, the group 
was called ‘Awinyo Malit,’ (I feel pain), and began in 2002 as a way of enabling ‘members 
to cope with life and become economically self reliant.’17  Experiences of coping with the 
effects of war and of moving through post-conflict life were described without reference 
to what Veena Das calls ‘grand gestures.’18  Instead people talked about the constructive 
ways in which they could engage on a personal and communal level to generate enough 
material and social capital to survive daily challenges.   
 
Those who had not been in captivity explained that the groups were open to all, and that 
returnees and non-returnees mixed well, but returnees tended to paint a more complex 
picture.  One young man in Bobi sub-county who worked as a part-time boda boda driver 
explained that some of his friends from the Bush have joined the village credit and 
savings scheme but that,  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 These groups were commonplace before the war, and people explained that communal digging 
continues to exist but in a less structured form.  For a description and analysis of pre-conflict Acholi Farm 
Work Groups in Southern Sudan, see Tim Allen, ‘Kwete and Kweri: Acholi Farm Work Groups in 
Southern Sudan’, Manchester Papers on Development, 3:2 (1987), pp.60-92 
15 Author led discussion group, Lukodi, 25.07.2012 
16 Author led discussion group, near Omot, 02.08.12 
17 Participant observation, Bobi sub-county, 23.08.2012 
18 Veena Das, ‘Life’, p.7 
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‘it is actually hard for us who have been in captivity to access credit from those 
who have never been abducted.  If I have a problem I use the mutual trust from 
within ourselves (the formerly abducted) to borrow money.  We trust each other 
since we share similar experiences and have solidarity.  We are all the same.’19  
  
Across research sites, returnees spoke of these loose-knit and informal groupings.  These 
were described in very positive terms by those involved.  Activities ranged from talking 
to praying together to small income generating activities such as shared digging, or 
roasting of maize and peddling of cassava.  One young woman explained that:  
‘when we sit together, I feel so comfortable because I know I am accepted but 
when I am with those that were never in the Bush, I feel that at any time I will be 
discriminated against, so I am not at liberty’.20   
 
In both Nwoya district and Amuru district returnees described these informal 
connections as a key way by which they were coping and moving on with life, both 
materially and emotionally. 
 
There exists, then, a range of groups and associations - some externally supported, but 
more commonly not - that have been formed to address the unmet needs of people as 
they try to move through life.  These resemble in their various forms the savings and 
loans groups and farmers groups that pre-dated the conflict.  Thus they are a 
continuation of local methods of self-help and income generation, but the function now 
extends to providing some form of non-material comfort too.  Even in the cases where 
this non-material agenda was more formalized, such as in Atiak and Lukodi, through 
methods like memorial prayers and ‘storytelling’, the leadership of the group still had to 
‘vernacularise’21 the donor and NGO agenda to make it meaningful and worthwhile to 
the local population.   The role that these groups played in interactions between 
returnees and non-returnees was more ambiguous. In some cases the groups were 
constituted in a way that reproduced the divisions created by the conflict.  In other 
instances, non-returnees explained that the savings and loan groups facilitated 
spontaneous interaction with former LRA members based on shared ideas about 
generating income or meeting other daily pressures.  Of course, not everyone was 
involved in these groups, nor do they comprehensively alleviate the shared deprivations 
that overshadow peoples’ lives.  Despite this, it was notable that when asked how people !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Author interview, Bobi Sub-County, 23.08.2012 
20 Author led discussion group, Purrongo sub-county, 15.08.2012 
21 ‘Vernacularise’ was a term coined by the anthropologist Sally Engle Merry to describe the process 
whereby international norms are and ideas are re-shaped and made relevant in local contexts.  See, Sally 
Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai’i: The Cultural Power of the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).!!
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live together and how they cope, it was these groupings, based on stated priorities of 
improving immediate material conditions and ‘coping up’ that were emphasized.   
 
Transitions, spirits and social healing 
 
When people are asked to describe the kinds of interventions that might facilitate the 
settling of past accounts and aid a peaceful transition from war, a range of possibilities 
are raised, most of which center on tangible socio-economic goods.  In the six research 
sites, these included scholarships for orphans, help with school fees, better health clinics, 
better roads, better livelihood opportunities, re-stocking of looted cattle, and better 
HIV/AIDs services for women who had been raped.22  These demands were articulated 
as entitlements rather than requests, and they were envisaged as a way of catching up 
with the rest of Uganda.  As victims of a war that lasted too long, people strongly 
asserted the exceptional nature of their needs as being over and above what was already 
being allocated elsewhere in development aid programmes such as the PRDP. 
Compensation, as one NGO worker put it, is the ‘the common language that victims 
speak’23 and it is often described by people as something tangible that the government 
can do help them ‘forget’ the dreadful experiences they have suffered.  As one young 
man in Omot sub-county explained,  
‘We are trying to forget the pain of the past but there is another disease which is 
poverty, much as you try to forget everything, you recall that those days you had 
cattle, you had land, but now all has gone.  So the problem now is poverty.  You 
are in poverty now.’    
 
There is in this sentiment a refusal to honour the historical breaks between war and 
peace that external analysts impose.  The notion of transition is too clear-cut to 
adequately express the structural deprivations that fasten the past to the present.   
 
The focus of ordinary people on the problems they faced in their daily lives currently 
upends orthodox transitional justice narratives, guided as they are by a basic structuring 
image that is essentially linear and material.  The reality in northern Uganda is that 
seemingly key events like the disbanding of the camps or the silence of the guns do not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 These are also raised as priorities in the UN Human Rights, ‘Dust’. 
23 Author interview with NGO staff member, Gulu, 24.07.2012  
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form the ‘main axis of life’ for many.24  The same can be said of more immediately 
dramatic and extreme events such as massacres.  Transitional justice places too much 
emphasis on ‘events’, on moments of exceptional physical violence, or moments of 
apparent ‘transition’ from war to peace, and ignores the fact that, in the Acholi context, 
these are episodic instances of extreme suffering or momentary relief that punctuate an 
almost permanent state of sustained neglect, discrimination, and insecurity.25  People in 
Acholiland were largely relieved to be back in their villages, and that the immediate threat 
of systematic LRA and UPDF violence has subsided, but they remained in a state of 
subjection, and often of crisis and fear: trapped in endemic poverty, bad health, the 
premature deaths of children, shortened life spans, violence against women, and limited 
choices.26  
 
Indeed during group discussions, a temporal disjuncture was apparent between 
transitional justice conceptions and local understandings of time, space and misfortune.  
Donor support for transitional justice envisages a linear ‘clock time’, which comprises a 
before and an after, so that violence was in the past; resolution and healing exist in the 
present and future. 27  This conception of time, as Victor Igreja has argued in the context 
of post-conflict Mozambique, contrasts with the ‘multiple temporalities’ that people 
experience in their everyday lives.28  For many, as Igreja points out, war time violence 
‘remains a part of their diurnal and nocturnal nightmares’ and it intervenes in both 
predictable and unpredictable ways, through cen, the ‘unhappy spirits’, usually of people 
who died violently or who had some physical connection with a place where violent 
events had occurred.29  The dynamic and cosmological significance of these processes are 
not captured by the externally supported ‘traditional justice’ agenda discussed in the 
previous chapter.  In all six of the research sites, people made reference to the ‘cen’ spirits 
that were disturbing them, making them feel deeply unsettled and uncomfortable in their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Miroslav Vanek, ‘Those who Prevailed and those who were Replaced: Interviewing on both sides of a 
conflict’, in Donald Ritchie (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Oral History Handbook (New York: Oxford 
University Press USA, 2012) p. 49 
25 Paige Arthur highlights the uneasy relationship between human rights violations and ‘long-term’ 
discrimination in ‘Introduction’ in Paige Arthur (ed), Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional Justice in 
Divided Societies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.1-14 at 9-10 
26 ibid at 10 
27 Victor Igreja, ‘Multiple Temporalities in Indigenous Justice and Healing Practices in Mozambique’, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6:3, 2012, pp.404-422, at 407 
28 Ibid p.407 
29 Ibid p.408; for a more detailed definition of the concept of cen see, Porter, ‘Rape’ p.99;  
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surroundings. In Nwoya district, villagers explained that ‘the gun is silent but there is no 
peace yet’.  One woman said that,  
‘a lot of people were killed around here and at night you do not see anybody but 
you hear voices calling people.  In my home, there are strange voices in the night 
that call names.  Until tomorrow it will still be happening.  Calling the names of 
the people who are gone.’30  
  
Others in the group described similar experiences.  A particular problem in the area had 
been at the local primary school, which was a barracks during the war.  Villagers 
recounted how at night, ‘spirits come and strangle teachers in the night and also the 
children of the teachers.31  One teacher was apparently strangled so badly that in the 
morning, ‘his neck was swollen and his eyes were almost coming out.’32  Cen and spirits 
of the dead transcend and decompose the barriers of linear time, and give form to 
people’s daily experience in Acholiland.  For the many who have died and never been 
identified or undergone a proper burial, their spirits are believed to be ever present, 
vengeful and destructive. One man in Gulu District described the unburied bones vividly 
as being like ‘unexploded ordinances.’33  Indeed, the way in which spirits intervene can be 
as violent, disturbing, and sudden, as the violence perpetrated by living combatants 
during the conflict.  
 
Ritual action is used widely across Acholiland in an attempt to cleanse and appease the 
spirits, and to heal the cosmological legacy of the war but the way in which it takes place 
in the absence of donor or NGO support is varied.  It can be improvised, and even 
unpredictable.  In order to avoid falling into yet another ‘ethno-justice’ trap, it should be 
noted that there are broad constituencies of people who eschew such methods – most 
notably Pentecostal Christians, who refer to themselves as ‘born agains’.  There are also 
those who accept and welcome ritual as a part of the social texture of rural Acholi life, 
but who openly keep a sort of respectful distance from it: this is often young men and 
women, who explain that their own elders never shared with them the function of these 
processes, and that camp life prohibited cultural learning.  This did not equate to 
rejection of ritual and other cultural mores, it was more a statement of fact than a 
statement of belief: this was not in their jurisdiction presently and in the future perhaps it 
might die out altogether.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Author led group discussion, Purongo sub-County, 15.08.2012 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
33 Author led discussion group, Gulu District, 27.07.2012!
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There was certain nomenclature that came up at every research site, and is worth 
mentioning here.  The stepping on the egg (nyomo ton gweno) ritual was performed widely 
at household level when an LRA member returned from the Bush and rejoined the 
family.  The purpose of the ceremony was to ‘cleanse’ the person who had been away 
from the home for a long period from spirits that he or she may have come into contact 
with which might bring misfortune to the wider community.  An egg is used because it is 
considered to be innocent.  One man described the curvature of the egg, and the fact 
that it has no mouth and no beginning or end.34  It is normally placed between a split 
branch from the opobo tree which is moist and signifies the washing away of dirt.  Beyond 
that there were many variations; in Agago for example, elders explained that during the 
process they use traditional cigarettes to ‘puff and spit on him’ and then ‘get some soils 
and begin to proclaim positive things in his life’.35  In three of the research sites further 
cleansing took place immediately after the stepping on the egg, and involved the ‘ritual 
washing’ of a returnee with blessed water, followed by the sharing of a meal prepared by 
the returnee’s mother.  In Gulu district this was described as ‘Moyo Kom,’ involving the 
slaughter of a goat and the ‘washing away of tears’ (lwoko pik wang) that have been shed 
during mourning, when it was believed that the returnee had died in the bush.  It is 
believed that if those tears are not washed away they will bring misfortune to the 
returnee.   
 
In every research site, animals had been sacrificed in order to cleanse impurities that lead 
to misfortune.  In Agago District people made reference to a recent example of ‘Mony 
Piny’, the cleansing of a particular area where specific incidents were recurring.  This 
involved the sacrifice of a sheep on a small hill, where regular lightning had been 
disturbing people.  There was a consensus among the village elders that this was being 
caused by cen linked to ‘what happened up there during the war’.36  In this instance it was 
explained that the cutting of the sheep releases cold and ‘innocent’ blood which drives 
away the evil spirits.  In Nwoya District residents explained that because of the number 
of bones scattered around large areas, it was decided that Ryemo Gemo must take place; 
this was described as a ‘chasing of spirits’ from a wide area, and again involved the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Author led group discussion, Omot sub-County, 02.08.2012 
35 Ibid 
36 Author led group discussion, Omot sub-County, 02.08.2012 
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sacrifice of a sheep.37   More commonly though, in discussions about spirits and cen, 
people just referred to need for ‘tum’.  ‘Tum’ was defined broadly as a sacrificial act – 
usually the cutting or ‘slicing’ of a sheep or a goat that would cleanse the area of the 
social and cosmological consequences that might accrue from instances of wrongdoing.  
Holly Porter identifies a deep etymological significance in the word ‘tumu’, ‘cutting’ 
which, she argues represents the severing of the consequences of an act of wrongdoing 
from its ‘capacity to spoil social harmony’.38   A common idea across Acholiland is the 
mutability, transcendence, and self-propagation of misfortune, if cleansing does not take 
place. 
 
What was more apparent than regular ‘ideal-type’ rituals promoted by the traditional 
justice agenda, were the various improvised ways in which people dealt with 
cosmological insecurity.  This often involved the mingling of traditional and religious 
processes.   Often religious methods were trialed before moving on to traditional rituals 
which were described as being more resource intensive.  In Lukodi, for example, an 
elderly woman complained that there were ‘bodies littered all around here and this is not 
good in our culture’, she said that her own son was being ‘disturbed by these spirits’ so 
she encouraged him to ‘lift up both hands and just proclaim the name of Jesus and say 
these things will not happen.’39  In Nwoya District the case of spirits strangling teachers 
and their children in the night was dealt with by the head teacher, who called the 
executive committee of the school together.  It was resolved that before turning to 
traditional processes, the group should pray together.  According to the villagers, the 
prayer had successfully sorted out the problem at the school.  When asked why religious 
prayers had been chosen over traditional ritual, one woman explained that ‘money is very 
important to mobilise traditional activities, but you know prayer can be done at no 
cost.’40  In Amuru District people explained that traditional processes were helpful in 
individual cases of suffering and sickness, and were carried out in the homestead, often 
with the help of an ajwaka (diviner), but that problems afflicting the broader community 
were more aptly addressed by prayer.41  Interestingly, across the research sites people 
were very reticent about whether or not they used ajwakas (diviners) at times of serious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Author led group discussion, Nwoya District, 15.08.2012.  In his PhD thesis, Thomas Harlacher 
documents all Acholi rituals that play a role in healing some of those mentioned in this research are 
explained in more detail.   See Harlacher, ‘Traditional’  
38 Porter, ‘Rape’, p.105 
39 Author led group discussion, Lukodi, 25.07.2012 
40 Author led group discussion, Nwoya District, 15.08.2012 
41 Author led group discussion, Atiak, 08.08.2012 
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misfortune, and no-one volunteered this information spontaneously.  When pressed, a 
common response was well encapsulated by one elder who said, ‘religion told us we 
cannot use them, so we are shy.  But, it is quite common and if you skip it, it is to your 
own danger.’42  
 
There is a strong sense of flexibility and tolerance in how peoples’ response to 
misfortune is linked to the spirit world.  On numerous occasions people explained that it 
was up to the family how they would like to proceed; some prefer ritual, some prefer 
prayer, and often they will experiment with both.  For those people who held committed 
positions on the desirability of one process over the other, the argument tended to be 
that this would be resolved metaphysically.  A worker at the World Vision reception 
centre in Gulu, for example, laughed at the thought that the ‘stepping on the egg’ would 
restore balance and stability to the war-affected communities, and expressed faux 
surprise when recounting how the family of a returnee came to her recently complaining 
that ‘the boy is still being stubborn.’  ‘Oh,’ she replied to them,  ‘so the egg did not 
work!?’ 43   In contrast, in Kalongo town, a largely Catholic area, which boasts an 
impressive Catholic mission, and is a place where people are quick to say that they 
eschew traditional rituals, an elder laughed and explained that no religion can ever fully 
convert an Acholi.  He had a complacent confidence about the role of traditional ritual in 
the regulation of Acholi life, ‘when the worst comes to the worst’, he said, ‘even the most 
devoted believer will backslide to tradition.’44  
 
Pentecostal Christians were most explicitly dismissive of traditional rituals, but even here 
there was acceptance that these things happen, and that they are meaningful to sections 
of Acholi society, even if the extent of this is sometimes underplayed.  In Agago District, 
for example, LC3 councilors explained that traditional beliefs no longer served the 
function that they once had in their area, 
‘when the war became too hot, people came close to God.  When there was a lot 
of insecurity, people started to pray.  People today, they go towards Christ and 
not the traditional leaders.  Traditional leaders demand money, goats and 
chickens and they are even liars.  People don’t want that.  They go to Church.  If 
you talk to God, your prayers are answered.’45  
   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Author interview, Gulu, 20.08.2013 
43 Author interview with World Vision staff member, Gulu, 02.10.2012 
44 Author interview, Kalongo Town, 15.08.2012 
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In the same breath though, it is accepted that, ‘you may not believe but members of your 
clan, they think it is the dead ones causing all these problems… and will conduct these 
things.’46  The general acceptance that these things took place was widely shared; and 
within the same village – even within the same family - people had very different 
perspectives on what might work.  An illustrative case was in Amuru District, where 
residents of one village were in disagreement over what should be done with a returnee 
who had been forced by the LRA to kill her own sister in the Bush, and was now 
committing all sorts of taboos, including walking around the village naked.  Those ‘born 
agains’ in the village attributed the girl’s behavior to her failure to keep up with prayer 
and church attendance.  This, they argued, had caused the spirits to start attacking her.  A 
group of young men were not so sure, they were concerned about the growing popularity 
of born again Christianity, arguing that it ‘is only pain that drags people there, and they 
do not get the healing they are looking for.’47  They felt that the only way to resolve the 
situation was for the elders to come together and make a sacrifice to appease the spirit of 
the sister who had been murdered.  Despite the tendency for older men to disparage the 
‘youth’ and their predilection for all things western, there was no clear generational divide 
between those who supported traditional practices and those who did not.  What was 
clearer was that those who had supreme confidence in the efficacy of their own moral 
system to cope with the unknown and predictable, demonstrated a courteous restraint 
towards those who preferred alternative methods.  
 
Ritual action was not always described in positive terms as restorative or healing.   A 
group of returnees in Gulu town, for example, those who had decided to settle away 
from home, described how elders had ‘put many curses on perpetrators.’48  This was 
described as kiir, the concept Okot p’Bitek defined as a curse, usually by someone who 
feels they have been wronged, which upends social relations.  One example given was 
that the families of victims were burying the dead with their heads facing away from the 
family compound (as opposed to the normal practice which was to bury the dead facing 
inward) and in doing so, ‘the dead can send out curses and the curse goes back to the 
family of the perpetrator’.49  Another example given by returnees in Nwoya District was 
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the practice of burying the victims with spears, again to direct them to wreak 
vengeance.50  
 
The liberal transitional justice paradigm is ill-equipped to deal with the dynamics of 
cosmological and spiritual practice in contexts like northern Uganda.   As a field, 
transitional justice has not engaged sufficiently with the dynamics and power of the spirit 
world and ‘its role in bringing the past to the present and threatening to jeopardize the 
future’.51  The traditional justice and reconciliation agenda, as argued in the previous 
chapter, also fails to capture the profundity of spiritual life in Acholiland and as a result  
it has failed to resonate.  What is perhaps most disorientating to many external observers 
is that spiritual methods and needs are central rather than peripheral.  They cannot be 
distilled, codified, and funded as add-ons to more formal transitional justice processes, 
because they comprise an entire meaning system: they are absolutely key to the way in 
which most people view the problems they face, and as prescriptions for how to heal 
individuals and communities and move on.52  Even if some people prefer religion to 
ritual, or priests over ajwaki, it is rare to meet someone who does not acknowledge 
spiritual causation in some form.  It is quite clearly evident that for many people it is 
spirits rather than universal concepts of reason that arbitrate truth.  Appeasing and 
reconciling with phenomena that cannot be empirically verified (i.e spirits) is a priority 
for many and it cannot be sidestepped.53  As the Gulu district speaker explained, ‘you can 
forgive or use these other western methods but there are still the spirits, we are all very 
concerned about the sprits’.54  Perhaps a useful way for scholars to approach this is the 
through a rather radical concession that the transitional justice imaginary is not that 
different from the spirit world of the Acholi, in that both create their own ‘powerful 
ghosts and fetishes.’55   
 
What is ‘ordinary justice’ in post-conflict Acholiland? 
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The preference for compensation and reparation over criminal trials and other formal 
accountability processes, and the very clear role that cosmology and ritual action play in 
regulating moral and social order, have spawned an unhelpful propositional logic, with its 
intellectual roots in 19th century colonial statecraft, which holds that state sanctioned 
forms of legal accountability are not culturally appropriate in Acholiland because they are 
‘western.’56   This has become a conventional trope in transitional justice debates: that 
Africans prefer restorative justice arbitrated by traditional authorities or in accordance 
with ‘traditional’ concepts.57  The aim of the following section is to depart from this form 
of essentialism through an examination of the public authorities people are using to 
resolve war-related land disputes in post-conflict Acholiland.  A criticism of such an 
approach may be that transitional justice is qualitatively different from ordinary justice: it 
carries a different set of objectives and a different set of processes.  Posner and Vermule, 
however, argue that analysts of TJ have ‘gone wrong through insufficient appreciation of 
ordinary law’.58  Bearing in mind E.P Thompson’s maxim that law does not ‘keep politely 
to a level’ but permeates and is imbricated ‘at every bloody level’, this argument can be 
stretched further to encourage a better appreciation of ‘ordinary life’.59  Given that TJ is 
contiguous with ‘ordinary’ justice and with the existing political settlement and social 
order in any given place, it is quite perplexing that so little is known about local justice 
provision in Acholiland.  
 
Resolv ing war-re lated land disputes  
This section focuses on the issue of land wrangles and disputes: the war-related issue that 
people say most affects their daily lives. This involves criminal damage, criminal trespass, 
removal of boundary marks, and threatening violence and assault.  Displacement into the 
camps from 1996 onwards had an overwhelmingly unsettling impact across northern 
Uganda, where people’s identity is linked to that of their clan, and where the clan, in 
turn, as a collective, is signified by and structured around the communal, customary land 
to which it lays claim.60  Camp life was impoverishing and unproductive, and on people’s 
return to the villages, access to customary, communal land was the only ‘productive asset’ 
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most people could rely on.61  The securing of this access has been subject, however, to 
many pressures and difficulties, ranging from confusion and disagreement over pre-
displacement land boundaries between households, to controversial attempts by the 
Government to open up Acholi land to investors for large-scale commercial farming.62   
Given that land is the ‘epicenter’ of social, economic, and cosmological life, disputes 
related to access, boundaries, and ownership affect the ‘rest of life’ profoundly.63  As one 
man explained, ‘if you really want to mess with the Acholi, you play with their land.’64  In 
northern Uganda this represents a huge transitional dilemma that people are actively 
seeking to resolve on a daily basis.  As a senior Acholi donor staff member explained, off 
the record,  
‘resolving transitional issues is a priority for people, but not the way donors 
understand it.  In Acholi a lot of time is spent on resolving tensions and conflict, 
especially over land. This is a key framework through which people are 
negotiating life.  But that is not the transitional justice which is discussed in 
public forums in Kampala and Gulu and if you are looking for that you are 
missing something.’65 
   
His point was that transitional justice - as a set of pre-articulated conceptions -  was not 
the right entry point through which to explore, let alone understand, the dynamics of 
post-conflict justice and social repair in Acholiland.  Equally, as is argued below, an 
examination of the way in which war-related disputes are being resolved on a daily basis 
elucidates and complicates assumptions inherent in prevailing transitional justice 
conceptions.  
 
Three main findings are clear.  The first is that donor and civil society promotion of the 
KKA and traditional chiefs as Acholi public authority figures is out of sync with the way 
in which social order is actually regulated.  The second is that arguments which suggest 
that there is a cultural aversion to formal/retributive justice misunderstand the deeply 
hybrid nature of current justice arrangements in Acholiland, and over-simplify the 
relationship between the Acholi and the state.  The third and related point is that 
Acholiland is not a blank justice slate.  Systems are in place which people use and  
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generally regard as being legitimate and efficient.  This complicates donor arguments 
which link transitional justice to rule of law strengthening through institutional and 
capacity building support. The assumption that Acholis are generic justice seekers waiting 
for access to state-backed justice systems does not take into account the justice choices 
that people are already making, and why.   
 
An examination of who the ‘principal providers’ of redress and settlement are in land 
cases gives important insight into how justice acquires meaning in local settings.66 Across 
research sites the vast majority of people who made reference to land-related disputes 
explained that they were between households at the village rather than the parish level.  
As Julian Hopwood has pointed out, ‘the law is largely silent on matters of customary 
land,’ and ‘decision making authority is vested in clan, sub-clan or extended family 
leaders’.67  In land cases, people overwhelming said that they would first consult clan 
elders who were familiar with the old, pre-conflict boundaries, and if the elders could not 
resolve the issue or were no longer alive, either the Rwot Kweri or the LC1 would be 
consulted.  This was interesting because both roles are modern formations. The Rwot 
Kweri, as was discussed in Chapter 3, is a ‘chief of the hoe’, an elected or appointed local 
customary leader who provides leadership and arbitrates over issues of land, farming and 
agriculture in sub-divisions of LC1 villages. The LC1 on the other hand is an elected 
political representative, albeit at the lowest level of the decentralized local government 
system. 68  As described in Chapter 3, in the early days of the NRM, the LCI figure was 
regarded with some suspicion in the locality as a government interloper and enforcer, but 
is now generally regarded as a trusted arbitrator of local concerns.69  Elders, Rwodi Kweri, 
and LC1s, derive their authority from different sources, and have contrasting 
relationships with the Ugandan state, yet they share a perceived ability to arbitrate on 
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cases based on unwritten customary law.  This was usually because of physical presence 
and deep knowledge of the area, rather than kinship affinities or authority status. 
 
Thus the highly local order of Acholi society creates a sliding scale of legitimacy in justice 
institutions.  The choice of who to turn to depended on the proximity of the authority to 
the location of the dispute, the perceived integrity of the individual, his range of relevant 
knowledge, and the degree to which he is both trusted by the community and nested 
within it.  What was striking was that situations resolved at this very local level (elders, 
Rwot Kweri or LC1) were rarely contested openly.  As one informant in Lukodi 
explained:  
‘if the dispute starts at a small level we normally go to the nearby elders.  
Sometimes we cannot even involve the LC1.  If it is big you will go to the LC1.  
Others might raise it at the sub-county but mostly we have been handling issues 
that stop at the level of the LC1.  People get satisfied with the rulings.  I have 
never heard of anyone going to the level of the magistrates.’70   
 
This did not necessarily mean that decisions were universally accepted (as will be 
explored in more detail below), but it did support the argument put forward by Atkinson 
and Hopwood that the overall number of discrete rural land disputes has been ‘declining 
significantly’ due to ‘high resolution rates’ arbitrated by elders and lower level councilors 
and courts.71   
 
What people emphasized frequently was the great asymmetry of information that existed 
between those authorities who were closely acquainted with the geographical area under 
dispute and those authorities whose role and function transcended the immediate 
context.  Indeed preferences were not so much ‘culture-bound’ as they were ‘context-
bound’, so that any authority outside of the immediate locus of the dispute was viewed 
with some trepidation.72  Even the LCII, the local Parish chief, is talked about as coming 
‘from a far distance’ and ‘not knowing the history of the area.’73  As an authority figure 
he may be a member of the broader community, but he is also more tangential to the 
symbiosis of village life, and therefore more prone to misinterpretation, misinformation 
and corruption.   Similarly, despite their valorization as the custodians of customary law !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Author led discussion, Lukodi, 25.07.2012 
71 Hopwood and Atkinson, ‘Mapping’, p.i 
72 Mahmood Mamdani makes described colonial ideas relating to law being ‘culture’ and ‘context’; although 
the argument I put forward is different here, see Mahmood Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political 
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and culture, not one person mentioned the Ker Kwaro Acholi chiefs as figures they 
would turn to in the event of a dispute.  
 
The distinction people made between the knowing and the un-knowing, the legitimate 
and the illegitimate, complicates understandings of Acholi attitudes towards the state 
authorities, which arguably amounts to more than an abstract lack of trust.  Respondents 
did not express a cultural aversion to formal legal institutions (which begin at the level of 
the magistrate), inasmuch as they expressed qualified concern about any institution that 
was not equipped to act in their interests.  This could be a corrupt elder, or a distant 
chief, just as much as it might be an incompetent local magistrate.  It was the issue of 
efficiency and positive outcomes that people raised most emphatically, what Baker and 
Scheye call ‘performance accountability.’74  In Odek sub-county, during a discussion 
group about local disputes and their resolution (or not), people were asked whether they 
would like to have their cases heard in magistrates courts, if the opportunity were there.  
The predictable response would have been negative, based on preconceived notions of 
mistrust and fear of state structures.  The actual response was as follows:  
 
‘No, we would not like to go to a magistrates court, even if it was here, right here 
and we had the money’. 
 
‘Is it because you do not trust the courts to rule fairly?’ 
 
‘Not because of trust, no.  It is because it is pointless.  It is because the people 
who know the boundaries are already here, among us.  It is a local thing’.75 
 
The word ‘pointless’ is interesting here and it reflected a more general sentiment about 
the superfluity of rules and practice that were not rooted in the relevant context. This 
was hardly surprising as the disputes arise in situations where, as Judith Scheele notes, 
people rarely deal with ‘abstract things or with abstract people, but rather with 
neighbours, family members and in-laws.’76  This is particularly the case with land, where 
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validity of claims depends ‘less on universal truth than on neighbour’s opinion’77 but is 
also relevant for other disputes arising from acts of wrongdoing, as Holly Porter has 
shown in her study of responses to rape and gender violence in Acholiland.  People 
grapple with the ‘generality’ of the law and its universality because these properties stand 
in tension with the highly place and circumstance-specific way in which rightful order is 
maintained.   The discernable utilitarian and pragmatic approach to the resolution of 
issues should encourage us to re-direct attention away from the orthodox conceptual 
boundaries between customary and formal, traditional and modern, and towards what 
Donald Davis describes as a more pluralist model which un-binds and re-conceptualises 
the notion of jurisdiction so that it viewed not just as a ‘bounded area within which legal 
authority can be exercised but rather as a capacity to “speak the law”’.78  Indeed if we are 
able to distinguish between ‘rules’: i.e the customary and the formal and ‘practice’, i.e the 
way that these rules are implemented and by whom and in what context, it is possible to 
avoid slippage in the conceptual analysis that tends to conflate the two and create the 
rigid distinctions that do not always operate in practice.   
 
The risk in conceptualising justice as ‘context-bound’ is the suggestion that modes of 
resolution are deeply parochial.  People appear, however, to embed their justice decisions 
in a logic that is cognizant of the wider world, exhibiting what Hart once referred to as a 
‘critical reflective attitude’ about how the world is.79  This in turn, confers meaning on 
the sort of actions that will allow or threaten what Lon Fuller called a ‘programme for 
living together’.80  The resolution of disputes and wrongdoing is a practical, utilitarian 
and consequentialist process in which wrongdoing and punishment are defined and 
determined by context and circumstance.   It is interesting to note, therefore, that in the 
urban areas where research was conducted, where systems of mutual economic and 
social support and obligation were looser, there was widespread support for police 
intervention and trials in cases of theft.   Indeed Gulu’s State Attorney lamented the fact 
that the traditional system was not functioning adequately in relation to these crimes in 
urban areas. 81  It was also the case that for those groups who felt dislocated and 
marginalized in their home communities, it was more likely that they would choose !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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external organisations, particularly NGOs, to help them mediate their local disputes.  The 
IOM, for example, has reported that 50 per cent of all succession and inheritance cases 
between August 2003 and October 2009 were filed by young adults between the ages of 
18-30, who no longer felt protected by the customary rights arbitrated by elders in their 
own communities.82  
 
Impli cat ions for  transi t ional  just i c e  
What the above suggests is that the decision to refer a dispute and seek redress is 
premised on the available information, a realistic assessment of the likelihood of a 
tolerable outcome, and the consequences of that outcome on moral, cosmological, and 
social stability.  As will be explored below, it is the uncertainty relating to these three 
premises that make peoples’ attitudes towards state-led or externally supported 
transitional justice for wrongdoing perpetrated by the GoU and the LRA, so ambivalent.   
Whether or not amnesty, trials, truth-telling, or external funding for mato oput, are 
preferable options or not, remains largely unresolved in the minds of most people.  In 
fact, when asked, most people today stress the deeply complex implications of such 
processes, and emphasise their lack of power  in the ability to shape their direction. 
 
An illustrative example came to light during a discussion with an elderly woman in 
Kalongo town in the eastern-most part of Acholiland.  She began by explaining how 
petty theft was the major security issue affecting her life and that it was being perpetrated 
by young men who had grown up in the camps and could not be bothered to work.  She 
then emphasized that suspected criminals should be reported to the police and punished, 
preferably with a prison sentence and a fine.  This seemed to jar with an earlier part of 
the interview in which she expressed her desire to forgive LRA perpetrators for the 
violent crimes they had committed, even against her own family.  When this apparent 
contradiction was explored further, she explained that,  
 
‘These are two different things.  The ones who killed on a larger scale, like Joseph 
Kony, should his life be lost because of all the others he killed?  It does not make 
up for the loss of life that he caused. Those of Kony and his group is different.  
The impression we have is that it is beyond our means and we just need to 
forgive them.  The LRA killed two of my children and my husband but one of 
them lives with us here in the village now, there is nothing I can do, they just 
come and settle down.  But that other person, that thief, he came and stole my !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Mckibben and Bean, ‘Land’, p.19  
! 272 
things and it is good to punish him because those thief’s have taken my things 
three times now.  Those of Kony and his group are different, but this case of 
mine, it is from home.’83 
 
When prodded a bit further on whether or not she would support a trial for Joseph 
Kony if he were captured, she again expressed a sense of incapacity and impotence, as if 
the issue was too ‘far from home’ metaphorically speaking and therefore too latitudinous 
for adjudication, saying that: 
‘We are people at a household level and we do not have power over that.  If it 
was marriage, if Kony wanted to marry one of my daughters, I would not accept 
it.  Forgiveness I might grant him would be that he cannot marry from my home.  
That would be impossible and I could never accept.  He can come and dig.’84 
 
Her response turned the issue on its head and expressed her feelings towards the LRA 
leadership through the institutions over which she had some jurisdiction and control.  It 
also highlighted a broader tendency to make a distinction between governable and 
ungovernable justice spaces.   
 
The LC1 in the same village had a remarkably similar opinion on things.  He explained 
that when a mattress was stolen from his hut recently the thief was chased into town by a 
mob who beat him so seriously that he almost died.  When asked about punitive 
accountability for crimes committed during the war his attitude shifted, and he explained 
‘well, my opinion cannot reach to the level of government. People have just surrendered 
all these things.’ 85  In many ways, perhaps, this was an expression of ‘transitional justice’, 
an acknowledgement that justice for crimes committed during a conflict require a 
different approach from those committed during peacetime.  People also pointed out of 
course that there was an Amnesty Act in place which although championed by the local 
traditional, religious and political leadership, was also regarded as a government measure, 
regulated and controlled in a faraway place.  The way in which people framed their 
‘powerlessness’ however, is worthy of further examination, because it was defined in 
oppositional terms, against the agency they possessed in their immediate locales and 
because of this it actually became more apparent as a strategy.   The reticence people 
assumed is captured well by two particular variants of Roger Mac Ginty’s concept of 
‘non-participation’, which posits a conceptual alternative to ‘resistance’ and ‘compliance’ 
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towards international and state interventions into daily lives.86   Across research sites in 
Acholiland two particular forms of non-participation became quite apparent in relation 
to transitional justice.  The first was more noticeable in relation to discussions about 
crimes committed by the LRA, and was a form of ‘voluntary non-participation’, 
described as a ‘rational choice, a utilitarian calculation that participation will bring few 
benefits’.87  Because people rarely identified a clear link between criminal accountability 
for LRA war crimes and material improvements in their own lives, or greater 
cosmological or physical security, they actively disengaged from the topic on the basis 
that keeping a ‘low profile’ would better serve ‘the goal of long term accommodation’.88 
Voluntary non-participation in debates about criminal accountability thus carried clear, 
practical benefits.  It was not uncommon to hear people bat away suggestions of criminal 
accountability for LRA perpetrators with comments like ‘I have no problem with the 
LRA’, or, ‘just let them come so we have peace here’.   
 
Of course, this ‘denotes a degree of agency’ but it was often combined with another 
sense of ‘involuntary non-participation’ which came to the fore during discussions 
around UPDF crimes and accountability.  This, Mac Ginty describes as ‘acculturation’, 
the idea that norms of non-participation are deeply structural, they are ‘embedded in the 
thought and behavior patterns of individuals and groups’ and are thus difficult to shift.89  
While people expressed a strong desire to see UPDF soldiers and government officials 
prosecuted for war crimes and theft, these remarks were always caveated with assertions 
of powerlessness: people felt disqualified from participating in these debates because they 
had ‘no power,’ and because ‘this would never happen.’90  Government and UPDF 
accountability was an aspirational, perhaps unobtainable desire and a vision of a more 
equitable future, while LRA prosecutions represented something far more ambiguous 
and de-stablising, perhaps because the prospect was more real and the likelihood of 
instrumentalisation and manipulation were immediate.  The important caveat is that 
support for the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo was quite evident among many of the people 
directly affected by the violence he allegedly perpetrated.  Their support was linked to a 
tangible opportunity structure and thus criminal accountability shifted from presenting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Between Resistance and Compliance: Non-participation and the liberal peace’, Journal 
of Intervention and State-building, 6:4 (2012) p.167-87.  
87 Ibid, p.174. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, p.176. 
90 Author field notes, Acholiland, June-October 2012.!
! 274 
itself as an alarming and ungovernable ‘spectre’ to something that could actually address 
people’s justice needs.   
 
Generally though, state-led transitional justice processes, as promoted by donors and 
JLOS, are a red herring to most people.  This was not because of a cultural aversion to 
formal justice, nor was it fatalistic.  It was pragmatic and based on a clear understanding 
of the hegemony of the NRM and its narrative about the LRA war.   For most people, 
the lived experiences of the ICC, the ICD, and the truth commissions for those who 
remember them, were that they were biased and, or, ineffective.  It was not considered 
practical or wise to separate the processes themselves from the deeply unequal political 
environment in which they would operate.   This is not to say that they were not 
supported in theory, rather that people were deeply dubious about them in context.  To 
equate transitional justice with peace, accountability, reconciliation, and healing, is to 
‘implicitly assume effective and equitable governance’, and people in northern Uganda, 
understandably, rarely make that assumption.91    
 
The relationship between the community affected by violence, and the state responsible 
for delivering transitional justice, should be central to calculations of donor support, yet, 
as chapters five and six have argued, as a political consideration it has not really figured.   
In discussions with people about the role that the state can play in criminal accountability 
for war crimes one gets a strong sense of the inner tension that such questions pose.  
People shifted about, sometimes they sighed or laughed, other times they became 
agitated.  Their spoken and physical reactions expressed a sense of what Kirsten 
Campbell has called the ‘trauma of the law’: the torment of an incorporeal ‘justice’ that is 
mediated in far away places by people who cannot be trusted, and which brings no 
immediate material benefit.  The ‘trauma of the law’, writes Campbell: 
‘is that it cannot represent justice.  The trauma of justice is that it is a juridical 
impossibility… justice requires a fundamental change to the social order which 
made possible the originary trauma of crimes against humanity.  In this sense, 
justice remains an event to come’.92   
 
The long-term nature of this realization is something that people understand, and it has 
informed their strategies of non-participation.  Indeed, as well as the impression that TJ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 This point is made in relation to the land titling debate in northern Uganda but is also relevant here cf. 
Atkinson and Hopwood, ‘Land’, p.7 
92 cf. Weinstein et al, ‘Vengeance’, p. 37 
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in Uganda can never be fair, people also talked frequently about there not being enough 
‘time’ to push for it.  Acholiland, said one elderly man, has been like ‘stagnant’ water for 
twenty years.93  People, younger people included, worried that their lives were being 
wasted; they were getting older and could not sacrifice any more of their resources on 
broad political questions or projects.  People’s attitudes towards the state were complex: 
there was a desire to castigate, but also a recoiling force which is located in people’s own 
marginality.94  It is too simplistic to claim that the state is ‘absent’ in people’s everyday 
experiences, because it is highly present as a concept in people’s imaginations. Of course, 
decentralization and the LC system means that the apparatus of the state, in a hybrid 
form, seeps down right to the village level.  But more amorphously perhaps, people use 
the state as a reference point to lament their exclusion from key social and economic 
goods. As Salwa Ismail noted in her work on Egypt, citizens ‘come to experience the 
state in the ways in which it does not exist for them, and not just the ways that it does’.95  
It was not the state as a concept that was criticised, but its failure to function well in 
people’s everyday lives.  In the absence of political transition, if the state was going to 
function at all, people wanted it to deliver services and material compensation for what 
they lost during the war.  This was felt to be something tangible that the government 
could provide, and it was one of the reasons why the NRM did relatively well in 
Acholiand in the 2011 general election.  The result, lauded by the NRM as proof that the 
Acholi had finally come to their senses about who the bad guy was, could also be 
interpreted as a pragmatic choice after so many years of conflict. ‘The opposition 
rhetoric never changed our lives’ said one Acholi elder, 
‘when the NRM said, if you vote for us we can work for you, we could buy into 
that because we saw what was happening with development in other parts of the 
country.  Only the government has the resources to bring it, so we’ll see’.96   
 
The question is how do we make sense of such rich and textured attitudes around 
redress, accountability and justice?  Firstly, it helps to conceptualise the political and 
socio-legal landscape in post-conflict Acholiland as an ecosystem marked by multiple 
opportunities and multiple constraints that shape individual and collective decisions 
about the most desirable and practical form of recourse to address the harms caused.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Author led discussion group, Agago District, 02.08.12 
94 The idea of people locating their thoughts in their own marginality is borrowed from Shaw, 
‘Forgiveness’, p.220 
95 Salwa Ismail, Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State (Minnesota: Regents of the 
University of Minnesota, 2006). Quoted in Sarah-Jane Cooper-Knock, ‘Your Child is Getting Killed This 
Side: Re-considering “street justice” in South Africa, African Affairs (Forthcoming).  
96 Author led discussion group, Agago District, 27.07.2012 
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The ecosystem that exists today is a compound of conflict, tradition, hybridity, structural 
inequality, and external intervention.  The proportions of these features might vary from 
place to place and circumstance to circumstance.  Some of the moulding factors, like 
NGO interventions, are sporadic, others are more or less rooted, like structural violence, 
and others are subject to constant negotiation, like the relationship between tradition and 
modernity.  Because people live in a ‘multi-layered’ political and socio-legal system their 
justice choices, as far as they have them, might not be consistent.97 Perceptions about the 
best mode of dispute resolution for example, may shift over time or it may depend on 
the intricacies of the issue at hand and its implications for ‘the rest of life’.  The protean 
approach people adopt towards justice is ‘law in action’, and it is something that western 
observers feel very uncomfortable with because it rubs up against their own subjective 
understanding of law and justice as a set of ‘more of less formalized rules,’ and instead 
presents the prospect of ‘improvised responses to circumstances.’ 98  
 
Arguably all legal systems, including the ICC, are prone to this.  What we have not 
managed to come to terms with is what to do when this is the premise of the system 
rather than its perversion.  Until now there has been a tendency in the transitional justice 
literature and practice to attempt to ameliorate epistemological differences through 
procedural pluralism, hence the popularity of the idea of ‘retributive’ measures existing 
alongside ‘restorative’ measures.  This conceptual division does not adequately take into 
account the substantive complexity around the choices that people make (or are forced 
to make), the outcomes of those decisions, and the complicated and often hybrid 
character of the authorities that are called upon to adjudicate.  In cases of land-related 
disputes for example, the location, crime (or dispute), and the identity of the alleged 
victim are key, as are questions about ‘what is available’, ‘what works and what will the 
consequences be?’ and ‘what can I afford?’99  These considerations are, as was argued 
earlier, ‘context-bound’ rather than ‘culture-bound’.  The same questions apply in 
response to war crimes, and tell us a lot about people’s attitudes towards the kind of 
redress they see as legitimate and feasible.  If transitional justice interventions are to be 
relevant, they need to engage more seriously with practical justice provision and the 
concurrent dilemmas that are part of people’s every day realities.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 The concept of the ‘multi-layered’ is borrowed from Baker and Scheye, ‘Multi-layered’. 
98 Skoda, ‘Historian’s’ p.43 - 44 




This chapter has so far explored the various means by which people in Acholiland have 
been moving on with their lives and reconstructing social, moral and economic 
relationships in the aftermath of the twenty-year war.  This has included self-help groups, 
dynamic and flexible spiritual practices and local justice practices designed to ameliorate 
the most fractious conflict related issue: that of land disputes.  The final section of this 
chapter explores some of the factors that continue to place a strain on post-conflict 
relationships and argues that micro-level realities and local interactions have been shaped 
largely by the ‘political economy of survival’100 rather than by more normative concepts 
of peace, forgiveness and reconciliation.   
 
The returnee group is diverse.  As an illustration, it ranges from the man, now in his mid 
thirties, who spent two weeks in the Bush in the mid-1990s, to the woman who was 
rescued in 2013 at the age 27, who had been in captivity since she was nine years old, and 
given birth to three children, the oldest when she was only twelve.101  Those who had a 
briefer experience in the Bush many years ago are, on the whole, less likely to see 
themselves in the ‘returnee’ category, although many do.  The section below focuses on 
those who self-identified as returnees, and shared their experiences.  As described in the 
last chapter, there was an observable trend across research sites for people who had 
spent time in the Bush to feel apart from their communities because of the 
circumstances they had faced and the treatment they had received.  There do appear to 
be different experiences of the ‘stigma’ that was discussed in the previous chapter, and 
one important distinction is well illustrated by John Braithwaite’s conceptual division 
between ‘reintegrative shaming’ and ‘stigmatic shaming.’102  Broadly speaking, the logic of 
reintegrative shaming is essentially correctional and restorative, because ‘shaming’, the 
idea that you are under watch, has as its function the desire to gradually reintegrate the 
wrongdoer through re-adaptation to social norms.  The requirement to ‘be normal’, 
discussed in the last chapter, is an expression of this.  Stigmatic shaming, on the other 
hand, carries a logic based on rejection.  Moral disproval is focused on the wrongdoer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Mac Ginty, ‘Between’, p.180 
101 This refer’s to the author’s own sample.  
102 John Braithwaite, Crime Shame and Reintegration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John 
Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice: Theories and Worries’ 123rd International Seminar Visiting Experts Papers 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No63/No63_10VE_Braithwaite2.pdf; ‘Revisiting reintegrative 
shaming’, Criminology Aotearoa/New Zealand, Newsletter of the Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington (September 2001) 
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rather than the wrongdoing, to justify the re-definition of conventional social and moral 
boundaries.  This has the effect of excluding the ‘wrong-doer’ from certain social goods: 
these might be based on geography, i.e the redrawing of land boundaries and/or on 
genealogy, the rejection of a person and their dependents based on their kinship status.103  
Sometimes it might lead the excluded member to leave the community and set up a life 
elsewhere, while in other cases people remain but are marginalized. 
 
It is to this form of ‘stigmatic shaming’ that this final section focuses on.  The emphasis 
is on those people interviewed who felt rejected by their communities, and why this 
might have been so.  The problem that many returnees faced was that they had very little 
control over the extent to which their very presence might bring what one elderly woman 
called ‘disharmony’ to their village.104  This was especially the case for those individuals 
who represented the most significant strain on already fractured family structures.  Not 
surprisingly this ties back into the fraught question of land and land-use in post-conflict 
Acholiland.  Two recent reports, one for the IOM and another for the UNDP, describe a 
situation in which returnees face, in the words of the former, ‘acute marginalization in 
relation to land access and reintegration’.105   Despite recognised land rights in Acholi 
customary land tenure, disputes over land and the scarcity of land has resulted, according 
to Atkinson and Hopwood, in ‘anyone with less than first rank land claims being 
unwelcome’ or ‘conspired against’ by other family members.106  Because of this, it has 
been estimated that at least two thousand former LRA have re-settled in Gulu town to 
‘re-start a new life’, although this is most likely a very conservative figure.107  In 2012, 
Amnesty Commission staff in Gulu made reference to the ‘many’ who have moved out 
of the sub-region altogether, settling instead in the trading centres north of Karuma falls, 
along the main highway to Kampala.108  Here they engage in small-scale business such as 
roasting maize for the travellers and truck drivers who pass through.   ‘These are places’, 
explained one member of staff:  
‘where they cannot be disturbed.  We re-insert them but there is stigma, land 
conflicts, for example your uncle has taken your land; and then you just choose 
to find your own way.’109    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 Dresch describes this kind of exclusion, ‘Legalism’ p.35;  
104 Author led group discussion, Odek sub-County, 27.07.2012 
105 McKibben and Bean, ‘Land’, p. 8; Atkinson and Hopwood, ‘Mapping’  
106 cf. Hopwood and Atkinson, ‘Mapping’, p.16 
107 This figure was given by Amnesty Staff to the IOM in 2011 and was based on ‘anecdotal evidence’, 
Mckibben and Bean, ‘Land’, p. 20 




The ability to choose to re-locate at least implies some agency, which raises an important 
question about what happens to those individuals who are denied their customary rights 
and who suffer from forms of stigmatic shaming, but who do not have the resources to 
move.   
 
Women returnees, and particularly those who came back with children who were born in 
the bush, face particular difficulties.  Indeed the position of women in rural Acholiland in 
general has been in flux since the conflict began.  The ideal-type communal land system 
across the Acholi sub-region involves the patrilineal and patrilocal inheritance of land, 
and women’s access to this land is usually determined by traditional marriage.  The long 
period of displacement and the poverty it created has, as Hopwood and Atkinson point 
out, placed particular strains on the institution of marriage.110  It is now increasingly 
difficult for a man’s family to gather the resources necessary to pay bride price (luk), and 
in the absence of this transaction the lineage status of women and their children, and 
women’s rights to land use, have altered.   Where the bride price has not been paid, 
women are more likely to be rejected from their husband’s family on his death.111  On the 
other hand, the lack of bride price payment also means that affinal relationships are less 
fixed and regulated. It is not uncommon for women to move from male partner to male 
partner in search of security, and often this means leaving children from previous 
relationships with their grandmother or the family of the maternal uncle. Indeed even 
where bride price has been paid it tends not to be considerable.  This increases the 
opportunity for women to leave their husbands and return to the family they were born 
into, because the financial implications of re-paying the dowry are not so daunting.112    
 
These status and lineage issues are intensified for women returning from the bush, and 
particularly if they came back with children whose paternal lineage was unclear.  ‘A 
common thing you hear from the community,’ said an Amnesty Commission worker in 
Gulu, is ‘we want our daughters back but not these bush children.’113  This suggests a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Atkinson and Hopwood, ‘Mapping’, p.13-17 
111 This trend is also identified as a consequence of HIV/AIDs, see Atkinson and Hopwood, ‘Mapping’, 
p.15  
112 Hopwood and Atkinson provide an interesting discussion of these dynamics, ‘Mapping’, p. 14-15. These 
shifting dynamics have probably increased the significance of matrilineal connections presently and will 
almost certainly have that effect in the future because it is estimated that currently thirty percent of 
households in the Acholi sub-region are estimated to be ‘female headed’, see McKibben and Bean, ‘Land’, 
p.8 
113 Author interview with Amnesty Commission staff member, Gulu, 13.09.2012 
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different picture from that presented by Blattman et. al’s widely cited 2007 Survey of War 
Affected Youth (SWAY), which used mixed-methods to understand the impact of war 
on participants, and found that ‘forced marriages and motherhood are not consistently 
associated with lower rates of family and community acceptance’.114  The problem with 
the SWAY project was that it quantified individual interactions at a moment in time.  
There is arguably, however, a vast open space of possibilities between being  ‘welcomed’ 
home by your family, your children ‘looked after’ by their grandparents, and the quality 
of your life, your social relationships, and the opportunities open to you.115   
 
It was striking that of the twenty-three returnee women interviewed, twenty-one had 
problems accessing land, and all expressed insecurity over their relationship with their 
male partner.  In each case the women blamed their difficulty in accessing land on the 
fact that they had been in captivity.  A particularly painful case was the story of a woman, 
Atim Mercy,116 who had been married to one of the LRA high command, a man wanted 
by the ICC who, according to her, had the habit of stamping on her chest so regularly 
and with such force that she lives in permanent discomfort.  She was in captivity for 
eighteen years and had given birth to three children whilst there.  On her return, she 
became involved with another man so that she could have access to his ancestral land.   
Mercy needed land to cultivate, she said, because when her father died three years 
previously, his family conspired to take away his land from her mother, so that she had 
only a very small plot now.  Her mother suffers from HIV/AIDs and is now responsible 
for caring for Mercy’s three children, because her new husband will not accept them into 
his home.  Quickly Mercy became pregnant again but the new husband, who has not 
paid a bride price, beats her regularly and calls her cen tye iwii, meaning ‘cen is in your 
head’.   Whenever he beats her badly she returns to stay with her mother, but she is 
dependent on the husband for access to land so as to feed herself and the child she has 
with him.  Her feelings about life were summed about in one short sentence: Kony olanya 
ya, ‘Kony has ruined me’.  
 
Of course, the risk in using non-representative samples is that one becomes drawn to the 
most sensational cases, and the general picture becomes distorted.  While it was not 
possible to quantify the problem of economic and social exclusion that returnees !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 Blattman et. Al ‘Reintegration’, p.21 
115 Blattman et. Al, ‘Reintegration’, p.21  116!Her name has been changed. 
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experienced in the research sites visited, Atim Mercy’s story was, unfortunately, not an 
extreme aberrant in the general narrative that many women shared.  But there is also a 
risk of falling into a declarative model of victimhood, rather than a comparative one, i.e 
of treating ‘returnee’ women as a exceptional group with exceptional problems, when 
perhaps the challenges they face have more to do with other factors such as gender or 
economic status.  In their own words though, the returnee women interviewed said that 
they felt the problems they faced were linked directly to the fact that they had spent time 
in Bush, and that non-returnee women did not face challenges to the same degree.  
Whether or not this is true requires further research, but the logic was framed as follows:  
women returnees explained that their families and communities cannot come to terms, 
morally, socially or cosmologically, with the fact that they have spent time in captivity,  
even though the vast majority were abducted against their will.  The women attributed 
their situation to an attitude they said was common among men and influenced by 
society: that formerly abducted women have traits that distinguish them from those who 
were never abducted.  There was a general feeling that they were violent and not suited 
well to marriage: their minds could be rehabilitated and men both feared and resented 
them.  Not one of the twenty-three women interviewed could say that their male 
partners were loving, kind and could take good care of them, and most said that they 
were in abusive and insecure relationships.  One LC1 explained that men can only ever 
give women who have been in the bush ‘half of their love’ because you can ‘never know 
what is in their heads and you fear what it might be’, these men, he said, ‘can give you 
children but they cannot love you with all their heart’.117 
 
Women lamented this situation but at the same time felt compelled to live within it.  
Finding a man who could, as one woman said, ‘protect us from humiliation in the 
community’ was noted as a priority for many.118  The pattern though, was familiar, and 
described well by one woman who explained that:  
 ‘whenever we get into relationships with would-be husbands, they kind of reject 
our children, they say, I cannot father children that were born in captivity, so at 
all costs wherever we have gone, it has been a problem for us and you will find 
that we live in very funny relationships.  Men do not want to get engaged with us, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Author interview with LC1, Bobi sub-County, 23.08.2013; Author interview, Amuru District, 
09.08.2012. Many women explained that families would be unwilling to pay (luk) for women returnees, ‘we 
cannot pay for somebody who was in captivity’.   
118 Author led group discussion, Agago District, 02.08.2012 
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although we want to live with them together, but this problem always comes out 
when we try to do so.’119 
 
Male returnees also expressed difficulties in forming relationships with peers and women, 
coming up against rumours that anyone who stayed with them risked being ‘strangled at 
night,’ but generally the structural and social impediments to re-settlement appeared less 
severe.120   
 
Barriers to resettlement and acceptance, and the likelihood of experiencing ‘stigmatic 
shaming’, included upended family structures, often with a deceased father, or both 
parents deceased; inter-family and inter-village land wrangles; and a willingness to defend 
oneself in related disputes (often interpreted as ‘provocation’).  Relationships were also 
strained by any perceived ‘abnormal’ behavior: this could range from physical illness and 
mental distress, to criminal activity and the tendency to be ‘lazy’ or economically 
unproductive.  Female returnees, and particularly those who returned with children, 
appear to be particularly vulnerable.  There were also external interventions which have 
exaggerated tensions, most notably the perception that returnees were receiving 
preferential treatment from the authorities, such as the Amnesty Commission, and from 
NGOs in the form of material assistance.121  An alarming feature was that in two 
research sites, young men and women expressed a wish to return to the Bush because of 
the treatment they were receiving at home.  The logic was disturbing: at least in the Bush 
you expect to be treated badly.  People articulated a desire to return based on the way 
were being treated by their own communities and not for political reasons.  As one 
returnee explained:  
‘Life is difficult; we would prefer to go back to the Bush if only those of Kony 
would return.  We are suffering, our parents are dead, it was better in captivity, I 
see no point in staying here.  I have no family, no-one cares about me.  I am all 
alone so I would opt to go back.  In captivity you are treated badly, but you know 
your hardships and you know people will not protect you.  At home you expect 
people to support and look after you but they don’t.  So, it is really out of 
frustration that we want to go back’.122   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Author led group discussion, Nwoya District, 15.08.2012 
120 Author led group discussion, Gulu District, 25.07.2012 
121 This was a major issue in the early, mid-2000s, but since then, there has been ‘learning’ in the NGO 
community and most projects now operate on the basis of ‘integration’ of returnees and non-returnees, so 
as not to exacerbate tensions between these groups.  
122 Author led group discussion (location withheld). 
! 283 
This reaction suggests serious impediments to co-existence based on the often 
‘uncontrolled and repetitive moral and social indignation’ that returnees experience.123 
Because a lot of the stigmatization is embedded within family and community settings, 
and intertwined with the social and economic dynamics of post-conflict life, it becomes 
very difficult, if not impossible, to determine causation.  In an off-hand comment one 
research assistant explained, after a long day of interviews and focus groups, that people 
‘stigmatise for their own reasons’ and because of how life is now.  Rather than what 
happened in the bush, it is current pressures on daily existence that are encouraging 
people to instrumentalise a person’s status as a returnee and use it against him or her to 
protect their own status or livelihood.  There are certain ‘common problems,’ such as a 
strained relationship with the husband’s family and the co-wives that affect women, 
‘whether they were in the bush or not’.124  Since the war though, it is more common for 
these pressures to crystallise around certain identities.  Many returnee women explained 
that the stigma directed at them by their co-wives, designed to ‘make people hate you so 
that you and your children cannot fit into the home,’ affected their lives profoundly. 125   
The same went for children whose patrilineal descent was unclear, often referred to as 
‘okeyo’ or illegitimate: this was not a new phenomenon in Acholiland, but for the many 
children who were born in captivity, the problem of lineage and land has become more 
pronounced.   What became quite apparent was that the social relationships that have 
always been strained have become increasingly so as the deprivations people suffer daily 
erode what Amartya Sen has called the ‘bonds of care and concern’ that sustain 
humanity.126  Indeed it is poverty and insecurity and the pressures they impose on moral 
and social worlds, rather than transitional justice, that really shapes relationships in post-




This chapter paints of a complex picture of the plurality of ways in which people are 
negotiating and experiencing justice and co-existence in the transition from war to peace !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Suzanne Retzinger and Thomas Scheff, ‘Strategy for Community Conference: Emotions and Social 
Bond’, in Galaway et. al, Restorative Justice: International Perspectives (New York: International Criminal Justice 
Press, 1996). 
124 Author fieldnotes, 01.10.2012 
125 Author interview, Nwoya District, 01.10.12 
126 Amartya Sen, ‘Poverty and the Tolerance of the Intolerable’, LSE Public Lecture, Wednesday 22 January 
2014 
! 284 
in Acholiland.  A clearer understanding of local conceptions of justice, co-existence and 
the power dynamics around these processes begins to shape insight into the relationship 
between macro-TJ narratives and local realities.  That relationship is currently in tension.  
Here, Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘plural grounding’ is strikingly relevant: 
‘we can have a strong sense of injustice on many different grounds, and yet not 
agree on one particular ground as being the dominant reason for the diagnosis of 
injustice’.127   
 
In Uganda, transitional justice donors and NGOs and traditional reconciliation and 
forgiveness promoters are all responding to the direct physical violence that people 
suffered.  This is understandable but the uncomfortable reality is that it is not consonant 
with people’s priorities or their interpretations of what might be possible.  Across 
research sites, it was apparent that if there was one dominant diagnosis of injustice, it was 
structural violence: the harm still being done by a set of socio-political structures that 
remained in place and that were depriving people of their ability to access the basic needs 
they require to fulfill their potential in life.  Every transitional justice measure listed in the 
AAR was discussed and interpreted in these terms: how will this change our lives?  Will it 
make our lives better, safer, more prosperous or even less secure?  This was not just a 
theoretical question either: as the discussion about re-settlement and re-integration 
argued, ideas around forgiveness and reconciliation exist in a symbiotic and fragile 
relationship with the ‘political economy of survival’ in post-conflict Acholiland.128  
 
Does this mean that transitional justice has played no role at all? The broad principles 
that transitional justice practitioners and advocates promote: accountability, truth, and 
reconciliation, for example, all carry relevance as ideas.  Indeed related issues that are of 
most immediate concern, for example reconciliation with the dead and justice for land 
disputes, are being conducted outside of the purview of state authorities and 
international peace-building projects.  So where does transitional justice fit it?  
Sometimes, depending on context, transitional justice makes sense to people and delivers 
a sense of ‘justness’.  Support for the Kwoyelo trial amongst his alleged victims is one 
example, careful support for ritual is another, and reparation and compensation is almost 
unequivocally considered a good thing.  Transitional justice as experienced in Acholiland, 
does not, however, have the broad transformative role its proponents often claim for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Sen, ‘Justice’, p.2 
128 Mac Ginty, ‘Between’, p.180. 
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it.129  Local experiences and attitudes towards these processes do not fit neatly with the 
normative assumptions and values that advocates ascribe to them.  In order to reduce 
this dissonance, TJ needs either to reign in its own aspirations, or to embark on a much 
more detailed understanding of local context.  In Uganda this would involve a serious 
engagement with the national political context (as has been discussed in previous 
chapters), but also an in-depth analysis of local dynamics addressed this in this chapter: 
the spiritual, social and economic function of land; contrasting notions of time and 
temporalities; the importance of negotiation with ghosts and spirits; the complexity of 
public authority systems that transcend the misleading ‘restorative/retributive’ and 
‘formal/informal’ divides; and the broader socio-economic factors that shape and place 
strain on relationships between returnees, their families, broader communities.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




The story of modern efforts to promote transitional justice in Uganda provides a 
cautionary tale.  After a frenetic period of moral, legal, and political debate sparked by 
the ICC’s first arrest warrants against five LRA commanders in 2005, the ‘global litmus 
test’ for international justice, on the face of it, was a damp squib.  After the AAR 
agreements were signed at Juba, transitional justice, at the state-level, was largely a donor 
driven project.  It was subsumed into broader governance and peace-building 
programming, taken up by weak government bureaucracies and out-maneuvered by 
political players, sometimes with strategic intent, other times simply as part of a busy and 
disordered juggling act.  The result was a set of abstracted transitional justice narratives 
and a broad policy framework which too often failed to capture the imagination or meet 
the psychological and material needs of the people in Acholiland, and which remained 
largely inconsequential to the realities of everyday life.  Those conceptions of transitional 
justice considered by advocates to be more ‘culturally embedded’: forgiveness and 
traditional reconciliation promotion, meanwhile, have, in practice, elicited a deep range 
of responses and enactments, which expose a gap between the local as imagined, in post-
conflict Acholiland, and the local as lived experience.    
 
The anti-politics of transitional justice in Uganda 
 
Chapter 2 charted the genesis and trajectory of the study and practice of the transitional 
justice paradigm since the late 1980s, setting the context for the subsequent discussion of 
its implementation in Uganda.  It argued that the dominant approach of transitional 
justice, as practiced by aid and development agencies, is marked by two features.  First, 
while the concept emerged as a way of dealing with regime change in countries 
transitioning from authoritarianism, by the mid-2000s it had become both normalised 
and professionalised in a broader post-Cold War political project: that of international 
liberal peace-building.  The type of transition to which transitional justice might apply 
thus shifted from the domain of political bargaining and contestation (regime change), to 
a much broader set of peace-building and state-building objectives, including rule of law 
promotion, resolution of intra-communal violence and re-integration of ex-combatants. 
Second, it morphed from a largely domestically-driven affair into an international policy 
intervention, often abstracted from the political context it hoped to transform.  The type 
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of change it envisaged remained deeply political and yet it was deployed as a ‘neutral 
technology’: as both apolitical and ideologically dispassionate.  On application however, 
it has had to coexist with alternative political and cultural conceptions of how best to 
respond to mass atrocities. Chapter 3 provided the conceptual framework for 
understanding how transitional justice interventions fared in Uganda.   Through a 
historical examination of justice and social order and the political relationship between 
Acholiland and the central state, the chapter provided the context to help understand the 
way in which a particular response to the twenty-year conflict, transitional justice, fit with 
the broader legal realms and notions of social order upon which it was grafted. 
 
Chapter 4 charted the construction of Uganda’s transitional justice blueprint: the 
Agreement on Accountability and its Annex.  When accountability and reconciliation 
were discussed at the Juba peace talks, the transitional justice ‘tool-kit’ had expanded to 
include a range of processes and practices to be applied ‘holistically’ to address the 
myriad needs of post-conflict societies.  As argued in Chapter 4, the AAR agreements 
reflected this expansion of both means and ends.  They presented a veritable ‘shopping 
list’ of transitional justice options.  On paper, taken out of context, the agreements could 
be interpreted as a declaration of liberal norms and a paradigm shift from impunity and 
violence towards accountability and peace, but closer examination of the political 
objectives informing both negotiating parties at Juba revealed the ways in which the TJ 
‘toolkit’ was instrumentalised rather than internalised.  The agreements did not represent 
genuine or widespread political consensus on issues of accountability and reconciliation.  
They were negotiated behind closed doors as a means to circumvent the ICC arrest 
warrants, to provide avenues for impunity and political narrative shaping, and to keep the 
talks moving forward.    
 
The failure on the part of justice-sector donors to acknowledge this reality was at the 
root of the dissonance that existed between the expectations of donors who decided to 
fund implementation of the AAR agreements and the messy reality of political processes 
and machinations in a non-transitioning Uganda.  Chapters 5 and 6 explored this 
dissonance and argued that it was domestic politics that shaped the trajectory of 
transitional justice in Uganda.  The same leadership that engaged in the war in the north 
for twenty years remained in power.  The Museveni regime did not confront the classic 
predicament transitional justice was first designed to address: the need to ‘solve 
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accountability deficits without exacerbating political instability’.1  Transitional justice was 
never a major domestic political issue and the government’s narrative about the war in 
the north - the barbarism of Joseph Kony and the LRA, and the ‘otherness’ of the Acholi 
- was widely accepted in most of the country.  In short, as far as political elites were 
concerned, there was no transitional justice dilemma after Juba and the AAR agreements 
could be contained and managed very easily.   
 
Justice sector donors saw things very differently.  By the time the Juba talks collapsed in 
late 2008 transitional justice and its links to peace-building and rule of law objectives 
were normalised in UN frameworks and programming.  As Chapter 5 argued, this logic 
was re-produced in Uganda, where donors could see the potential of transitional justice 
to contribute to broader governance objectives.  But while the transitional justice agenda 
was normative, in that it quite openly made links between accountability, human rights 
and liberal peace and democracy, the approach to policy and implementation was 
technocratic.  It was characterised by three criteria that Frank Fischer’s seminal work on 
technocracy highlighted: fear of ‘political’ solutions and debate; reluctance to explore 
conflicting interests and emphasis on positivist, ‘objective’ knowledge in decision-
making.2   In promoting the idea that political relationships could be altered, and optimal 
liberalising settlements arrived at through what Centano calls the ‘ideology of method’ or 
the ‘application of particular practices’, we can make three observations, discussed 
below.3  
 
First, as Chapters 5 and 6 showed, transitional justice grew its own small bureaucracy: 
administrative structures were created and legislation was passed.  The most significant 
of these were the JLOS Transitional Justice Working Group, the International Crimes 
Division and the International Criminal Court Act.   These developments represented 
what Carothers has called ‘type one’ and ‘type two’ rule of law reform.4  The former 
involved the revision and expansion of existing laws; the latter involved the 
strengthening of law-related institutions, including, for example, judicial capacity 
building.  Donors defended this gradualist approach to transitional justice with the logic 
of ‘sequencing’.  Building capacity in the ICD; training the judiciary in international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 De Greiff, ‘Thoughts’, p.2. 
2 cf. Milja Kurki, ‘Democracy through technocracy?  Reflections on Technocratic Assumptions in EU 
Democracy Promotion Discourse’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5:2 (2011), p.211-234, p.215. 
3 cf. Mac Ginty, ‘Routine’, p.291.!
4 Carothers, ‘Revival’. 
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crimes and funding JLOS staff to draw up a draft transitional justice strategy would, it 
was hoped, contribute to a more accountable, peaceful and democratic Uganda.   Second, 
at the time of writing, it was very hard to see how technocratic approaches to transitional 
justice would cross over into the broader donor goal of genuine political reform.  This 
‘type three’ reform would require transforming the entrenched and countervailing 
interests of political elites.5  As one veteran development worker recently commented, 
‘no amount of technical advice can change basic political calculations’.6   
 
A counter-argument might be that transitional justice debates in Uganda have had 
‘positive derivative effects’ and that the creation of parallel bureaucracies such as the 
JLOS-TJWG and institutions such as the ICD have lent ‘additional power to the 
proponents of liberal values’ and the expansion of accountability norms.7  But there is, as 
yet, little concrete evidence of either.  Because transitional justice remained largely within 
the realm of administrative control, ‘practical and programmatic’ debates were privileged 
over ‘protracted normative debates’ in policy discussions.8  Furthermore, as argued in 
Chapter 4, the AAR was drawn up before the communities most affected by the violence 
had a chance to deliberate upon the meaning of justice, accountability and reconciliation 
in their particular contexts.9  In general, there has been very little space for genuine 
debate about the needs of affected communities in post-conflict Acholiland or what 
might constitute the ‘good life’.   While there was some civil society activity in this area, 
in practice, it often fell into the same anti-democratic trap.  Sensitisation campaigns, 
stakeholder meetings and training workshops on transitional justice have been predicated 
on the notion of ‘victim-centered approaches’ but affected communities have too often 
been presented with a delimited range of options and asked to comment on them.  On 
the ground in Acholiland, as argued in Chapters 7 and 8, there was very little evidence 
that transitional justice addressed the needs of ‘victims’ or ‘empowered’ them and much 
more evidence to support the argument of one Acholi lawyer that ‘everyone has let them 
down, the ICC; the government; their own communities – people, they just want to let 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Ibid. 
6 Michael Bear Kleinman, ‘Putting the Politics Back Into Development’, Stanford Social Innovation Review, 7 
(June, 2014). 
7 Leslie Vinjamuri quoted in Nettlefield, ‘Courting’, p.30. 
8 Kurki, ‘Democracy’.!
9 As Chapter 4 argued, while it was true that ‘public consultations’ were carried out in the interim between 
the signing of the AAR and the signing of the annex, these consultations were largely viewed as a ‘rubber 
stamp’ to what had already been decided by the parties. !
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go now, they just want to move on’.10   The sense of withdrawal, of apathy and of 
unfulfilled expectations during discussions about transitional justice was quite palpable.   
 
Third, and finally, technocratic approaches towards transitional justice created a double-
helix of de-politicisation.  The justice sector donors funding transitional justice counter 
intuitively avoided engaging the political leadership on the types of systemic political 
changes they hoped to engineer.  At the same time, transitional justice provided a 
convenient shield behind which the leadership of the state could deflect criticism about 
its political relationship with the north.  Transitional justice turned political problems like 
‘accountability’, ‘reconciliation’ and even ‘justice’ into technical peace-building or legal 
problems.11  But it is important, as both Chapters 5 and 6 argued, not to exaggerate the 
extent to which the political leadership actively manipulated the transitional justice agenda.  
In the more unspectacular instances, explored in Chapter 5, technocratic approaches 
provided the political and bureaucratic space for perennial procrastination; diversion; 
damage limitation and occasionally opportunism.  This was most clearly evident in 
relation to debates and programming around reparations and truth telling, described in 
Chapter 5.  In the more dramatic instances, described in Chapter 6, particularly around 
the conflict between amnesty and prosecution and the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, 
President Museveni maintained an equivocal stance.  Ultimately it was the military and 
the security services, in close collaboration with US government advisers who decided 
the fate of the Amnesty Act.  But during the period between its lapsing and its re-
instatement and since, the President has maintained what Andrew Mwenda calls an 
‘unstable equilibrium’ between the ICD, the Amnesty Commission and the UPDF.  This 
is characteristic of his governing style which sees him:  
 
‘stand atop [this] chaos, fanning it but also stabilising it…(he) has been tolerant 
and accommodating of everything except one thing he treasures above all else – 
his job’.12   
 
This brings us full circle back to the first observation, which, to paraphrase Ruti Teitel, is 
that transitional justice in any given context is both constituted by and constitutive of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Author interview, lawyer, Gulu, 28.07.2012 
11 Goodale and Merry, ‘Practice’, p.351 




transition.13  The domestic political response to external transitional justice promotion is 
a reflection of the fact that there has been no substantive political transition and overall 
there has been very little domestic political pressure to implement the AAR.  Transitional 
justice became a naturalised part of the power structure into which it was subsumed. 
Transitional justice scripts and ordinary life 
 
There are many transitional justice scripts in Uganda.   Transitional justice is capacious, it 
provides enough conceptual space for diverse agendas to co-exist, often awkwardly.  
While prescriptions about the best way forward may differ, what all transitional justice 
conceptions have in common, argued Chapters 7 and 8, whether it be amnesty, 
prosecutions, forgiveness or traditional reconciliation, are that they are political 
constructions which carry a cumulative self-echoing logic: they have a destiny, and they 
peregrinate accordingly.  
 
Commentators have often objectified Acholi desires around false dichotomies of one 
form of justice over another.  This has led to what Alexander Hinton calls ‘identity 
shrinkage’.14  On the one hand, the liberal transitional justice paradigm implies a single, 
fundamental human identity in which people exist as autonomous, liberal subjects: they 
have the capacity to achieve and enjoy freedom, equality and rights and they have the 
chance to engage in democratic and juridical processes as soon as the moment is right.  
On the other hand, as Chapters 3 and 7 argued, the ethnojustice and forgiveness 
conceptions of transitional justice are clear examples of cultural relativism, the argument 
is that the Acholi should both follow and be defined by their ‘culture’.  Both identity 
categories are idealised, and such idealised notions gloss over the ambivalent, dual and 
ambiguous choices that people make and actions they take in any given set of 
circumstances.15  
 
Transitional justice categories such as formal and informal, retributive and restorative, 
and local and universal tend to emphasise epiphenomenal practices rather than the inter-
subjective meanings that shape understandings of them.  A closer, more micro-level 
examination of how people negotiate life in post-conflict Acholiland in Chapter 8, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ruti Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: contemporary essays (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 
2014). 
14 Alexander Hinton, ‘Transitional’, p.7. 
15 ibid. 
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highlighted the hybrid nature of the public authorities that people draw upon and the 
highly contingent nature of their justice decisions which are based on the most pragmatic 
and effective means by which to restore balance and meaning to social relations.  
Sometimes this might be creative and peaceful endeavour, at other times it might be 
exclusionary or violent.  The relationship between rules and practice are dialectic and this 
complicated reality and the difficult choices that people make cannot, as McAvoy argues, 
be translated neatly into ‘rights discourses…legal certainties and political objectivity’16 in 
the way that the liberal paradigm pre-supposes, nor can it be understood through cultural 
essentialism.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 all argued to various degrees that deontologically grounded calls for 
accountability and criminal prosecutions and even truth telling can represent a profound 
existential challenge in precarious, post-conflict Acholiland where victims, perpetrators 
and victim-perpetrators live side by side.  Too often though, as Chapter 7 showed, 
pragmatic non-participation has been confused with a culturally determinate predilection 
for forgiveness, reconciliation and acceptance.  This argued the veteran head of Gulu’s 
NGO forum, was worrying.   ‘The Acholi’, he argued ‘are a very resilient people but that 
does not mean there is no pain in them and that they don’t hurt’.17    The problem with 
rhetoric that presents an ideal vision of ‘the Acholi’ capacity to forgive and reconcile, 
argued Chapters 7 and 8, is that it does not take account of the many pressures that 
people face on a daily basis, whether linked to feelings of vindication about what they 
experienced during the war or to exclusion and marginalization as a result of their status 
of a ‘returnee’, in all its complexity.  The struggle to restore a sense of social order and 
meaning is profound and labyrinthine and linked to a multitude of different factors, none 
of which can be self-contained or portioned off from the other.  Chapter 8 explored the 
inter-linkages of the spiritual world, of land, and of poverty as important factors that 
determine whether or not someone feels that can move on with life.   The reality of this 
was quite a shock to one NGO worker, an Acholi himself, who had been working for a 
long time promoting conventional transitional justice across the region such as 
‘traditional’ processes, truth-telling and memorials.  Then he got a new job and took a 
step back from things and began to feel uncomfortable.   
‘There is a real dilemma that I came to understand after I left [the organization].  
Transitional justice should be about breaking cycles of violence and suffering.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 McAvoy, ‘Legalism’, p.419.!
17 Author interview with former NGO project director, 27.05.2012. 
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But those cycles of violence are fed by very specific acts and factors and you 
need to tap into those things.  I have not seen any process that is grounded on 
concrete data about where you should focus your efforts, I mean, what about 
land use, why weren’t we thinking about those things?  Then I think, oh no, oh 
god, what was all that about?’18 
 
Transitional justice is not ordinary justice but it needs to understand ordinary life.  A 
more poetic way of explaining this is in the words of Okot p’Bitek himself, who wrote in 
the Artist and the Ruler that ‘human beings do not behave like dry leaves, smoke or 
clouds which are blown here and there by the wind’.19  An intervention that tries to 
transform societies and yet takes no account of the building blocks that shape ‘ideas 




In a recent meeting of scholars discussing the major limitations and unintended 
consequences of transitional justice policy across contexts, one asked the question: ‘what 
would happen if we just stopped?’.20  What if funding stopped, advocacy stopped, the 
whole thing just stopped? Would things be any worse?  Would they be any better?  Of 
course it was a provocative question and this thesis cannot claim to answer it but three 
points from the Ugandan case do appear particularly pertinent to the transitional justice 
endeavour in all its various forms, and are ripe for further research.  
 
The first relates to the dynamics and wisdom of transitional justice promotion at the state 
level in the absence of political transition.  Donors made the calculation that the 
Ugandan state was to be an effective or at least legitimate provider of transitional justice 
and thus a deserving recipient of international aid to build up its capacity in this area.  
Given the nature of the war in northern Uganda and the nature of Ugandan politics this 
remains a puzzling decision.  What international policymakers overlooked in their 
enthusiasm for transitional justice was that achieving the sort of transformative change 
TJ proponents claim for it: peace, reconciliation and rule of law, would require far more 
than a series of technical fixes.  It would involve a major re-shaping of existing power 
arrangements and fundamental changes in the way in which citizens relate to state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 ibid. 
19 p’Bitek, ‘Artist’, p.13 
20 Transcript of Transitional Justice Workshop, International Studies Association, Toronto, 25 March 2014 
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authority, as well as to each other.21  This latter point is crucial because it highlights 
something that reified institutions alone cannot deliver, which is a shared popular belief 
that transitional justice processes are ‘fundamentally just’, in other words, the law and 
social norms need to correspond.22  
 
The second point is that social engineering is difficult to achieve.  Transitional justice 
conceptions in Uganda are all in some form or another, an attempt to mould a type of 
subject, whether he or she be the liberal individual or the ideal ‘golden age’ Acholi of the 
ethnojustice imagination, or an acceptable mixture of the two.  Furthermore, assuming 
that a declaration of forgiveness or attendance at a reconciliation ritual makes relations 
significantly better is too easy and it does not reflect the underlying grievances that 
people hold about what they experienced.  There exists then, an under-explored gap 
between process and outcome.  This highlights a need for sounder engagement with the 
‘hidden’ and the ‘after’.   Does the declaration of forgiveness or the performance of ritual 
significantly restore inter-personal and communal relations?  This thesis argued that the 
reality is more complex and that post-conflict inter-communal relations are dependent on 
the wider socio-economic context including poverty, insecurity and other quotidian 
strains in Acholiland.  
 
The third point is that transitional justice conceptions may carry a degree of meaning in 
Acholiland but they lack bearing and too often they make little sense to people who 
understand the political and social constraints within which they exist much better than 
external observers, policy makers and civil society activists do.  It is difficult to imagine 
how these broad ideas and what Veena Das calls ‘grand gestures’, might be anchored to 
everyday realities in a way that would help people in their immediate context.  Given that 
transitional justice promoters in Uganda claim to be ‘victim-centered’, and make explicit 
links between transitional justice, peace-building and reconciliation, this is a problem.  An 
ex-pat NGO worker who had been living in Acholiland for eight years explained how, 
from the very outset, transitional justice agendas had been ‘wildly out of synch’ with local 
needs.23  So should it all just stop?  Perhaps not, but certainly it needs to be drastically re-
imagined.  A good place to start is with more self-reflexive honesty about what 
transitional justice really is; more humility about what it can really achieve, and a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Carothers, ‘Revival’. 
22 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Transitions to the Rule of Law’, Journal of Democracy, 21:1 (2010), p.37.!
23 Das, ‘Life’. !
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commitment to better understand and better represent societies in question.  This is 
where this thesis hopes to contribute: through a systematic, empirical examination – in 
the Ugandan context - of the dissonances between transitional justice conceptions kept 
in stasis by their epistemic boundaries and the kinds of pragmatic, fluid and variable 
approaches that States, communities and individuals adopt in response to the concrete, 
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Appendix: The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
(2007) and the Annexure (2008) 
 
 
AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION 
 
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA AND 




This Agreement, between the Government of Uganda (The Government) 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) (herein referred to as 




WHEREAS THE PARTIES: 
 
HAVING BEEN engaged in protracted negotiations in Juba, Southern 
Sudan, in order to find just, peaceful and lasting solutions to the long-
running conflict, and to promote reconciliation and restore harmony and 
tranquillity within the affected communities and in Uganda generally;  
 
CONSCIOUS of the immense, pain, suffering, injury and adverse socio-
economic and political impacts of the conflict, and of the serious crimes, 
human rights violations; and recognising the need to honour the victims by 
promoting lasting peace with justice;  
 
COMMITTED to preventing impunity and promoting redress in accordance 
with the Constitution and international obligations and recalling, in this 
connection, the requirements of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and in particular the principle of complementarity;   
 
DRIVEN by the need for adopting appropriate justice mechanisms, 
including customary processes of accountability, that would resolve the 
conflict while promoting reconciliation and convinced that this Agreement 
is a sound basis for achieving that purpose;  
 
GUIDED BY the Objective Principle of the Constitution, which directs that 
there shall be established and nurtured institutions and procedures for the 
resolution of conflicts fairly and peacefully; and further recalling the 
Constitutional duty on the courts of Uganda to promote reconciliation 
between contesting parties;   
 





Unless the context suggests otherwise, the following words and phrases 
shall have the meaning assigned thereto:  
 
“Ailuc” refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Madi to 
reconcile parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability. 
 
“Alternative justice mechanisms” refers to justice mechanisms not 
currently administered in the formal courts established under the 
Constitution. 
 
“the conflict” means the Northern and North-eastern Uganda conflict, 
and includes the impacts of that conflict in the neighbouring countries. 
  
“Constitution” means the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. 
 
“Culo Kwor” refers to the compensation to atone for homicide as 
practiced in Acholi and Lango cultures, and any other forms of 
reparation for any other purposes, after full accountability. 
 
“Gender” refers to the two sexes, men and women, within the context 
of society.  
 
“Government” means the Republic of Government of Uganda. 
 
“Kayo Cuk” refers to the traditional accountability and reconciliation 
processes practiced by the Langi communities after full accountability 
and reconciliation has been attained between parties formerly in 
conflict, after full accountability.   
 
“Mato Oput” refers to the traditional ritual performed by the Acholi 
after full accountability and reconciliation has been attained between 
parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability. 
 
“Reconciliation” refers to the process of restoring broken 
relationships and re-establishing harmony.  
 
“Tonu ci Koka” refers to the traditional rituals performed by the Madi 
to reconcile parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability; 
 
“Victims” means persons who have individually or collectively suffered 
harm as a consequence of crimes and human rights violations 
committed during the conflict.  
 
 
2. COMMITMENT TO ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION 
 
2.1. The Parties shall promote national legal arrangements, consisting 
of formal and non formal institutions and measures for ensuring 
justice and reconciliation with respect to the conflict.  
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2.2. The accountability processes stipulated in this Agreement shall 
relate to the period of the conflict. However, this clause shall not 
prevent the consideration and analysis of any relevant matter 
before this period, or the promotion of reconciliation with respect to 
events that occurred before this period.  
 
2.3. The Parties believe that a comprehensive, independent and 
impartial analysis of the history and manifestations of the conflict, 
especially the human rights violations and crimes committed during 
the course of the conflict, is an essential ingredient for attaining 
reconciliation at all levels.   
 
2.4. The Parties agree that at all stages of the development and 
implementation of the principles and mechanisms of this 
Agreement, the widest possible consultations shall be promoted 
and undertaken in order to receive the views and concerns of all 
stakeholders, and to ensure the widest national ownership of the 
accountability and reconciliation processes. Consultations shall 
extend to state institutions, civil society, academia, community 
leaders, traditional and religious leaders, and victims.   
 
2.5. The Parties undertake to honour and respect, at all times, all the 
terms of this Agreement which shall be implemented in the utmost 
good faith and shall adopt effective measures for monitoring and 




3. PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL APPLICATION 
 
3.1. Traditional justice mechanisms, such as Culo Kwor, Mato Oput, 
Kayo Cuk, Ailuc and Tonu ci Koka and others as practiced in the 
communities affected by the conflict, shall be promoted, with 
necessary modifications, as a central part of the framework for 
accountability and reconciliation.  
 
Conduct of Proceedings 
 
3.2. The Parties recognise that any meaningful accountability 
proceedings should, in the context of recovery from the conflict, 
promote reconciliation and encourage individuals to take personal 
responsibility for their conduct.   
 
3.3. With respect to any proceedings under this Agreement, the right of 
the individual to a fair hearing and due process, as guaranteed by 
the Constitution, shall at all times be protected. In particular, in the 
determination of civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge, a 
person shall be entitled to a fair, speedy and public hearing before 
an independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law.   
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3.4. In the conduct of accountability and reconciliation processes, 
measures shall be taken to ensure the safety and privacy of 
witnesses.  Witnesses shall be protected from intimidation or 
persecution on account of their testimony. Child witnesses and 
victims of sexual crimes shall be given particular protection during 
proceedings.   
 
Cooperation within proceedings 
 
3.5. The Parties shall promote procedures and approaches to enable 
individuals to cooperate with formal criminal or civil investigations 
processes and proceedings. Cooperation may include the making 
of confessions, disclosures and provision of information on relevant 
matters. The application of any cooperation procedures shall not 
prejudice the rights of cooperating individuals. 
 
3.6. Provisions may be made for the recognition of confessions or other 
forms of cooperation to be recognised for purposes of sentencing or 




3.7. Any person appearing before a formal proceeding shall be entitled 
to appear in person or to be represented at that person’s expense 
by a lawyer of his or her choice. Victims participating in proceedings 
shall be entitled to be legally represented.  
 
3.8. Provision shall be made for individuals facing serious criminal 
charges or allegations of serious human rights violations and for 
victims participating in such proceedings, who cannot afford 
representation, to be afforded legal representation at the expense 
of the State.  
 
 
Finality and effect of proceedings 
 
3.9. In order to achieve finality of legal processes, accountability and 
reconciliation procedures shall address the full extent of the 
offending conduct attributed to an individual. Legislation may 
stipulate the time within which accountability and reconciliation 
mechanisms should be undertaken.  
 
3.10. Where a person has already been subjected to proceedings or 
exempted from liability for any crime or civil acts or omissions, or 
has been subjected to accountability or reconciliation proceedings 
for any conduct in the course of the conflict, that person shall not be 






4.1. Formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be applied to any 
individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes or 
human rights violations in the course of the conflict. Provided that, 
state actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice processes 
and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.   
 
4.2. Prosecutions and other formal accountability proceedings shall be 
based upon systematic, independent and impartial investigations.  
 
4.3. The choice of forum for the adjudication of any particular case shall 
depend, amongst other considerations, on the nature and gravity of 
the offending conduct and the role of the alleged perpetrator in that 
conduct. 
 
4.4. For purposes of this Agreement, accountability mechanisms shall 
be implemented through the adapted legal framework in Uganda.  
5. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1. The Parties affirm that Uganda has institutions and mechanisms, 
customs and usages as provided for and recognised under national 
laws, capable of addressing the crimes and human rights violations 
committed during the conflict. The Parties also recognise that 
modifications may be required within the national legal system to 
ensure a more effective and integrated justice and accountability 
response.  
 
5.2. The Parties therefore acknowledge the need for an overarching 
justice framework that will provide for the exercise of formal criminal 
jurisdiction, and for the adoption and recognition of complementary 
alternative justice mechanisms.  
 
5.3. Alternative justice mechanisms shall promote reconciliation and 
shall include traditional justice processes, alternative sentences, 
reparations, and any other formal institutions or mechanisms. 
 
5.4. Insofar as practicable, accountability and reconciliation processes 
shall be promoted through existing national institutions and 
mechanisms, with necessary modifications. The Parties shall 
consult on the need to introduce any additional institutions or 
mechanisms for the implementation of this Agreement. 
 
5.5. The Parties consider that the Uganda Human Rights Commission 
and the Uganda Amnesty Commission are capable of implementing 
relevant aspects of this Agreement.  
 
Legislative and policy changes  
 
5.6. The Government will introduce any necessary legislation, policies 
and procedures to establish the framework for addressing 
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accountability and reconciliation and shall introduce amendments to 




6. FORMAL JUSTICE PROCESSES 
 
6.1. Formal courts provided for under the Constitution shall exercise 
jurisdiction over individuals who are alleged to bear particular 
responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes 
amounting to international crimes, during the course of the conflict.   
 
6.2. Formal courts and tribunals established by law shall adjudicate 
allegations of gross human rights violations arising from the conflict.  
Sentences and Sanctions  
 
6.3. Legislation shall introduce a regime of alternative penalties and 
sanctions which shall apply, and replace existing penalties, with 
respect to serious crimes and human rights violations committed by 
non-state actors in the course of the conflict. 
 
6.4. Alternative penalties and sanctions shall, as relevant: reflect the 
gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconciliation between 
individuals and within communities; promote the rehabilitation of 
offenders; take into account an individual’s admissions or other 
cooperation with proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make 





7.1. The Parties shall promote appropriate reconciliation mechanisms to 
address issues arising from within or outside Uganda with respect 
to the conflict. 
 
7.2. The Parties shall promote collective as well as individual acts and 
processes of reconciliation shall be promoted at all levels.  
 






8.1. The Parties agree that it is essential to acknowledge and address 
the suffering of victims, paying attention to the most vulnerable 




8.2. The Government shall promote the effective and meaningful 
participation of victims in accountability and reconciliation 
proceedings, consistently with the rights of the other parties in the 
proceedings. Victims shall be informed of the processes and any 
decisions affecting their interests.  
 
8.3. Victims have the right of access to relevant information about their 
experiences and to remember and commemorate past events 
affecting them.  
 
8.4. In the implementation of accountability and reconciliation 
mechanisms, the dignity, privacy and security of victims shall be 





9.1. Reparations may include a range of measures such as: 
rehabilitation; restitution; compensation; guarantees of non-
recurrence and other symbolic measures such as apologies, 
memorials and commemorations. Priority shall be given to 
members of vulnerable groups.   
 
9.2. The Parties agree that collective as well as individual reparations 
should be made to victims through mechanisms to be adopted by 
the Parties upon further consultation.  
 
9.3. Reparations may be ordered to be made by perpetrators as part of 





In the implementation of this Agreement, a gender-sensitive approach 
shall be promoted and in particular, implementers of this Agreement shall 
strive to prevent and eliminate any gender inequalities that may arise.  
 
 
11. WOMEN AND GIRLS 
 
In the implementation of this Agreement it is agreed to: 
 
(i) Recognise and address the special needs of women and girls. 
 
(ii) Ensure that the experiences, views and concerns of women and 
girls are recognised and taken into account. 
 
(iii) Protect the dignity, privacy and security of women and girls. 
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(iv) Encourage and facilitate the participation of women and girls in the 




In the implementation of this Agreement it is agreed to: 
 
(i) Recognise and address the special needs of children and adopt 
child-sensitive approaches. 
 
(ii) Recognise and consider the experiences, views and concerns or 
children. 
 
(iii) Protect the dignity, privacy and security of children in any 
accountability and reconciliation proceedings. 
 
(iv) Ensure that children are not subjected to criminal justice 
proceedings, but may participate, as appropriate, in reconciliation 
processes.   
 
(v) Promote appropriate reparations for children. 
 
(vi) Encourage and facilitate the participation of children in the 





The Government will avail and solicit resources for the effective 
implementation of this Agreement. 
 
 




14.1. Expeditiously consult upon and develop proposals for mechanisms 
for implementing these principles. 
 
14.2. Ensure that any accountability and reconciliation issues arising in 
any other agreement between themselves are consistent and 




14.3. Adopt an appropriate policy framework for implementing the terms 
of this Agreement. 
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14.4. Introduce any amendments to the Amnesty Act or the Uganda 
Human Rights Act in order to bring it into conformity with the 
principles of this Agreement.    
 
14.5. Undertake any necessary representations or legal proceedings 
nationally or internationally, to implement the principles of this 
Agreement. 
 
14.6. Address conscientiously the question of the ICC arrest warrants 
relating to the leaders of the LRA/M. 
 
14.7. Remove the LRA/M from the list of Terrorist Organisations under 
the Anti-Terrorism Act of Uganda upon the LRA/M abandoning 
rebellion, ceasing fire, and submitting its members to the process of 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration. 
 
14.8. Make representations to any state or institution which has 
proscribed the LRA/M to take steps to remove the LRA/M or its 




14.9. The LRA/M shall assume obligations and enjoy rights pursuant to 
this Agreement. 
 
14.10. The LRA/M shall actively promote the principles of this Agreement.  
 
 
15.  ADOPTION OF MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS 
AGREEMENT 
 
15.1. The Parties shall negotiate and adopt an annexure to this 
Agreement which shall set out elaborated principles and 
mechanisms for the implementation of this Agreement. The 
annexure shall form a part of this Agreement. 
 
15.2. The Parties may agree and the Mediator will provide additional 
guidance on the matters for the Parties to consider and consult 
upon in the interim period, in developing proposals for mechanisms 




This Agreement shall take effect upon signature. 
 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the duly authorized representatives of the 
parties have hereunto appended their respective signatures at Juba, South 
Sudan, this 29th day of June 2007. 
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ANNEXURE TO THE AGREEMENT ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
RECONCILIATION, 19 FEBRUARY 2008 
 
The Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and 
Reconciliation  signed  between the  Government  of  the Republic of Uganda 
(the  Government) and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) (the 
Parties)  on  29th June 2007  (the Principal Agreement) provides as follows:  
 
The parties  
 
Having signed the Principal Agreement by which the parties committed 
themselves to implementing accountability and reconciliation with respect to 
the conflict;  
 
Pursuant to the terms of the principal agreement calling for the adoption of 
mechanisms for implementing accountability and reconciliation;  
 
Having carried out broad consultations within and outside Uganda, and in 
particular, with communities that have suffered most as a result of the conflict; 
 
Having established through consultations under Clause 2.4 of the principal 
agreement, that there is national consensus in Uganda that adequate 
mechanisms exist or can be expeditiously established to try the offences 
committed during the conflict;  
 
Recalling their commitment to preventing impunity and promoting redress in 
accordance with the Constitution and international obligations, and recalling, 
in this connection, the requirements of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and in particular the principle of complementarity; 
 
Confident that the Principal Agreement embodies the necessary principles by 
which the conflict can be resolved with justice and reconciliation and 
consistent with national and international aspirations and standards;  
 
Now therefore agree as follows:  
 
Primacy of the Principal Agreement 
 
1.  This Annexure sets out a framework by which accountability and 
reconciliation are to be implemented pursuant to the principal agreement, 
provided that this annexure shall not in any way limit the application of that 
agreement, whose provisions are to be implemented in full.  
 
2.  The government shall expeditiously prepare and develop the necessary 
legislation and modalities for implementing the principal agreement and this 
annexure ('the agreement').   
 
3.  The government, under clause 2 above, shall take into account any 
representations from the parties on findings arising from the consultations 
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Inquiry into the past and related matters (Principal Agreement: clauses 
2.2 & 2.3) 
 
4. The government shall by law establish a body to be conferred with all the 
necessary powers and immunities, whose functions shall include:  
 
 (a) to consider and analyse any relevant matters including the history 
of the conflict; 
 
 (b) to inquire into the manifestations of the conflict; 
 
 (c) to inquire into human rights violations committed during the conflict, 
giving  particular attention to the experiences of women and children; 
 
 (d) to hold hearings and sessions in public and private; 
 
 (e) to make provision for witness protection, especially for children and 
women; 
 
 (f) to make special provision for cases involving gender based violence; 
 
 (g) to promote truth-telling in communities and in this respect to liaise 
with any traditional or other community reconciliation interlocutors; 
 
 (h) to promote and encourage the preservation of the memory of the 
events and victims of the conflict through memorials, archives, 
commemorations and other forms of preservation; 
 
 (i) to gather and analyse information on those who have disappeared 
during the conflict;  
 
 (j) to make recommendations for the most appropriate modalities for 
 implementing a regime of reparations, taking into account the principles 
set out in the principal  agreement; 
 
 (k) to make recommendations for preventing any future outbreak of 
conflict; 
 
 (l) to publish its findings as a public document; 
 
 (m) to undertake any other functions relevant to the principles set out in 
this agreement. 
 
5.    In the fulfilment of its functions, the body shall give precedence to any 
investigations or formal proceedings instituted pursuant to the terms of this 
agreement. Detailed guidelines and working practices shall be established to 
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regulate the relationship between the body and any other adjudicatory body 
seized of a case relating to this agreement.  
 
6.  The body shall be made up of individuals of high moral character and 
proven integrity and the necessary expertise for carrying out its functions. In 
particular, its composition shall reflect a gender balance and the national 
character.  
 
Legal and Institutional Framework (Principal Agreement: Part 5) 
 
7.  A special division of the High Court of Uganda shall be established to try 
individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the 
conflict.   
 
8.  The special division of the High Court shall have a registry dedicated to the 
work of the division and in particular, shall make arrangements to facilitate the 
protection and participation of witnesses, victims, women and children.  
 
9.  For the proper functioning of the special division of the court in accordance 
with the agreed principles of accountability and reconciliation, legislation may 
provide for: 
 
 (a) The constitution of the court; 
 
 (b) The substantive law to be applied; 
 
 (c) Appeals against the decisions of the court; 
 
 (d) Rules of procedure; 
 
 (e) The recognition of traditional and community justice processes in 
proceedings.  
 
Investigations and Prosecutions (Principal Agreement: Part 4) 
 
10. The government shall establish a unit for carrying out investigations and 
prosecutions in support of trials and other formal proceedings as envisaged 
by the principal agreement.  
 
11. The unit shall have a multi-disciplinary character.  
 
12. The Director of Public Prosecutions shall have overall control of the 
criminal investigations of the unit and of the prosecutions before the special 
division. 
 
13. Investigations shall:  
 
 (a) Seek to identify individuals who are alleged to have planned or 
carried out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks directed against 
civilians;   
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 (b) Reflect the broad pattern of serious crimes and violations committed 
during the conflict;  
 
 (c) Give particular attention to crimes and violations against women 
and children  committed during the conflict. 
 
14. Prosecutions shall focus on individuals alleged to have planned or carried 
out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks directed against civilians or 
who are alleged to have committed grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions.  
 
Cooperation with Investigations and Proceedings (Principal Agreement: 
Clauses 3.5 & 3.6) 
 
15. Rules and procedures shall regulate the manner in which an individual 
may cooperate with any investigations and proceedings arising from this 
Agreement, by disclosure of all relevant information relating to:  
 
  (a) His or her own conduct during the conflict; 
 
  (b) Details which may assist in establishing the fate of persons missing 
during the conflict; 
 
(c) The location of land mines or unexploded ordnances or other 
munitions; and, 
 
(d) Any other relevant information.  
 
Provided that a person shall not be compelled to disclose any matter which 
might incriminate him or her. 
 
Reparations (Principal Agreement: Clauses 6.4 & 9) 
 
16. The government shall establish the necessary arrangements for making 
reparations to victims of the conflict in accordance with the terms of 
the principal agreement.  
 
17. Prior to establishing arrangements for reparations, the government shall 
review the financial and institutional requirements for reparations, in order to 
ensure the adoption of the most effective mechanisms for reparations.  
 
18. In reviewing the question of reparations, consideration shall be given to 
clarifying and determining the procedures for reparations.  
 
Traditional Justice (Principal Agreement: Clause 3.1) 
 
19. Traditional justice shall form a central part of the alternative justice and 
reconciliation framework identified in the principal agreement. 
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20. The government shall, in consultation with relevant interlocutors, examine 
the practices of traditional justice mechanisms in affected areas, with a view 
to identifying the most appropriate roles for such mechanisms. In particular, it 
shall consider the role and impact of the processes on women and children.  
 
21. The Traditional Justice Mechanisms referred to include: 
 
  i. Mato  Oput in Acholi, Kayo Cuk in Lango, Ailuc in Teso, Tonu 
ci  Koka  in   Madi and Okukaraba in Ankole;  and 
 
  ii. Communal dispute settlement institutions such as family and clan 
courts. 
 
22. A person shall not be compelled to undergo any traditional ritual.  
 
Provisions of General Application 
 
23. Subject to clause 4.1 of the principal agreement, the Government shall 
ensure that serious crimes committed during the conflict are addressed by the 
special Division  of  the High Court; traditional  justice mechanisms; and any 
other alternative justice mechanism established under the principal 
agreement, but not the military courts. 
 
24. All bodies implementing the agreement shall establish internal procedures 
and arrangements for protecting and ensuring the participation of victims, 
traumatised individuals, women, children, persons with disabilities and victims 
of sexual violence in proceedings.  
 
25. In the appointment of members and staff of institutions envisaged by the 
Agreement, overriding consideration shall be given to the competences and 
skills required for the office, and gender balance shall be ensured. 
 
26. The mediator shall from time to time receive or make requests for reports 
on the progress of the implementation of the agreement.  
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